Flt 587-Airbus vs American Airlines

"John Bailey" wrote
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html is a report of
the maneuvering by both Airbus and American Airlines to get in their 2
cents, pilot training vs inadequate design, in the crash of AA Flt 587
over Queens. Apparently the tail came off because of a violent yaw
type of pilot induced oscillation. The range of rudder control
available to the pilot seems grossly inadequate. AA may have
contributed to the problem by failing to reflect the design flaw in
their training, however their real failure might be not grounding the
planes for suicidal instability. Pilots of the F86D had to accept
working around a low altitude-high speed pilot induced oscillation. In
that case the oscillations were in pitch. I could accept such on a
military fighter plane, but such an accident waiting to happen in a
commercial airliner seems unconscionable.

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

Why is rudder input mandatory during an engine failure vice simply
using ailerons?

Quick example, a United 747-400 lost an engine on takeoff from SFO a
couple years back. The jet was full/heavy, the FO (guy in the right
seat) was making the takeoff. During intial climbout, the FO used full
aileron/yoke to maintain wings level while trying to climb straight
out. The only problem was the drag caused by the deployed spoilers
(for roll) on the side with two good motors. [picture aileron into the
two good engines trying to "lift" the wing with only one motor to turn
into the good side]. This was not the approved solution for
controlling a 747 on takeoff with an engine failure.

As a result the drag severely degraded the climb capability and there
was a ridge line in front of the jet. Two guys sitting in jumpseats
finally had enough of the FO's hamfisted technique and started
insisting he use rudder to control the yaw and not aileron. The FO
listened..."Oh yeah, ****, f*ck me..." and they cleared the rapidly
rising terrain by mere feet.

So that is why rudder input is critical, minimize yaw and drag to
provide climb performance.

And as you alluded to, blind rapid full rudder inputs can simply
over-G the airframe.

The technique we are taught during an engine failure is to climb
straight ahead (airspace and terrain permitting), engine failure
during the takeoff roll are pretty painless if you simply blend in
enough rudder to keep on centerline as you accelerate then shift to
instruments once airborne.

Engine failure during climbout while in a turn can be disorienting
with the greater yawing and rolling tendencies due to higher speeds
and power settings...obviously greater care must be taken by the pilot
flying the jet.

Juvat

"Robey Price" wrote
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

Why is rudder input mandatory during an engine failure vice simply
using ailerons?

Quick example, a United 747-400 lost an engine on takeoff from SFO a
couple years back. The jet was full/heavy, the FO (guy in the right
seat) was making the takeoff. During intial climbout, the FO used full
aileron/yoke to maintain wings level while trying to climb straight
out. The only problem was the drag caused by the deployed spoilers
(for roll) on the side with two good motors. [picture aileron into the
two good engines trying to "lift" the wing with only one motor to turn
into the good side]. This was not the approved solution for
controlling a 747 on takeoff with an engine failure.

As a result the drag severely degraded the climb capability and there
was a ridge line in front of the jet. Two guys sitting in jumpseats
finally had enough of the FO's hamfisted technique and started
insisting he use rudder to control the yaw and not aileron. The FO
listened..."Oh yeah, ****, f*ck me..." and they cleared the rapidly
rising terrain by mere feet.

So that is why rudder input is critical, minimize yaw and drag to
provide climb performance.

And as you alluded to, blind rapid full rudder inputs can simply
over-G the airframe.

The technique we are taught during an engine failure is to climb
straight ahead (airspace and terrain permitting), engine failure
during the takeoff roll are pretty painless if you simply blend in
enough rudder to keep on centerline as you accelerate then shift to
instruments once airborne.

Engine failure during climbout while in a turn can be disorienting
with the greater yawing and rolling tendencies due to higher speeds
and power settings...obviously greater care must be taken by the pilot
flying the jet.

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.

In article ,
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Robey Price" wrote
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

Why is rudder input mandatory during an engine failure vice simply
using ailerons?

