No More New Fighter Aircraft Types?

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
wrote:

Considering that Sweden (population 8,8 million, GDP US$231
billion) could still afford to develop JAS39 Gripen, I think that
the demise of the fighter aircraft for financial reasons does not
yet need to be feared.

A good example. But, it also is an example of drawing conclusions when
comparing apples to oranges. Certainly Sweden has a history of
developing, producing and operating exceptional aircraft, but the
neutrality of Sweden means that the aircraft are by definition going
to be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. We won't be
finding much force projection going on for the Swedish military.

The result is a fairly straightforward high agility, interceptor with
limited ground attack capability and a fairly traditional sensor
suite.

What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
development. The USA is now trying to fund two fighters, the
F"/A"-22 and the F-35, which are both highly ambitious and
complex. With hindsight, it should have developed a single
middle-class fighter (designed for carrier use; the USAF can
use a lightened version) instead of a high/low mix, and the
approach to design should have been more evolutionary.

While the stake in McNamara's heart never kill him? Must we also
administer a silver bullet and still wear garlic around our necks?
Your suggest sounds a lot like TFX--the horrendous "one size fits all"
development projection that got the US the F-111. An airplane the Navy
aborted in the third trimester and which the AF could not effectively
operate for twenty years after deployment. The under-powered A, the
vacuum tube unmaintainable D, the unsustainable E and finally the
almost capable F model....ahhh yes, I remember them well. Great
examples such as Mt. Home which housed 84 airplanes disguised as a
three squadron (18 UE per squadron) wing and still could barely
generate 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day figured on their "authorized
equippage of 54 airframes.

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix--the USAF has done quite nicely
with F-15/16 and the Navy seems to have concluded that the "good ol'
days" of F-14/A-6 operations were better on both sides of the mission
than the F/A-18 business.

But I suspect that no small part of the cost getting out of control
is due to so-called "management", techniques which are now
also eating their way into military culture. The litigious American
mind has long had an excessive reverence for the written word
(whether it is the Constitution or "Do not dry pets in this microwave
oven!") and appears to be easily seduced by the trappings of
bureaucracy. Granted, the multi-national Eurofighter bureaucracy
cannot be any better! There is a risk-averse tendency to break
down development in phases, phases in stages, and stages in
substages, ad infinitum, all surrounded by due process and a mass
of tests. In theory, these serve to eliminate risks and get the best
possible aircraft; in practice they stretch development time and
increase costs. The justification is that the complexity of modern
aircraft requires delegation of the work. In practice, according to
Conway's law, every dividing line in the organisation adds
complexity to the final system.

Gotta agree 100% here. Certainly the project management culture
increases costs while attempting to minimize risks. What you don't
address, however, is the over-lay of political decision interference.
While a free-market capitalist business model might be successful with
the phase/stage/substage sequence, when you throw in the political
posturing, competition for budget dollars, mis-information campaigns
and general pacifism of nearly 50% of the American electorate, you
really get a screwed up program.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix--the USAF has done quite nicely
with F-15/16 and the Navy seems to have concluded that the "good ol'
days" of F-14/A-6 operations were better on both sides of the mission
than the F/A-18 business.

The F/A-18 is the solution to USN's problems and a fine example of a
procurement that faced the realities of the times.

We can't very well expect to keep F-35 costs down by migrating
electric/electronic systems from the F-22. That alone is reason for the
price of the F-35 to adjust upwards by 1/3. These days I would look to tha
F-35 to migrate technology to the F-22, if the F-22 survives it's current
review.

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

"phil hunt" wrote in message
. ..
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

The USAF loses power under that scenerio.

I'd say a few USAF super bugs might get the point across.

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A good question. Start by acknowledging that modern tactical aircraft
are not simply airplanes that fight. They are complex weapon systems
that bring together not only the airframe but the sensors, the
weapons, the defenses, etc. All of these components come with their
own baggage of trade-offs, compromises that must be made to get the
job done. For example stealth has become a desireable asset, but
building a stealthy airframe often means loss of manueverability.

An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The ground attack system needs a different sensor suite and must be
capable of carrying a meaningful payload. It has to feed data into the
complex ground attack weapons. It needs range, but might do without
some of the agility. It might be larger, heavier and less stealthy
than the A/A airplane.

The naval aircraft needs the durability to operate off the boat. The
weight of landing gear, arresting hooks, launch attachments, etc.
aren't necessary for the conventional ground-based system.

