Use of 150 octane fuel in the Merlin (Xylidine additive etc etc)

In article , WaltBJ
writes
Slightly off track - the Germans did not seem to place the same level
of importance on recce that the Brits and USAF did. Me109s could (some
did) carry a camera in the aft fuselage like the recce P51s (F6?). A
lightened waxed Me109F or G would have a very good chance of
completing a recce pass on an in-and-out basis flown at max speed on a
curving descent or in-and-out at naught feet (prop tips above the wave
tips). It appears to me that the 86R was declared a 'clay pigeon' when
the LW found out Spits and Mosquitoes, appropriately modifed, could
get up that high. Why the LW didn't use 'hot-rodded' photofighters is
beyond me. Maybe they swallowed the 'XX' turned spies' reports as
gospel.
Walt BJ

Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to the
German High Command was remarkable.

Without wanting to go wildly off-topic, there was a programme on UK TV a
few nights ago ('Spitfire Ace') that had some very useful stuff on the
mentality of the RAF versus the that of Luftwaffe in 1940. The RAF
(through the vision and efforts of Dowding) had created a parless air
defence system, while the Luftwaffe had concentrated overmuch on the
lionisation of its individual pilots. I think that by 1944 the Allies
had developed a war machine that was thorough enough to filter out most
flakey thinking and to concentrate on the real issues. If the Luftwaffe
in 1944 was still relying on the whims of 'gifted individuals' (Hitler,
Goering), who would have prided their own (uncriticised) judgement then
a lot of bad ideas would have good through and a lot of good ideas would
have been turned away.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

Dave Eadsforth wrote:

: Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to the
: German High Command was remarkable.

The familiar problem, as far as I know:
Too many different intelligence services, every
one a part of the personal empire of a different
Nazi leader, and unwilling or unable to cooperate.
And of course the 'Abwehr' leaked like a sieve.

The Germans did produce recce versions of fighters,
usually with fewer guns and more fuel; in addition
to cameras of course. But I suspect the Bf 109 was
just less adaptable to the task than the Spitfire.
It was even smaller.

The Spitfire had inherited a D-shaped leading edge
structure from its direct ancestor, the Supermarine
227, which used this as a condensor for its
steam-cooled Goshawk engine. This made a great fuel
tank for the long-range reconnaissance versions.
With better fuel and more powerful engines, these
models could also operate at higher weights and
reach higher altitudes than Bf 109s.

On the other hand Ju 88s were less suitable for
reconnaissance than Mosquitoes, because they were
bigger and slower. Still, the Germans did develop
a high-performance recce aircraft in the Ar 234A.

Emmanuel Gustin

In article , Emmanuel.Gustin
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:

: Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to the
: German High Command was remarkable.

The familiar problem, as far as I know:
Too many different intelligence services, every
one a part of the personal empire of a different
Nazi leader, and unwilling or unable to cooperate.
And of course the 'Abwehr' leaked like a sieve.

The Germans did produce recce versions of fighters,
usually with fewer guns and more fuel; in addition
to cameras of course. But I suspect the Bf 109 was
just less adaptable to the task than the Spitfire.
It was even smaller.

The Spitfire had inherited a D-shaped leading edge
structure from its direct ancestor, the Supermarine
227, which used this as a condensor for its
steam-cooled Goshawk engine. This made a great fuel
tank for the long-range reconnaissance versions.
With better fuel and more powerful engines, these
models could also operate at higher weights and
reach higher altitudes than Bf 109s.

On the other hand Ju 88s were less suitable for
reconnaissance than Mosquitoes, because they were
bigger and slower. Still, the Germans did develop
a high-performance recce aircraft in the Ar 234A.

Emmanuel Gustin

Thanks for that!

Re. the Ar 234A, I believe that this machine made a number of attacks on
the UK, but I do not know when. Do you happen to have any rough dates?

Also, do you happen to know if the Ar 234 (of any mark) was ever used as
a recce machine over the UK prior to D-Day?

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

In article ,
Dave Eadsforth writes:
Re. the Ar 234A, I believe that this machine made a number of attacks on
the UK, but I do not know when. Do you happen to have any rough dates?

I don't think the Ar 234s made any bombing attacks over the U.K. They
were used against targetsin Belgium and France in late 1944.

Also, do you happen to know if the Ar 234 (of any mark) was ever used as
a recce machine over the UK prior to D-Day?

