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#11
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On Thursday, April 10, 2014 7:03:51 AM UTC-6, wrote:
If the insurance company can't link passengers touching of controls, in general, to accidents why forbid it? I wonder how many GA accidents have been linked to a non-pilot passenger handling the controls. There are probably some but I'd guess that they would involve panicked passengers. If its such a big deal why not require that there be no controls accessible to the passenger? I could understand no touching during critical phases of flight (approach, landing take-off, below x altitude, etc) but to completely forbid it is overkill. I just fail to see the logic of "Well, before you stall/spun on final you let the passenger make a few turns an hour prior. Therefore, your policy is cancelled" or worse, deny coverage on that particular accident. I know 'don't ask, don't tell' is the simplest way around it but I'd hate to say to someone "I'll let you try but you can't tell anybody when we get back on the ground". That's to the point. Not to get into cosmic scenarios, the matter boils down to what the courts will decide. That is, the expectation of service. If someone is paying for a service, the courts will hold to commercial standards in the event of an incident. You cannot have any expectation that the statements for testimony of an injured party will support your position. The ten-hour annual pilot may not be any more likely to end up in the rocks and sagebrush as anyone else, but clearly is not your average XC pilot. Hard landing, PIO, runway excursion, or PTT, why risk it? The projected audience of the OP are likely pilots, some current, some not, but they will really want to test their stick and rudder skills. I think there are better options for generating long-term results than what's being considered. Embrace the prospective new member, make than an introductory club/chapter member for three months (the SSA part is free), and get them 3-4 lessons in the book and at least a one hour soaring trip on O2. My $.02, Frank Whiteley |
#12
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On Thu, 10 Apr 2014 09:04:59 -0600, "Dan Marotta"
wrote: Not GA, but I recall an Air Force accident report where shards of the stick grip in the palm of the back seat passenger's hand indicated that he was on the stick at impact. I think it was an academy cadet in a T-33 and the instructor in the front had a heart attack. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593 rj |
#13
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On Thursday, April 10, 2014 3:59:42 PM UTC-7, Ralph Jones wrote:
On Thu, 10 Apr 2014 09:04:59 -0600, "Dan Marotta" wrote: Not GA, but I recall an Air Force accident report where shards of the stick grip in the palm of the back seat passenger's hand indicated that he was on the stick at impact. I think it was an academy cadet in a T-33 and the instructor in the front had a heart attack. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593 rj A 2-32 crashed at Calistoga, years ago when the rear passenger 'adjusted' his seating position and unknowingly shoved on one rudder pedal. They were coming over the west ridge line when suddenly the ship was in the trees. Like most ride 2-32's, the rear stick had been removed. Probably a good idea to remove the rudder pedals also. JJ |
#14
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On Friday, April 11, 2014 6:37:42 AM UTC-6, JJ Sinclair wrote:
On Thursday, April 10, 2014 3:59:42 PM UTC-7, Ralph Jones wrote: On Thu, 10 Apr 2014 09:04:59 -0600, "Dan Marotta" wrote: Not GA, but I recall an Air Force accident report where shards of the stick grip in the palm of the back seat passenger's hand indicated that he was on the stick at impact. I think it was an academy cadet in a T-33 and the instructor in the front had a heart attack. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593 rj A 2-32 crashed at Calistoga, years ago when the rear passenger 'adjusted' his seating position and unknowingly shoved on one rudder pedal. They were coming over the west ridge line when suddenly the ship was in the trees. Like most ride 2-32's, the rear stick had been removed. Probably a good idea to remove the rudder pedals also. JJ 1982. Rick told me during my BFR in 1984 that it was believed the passenger's hiking boot jammed between the pedal and the hull after pushing on the pedal. Surprisingly sparse NTSB report considering this was an injury/fatal accident. Frank Whiteley |
#15
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Most, if not all, the cited incidents involve unintentional touching/interfering with the controls. I'd like see to one or two where the probable cause of the accident was "failure of the PIC to control the aircraft as a result of his allowing a passenger to manipulate the controls" or similar FAA lingo.
