"Cluster bombs called 'war crime'"

"Emmanuel Gustin" wrote in message
...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...

The totalitarian nations started those conflicts at the time of their
choosing with their large conscript armies fully mobilised trained,
equipped and battle ready while those of the allies were either
very small (like the Americans and British) or underfunded,
demoralised and ill led like the French and South Koreans.

I think that is a too superficial analysis.

It is easy to condemn the French Army of 1940 as "underfunded,
demoralised, and ill led", because it quickly lost the battle. But
that ignores that France had a smaller population than Germany,
that the age group fit for military service had been reduced by the
slaughter of WWI, and that France in the years before the war had
only 1/3 of the industrial strength of Germany -- a production of
20 million tons of steel, for example, as opposed to Germany's 65.

Well by 1939 relatively few of those who had been fit for service
in 1918 were still young enough to still be of military age and
German losses in WW1 were pretty heavy too so that excuse
wont wash.

As for steel production France had more tanks available for
front line service than Germany and although they had some
deficiencies so did the Panzer units which had a far higher
proportion of PkW 1 and 2's than was desirable.


Under these conditions one should not be amazed that the French
forces were weaker than the German forces; on the contrary the
real amazing fact is that they were almost a match.

Numerically they may well have been superior, the problem was
that were too static and wedded to the doctrines of defensive
warfare. The potential danger of a properly led and motivated
French army was shown by the counterattack of DeGaulle's
4th Armored Division on the Meuse bridgehead but it was
too little too late.

The 'weak'
French democracy actually achieved a level of effort that Nazi
Germany would probably not match until late in the war. The
military mobilisation ratio was 1 in 8. Nor were French politicians
inclined to micro-managing the war effort in the style of Hitler;
in fact it could be argued that they left too much to the generals.


The problem is the doctrine adopted by the generals was
for the most part seriously flawed and they found themselves
unable to cope with a war of manoeveur

Evidently much of the effort was wasted -- too much was spent
on the Maginot line and on one of the world's most modern and
powerful fleets, and too little on the air force. The policy of
'corporate welfare' towards arms manufacturers in the years
between the two wars had the effect of discouraging innovation,
and gave the military too much outdated equipment. The large
number of reservists called on were too poorly trained and the
officers corps failed to train them.


ie they were underfunded, demoralised and ill-led. The courage
of individual French soldiers is not an issue despite what some
of the more rabid posters claim, it was their leadership that
was at fault.Well led units like those of LeClerc would prove
just what Frenchmen could do.

But Germany's level of preparedness should not be overestimated
either. When Hitler plunged his country into war, the air force's
supply of bombs was tought to be sufficient for only three weeks
of war. The most numerous tanks in the army were PzKw.I and II
'tin cans' barely fit for combat. The army still had a large number
of 77mm guns dating back to WW1. The fleet was 'under
construction', even the U-boat force was barely capable of
operating. Besides 43 first-line divisions, the Germans too had
51 newly mobilised second-line divisions. Enthusiasm for war
among the people was almost non-existent.


Sure but its army was fully mobilised, well trained and led
for the most part by able Generals with sound modern doctrines
for waging war.

Britain may have a small army -- traditionally -- but it had an air
force that was a match for the Luftwaffe and was outpacing it, and
of course a powerful fleet.

Absolutely but much of that fleet was made up of obsolete
or obsolescent warships and the army was still for the most
part equipped with the same weapons that had been used
in 1918. The RAF had (rightly IMHO) been allocated
the lions share of waht funds were available and so of course
were in the best situation at the outbreak of war.

The USA had an extremely small army,
but the effects of isolatationist and pacificist voices should not be
overrated either: FDR's programs to expand the armed forces on
a huge scale were approved by Congress, which certainly was
sensitive to popular opinion.


And yet when war came to the US on Dec 7 1941 that nation
was fundamentally unprepared and the IJN ran rampant for 6 months
in the Pacific while German U-boats devastated US shipping within
sight of the US coastline.

When fully mobilised democracies may well have a better track
record but there's little doubt that in the opening phases
of the major wars of the 20th century they were unprepared
and consequently a great many men died unnecessarily.

Keith