Not prior to D-Day. The Ar 234s available in June/July 1944 were the
inital models with a skid landing gear, which used a wheeled trolley
for takeoff. Immediately following the Invasion, one or two fo these
prototypes were staged to an airfield in France, where a vcertain
logistical weakness was discovered - It's no use having a Jet Recce
airplane that can stage to a forward airfield in an hour when its
takeoff gear and mechanics have to come by truck, through the Allied
Fighter-Bomber cover. It took until mid-July to get all the pieces
rounded up so that they could fly missions, and by that time, it was a
matter of shutting the barn door after the horse was gone. (It turns
out that they wouldn't have been able to return any useful intel even
if they could have flown sooner. There weren't enough experienced
photointerpreters to sort through the pictures, so the turnaround time
from flights to intel in the hands of the Staff was on the order of a
couple of weeks. Not much use in mobile warfare.

If you get a chance, check out Alfred Price's "The Last Year of the
Luftwaffe." It's an excellent account of what the state of German
Airpower was from just before Normandy until the final collapse.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

In article , Peter Stickney
writes
In article ,
Dave Eadsforth writes:
Re. the Ar 234A, I believe that this machine made a number of attacks on
the UK, but I do not know when. Do you happen to have any rough dates?

I don't think the Ar 234s made any bombing attacks over the U.K. They
were used against targetsin Belgium and France in late 1944.

Also, do you happen to know if the Ar 234 (of any mark) was ever used as
a recce machine over the UK prior to D-Day?

Not prior to D-Day. The Ar 234s available in June/July 1944 were the
inital models with a skid landing gear, which used a wheeled trolley
for takeoff.

I've seen a photo - quite a sight.

Immediately following the Invasion, one or two fo these
prototypes were staged to an airfield in France, where a vcertain
logistical weakness was discovered - It's no use having a Jet Recce
airplane that can stage to a forward airfield in an hour when its
takeoff gear and mechanics have to come by truck, through the Allied
Fighter-Bomber cover.

Would it be too awful to suggest that the whole programme was on the
skids?

It took until mid-July to get all the pieces
rounded up so that they could fly missions, and by that time, it was a
matter of shutting the barn door after the horse was gone. (It turns
out that they wouldn't have been able to return any useful intel even
if they could have flown sooner. There weren't enough experienced
photointerpreters to sort through the pictures, so the turnaround time
from flights to intel in the hands of the Staff was on the order of a
couple of weeks. Not much use in mobile warfare.

Hmm, no German equivalent of Constance Babington-Smith then?

If you get a chance, check out Alfred Price's "The Last Year of the
Luftwaffe." It's an excellent account of what the state of German
Airpower was from just before Normandy until the final collapse.

Would you believe I bought a copy last week? I haven't had time to read
it yet - but it's nice to know I have made a good choice!

Thanks,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

Dave Eadsforth wrote:
In article , Peter Stickney
writes

In article ,
Dave Eadsforth writes:

Re. the Ar 234A, I believe that this machine made a number of attacks on
the UK, but I do not know when. Do you happen to have any rough dates?

I don't think the Ar 234s made any bombing attacks over the U.K. They
were used against targetsin Belgium and France in late 1944.


Also, do you happen to know if the Ar 234 (of any mark) was ever used as
a recce machine over the UK prior to D-Day?

Not prior to D-Day. The Ar 234s available in June/July 1944 were the
inital models with a skid landing gear, which used a wheeled trolley
for takeoff.


I've seen a photo - quite a sight.


Immediately following the Invasion, one or two fo these
prototypes were staged to an airfield in France, where a vcertain
logistical weakness was discovered - It's no use having a Jet Recce
airplane that can stage to a forward airfield in an hour when its
takeoff gear and mechanics have to come by truck, through the Allied
Fighter-Bomber cover.


Would it be too awful to suggest that the whole programme was on the
skids?


It took until mid-July to get all the pieces
rounded up so that they could fly missions, and by that time, it was a
matter of shutting the barn door after the horse was gone. (It turns
out that they wouldn't have been able to return any useful intel even
if they could have flown sooner. There weren't enough experienced
photointerpreters to sort through the pictures, so the turnaround time

from flights to intel in the hands of the Staff was on the order of a

couple of weeks. Not much use in mobile warfare.


Hmm, no German equivalent of Constance Babington-Smith then?

If you get a chance, check out Alfred Price's "The Last Year of the
Luftwaffe." It's an excellent account of what the state of German
Airpower was from just before Normandy until the final collapse.


Would you believe I bought a copy last week? I haven't had time to read
it yet - but it's nice to know I have made a good choice!

I also think it's a great book.

John

"Dave Eadsforth" wrote in message
...
In article ,
Emmanuel.Gustin
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:

: Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to
the
: German High Command was remarkable.