Quick example, a United 747-400 lost an engine on takeoff from SFO a
couple years back. The jet was full/heavy, the FO (guy in the right
seat) was making the takeoff. During intial climbout, the FO used full
aileron/yoke to maintain wings level while trying to climb straight
out. The only problem was the drag caused by the deployed spoilers
(for roll) on the side with two good motors. [picture aileron into the
two good engines trying to "lift" the wing with only one motor to turn
into the good side]. This was not the approved solution for
controlling a 747 on takeoff with an engine failure.

As a result the drag severely degraded the climb capability and there
was a ridge line in front of the jet. Two guys sitting in jumpseats
finally had enough of the FO's hamfisted technique and started
insisting he use rudder to control the yaw and not aileron. The FO
listened..."Oh yeah, ****, f*ck me..." and they cleared the rapidly
rising terrain by mere feet.

So that is why rudder input is critical, minimize yaw and drag to
provide climb performance.

And as you alluded to, blind rapid full rudder inputs can simply
over-G the airframe.

The technique we are taught during an engine failure is to climb
straight ahead (airspace and terrain permitting), engine failure
during the takeoff roll are pretty painless if you simply blend in
enough rudder to keep on centerline as you accelerate then shift to
instruments once airborne.

Engine failure during climbout while in a turn can be disorienting
with the greater yawing and rolling tendencies due to higher speeds
and power settings...obviously greater care must be taken by the pilot
flying the jet.

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.



Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.

--
Ron

Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.



The same for Boeing 737 tail problem... resolved for the entire fleet
only in ....2012....

"Nemo l'ancien" wrote in message
...

Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.



The same for Boeing 737 tail problem... resolved for the entire fleet
only in ....2012....

The Boeing tail problem is the same one the A-300 has; the 737 rudder PCU AD
is basicly political bull****. Loss of ATC seperation led to a control
surface stall and the pilot beat the rudder pedals through the floor. The
difference is that the A-300 in question was equiped with a DFDR and we can
know exactly what happened. We know the pilot's inputs to the airplane, the
direction of deflection of the rudder and the aircraft's response to those
control surface deflections. Flight AA587 was classic rudder reversal due
to flow seperation. (stall)

Referernce: Blakey's statement to the USAir 737 and AA A-300.

"Ron Parsons" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Robey Price" wrote
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
....

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.



Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.

Nonsense. The lack of analysis of that condition is long standing and
applied to Lockheed, Boeing and McAir before Airbus was born.

In case you have trouble keeping up, the failure mode that augered in AA587
probably applies to most jet transports. Because the analysis hasn't been
done, you can't prove that_any_certified for passenger service will survive
a rudder slam while in a sideslip at low altitude.

You can fix the problem if 1. you know the envelope that's survivable and 2.
you prevent excursions outside the envelope. You prevent the excursion (in
increasing order of preferability) by training, by modifications to control
"feel", by changes to control laws and by structural enhancements. The last
may not be possible within acceptable weight and moment constraints.

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
...

"Ron Parsons" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Robey Price" wrote
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw
has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
...

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.



Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.

Nonsense. The lack of analysis of that condition is long standing and
applied to Lockheed, Boeing and McAir before Airbus was born.

In case you have trouble keeping up, the failure mode that augered in
AA587
probably applies to most jet transports. Because the analysis hasn't been
done, you can't prove that_any_certified for passenger service will
survive
a rudder slam while in a sideslip at low altitude.

You can fix the problem if 1. you know the envelope that's survivable and
2.
you prevent excursions outside the envelope. You prevent the excursion (in
increasing order of preferability) by training, by modifications to
control
"feel", by changes to control laws and by structural enhancements. The
last
may not be possible within acceptable weight and moment constraints.

Twin engine out takeoff requirements have driven regulation for these big
rudders, until now. It is a fairly simple matter for AI to reduce the
pilot's command authority by adjusting the control LAWs.

"Ron Parsons" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Robey Price" wrote
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

snip

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.



Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.

...and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.


--
Ron

In article ,
"tw" wrote:

"Ron Parsons" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

"Robey Price" wrote
After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

snip

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.



Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.

..and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.

Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
incidents.

The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.

Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
might be improper maintainance.

The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.

Airbus has been consistant in finding Pilot Error, in one case in Asia
releasing their findings before the Accdent Investigation Team had even
arrived at the site.

The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.

FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.

Now don't you feel safer?

--
Ron