That one Frank links to is weird. |
#16
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On Friday, April 11, 2014 11:02:12 AM UTC-6, wrote:
Most, if not all, the cited incidents involve unintentional touching/interfering with the controls. I'd like see to one or two where the probable cause of the accident was "failure of the PIC to control the aircraft as a result of his allowing a passenger to manipulate the controls" or similar FAA lingo. That one Frank links to is weird. We fly within several constraints. There are additional constraints due to organizing as a club or chapter. Insurance requirements are but one. Within this framework there are requirements and limits imposed by the FAA, IRS, state and local statutes, and organizing documents (articles and by-laws). At the outset, some appear to be nonsensical. A few are contradictory and actually AOPA has the lead in seeking a change in an FAA Order which may offer the opportunity to amend the organizing documents of some SSA clubs and chapters. I have no idea why the explicit 'sole manipulator' phraseology is specified. It may be unique to the club insurance offered. It may have originated from other aviation activities and is not unique to gliding insurance. I don't fly power, so am not involved with other insurances. If there is a case for striking this clause, let's hear it. Discuss it with the Soaring Safety Foundation and SSA directors and see if there is a consensus for doing so that would allow it to be broached to the underwriter. Our broker has undertaken similar initiatives in his representation to us. SSA clubs and chapters insured under the group plan are buying club insurance. AFAIK, clubs and chapters using other underwriters are not buying club insurance, but commercial insurance and the coverage varies in subtle and sometimes important ways. That weird link is to a situation where a person who should not have been in the A/C's seat may have actually contributed to the accident. I recall the accident as I wore a SAC hat in those days. That EC-135 was SAC's East Auxiliary Airborne Command Post and they were rather more expensive than the KC-135. Scuttlebutt at the time was that she was actually flying the bird. However, if you don't think that accident had an impact on several policies, you'd be mistaken. It wasn't unlike the F-16D incentive flights at Incirlik for outstanding airmen that abruptly ended permanently when the pilot and an NCO splashed into the Med. Changes in insurance plans, club rules, and airport operations usually result from reaction to a gap that was unforeseen and someone flew into it, probably with bad or at least uncomfortable results for some involved party. If you race in SSA sanctioned contests, you'll know that the entry release has changed for exactly that reason. We have a vehicle, it's a matter of using the right tool for the right job. It may be possible to add to that tool kit. FW |
#17
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![]() 1982. Rick told me during my BFR in 1984 that it was believed the passenger's hiking boot jammed between the pedal and the hull after pushing on the pedal. Surprisingly sparse NTSB report considering this was an injury/fatal accident. Frank Whiteley If memory serves me, the passenger tried to climb down from the tree and fell to his death. I try to remember that even though things may be very very bad, I ask myself: If I do X, will this very bad situation get better or worse? If the answer isn't a resounding, GET BETTER..................I'll probably not try doing X. Clem Bowman probably didn't know that his elevator had fallen off during takeoff, but he knew for sure that something was very wrong because he was in extreme low tow position despite holding full up elevator. Clem should have asked himself: If I release at 1000 feet, will this very bad situation get better or worse if I pull the release lever? We will never know for sure because Clem is no longer with us. JJ |
#18
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On Saturday, April 12, 2014 6:36:49 PM UTC-4, JJ Sinclair wrote:
If memory serves me, the passenger tried to climb down from the tree and fell to his death. That's truly useful to read. I've made a mental note to think twice about climbing to the ground when I find myself in a glider in the trees. I assume that this useful tidbit was omitted from the NTSB report. The NTSB report style serves a narrow and important purpose and perhaps it needs to remove detail, speculation, and unprovable conjectures. But it seems that detail and speculation can be instructive. I wonder if we will ever see a deliberately unofficial wiki style compendium of glider accident reports, a wiki that accommodates multiple contributors, that is community reviewed, and where the write up is not constrained by the narrow goals of an NTSB report. NTSB reports are official and they need to be circumspect. There is many reasons why NTSB reports are the way that they are and I don't want to change them. But I wonder if a wiki approach to accident documentation would improve the number of lessons learned. Is it time to try this with the analysis of glider accidents? Here is an explanation of how the editing of Wikipedia works: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia#Editing |
#19
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I have done essentially that very thing as a periodic Convention presentation over the last decade. I extract location, situation, causal factors according to NTSB, and then interview local soaring folks abut fatalities.
The results are often very conflicting with the formal statement, and situationally much more believable in context. The local knowledge often controverts the wrung-dry report. I add the hype of ill informed media reporting, and then ask my audience to conjecture about possible causes. We always get a range of possibilities, based on the audience's life/piloting experiences. Then, I wrap up each event by asking if the audience knows folks who have toyed with similar scenarios at their home field, or themselves been thusly vulnerable. That's when the real learning occurs. "I can be vulnerable. I can avoid that behavior." "I can intercede when I see that occurring." Yes - there is tremendous value in reviewing the reports and imagining how to avoid those situations for the future. Best wishes for 2014, Cindy B |
#20
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On Saturday, April 12, 2014 8:13:46 PM UTC-4, son_of_flubber wrote:
But I wonder if a wiki approach to accident documentation would improve the number of lessons learned. Is it time to try this with the analysis of glider accidents? Here is an explanation of how the editing of Wikipedia works: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia#Editing I'm thinking that this wiki should be private and perhaps require a cookie that shows that contributors and readers are logged into the members-only area of the SSA website. It might be best to otherwise be completely independent of the SSA website in order to avoid any hint of SSA official endorsement of the opinions expressed on the wiki. Likewise the contributions should be pseudo-anonymous (though little is truly anonymous on the internet) in order to lower the inhibitions of contributors. That and other measures should relegate the credulity of the discussion to that of 'rumor expressed on the internet' so that the discussion is useless to lawyerly types that might otherwise try to use the information to pursue lawsuits (and/or criminal prosecutions). The wiki would be 'educational and entertainment purposes only'. We would engage knowledgeable moderators to keep the quality high and the recriminations low. (To clarify for those less familiar with how the internet works... I'm proposing that we set up a 'private wiki' on the internet that functions in a fashion similar to wikipedia, but it would not be part of wikipedia. It would only be accessible to SSA members.) Discussions of accidents on RAS and other forums could be mined and summarized as content for the wiki. Another possibility that might be a good place to start would be to set up a private sub-reddit on Reddit.com to have a more back and forth structured discussion. For example see http://www.reddit.com/r/MH370/search..._sr=on& t=all If you're unfamiliar with reddit, the posts and comments are upvoted/downvoted by readers to sort the popular from the unpopular. Some subreddits are also moderated, and some are private to a specific group of contributors. |
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