Is there a place for Traditional CAS in the 21st century?

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:



I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a
transportation link.

Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years
ago.

You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter
mafia.

And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in
this forum.

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:



I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a
transportation link.

OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
solution.

The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing
engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the
current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to
small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is
often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in
directions, and other factors.

Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years
ago.

Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think
the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact
and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose
look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with
stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what
CAS really is more debatable.

I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an
operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm
comfortable.

You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter
mafia.

I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.

And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in
this forum.

Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good
with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the
machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.
I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
probability of error.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:



I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be
eliminated.

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator
and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace
using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode
could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along
a
transportation link.

OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
solution.

The ground operator would have the capability of designating targets and the
ability to change the level of agression of the autonomous vehicle. I want
to get pilots out of the mud, not send them into harm's way. There is a
similar autonomous vehicle envisioned for the F-35, but it can wait until
the F-22 is either produced, or cancelled.

The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing
engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the
current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to
small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is
often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in
directions, and other factors.

The loiter vehicle is moving forward first, as it is funded for paper
investigation of the idea. That way it stays out of the obvious reality
check issues for "silver bullet" type assets.

Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having
a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA
years
ago.

Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think
the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact
and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose
look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with
stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what
CAS really is more debatable.

A 2000 pound bomb dropped accurate does the same job from 15,000 feet as it
does from 200 feet; perhaps even better, as the man on the ground has better
control of the target's coordinates. That is not always true, as my brother
has a story of his company commander calling a strike on his own company's
position, but that is another issue. The CO got his bronze star and never
went out again. (ie heroin addict)

I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an
operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm
comfortable.

How about a wedding? (Afghanistan)

You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the
fighter
mafia.

I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.

Which is why we are discussing autonomous vehicles for filling the role of
"traditional CAS". I have the impression that the Infantry is as pleased to
stay out of that type of situation as a fighter pilot is to have BVR
weapons.

And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue
incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality
in
this forum.

Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good
with regard to CAS.

Not as good as the Army's own rotary wings.

And, there is nothing inherent about "the
machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
system.

That depends on how well the operator can see the battle and follow
instructions.

Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.

The Army's own assets are statistically less likely to blue on blue.

I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
probability of error.

My man is on the ground, saving his own life.

Do you think Cleland was fragged?

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


Do you think Cleland was fragged?

No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


Do you think Cleland was fragged?

No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Actually, recently the story was changed due to another soldier coming
forth and admitting that it was his grenade, and that he had straightened
the pin, having been told that was the warrior like thing to do.

The story was well covered here in Georgia.

I guess I could find a link if you wish.

Bob McKellar, former Cleland constituent

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


Do you think Cleland was fragged?

No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.

Actually, Ed, if you do a Google on it there is some evidence to support
that may not have been the case. Cleland thought that was what must have
happened, but another man who was on the ground with him now claims it was
another individual who dropped the grenade. Nobody can no for sure, and it
really does not matter in the end.

Brooks



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


Do you think Cleland was fragged?

No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

For what it's worth, we just got a USMC Hornet exchange pilot on our
squadron who was in both Afghanistan. He did a LOT of CAS, and his
experience was that JDAM and LGBs just weren't working for the job.
The solution - "traditional CAS - in his own words they were operating
" as low as they could "- often down @ 100-200 feet. I watched a
zillion of his HUD tapes from Iraq. Believe it or not, his unit used
almost exclusively dumb bombs, unguided rockets, and CBUs.

On 14 Mar 2004 20:44:45 -0800, (monkey) wrote:

For what it's worth, we just got a USMC Hornet exchange pilot on our
squadron who was in both Afghanistan. He did a LOT of CAS, and his
experience was that JDAM and LGBs just weren't working for the job.
The solution - "traditional CAS - in his own words they were operating
" as low as they could "- often down @ 100-200 feet. I watched a
zillion of his HUD tapes from Iraq. Believe it or not, his unit used
almost exclusively dumb bombs, unguided rockets, and CBUs.

If the weather is good and you aren't a classic "troops-in-contact"
situation there isn't much reason to be dealing with 100-200 feet. Way
too much can go wrong to justify that type of delivery. If the bad
guys are in the wires, then every tactical aviator I've known will do
what is necessary.

That being said, however, I didn't know that "unguided rockets" were
still in the inventory for regular carry. And, I'm unfamiliar with any
type of CBU that can be delivered at 100-200 feet. Last one of those I
believe was the infamous CBU-2 which pushed the bomblets out the back
of a canister that was retained on the airplane.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote in message . ..
On 14 Mar 2004 20:44:45 -0800, (monkey) wrote:

For what it's worth, we just got a USMC Hornet exchange pilot on our
squadron who was in both Afghanistan. He did a LOT of CAS, and his
experience was that JDAM and LGBs just weren't working for the job.
The solution - "traditional CAS - in his own words they were operating
" as low as they could "- often down @ 100-200 feet. I watched a
zillion of his HUD tapes from Iraq. Believe it or not, his unit used
almost exclusively dumb bombs, unguided rockets, and CBUs.

If the weather is good and you aren't a classic "troops-in-contact"
situation there isn't much reason to be dealing with 100-200 feet. Way
too much can go wrong to justify that type of delivery. If the bad
guys are in the wires, then every tactical aviator I've known will do
what is necessary.

That being said, however, I didn't know that "unguided rockets" were
still in the inventory for regular carry. And, I'm unfamiliar with any
type of CBU that can be delivered at 100-200 feet. Last one of those I
believe was the infamous CBU-2 which pushed the bomblets out the back
of a canister that was retained on the airplane.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Hey, Ed, I'm just repeating what the guy said. It should be fairly
obviuos to anyone that you can't drop a CBU or bomb from 100 feet - I
was referring to the low stuff as his altitude of choice to negate
threats - I assume that he used SOP MAP for the above mentioned
weapons. I'm not sure which rocket pods they were using but i did view
several hud tapes of them in use.

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


Do you think Cleland was fragged?

No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.

Ummm....No.

One of his men, who didn't know how th rig his pin
properly, dropped his grenade, and Cleland THOUGHT that it was
one of his.

Since he knew that he rigged his properly, he picked it
up.

All the planning in the world doesn't matter when an
angel pees down the barrel of your rifle.
--
--Matthew Saroff
Rules to live by:
1) To thine own self be true
2) Don't let your mouth write no checks that your butt can't cash
3) Interference in the time stream is forbidden, do not meddle in causality
Check http://www.pobox.com/~msaroff, including The Bad Hair Web Page