The familiar problem, as far as I know:
Too many different intelligence services, every
one a part of the personal empire of a different
Nazi leader, and unwilling or unable to cooperate.
And of course the 'Abwehr' leaked like a sieve.

The Germans did produce recce versions of fighters,
usually with fewer guns and more fuel; in addition
to cameras of course. But I suspect the Bf 109 was
just less adaptable to the task than the Spitfire.
It was even smaller.

The Spitfire had inherited a D-shaped leading edge
structure from its direct ancestor, the Supermarine
227, which used this as a condensor for its
steam-cooled Goshawk engine. This made a great fuel
tank for the long-range reconnaissance versions.
With better fuel and more powerful engines, these
models could also operate at higher weights and
reach higher altitudes than Bf 109s.

On the other hand Ju 88s were less suitable for
reconnaissance than Mosquitoes, because they were
bigger and slower. Still, the Germans did develop
a high-performance recce aircraft in the Ar 234A.

Emmanuel Gustin

Thanks for that!

Re. the Ar 234A, I believe that this machine made a number of
attacks on
the UK, but I do not know when. Do you happen to have any rough
dates?

Also, do you happen to know if the Ar 234 (of any mark) was ever
used as
a recce machine over the UK prior to D-Day?

Leutnant Erich Somner made the world fist jet reconaisance flight on
August 2 1944. in the Arado 234 V7. The V7 indicating that it was
the 7th prootype. (V stands for Versuchs or esperimental) which was
hurridly adapted to obtain the photorecon of the situation at the
Cherbourg Penisuala. He had accomplished more in this mission than
the entire luftwaffe did in 2 months. It took 12 photographic
interpreters 2 days to produce an intitial report. This revealed that
the Allies had landed 1.5 million men.

Somner was a test pilot and responsible for having the Lofte 7
bombsight linked into the PDS autopilot.

On September 9th Somner conducted a reconaisance mission over London
and the Thames estury. On the outward bound leg he came upon a
reconaisance Mosquito intent on the same type of mission. As both
pilots aircraft were unarmed the pilots simply waved at each other.

Somner despite being given orders to fly the reconaisance flight was
almost court martialed as unbeknownst to him flying a jet over Britain
was strictly forbiden Somners friend the Horst Gotz flew his Fiesler
Storch to see Goebells and this may have save hime from the court
martial. "Exellent Propaganda" was the comment of Goebells's
assisatant.


Early Arado 234A used a trolley to take of and skid to land. The
Ardo 234B bomber an undercariage and had a fueselage 1 inch wider to
accomodate the recessed bomb bay and compensate for fuel loss. The
recon Arado was swiched over to an normal undercarriage as the 10
minutes needed to retrieve the aircraft left it too vulnerable to
straffing.

Bombing raids on the UK would have been possible with a light bomb
load and heavier loads with the more developed versions.

The Arado had an accurate computing Bomb sight the Lotfe 7 (this was
regarded as more accurate than allied sights and it was once
recomended that it be copied for the RAF) it also apparently had the
EGON blind bombing system (similar to OBOE apparently) and a computing
dive bombing sight.

The few aircarft to enter service (about 70) were to busy with recon
tasks and attacking supply lines to overfly the UK I assume.
Nevertheless EGON was probably as accurate as oboe though it is hard
to imagine that even a Lotfe 7 would be accurate at the 10,000 meters
that would be used over the British isles.

Dive bombing had to be done with care as the aircraft lacked dive
breaks and in conditions of tension produced by AAA the pilot could
easily get in trouble with Mach. The Arado 234 was a pretty aircraft
because of its amazing smoothness.

It's designer Rudiger Kosin lofted the wing on a computer and rather
than rivet the wing on points of equal chord it was riveted at points
of equal curvature to produce a wrinkel free su Kosin also invented
the crescent wing (as in handley page victor) to overcome the Arado
234s mach limitation. He also invented the Krueger flap. (Krueger
was the wind tunnel technican who did the tests)






Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

In article , The
Enlightenment writes

"Dave Eadsforth" wrote in message
...
In article ,
Emmanuel.Gustin
writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote:


SNIP of previous detail


Also, do you happen to know if the Ar 234 (of any mark) was ever
used as
a recce machine over the UK prior to D-Day?

Leutnant Erich Somner made the world fist jet reconaisance flight on
August 2 1944. in the Arado 234 V7. The V7 indicating that it was
the 7th prootype. (V stands for Versuchs or esperimental) which was
hurridly adapted to obtain the photorecon of the situation at the
Cherbourg Penisuala. He had accomplished more in this mission than
the entire luftwaffe did in 2 months. It took 12 photographic
interpreters 2 days to produce an intitial report. This revealed that
the Allies had landed 1.5 million men.

