Future military fighters and guns - yes or no ?

In message , Tony
Williams writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
"Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of
cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter
force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free.

No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and
dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance.

I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the
best option, if that's a key driver.

550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent
Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying
helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against
low-flying helicopters"?

The A-10 was not equipped (nor are the pilots trained, AFAIK) for
air-to-air gunnery.

So? Helicopters are closer to air-to-ground strafing than air-to-air,
looking at the velocity and altitude differentials.

How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest?

Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast.

A few examples where this has befallen Western pilots would be handy. It
was a problem in Vietnam for the USAF, for example, where they were
plagued by poor reliability of the weapons and by doctrinal guidance to
volley every selected weapon at a target (so a F-4 Phantom effectively
had one Sidewinder shot and one Sparrow shot); the USN used different
doctrine based on single firings and got much better results.


A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars
only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on
relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one
a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara:
though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine
aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen,
and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for
instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as
well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara;
Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on
8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a
third kill with another Sidewinder...)

Having the guns along when the missiles were exhausted was no guarantee
of being able to get into range, let alone score disabling damage: with
hindsight, trading the gun pods for more fuel and twin-rail Sidewinder
launchers (giving four rather than two shots) would have been much more
effective.

Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the
enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy
to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a
guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches
to evade enemy AAMs)

The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and
Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored
kills with the gun.

The Iranians also used human wave attacks against prepared defensive
positions, using unarmed schoolboys carrying plastic "keys to heaven" in
the first wave (they were expendable, available, and revealed the
locations of minefields and concealed bunkers for the armed fighters
following). I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian
tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved.

Nice theories about how engagements ought to go
tend to break down in real life.

True: like the notion that any gunless fighter is doomed

If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not
fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than
a cannon will allow?

Because an aircraft has far more space for sensors and computing
capacity than a missile does.

But the gun is still a fixed installation and you have to point it at
where the target will be one time-of-flight after firing: and you have
to fly through the enemy's weapons envelope(s) to do so.

Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their
reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of
the story than might actually exist.

The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years?

They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the
chances of a 'danger close'?

Then what? Do
guns suddenly stop being useful for such purposes?

They were available then - the story seems to have more agenda behind it
than it would like to admit.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Tony
Williams writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
"Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of
cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter
force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free.

No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and
dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance.

I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the
best option, if that's a key driver.

Now here, Tony raises an interesting point. Talking with a serving IAF pilot
some years back, he mentioned that all their tactical a/c have their guns
loaded on every flight, including training, just so they'll have something to
fire if they get diverted to an interception. He said that an IAF Brigadier
General had shot down a foreign recon drone while on a training flight in his
(IIRR) F-15 . Of course, lasers or cheap missiles may do the job as well, and
high-performance UAVs are never going to be _that_ cheap.

snip

How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest?

Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast.

A few examples where this has befallen Western pilots would be handy. It
was a problem in Vietnam for the USAF, for example, where they were
plagued by poor reliability of the weapons and by doctrinal guidance to
volley every selected weapon at a target (so a F-4 Phantom effectively
had one Sidewinder shot and one Sparrow shot); the USN used different
doctrine based on single firings and got much better results.

A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars
only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on
relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one
a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara:
though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine
aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen,
and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for
instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as
well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara;
Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on
8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a
third kill with another Sidewinder...)

Having the guns along when the missiles were exhausted was no guarantee
of being able to get into range, let alone score disabling damage: with
hindsight, trading the gun pods for more fuel and twin-rail Sidewinder
launchers (giving four rather than two shots) would have been much more
effective.

snip

Yup. Of course, the lack of IR decoys in most of the Argentine a/c also played
a part, but we're now in the age of IIR seekers, and decoying _them_ is going
to be very difficult if not impossible. They may require damage or destruction
to make them miss. And if the SHARs had had RH missiles and PD radar (and
AEW), then chances are they would have shot down many of the Argentine aircraft
long before they'd even have closed to visual range, even if they were using
older generation missiles.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Tony
Williams writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
"Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of
cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter
force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free.

No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and
dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance.

I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the
best option, if that's a key driver.

Now here, Tony raises an interesting point. Talking with a serving IAF pilot
some years back, he mentioned that all their tactical a/c have their guns
loaded on every flight, including training, just so they'll have something to
fire if they get diverted to an interception. He said that an IAF Brigadier
General had shot down a foreign recon drone while on a training flight in his
(IIRR) F-15 . Of course, lasers or cheap missiles may do the job as well, and
high-performance UAVs are never going to be _that_ cheap.

The reason for the MiG-31 (a specialised, long-range interceptor if
ever there was one) carrying the GSh-6-23 gun is reportedly
specifically to deal with recon drones etc.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony
Williams writes

A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars
only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on
relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one
a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara:
though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine
aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen,
and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for
instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as
well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara;
Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on
8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a
third kill with another Sidewinder...)

Fair points. However, the 30mm Aden is an old gun with poor ballistics
by modern standards and there are now much better guns available for
air combat. The critical factor is of course the quality of the gun
fire control system. I don't know how good it was in the SHARs, but
what I have read about modern fighters is that once they've got a
radar lock there is a strong probability of a gun kill, with only a
short burst normally being required. In some cases, the FCS actually
takes over control of some elements of the flight controls to ensure
that the gun is correctly aimed.

The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and
Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored
kills with the gun.

The Iranians also used human wave attacks against prepared defensive
positions, using unarmed schoolboys carrying plastic "keys to heaven" in
the first wave (they were expendable, available, and revealed the
locations of minefields and concealed bunkers for the armed fighters
following). I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian
tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved.

There's loads of detail available in Cooper and Bishop's 'Iran-Iraq
War in the Air 1980-1988' (Schiffer Military History, 2000). The
Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS,
orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However,
tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet
closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns.

Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their
reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of
the story than might actually exist.

The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years?

They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the
chances of a 'danger close'?

I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s
were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to
use.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

In message , Tony
Williams writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars
only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on
relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills

Fair points. However, the 30mm Aden is an old gun with poor ballistics
by modern standards and there are now much better guns available for
air combat. The critical factor is of course the quality of the gun
fire control system. I don't know how good it was in the SHARs, but
what I have read about modern fighters is that once they've got a
radar lock there is a strong probability of a gun kill, with only a
short burst normally being required. In some cases, the FCS actually
takes over control of some elements of the flight controls to ensure
that the gun is correctly aimed.

Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the
target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep
guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and
shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed

Tony, you get picked on because you're a reasonable man advancing good
arguments and so I can have a civil debate with you. It's not your fault
that others have advanced some rather poor arguments... you just get hit
with defending them sometimes as well as arguing your own position. I
appreciate your forbearance.

I'd personally like to keep the gun a little longer, especially in cases
like EF2000 where the fitting costs are paid already: but there _is_ the
problem that training costs are significant, and the UK defence budget
_is_ so straightened that "deleting maintenance and training for
Eurofighter guns" is operationally significant and funds more urgent
requirements, and seems to be less bad than the alternatives. It sucks
but there it is.

I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian
tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved.

There's loads of detail available in Cooper and Bishop's 'Iran-Iraq
War in the Air 1980-1988' (Schiffer Military History, 2000).

Thanks for the cue. Tom Cooper posts on occasion and comes across well:
another author found via Usenet, it seems.

The
Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS,
orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However,
tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet
closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns.

Out of interest, how many Iranian Tomcats were lost in air combat?

They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the
chances of a 'danger close'?

I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s
were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to
use.

True to a point, but the SHars are at least multi-role and could even be
swing-role with the right loadout (what does the A in FA.2 stand for,
after all?) and there wasn't a noticeable fixed-wing air threat in
Sierra Leone that would require a CAP or DLI presence.

Also, can't the RAF Harriers use the 30mm gun packs?



I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of
space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat
experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost
counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the
desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say
"that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!"
than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance
shortcomings.

I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with
significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods
for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though
the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For
that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?)

Who knows, if I can find the time I may follow your example and write a
book with this as a chapter



[1] Based on sound analysis for the expected wars, is the worst thing.
Fighter-versus-fighter shootouts at low level in Southeast Asia were not
a high priority compared to keeping nuclear missile-armed bombers from
hitting USN carrier groups or US cities, back when design decisions were
being made...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony
Williams writes

Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the
target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep
guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and
shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed

True. I do include this statement in the book:

"The percentage of shots which hit the target in air-to-air firing
exercises varies greatly depending on the circumstances. Modern fire
control systems can calculate the correct aiming point, taking into
account such variables as the effects of gravity (if the gun is fired
when the aircraft is banking) and of relative wind (if the aircraft is
manoeuvring so that its gun is pointing away from the direction of
flight). If the radar is locked on to the target, a high percentage of
hits can be achieved; if not, then the scores drop down to optical
gunsight levels. If a pilot knows he is under gun attack, he can make
a radar lock virtually impossible by constantly making small changes
in direction every couple of seconds. The number of hits required to
destroy a modern aircraft is estimated at four to six hits of 30 mm
fire and perhaps three times as many with a 20 mm gun."

However, it obviously takes an aware and skilled pilot to stop his
attacker from getting a radar lock.

Tony, you get picked on because you're a reasonable man advancing good
arguments and so I can have a civil debate with you. It's not your fault
that others have advanced some rather poor arguments... you just get hit
with defending them sometimes as well as arguing your own position. I
appreciate your forbearance.

No problem - I enjoy a good debate and learn from it; it's only the
idiots who occasionally irritate me! I sometimes have to remind myself
of the sound advice someone once used as a signatu "Never argue
with an idiot. He'll drag you down to his level and beat you with
experience."

The
Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS,
orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However,
tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet
closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns.

Out of interest, how many Iranian Tomcats were lost in air combat?

Umm. I don't know off hand. The major failing of the book is that it
doesn't have an index. However, Tom Cooper helps to manage the
acig.org site which collects and posts shoot-down stats for post-WW2
conflicts.

I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s
were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to
use.

True to a point, but the SHars are at least multi-role and could even be
swing-role with the right loadout (what does the A in FA.2 stand for,
after all?) and there wasn't a noticeable fixed-wing air threat in
Sierra Leone that would require a CAP or DLI presence.

Well, I presume that the GR.7s were specifically sent along to do the
job; the RN doesn't normally carry them unless they're needed, AFAIK.

Also, can't the RAF Harriers use the 30mm gun packs?

I doubt that very much. Apart from the fact that their 'gunpods' are
now stuffed with electronics which are presumably a part of their
system, they almost certainly don't have the gun programme in their
FCS. I remember some years ago there was a series on DERA which
incidentally included some footage of a GR.7 testing the unfortunate
25mm Aden installation (the test had to be aborted as one of the guns
broke...). They were having great difficulty adjusting the system to
get the guns firing accurately - they were missing the targets by
scores of metres. There's more to installing a gun than just bolting
it on.

I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of
space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat
experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost
counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the
desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say
"that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!"
than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance
shortcomings.

I also include the following in the book, which illustrates your point
rather better than Vietnam:

"The growing importance of missiles is graphically demonstrated by the
experience of the Israeli Air Force, which has experienced more
air-to-air combat in this period than any other. In the Six Day War of
1967, guns scored 100% of the Israeli fighter kills. Between then and
1973, the figure dropped to 70%. In the Yom Kippur War there was a
further drop to 30%, between 1973 and 1979 it was 20%, from 1979 to
1982 it was 10%, in the Lebanon campaign of 1982 it was 7%, and since
then 0%."

I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with
significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods
for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though
the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For
that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?)

I presume that the F-14 installation, along with the F-15, was part of
the 'backlash' against the gunless planes (for the initially
lower-capability, general-purpose F-16 the gun was more
understandable). The F-111B could carry a gun - another quote:

"The F 111 had an internal weapons bay in the front fuselage and one
of the loads that could be accommodated was a M61A1 with a generous
2,048 rounds, with the gun in the left half of the bay. The only
version that regularly carried this weapon was the F 111D, and
although it was carried in Vietnam the weapon saw no use there. It was
soon decided to carry AIM 9 missiles for self-defence instead."

Who knows, if I can find the time I may follow your example and write a
book with this as a chapter

Join the club - but be prepared to give up your social life and get a
pittance in return!

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Tony Williams wrote:

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony
Williams writes

Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the
target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep
guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and
shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed

True. I do include this statement in the book:

"The percentage of shots which hit the target in air-to-air firing
exercises varies greatly depending on the circumstances. Modern fire
control systems can calculate the correct aiming point, taking into
account such variables as the effects of gravity (if the gun is fired
when the aircraft is banking) and of relative wind (if the aircraft is
manoeuvring so that its gun is pointing away from the direction of
flight). If the radar is locked on to the target, a high percentage of
hits can be achieved; if not, then the scores drop down to optical
gunsight levels. If a pilot knows he is under gun attack, he can make
a radar lock virtually impossible by constantly making small changes
in direction every couple of seconds. The number of hits required to
destroy a modern aircraft is estimated at four to six hits of 30 mm
fire and perhaps three times as many with a 20 mm gun."

However, it obviously takes an aware and skilled pilot to stop his
attacker from getting a radar lock.

ISTM we're ignoring Laser/IRSTS here, but many of the same comments apply. However, if you're locking someone
up then you're almost certainly setting off his radar/laser warning systems (assuming he's so fitted).

snip

I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of
space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat
experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost
counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the
desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say
"that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!"
than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance
shortcomings.

