Malaysia Flight 370 - Troubling Questions

Kevin,

This is one of those cases where you might find yourself cursed with what you asked for. When the FAA hands out new rules, they aren't always careful who they deal the cards to. Often, yes, to their credit. But far from always.

14CFR§99.13 already requires that most aircraft equipped with transponders have to have them turned on for the majority of flight operations. Fortunately 14CFR§99.13(d) allows an exception in the case of gliders. However, guidance from FSDOs seem to indicate that they expect that, if you turn a transponder on, they expect you to leave it on for the duration of the flight.

Of course, 14CFR§91.3 give the pilot ultimate responsibility over the aircraft, and under its authority can take any action the pilot deems necessary to ensure safety of flight. And that includes turning the transponder off if, for example, it is using electrical power that might otherwise be needed for arguably more critical equipment such as varios or navigation equipment. However, 14CFR§91.3 is not a get-out-of-jail free card. When you invoke it, you should fully expect to have to explain the context and rationale for your decisions to the FAA administrator or their designated representative.

One takeaway here is that when the FAA tightens up its regulations, it often starts by eliminating loopholes such as that offered in 14CFR§99.13(d). Which, all things considered might be a good thing as regards safety of flight, but I have to respect that many pilots and aircraft owners will see it differently.

Another takeaway is that when authorities start requiring thus-and-such equipment must be permanently enabled and powered on, it flies in the face of 14CFR§91.3 which establishes the essential authority of the pilot in command. If the pilot does not have ultimate authority over every single switch, valve, and control on their aircraft, then who does? Who else sould we trust with such responsibility?

Thanks, Bob K.


On Thursday, March 13, 2014 8:11:10 AM UTC-7, Kevin Christner wrote:
Hi all,



The news on flight 370 got more interesting today. It appears the plane flew for several hours after dropping off radar. This begs a few questions..



Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?

Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?

It appears some data was sent to Rolls Royce about the condition of the engines. Why did it take so long for them to provide this data?



I am sure there are more questions. But I'm also pretty sure that giving full cavity searches at the airport does not appear to be addressing critical security issues that have simple, one time fixes.



Thoughts?



2C

On Thursday, March 13, 2014 11:17:12 AM UTC-5, Bob Kuykendall wrote:
Kevin,



This is one of those cases where you might find yourself cursed with what you asked for. When the FAA hands out new rules, they aren't always careful who they deal the cards to. Often, yes, to their credit. But far from always.



14CFR§99.13 already requires that most aircraft equipped with transponders have to have them turned on for the majority of flight operations. Fortunately 14CFR§99.13(d) allows an exception in the case of gliders. However, guidance from FSDOs seem to indicate that they expect that, if you turn a transponder on, they expect you to leave it on for the duration of the flight.



Of course, 14CFR§91.3 give the pilot ultimate responsibility over the aircraft, and under its authority can take any action the pilot deems necessary to ensure safety of flight. And that includes turning the transponder off if, for example, it is using electrical power that might otherwise be needed for arguably more critical equipment such as varios or navigation equipment. However, 14CFR§91.3 is not a get-out-of-jail free card. When you invoke it, you should fully expect to have to explain the context and rationale for your decisions to the FAA administrator or their designated representative.



One takeaway here is that when the FAA tightens up its regulations, it often starts by eliminating loopholes such as that offered in 14CFR§99.13(d). Which, all things considered might be a good thing as regards safety of flight, but I have to respect that many pilots and aircraft owners will see it differently.



Another takeaway is that when authorities start requiring thus-and-such equipment must be permanently enabled and powered on, it flies in the face of 14CFR§91.3 which establishes the essential authority of the pilot in command. If the pilot does not have ultimate authority over every single switch, valve, and control on their aircraft, then who does? Who else sould we trust with such responsibility?



Thanks, Bob K.





On Thursday, March 13, 2014 8:11:10 AM UTC-7, Kevin Christner wrote:

Hi all,







The news on flight 370 got more interesting today. It appears the plane flew for several hours after dropping off radar. This begs a few questions.







Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?



Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?



It appears some data was sent to Rolls Royce about the condition of the engines. Why did it take so long for them to provide this data?







I am sure there are more questions. But I'm also pretty sure that giving full cavity searches at the airport does not appear to be addressing critical security issues that have simple, one time fixes.







Thoughts?







2C

99.13(d) only expempts gliders from paragraphs (b) and (c). Paragraph (a) requires transponders to always be on if installed, and would still apply to a transponder equipped glider.