Somner was a test pilot and responsible for having the Lofte 7
bombsight linked into the PDS autopilot.

On September 9th Somner conducted a reconaisance mission over London
and the Thames estury. On the outward bound leg he came upon a
reconaisance Mosquito intent on the same type of mission. As both
pilots aircraft were unarmed the pilots simply waved at each other.

Shades of WWI...

Somner despite being given orders to fly the reconaisance flight was
almost court martialed as unbeknownst to him flying a jet over Britain
was strictly forbiden Somners friend the Horst Gotz flew his Fiesler
Storch to see Goebells and this may have save hime from the court
martial. "Exellent Propaganda" was the comment of Goebells's
assisatant.


Early Arado 234A used a trolley to take of and skid to land. The
Ardo 234B bomber an undercariage and had a fueselage 1 inch wider to
accomodate the recessed bomb bay and compensate for fuel loss. The
recon Arado was swiched over to an normal undercarriage as the 10
minutes needed to retrieve the aircraft left it too vulnerable to
straffing.

Bombing raids on the UK would have been possible with a light bomb
load and heavier loads with the more developed versions.

The Arado had an accurate computing Bomb sight the Lotfe 7 (this was
regarded as more accurate than allied sights and it was once
recomended that it be copied for the RAF) it also apparently had the
EGON blind bombing system (similar to OBOE apparently) and a computing
dive bombing sight.

The few aircarft to enter service (about 70) were to busy with recon
tasks and attacking supply lines to overfly the UK I assume.
Nevertheless EGON was probably as accurate as oboe though it is hard
to imagine that even a Lotfe 7 would be accurate at the 10,000 meters
that would be used over the British isles.

Dive bombing had to be done with care as the aircraft lacked dive
breaks and in conditions of tension produced by AAA the pilot could
easily get in trouble with Mach. The Arado 234 was a pretty aircraft
because of its amazing smoothness.

It's designer Rudiger Kosin lofted the wing on a computer and rather
than rivet the wing on points of equal chord it was riveted at points
of equal curvature to produce a wrinkel free su Kosin also invented
the crescent wing (as in handley page victor) to overcome the Arado
234s mach limitation. He also invented the Krueger flap. (Krueger
was the wind tunnel technican who did the tests)

A lot of innovation for the period...most impressive.

Thanks very much for that rundown - it seems it was quite a machine.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

Dave Eadsforth wrote in message ...
In article , WaltBJ
writes
Slightly off track - the Germans did not seem to place the same level
of importance on recce that the Brits and USAF did. Me109s could (some
did) carry a camera in the aft fuselage like the recce P51s (F6?). A
lightened waxed Me109F or G would have a very good chance of
completing a recce pass on an in-and-out basis flown at max speed on a
curving descent or in-and-out at naught feet (prop tips above the wave
tips). It appears to me that the 86R was declared a 'clay pigeon' when
the LW found out Spits and Mosquitoes, appropriately modifed, could
get up that high. Why the LW didn't use 'hot-rodded' photofighters is
beyond me. Maybe they swallowed the 'XX' turned spies' reports as
gospel.
Walt BJ

Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to the
German High Command was remarkable.

Without wanting to go wildly off-topic, there was a programme on UK TV a
few nights ago ('Spitfire Ace') that had some very useful stuff on the
mentality of the RAF versus the that of Luftwaffe in 1940. The RAF
(through the vision and efforts of Dowding) had created a parless air
defence system, while the Luftwaffe had concentrated overmuch on the
lionisation of its individual pilots.

Honestly this sounds like Brits patting themselves on the back while
not looking at the strategic and tactical issues the Germans faced.
(sadly this is a sort of anasthetic as the UK goes down a sewer)


I think that by 1944 the Allies
had developed a war machine that was thorough enough to filter out most
flakey thinking and to concentrate on the real issues. If the Luftwaffe
in 1944 was still relying on the whims of 'gifted individuals' (Hitler,
Goering), who would have prided their own (uncriticised) judgement then
a lot of bad ideas would have good through and a lot of good ideas would
have been turned away.


German thinking was predicated on the need to fight a short and sharp
war as a nation sourunded by hostile countries. Avoiding a war of
attrition was essential and avoiding a war on German territory was
also essential. The nation was physically to small and to devoid of
materials to handle a war in any other way and not loose thus
substantial offensive capability was emphasised but it was all up
front: resources were not devoted to reinforcements. This was the
thinking even before the Nazis came to power.