I also include the following in the book, which illustrates your point
rather better than Vietnam:

"The growing importance of missiles is graphically demonstrated by the
experience of the Israeli Air Force, which has experienced more
air-to-air combat in this period than any other. In the Six Day War of
1967, guns scored 100% of the Israeli fighter kills. Between then and
1973, the figure dropped to 70%. In the Yom Kippur War there was a
further drop to 30%, between 1973 and 1979 it was 20%, from 1979 to
1982 it was 10%, in the Lebanon campaign of 1982 it was 7%, and since
then 0%."

Someone else has a copy of "Fighters over Israel" ;-)

I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with
significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods
for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though
the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For
that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?)

I presume that the F-14 installation, along with the F-15, was part of
the 'backlash' against the gunless planes (for the initially
lower-capability, general-purpose F-16 the gun was more
understandable). The F-111B could carry a gun - another quote:

"The F 111 had an internal weapons bay in the front fuselage and one
of the loads that could be accommodated was a M61A1 with a generous
2,048 rounds, with the gun in the left half of the bay. The only
version that regularly carried this weapon was the F 111D, and
although it was carried in Vietnam the weapon saw no use there. It was
soon decided to carry AIM 9 missiles for self-defence instead."

snip

FWIW, Tony Thornborough's first book on the 'Vark (and probably the bigger one, which I haven't read) contains
interviews with a fair number of F-111A crews who flew in Vietnam. Their comment was that they were ordered to
carry the loaded gun on every mission and did so, but absolutely no one ever used it or intended to do so, and
they considered it and its ammo unnecessary weight. It made no sense to use it, given their mission
(night/all-weather, Lo-Lo-Lo-Hi, single-ship laydown attacks). The last thing they were going to do was to
come around and make strafing passes on an alerted target -- they figured if a full load of Slicks/Snakes/CBUs
didn't do the job the cannon wasn't going to, and it's not as if there were any MiGs flying around in the
conditions they operated in.

Guy

what sort of ranges is a modern aircraft gun effective at in the air to air
role?

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Tony Williams wrote:

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Tony
Williams writes

Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on
the
target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to
keep
guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and
shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed

True. I do include this statement in the book:

"The percentage of shots which hit the target in air-to-air firing
exercises varies greatly depending on the circumstances. Modern fire
control systems can calculate the correct aiming point, taking into
account such variables as the effects of gravity (if the gun is fired
when the aircraft is banking) and of relative wind (if the aircraft is
manoeuvring so that its gun is pointing away from the direction of
flight). If the radar is locked on to the target, a high percentage of
hits can be achieved; if not, then the scores drop down to optical
gunsight levels. If a pilot knows he is under gun attack, he can make
a radar lock virtually impossible by constantly making small changes
in direction every couple of seconds. The number of hits required to
destroy a modern aircraft is estimated at four to six hits of 30 mm
fire and perhaps three times as many with a 20 mm gun."

However, it obviously takes an aware and skilled pilot to stop his
attacker from getting a radar lock.

ISTM we're ignoring Laser/IRSTS here, but many of the same comments apply.
However, if you're locking someone
up then you're almost certainly setting off his radar/laser warning
systems (assuming he's so fitted).

snip

I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of
space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat
experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost
counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the
desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say
"that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!"
than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance
shortcomings.

I also include the following in the book, which illustrates your point
rather better than Vietnam:

"The growing importance of missiles is graphically demonstrated by the
experience of the Israeli Air Force, which has experienced more
air-to-air combat in this period than any other. In the Six Day War of
1967, guns scored 100% of the Israeli fighter kills. Between then and
1973, the figure dropped to 70%. In the Yom Kippur War there was a
further drop to 30%, between 1973 and 1979 it was 20%, from 1979 to
1982 it was 10%, in the Lebanon campaign of 1982 it was 7%, and since
then 0%."

Someone else has a copy of "Fighters over Israel" ;-)

I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with
significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods
for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though
the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why.
For
that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?)

