tow rope brake practice crash, what can we learn...

On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:
On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

On Jul 11, 3:45*pm, BobW wrote:
On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

Condolences to everyone involved. An unfortunately similar accident
over the weekend in Montana.
http://www.kpax.com/news/strong-wind...l-plane-crash/

Craig

On Jul 11, 3:45*pm, BobW wrote:
On 7/11/2011 3:38 PM, wrote:

On July 7, 2011 at Nowy Targ in southern Poland, glider Puchacz
crashed during training flight 2/3 mile from the airport. The
instructor (~64-67) and the student pilot (~18-19) are dead. *It was a
tow rope brake practice flight with down wind turn for down wind
landing from about 130-150 m of altitude (400 feet).
What can we learn from this?

First, my sincere condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy.

Without intending disrespect to the dead or to their families and friends, and
without intending flippancy in any way, shape or form, one of the things I
have concluded about these sorts of accidents in ~37 years of (mostly western
U.S.-based) soaring participation and personally-motivated (in a
self-preservational sense) incident/accident interest, is that this particular
scenario deserves the utmost respect from both student and instructor, and
demands from the instructor 'nearly perfect judgment' if it is to be conducted
safely, yet meaningfully. The 'need for it' is one of the (many) reasons I
have great respect for everyone who decides to instruct others in the art of
soaring.

Soaring is inherently risky because it involves energies easily capable of
ending human life. Failure to acknowledge that is - at the very least -
intellectually short-sighted, if not outright dishonest. That said, nearly a
century's worth of humankind indulging in the soul-enriching sporting activity
has provided today's practitioners much risk-reducing (not eliminating) knowledge.

I know zero of the circumstances of this sad and terrible accident, and can
only hope it was avoidable in the sense that - done 100 times under 'exactly
the same circumstances' - it would largely have resulted in a successfully
concluded downwind landing. If that was not the case, then (if we presume the
release was intentional) likely the instructor erred in his decision to pull
the release, regardless of the nature or seriousness of the eventual accident.
By (my) definition, an instructor should 'never' induce something which is
'accidentally-problematic' (e.g. an intentional departure from controlled
flight on the base-to-final turn...almost certain to be fatal, no matter the
glider type, or the pilots' skills).

If we presume the release circumstances were *not* 'accidentally-problematic'
(per the above definition), then the nature of the mistake(s) made become
murkier - and almost entirely speculative - in a hurry. Readers will note,
here, that - by my definition - any 'not accidentally problematic' premature
rope release resulting in an accident *does* involve pilot error. This is the
way I have always chosen to view fatal glider accidents, because it shines the
harshest light on my own potential actions in similar circumstances. I've long
sought to avoid others' mistakes - fatal or otherwise - when it comes to
acting as PIC, and laying accident causes on the pilot is, in my view, the
most conservative mental approach insofar as affecting my own decision-making
is concerned. If I die in a sailplane accident I sincerely hope it will be
obvious to my surviving friends and family that my death was *not* the result
of a 'stupid pilot trick,' i.e. the circumstances were unforeseeable and
unavoidable.

In this particular instance for example, the student might have reacted badly
and so rapidly and forcefully the instructor could not override the student's
stick forces in sufficient time. Or the instructor may not have been 'guarding
the stick' as closely as the situation/student 'naturally warranted.' Or the
PIC may have been flying 'by eye too much' (as distinct from also using the
ASI and yaw string as cross checks to the sight picture). You get the
idea...we can never know for sure.

Are these training flights mendatory under FAA rules?

I believe so, but have never pretended to memorize the FARs/CFRs. I expect
others will correct me if I'm wrong, but in any case, I *expect* to cover this
scenario in some form or other in any flight review, simply because it's an
unavoidable - and none too unlikely - scenario when taking aerotows. My
approach when taking (the still mandatory, but) what were originally called
'biennial flight reviews' has always been to discuss the premature release
scenario prior to getting into the glider. Most of my experience has been in
settings with not-very-pretty options in the case of premature aerotow
releases, so I tend to be paranoid about the possibility of it happening. I
believe Murphy is real.

That noted, my own 'Plan B/fail safe' as a pilot is 'Hit the ground
horizontally, not vertically.' Only then will I have a fighting chance of
surviving.

Can pilot request opt-out from "rope brake" during Biennial Flight
Review to avoid getting killed?

I don't think so, but s/he should definitely avoid any instructor who doesn't
take them life-/glider-threateningly seriously, and who is not also willing
beforehand to discuss them in detail, not only as a 'theoretical thing' but in
the circumstances pertaining to the airfield in question. Many airfields in
the western U.S. *will* result in broken sailplanes, if a premature release
from aerotow occurs 'too low.'

I remember once during BFR the instructor pulled the release on me in
the Blanik at about 200 feet, I had to do 180 turn and land down wind
from very low altitude. I think it was dangerous and unnecessary even
for an experienced pilot as me. Andre

And you were probably correct!

Best Regards,
Bob W.

A few years back I was at a SSA CFIG re-validation seminar in Seattle
and there was a discussion of rope break training prior to solo sign-
offs. I was a solo student at the time, just there to learn. I
mentioned that I had never done a rope break but had been signed off
solo and was made to stand and repeat that while the SSA safety team
(Carlson and Wander I think it was) listened with horror. The next
weekend I went to the field and performed 4 down to 200' and still try
to do 3 or 4 every year. Once you do a few and get it down it's a non-
event and probably good to have as a skill.

On the other hand during my check ride in a 2-22 the DE pulled the
release at 200' into a strong headwind and it was pretty exciting
getting that bird down when I had been doing them in a DG303 up to
then. That same DE is in a local hospital today after crashing while
performing a rope break in Montana last week, the other pilot was
killed. Those are two very different data points to try and reconcile.

Brian