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In message , a425couple
writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote... If you think worst-case, ditching or baling out offers the Chinese a nasty option. "We picked up nine of the crew, here they are. Mission Supervisor Snuffy, who knows all about what the aircraft can do and what its mission was? No, haven't found a trace of him, but we're still searching..." And who's to know different? Once the crew lose sight of each other, there's no way to know whether Supervisor Snuffy died during the bailout, drowned in the ocean, is on a slow fishing boat with no comms on his way to port, or is being forcibly persuaded to be detailed and explicit about EP-3 capabilities in a Beijing basement. Very interesting valid point of view, thanks. I certainly admit that I do not know what 'equipment' and software was destroyed and what was still discoverable. I'm also not sure how knowledgable the crew was! They for sure knew enough to deal with "Drop everything, we've got the Premier's private phone!" or similar prioritisation: they'd know what they could and could not get, what they were tasked to receive, what they'd been ordered to be alert to "just in case", and so on. For example, in WWII it was policy that nobody who had knowledge of important secrets should ever be allowed in areas where it might be possible to be captured. Depends on the compartments. You have to hit the balance between protecting your secrets, and achieving the mission. The crew are the real prize which could compromise the capability: Are you really sure about that? Utterly certain? No. Pretty confident? Yes. Knowing how to use a computer program, does not at all mean, you know the program. Or the equipment that runs the program. But you know what you're listening to, what can be cracked and translated aboard, what has to be recorded for later analysis, what the priorities and orders for the mission were, what the aircraft can and can't achieve. For a slightly forced armour analogy: the gunner doesn't know how the code in the ballistic computer runs and couldn't rewrite it from memory. But, with the computer properly trashed, the gunner is the person who potentially could be made to say what he can and can't hit in various circumstances, aided by whatever radar pixies dance inside the little boxes. "How do we copy that?" is one risk: "Dear God, we never knew they were that good" is another; and exposing "Is *that* the best they can actually do?" a third. -- He thinks too much, such men are dangerous. Paul J. Adam |
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On Oct 29, 4:00*pm, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote: In message , a425couple writes "Paul J. Adam" wrote... If you think worst-case, ditching or baling out offers the Chinese a nasty *option. "We picked up nine of the crew, here they are. Mission Supervisor *Snuffy, who knows all about what the aircraft can do and what its mission *was? No, haven't found a trace of him, but we're still searching..." And *who's to know different? Once the crew lose sight of each other, there's *no way to know whether Supervisor Snuffy died during the bailout, drowned *in the ocean, is on a slow fishing boat with no comms on his way to port, *or is being forcibly persuaded to be detailed and explicit about EP-3 *capabilities in a Beijing basement. Very interesting valid point of view, thanks. I certainly admit that I do not know what 'equipment' and software was destroyed and what was still discoverable. I'm also not sure how knowledgable the crew was! They for sure knew enough to deal with "Drop everything, we've got the Premier's private phone!" or similar prioritisation: they'd know what they could and could not get, what they were tasked to receive, what they'd been ordered to be alert to "just in case", and so on. For example, in WWII it was policy that nobody who had knowledge of important secrets should ever be allowed in areas where it might be possible to be captured. Depends on the compartments. You have to hit the balance between protecting your secrets, and achieving the mission. The crew are the real prize which could compromise the capability: Are you really sure about that? Utterly certain? No. Pretty confident? Yes. Knowing how to use a computer program, does not at all mean, you know the program. *Or the equipment that runs the program. But you know what you're listening to, what can be cracked and translated aboard, what has to be recorded for later analysis, what the priorities and orders for the mission were, what the aircraft can and can't achieve. For a slightly forced armour analogy: the gunner doesn't know how the code in the ballistic computer runs and couldn't rewrite it from memory. But, with the computer properly trashed, the gunner is the person who potentially could be made to say what he can and can't hit in various circumstances, aided by whatever radar pixies dance inside the little boxes. "How do we copy that?" is one risk: "Dear God, we never knew they were that good" is another; and exposing "Is *that* the best they can actually do?" a third. -- He thinks too much, such men are dangerous. Paul J. Adam Sometimes you keep things from people for this reason. Gunner knows he can hit a target. Not told is limitations or that defensive systems will keep things away. Or how the AWACS finds the targets for him. Current example would be, get this package its a bomb. You don't need to let out Saudis had an ex terrorist who went back then came in from the cold and gave the plot up. Or how well the bomb was made. Now did the bad guys know about the bomb, yeah. But going public let other bad guys know if it was a decent bomb or not. That ex terrorist is not 'burned' as far as other terrorist groups are concerned. Thing is, you can spin this stuff so much your head hurts. I recall a secret missive a few decades ago, listing stuff that might be compromised. One was something on a platform that was shot down in Vietnam. Well, you either keep it secret, AND DO NOT USE IT, or you put the secret do hickey out there and do use it and maybe kill gomers. There is a risk using it against gomers, that gomers will find it and usually send it out so somebody who does know about whatever it was can figure things out. But keeping stuff in inventory sort of negates the reason you built it. Whining about it being lost pretty much is stupidity. But that's an intell weenie for you. In this case, burning key cards would be first priority. Stuff that could compromise stuff elsewhere. Then you start going over the rest of the paper stuff and maybe what you can whack inside the airframe. Hopefully this has been thought out before hand. In one case I worked on,it was paper and computer tapes. Set up a burn pile, put the tapes on top and screw the environmental laws. Indians are coming over the ridge, some things just aren't important. Rest was take out your frustrations on pay, management, whatever. Get an axe and have at it. Run stuff without cooling fans. |
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