Much of the German work on Microwaves and Proximity fuses (which
inspired British research) was suspended because the anything that
could not be ready in 2 years would be a waste. It seems that at
this point that many of the German might have beens got caned.
Examination of this period is perhaps where it might be said that
Germany's technical may be said to lie. It migh also just lay in the
fact that Germany lacked the resources to develop them. The Tiazard
commision handed the proximity fuse and magnetron on a platter for the
USA to develop. The Germans just culled.

The excelent Freya and Wurzburg Radars were not integrated into a
defensive system because the bomber naviagation aids were considered
more important.





Cheers,

Dave

In article , The
Enlightenment writes
Dave Eadsforth wrote in message
news:s9BISHBVA3GAFw82
...
In article , WaltBJ
writes
Slightly off track - the Germans did not seem to place the same level
of importance on recce that the Brits and USAF did. Me109s could (some
did) carry a camera in the aft fuselage like the recce P51s (F6?). A
lightened waxed Me109F or G would have a very good chance of
completing a recce pass on an in-and-out basis flown at max speed on a
curving descent or in-and-out at naught feet (prop tips above the wave
tips). It appears to me that the 86R was declared a 'clay pigeon' when
the LW found out Spits and Mosquitoes, appropriately modifed, could
get up that high. Why the LW didn't use 'hot-rodded' photofighters is
beyond me. Maybe they swallowed the 'XX' turned spies' reports as
gospel.
Walt BJ

Yes, the success of agents like 'Garbo' in feeding duff stuff to the
German High Command was remarkable.

Without wanting to go wildly off-topic, there was a programme on UK TV a
few nights ago ('Spitfire Ace') that had some very useful stuff on the
mentality of the RAF versus the that of Luftwaffe in 1940. The RAF
(through the vision and efforts of Dowding) had created a parless air
defence system, while the Luftwaffe had concentrated overmuch on the
lionisation of its individual pilots.

Honestly this sounds like Brits patting themselves on the back while
not looking at the strategic and tactical issues the Germans faced.
(sadly this is a sort of anasthetic as the UK goes down a sewer)

While I agree that we, as a nation, should be organising our lives
better these days, there is no doubt that the British air defence system
of 1940 was unmatched anywhere else in the world, and no-one, not even
the Germans, dare to claim that Goering's boasts of 1940 held water.

I think that by 1944 the Allies
had developed a war machine that was thorough enough to filter out most
flakey thinking and to concentrate on the real issues. If the Luftwaffe
in 1944 was still relying on the whims of 'gifted individuals' (Hitler,
Goering), who would have prided their own (uncriticised) judgement then
a lot of bad ideas would have good through and a lot of good ideas would
have been turned away.


German thinking was predicated on the need to fight a short and sharp
war as a nation sourunded by hostile countries. Avoiding a war of
attrition was essential and avoiding a war on German territory was
also essential.

The surrounding countries were only hostile because of Hitler's
belligerence - he could have been a peaceful leader had he so chosen.
As for laying odds on a short war - having contingency plans in case
your lightning strike does not work is fundamental to military planning.

The nation was physically to small and to devoid of
materials to handle a war in any other way and not loose thus
substantial offensive capability was emphasised but it was all up
front: resources were not devoted to reinforcements. This was the
thinking even before the Nazis came to power.

Germany had many resources to spare in the early years of the war.
Their industry was still working single shifts until things got really
bad. While Hitler was telling the German people about how well things
were going, Churchill was telling the British that we had to get a
wiggle on or lose - and our industry went to 100 percent from 1940
onwards.

Much of the German work on Microwaves and Proximity fuses (which
inspired British research)

Um...they told us about their work in these fields?

was suspended because the anything that
could not be ready in 2 years would be a waste.

Not a waste, a strategic error - no-one to blame but themselves.

It seems that at
this point that many of the German might have beens got caned.
Examination of this period is perhaps where it might be said that
Germany's technical may be said to lie. It migh also just lay in the
fact that Germany lacked the resources to develop them.

Poor prioritization - no-one to blame but themselves. The proximity
fuse was a small printed circuit that any small group of radio men could
have taken forward - there was no great industrial effort needed here.

The Tiazard
commision handed the proximity fuse and magnetron on a platter for the
USA to develop. The Germans just culled.

Good prioritisation on Tizard's part - hand the designs over to the
people who can mass produce immediately.

The excelent Freya and Wurzburg Radars were not integrated into a
defensive system because the bomber naviagation aids were considered
more important.

Integration was a matter laying telephone connections and training a
limited number of staff. If you have started a war, and it has gone
pear-shaped, and your efforts have simply created a hostile world around
you, air defence should then be recognised as a priority. After 1942
the allies were no longer fighting a war dictated by German initiatives
- they were fighting according to their own.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth