Commanche alternatives?

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Kevin Brooks wrote:

snip

From my reading of the transcript, it seems pretty clear that they're
getting
rid of the Hueys entirely (did you see the slides?), replacing them
with
UH-60s,
and putting a new OH out for bid.

I did not come away with the same interpretation, and neither did the
following media source:

"Among the new buys will be 368 new reconnaissance helicopters to
replace
the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, 303 new light utility helicopters to replace
aging
Hueys, and roughly 25 new fixed-wing cargo aircraft that would replace
the
C-23 for intra-theater transport. The cancellation of Comanche **also**
[emphasis added] will allow for the purchase of an additional 80 UH-60
Black
Hawk helicopters and another 50 CH-47 Chinooks, according to Cody."

http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/new...s/inc02254.xml

The plan appears to be to purchase new aircraft to replace both the OH's
*and* the Hueys (may not be the same aircraft, obviously), and the
additional Blackhawk order is not going to impinge upon those plans
(note
the use of "also", as in "in addition to").

The tranxript and slides appear to be somewhat contradictory. One of the
slides shows the
proposed TO&E for AC/RC Multi-function Aviation Brigades, NG Brigades, and
brigades for the
Light divisions. The NG brigade lists the scout battalion as follows: 3
x 8 OH (LUH), which
to me implies that they're the same a/c. This is the a/c for which the
303 applies. At the
same time it lists 3 x 10 UH companies for the assault battalion, and the
UH definitely seems
to be the UH-60, as it is in the AC/Reserve components, while the OH for
the attack battalions
in the Light Divisions (the 368) appears to be the same a/c as that for
the NG (but armed).
OTOH, it may not be. The AC/RC brigades don't show a scout battalion at
all, the Block III
AH-64s apparently taking on this role. Maybe the slide is incorrect to
make this distinction,
but then there's the following exchange in the transcript:

Look at the timeline slide--it shows the LUH and OH programs as being
separate and distinct. The slide you are referring to is confusing as all
get out--what the hell is "AER"? And where are the non-divisional units?
What about the DIV CAV SQDN; does it retain any helos? Whoever the guy was
who prepared this set of briefing slides needs to be divested of his
"PowerPoint Ranger" tab immediately!

snip lots of gobbledygook from Blum, et al

"Modularity model"??! I met Blum when he was a one-star--he walked into the
work area outside our (my SGM's and my own) offices, picked up a tootsie pop
off the table while we stood there, and walked back out--not a "May I" or a
"thank you" muttered. If he is going to spout this kind of doublespeak
claptrap, he needs to steal some more tootsie pops to keep his mouth
otherwise engaged.


The Guard Hueys are going away, no question, to be replaced by the new
LUH, but per the slide
that will serve as the Guard's OH.

Well, not so sure about that. That slide, and the way it does not
necessarily agree with the later slide, is kind of questionable in terms of
its detail. Then again, they were prepared to allow the briefing of a bunch
of media wonks, most of whom could not tell the difference between an AH-58D
and AH-1 if they tried.

But the 6 Guard brigades are getting at least 30 and maybe
38 Blackhawks each as well as the 24 OH (LUH). The new recon helos for
the LDs are apparently
going to be a new design entirely.

That is not adding up either. I have not heard anything yet about drawing
the Guard division strength down that far (they are only showing two heavy
divs and (presumably) one light div in the ARNG). There are eight divisions
in the ARNG right now, and the plan was to redesignate two of them as CS/CSS
unit sources. That leaves six, of which one is a light division. See the
disconnect on the slide?


A 412 seems much too big, noisy and lacking in maneuverability to make a
good OH, and too close
to the UH-60 in capability to be worth buying as a utility helo, so what
would be its job?

Cheaper unit cost than the UH-60 plus cheaper operating cost, with a
somewhat reduced payload and range. The ARNG needs LUH's for the homeland
defense role, especially if/when their UH-60 elements are deployed
elsewhere. Disaster response, MEDEVAC, terrorist incident response, to
include mobility support for the NBC response teams springing up around the
country, customs/law enforcement support, firefighting support with bambi
buckets--a myriad of uses. Nothing says that the 412 can't serve the same
role as the current OH-58's do in the drug interdiction recon role, though a
ligheter and even less costly operating aircraft might be better in that
role. And again, if you look at that later slide, the apparent requirement
is for two different platforms--one LUH and one OH. I fully expect some of
the "UH" units on the ARNG side to be equipped with "LUH".



As you note, they are indeed buying more Blackhawks. But Blackhawks
are
pretty pricey compared to the 412. With the increased emphasis on
homeland
defense and the Guard's role in that respect, taking X amount of
money
and
buying more 412's than you could buy UH-60's with the same money
would
appear to be a doable solution to me. I doubt the Army wants to blow
any
more money than it has to on aircraft that it can't, or would prefer
not
to,
integrate into its warfighting plans across the board; if you bought
only
UH-60's, then the tendancy would be to identify them with
contingency
plan
force development requirements. They'd be a bit less likely to want
to
integrate a low density platform like the 412 would be. But hey, its
early--who knows?

At least how I understand it, they're not willing to do that,

That is not what AvLeak is saying.

I know, but that assumes they understand the briefing and slides any
better than I do;-)

I don't know how much credibility we can put in these slides, or for that
matter in some of the ridiculous verbage in the transcript--I can just see
junior/midgrade staff weenies lstening to their bosses in those confusing
exchanges cringing and saying to themselves, "No, you idiot! That is NOT
what that means!"


and want the Guard
to be seamlessly able to integrate with the active component, which
means
they've pretty much got to have the same equipment.

Not necessarily. That has BEEN the way they have thought for decades,
but
9-11, and the resultant load upon the Guard in terms of mobilizations
for
overseas deployment, coupled with the less-than-timely drawdown on the
Huey
and Cobra fleets, got some folks (including Governors and likely now the
DHS) to talking about the desirability of having some aircraft primarily
oriented towards the domestic requirement.

See Blum's comments above.

See the bullet comment about improving the homeland defense capabilities,
and see the recent comments from governors and congress critters concerned
over the gap in capabilities left when all of the high priority Guard units
are mobilized. See what the NGAUS has been harping about for a few years
now. And then remember that this presentation apprantly did NOT address the
entire Guard aviation force structure, for whatever reasons.


NGB has even begun talking about
the MV-22 as being a good match for some domestic requirements,
especially
for such roles as transporting the NG's NBC response teams. The desire
to
get an off-the-shelf utility bird specifically for the ARNG has also
been
discussed previously, which is why the plan to actually do that is not
that
surprising to me. And as the interest is towards a dedicated (or close
to
that term) domestic support aircraft, the need for interoperability with
active component systems is not as important. If such interoperability
was
such a key concern, why does the ARNG often find itself operating
equipment
(from trucks to helicopters) that the active component no longer
operates,
and sometimes won't even support?

Again, see Blum's comments. BTW, I'm having some problems with the
numbers. They say they
want 303 LUHs for the Guard. The 6 Guard MF AV BDEs each show 24 OH
(LUH), or 144 a/c.
That's 159 a/c for training, pipeline, and attrition. For the sake of
argument, let's assume
that the 8 C2 a/c per BDE are also LUHs, i.e. 48 more for a total of 192.
That's still 111 a/c
for T/P/A. Seems excessive given the loss rates nowadays. 1960s, sure.

Like I said earlier, this slide show ain't complete. There is too big a hole
in it in regards to the Guard aviation force structure. Where are the ARNG
counter drug aviation assets that reside in each state? Where are the other
divisional brigades?


While a 412 probably costs
less per hour to operate than a -60, when you add in the costs of the
separate
training, maintenance and spares support I suspect it just doesn't
make
sense
economically. Otherwise the USMC could have just bought UH-60s and
modified
AH-64s instead of staying all common with the UH-1Y/AH-1Z.

Well Guy, in this case it appears the Army disagrees with you. Eighty
UH-60's are a drop in the bucket compared to the needs in terms of
replacing
the UH-1's that have been lost, and I have to tell you that I think
AvLeak
is generally a rather reliable source, and they do indeed indicate that
a
*new* light utility airframe is in the works (and the UH-60 is a bit on
the
chunky side (both in terms of size and payload) to be called "light").

So's the Huey;-)

Watch it! Lightning has been known to strike those who speak ill of the old
washing machine with rotor attached! It had to have Divine approval, 'cause
it would never have flown without it.


I
doubt the amount of training required to prepare those Huey wrench
turners
for a platform like the 412 is any different from what is required to
prepare them for the UH-60, and unlike the AC side, those wrench turners
often spend their entire career in the same unit, so turnover won't be
as
big an issue. Crew training is not likely to be a major issue,
either--the
ARNG already manages C-23 training, just as the ANG is heavily involved
in
pilot training for the F-16 and F-15. Doing an in-house qualification
course
at either or both the eastern or western ARNG aviation training sites
(AZ
and PA, IIRC) would be no biggie as they have run crew training programs
for
years now on Cobras, Chinooks, and even Blackhawks and Apaches.

snip

If the idea is to neck down the the minimum number of systems, why even
put up with the hassle
of the extra pipeline?

Guy, face it, even the slide show is kind of clear in that a new line of
utility helos is coming.

Brooks


Guy