I presume that the F-14 installation, along with the F-15, was part of
the 'backlash' against the gunless planes (for the initially
lower-capability, general-purpose F-16 the gun was more
understandable). The F-111B could carry a gun - another quote:

"The F 111 had an internal weapons bay in the front fuselage and one
of the loads that could be accommodated was a M61A1 with a generous
2,048 rounds, with the gun in the left half of the bay. The only
version that regularly carried this weapon was the F 111D, and
although it was carried in Vietnam the weapon saw no use there. It was
soon decided to carry AIM 9 missiles for self-defence instead."

snip

FWIW, Tony Thornborough's first book on the 'Vark (and probably the bigger
one, which I haven't read) contains
interviews with a fair number of F-111A crews who flew in Vietnam. Their
comment was that they were ordered to
carry the loaded gun on every mission and did so, but absolutely no one
ever used it or intended to do so, and
they considered it and its ammo unnecessary weight. It made no sense to
use it, given their mission
(night/all-weather, Lo-Lo-Lo-Hi, single-ship laydown attacks). The last
thing they were going to do was to
come around and make strafing passes on an alerted target -- they figured
if a full load of Slicks/Snakes/CBUs
didn't do the job the cannon wasn't going to, and it's not as if there
were any MiGs flying around in the
conditions they operated in.

Guy

"Boomer" wrote in message ...
what sort of ranges is a modern aircraft gun effective at in the air to air
role?

It depends very much on the circumstances. In a high-speed tail chase
at low altitude, the projectiles will experience the maximum
aerodynamic drag and will slow down rapidly, reducing effectiveness to
only a few hundred metres.

At the opposite extreme is the head-on attack at high altitude. The
range for opening fire can be as much as 3,000m.

The gun makes a difference; other things being equal, the bigger the
calibre, the slower the shells will lose velocity and the longer will
be their effective range. The Russian 30mm shells are particularly
heavy at 390 grams (typical Western 30mm = 240-270 grams, 20mm = 100
grams), so they will slow down least of all among the fighter guns.
The most long-ranging fighter gun however is probably the SAAB
Viggen's 30mm Oerlikon KCA; it uses basically the same ammunition as
the GAU-8/A 'tankbuster' in the A-10.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Tony
Williams writes

Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the
target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep
guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and
shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed

True. I do include this statement in the book:

"The percentage of shots which hit the target in air-to-air firing
exercises varies greatly depending on the circumstances. Modern fire
control systems can calculate the correct aiming point, taking into
account such variables as the effects of gravity (if the gun is fired
when the aircraft is banking) and of relative wind (if the aircraft is
manoeuvring so that its gun is pointing away from the direction of
flight). If the radar is locked on to the target, a high percentage of
hits can be achieved; if not, then the scores drop down to optical
gunsight levels. If a pilot knows he is under gun attack, he can make
a radar lock virtually impossible by constantly making small changes
in direction every couple of seconds. The number of hits required to
destroy a modern aircraft is estimated at four to six hits of 30 mm
fire and perhaps three times as many with a 20 mm gun."

However, it obviously takes an aware and skilled pilot to stop his
attacker from getting a radar lock.

Tony, you get picked on because you're a reasonable man advancing good
arguments and so I can have a civil debate with you. It's not your fault
that others have advanced some rather poor arguments... you just get hit
with defending them sometimes as well as arguing your own position. I
appreciate your forbearance.

No problem - I enjoy a good debate and learn from it; it's only the
idiots who occasionally irritate me! I sometimes have to remind myself
of the sound advice someone once used as a signatu "Never argue
with an idiot. He'll drag you down to his level and beat you with
experience."

The
Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS,
orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However,
tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet
closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns.

Out of interest, how many Iranian Tomcats were lost in air combat?

Umm. I don't know off hand. The major failing of the book is that it
doesn't have an index. However, Tom Cooper helps to manage the
acig.org site which collects and posts shoot-down stats for post-WW2
conflicts.

I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s
were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to
use.

True to a point, but the SHars are at least multi-role and could even be
swing-role with the right loadout (what does the A in FA.2 stand for,
after all?) and there wasn't a noticeable fixed-wing air threat in
Sierra Leone that would require a CAP or DLI presence.

Well, I presume that the GR.7s were specifically sent along to do the
job; the RN doesn't normally carry them unless they're needed, AFAIK.

Also, can't the RAF Harriers use the 30mm gun packs?

I doubt that very much. Apart from the fact that their 'gunpods' are
now stuffed with electronics which are presumably a part of their
system, they almost certainly don't have the gun programme in their
FCS. I remember some years ago there was a series on DERA which
incidentally included some footage of a GR.7 testing the unfortunate
25mm Aden installation (the test had to be aborted as one of the guns
broke...). They were having great difficulty adjusting the system to
get the guns firing accurately - they were missing the targets by
scores of metres. There's more to installing a gun than just bolting
it on.

I'm 99% sure the GR7 (well the GR9 in development so hopefully it goes
backwards?) can carry and use the gunpod - have to check my contacts