Add a bit of advantage to multiple source procurement as well and you
can begin to build a compelling argument for a mixed force. It's going
to be a compromise. Too diverse a force and you get overly
complicated. Too singularly dependent and you incur too much
performance compromise.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:


An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with Global
capability. A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed. The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and
bogged down with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments. The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required direction for
Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only miss the boat again in
ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a prime example of USAF not adjusting to
USAF requirements in acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

Tarver Engineering wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:


An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with Global
capability.

Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?

A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed.

Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
be turning your displays into masses of grass...

The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments.

Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.
God help everyone if a condition exists which they haven't
planned to accomodate. (An absolute certainty!)
If you spend enough money, you'll either fix it or hide the
errors so well that the things will be sitting in DM before
anyone figures it out.

The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required
direction for Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only
miss the boat again in ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a
prime example of USAF not adjusting to USAF requirements in
acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

Once upon a time, John, there was a method where Airman Dukes
(who just tripped over the answer to a problem) could tell the
designers/programmers WHAT they did wrong, WHY it doesn't work,
and HOW he fixed it. (Been there, done that.) No longer.
That avenue is closed; the geeks don't dare admit error; and to
fix the problem would be a very costly admission indeed.
Military tech used to be walled off from the just curious by
classification alone; today, that SOB is hermetically sealed
deep underground, surrounded by tripwires, moats, mines, and
dead ends - all to designed to protect the core from infiltration
by those who know enough to make a difference - and simplify
the process. It's the vacuum of space...

John T., former WCS MSgt

"Dweezil Dwarftosser" wrote in message
...
Tarver Engineering wrote:

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, ess (phil
hunt) wrote:


An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with
Global
capability.

Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?

If they start jamming communications it won't matter if the information is
space based, or comming from an AWACS. In order to make any kind of
comparison you would ahve to compare to what is done today.

A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed.

Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
be turning your displays into masses of grass...

I don't believe there is much support in the system for the lone wolf
fighter pilot scenerio. There may be soem of that inside the F-22
community, but that space is not the rocking chair career booster it onece
was.

The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments.

Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.

Yes, that kind of thing even comes to the fore in the commercial World.
Tremble spent a fortune trying to be in the aviation avionics business, only
to find that their softhead small GA pilots could not follow a
specification.

God help everyone if a condition exists which they haven't
planned to accomodate. (An absolute certainty!)
If you spend enough money, you'll either fix it or hide the
errors so well that the things will be sitting in DM before
anyone figures it out.

The Mars rover just went through what you describe, but they were
fortunately able to hack it back to life.

The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required
direction for Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only
miss the boat again in ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a
prime example of USAF not adjusting to USAF requirements in
acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

Once upon a time, John, there was a method where Airman Dukes
(who just tripped over the answer to a problem) could tell the
designers/programmers WHAT they did wrong, WHY it doesn't work,
and HOW he fixed it.

You might have thought so, but today engineers can barely speak to techs.
During my 6 months at BCAG while I was a systems engineer in cabin systems
we had an AT&T flightphone to integrate to a Collins SATCOM. The first
system had already been delivered to another Airline with a Honeywell Satcom
and it should have been a piece of cake for me to just run through the
integration testing and have the DER stamp off.

The first meeting my lead and I had with the chief tech at plant one he
brought up the fact that he had palced a chassis ground wire on the STB
(seat telephone box) to eliminate a shock hazard, as that was his liability
requirement for the testing to go forward. Olin even put a big warning
sticker on the box, but my lead could not understand what he was saying.
Further down the production like I added a chassis ground wire to the
airplane, which greatly upset my two DERs. Now the already released
airplane would have to be changed post release. The DERs expalined to me
that the integration testing was done without the ground and I pointed out
to them that the technician had told them twice right in front of me that
what they said was not true.

Later I discovered my lead was off to AT&T for his new job. Unfortunately
for him, all of AT&T's telephones were scrapped due to their "unsafe
install". I was out due to AT&T's anger, but AT&T was gone from every
airplane. For you see, a short look into the history of AT&T's STB and ZTB
boxes would have shown that the designs were stolen from me in the first
place by DPI Labs, then stolen from them by Global Wolfsburg and then stolen
from them by Olin. Once I had identified the "shock hazard" there was no
higher authority to argue the point with me.

(Been there, done that.) No longer.
That avenue is closed; the geeks don't dare admit error; and to
fix the problem would be a very costly admission indeed.

Sometimes there is a lot of money tied up in some geek's design and changing
it might have system global implications, or even scrap $millions in
equipments.

Military tech used to be walled off from the just curious by
classification alone; today, that SOB is hermetically sealed
deep underground, surrounded by tripwires, moats, mines, and
dead ends - all to designed to protect the core from infiltration
by those who know enough to make a difference - and simplify
the process. It's the vacuum of space...

So true, but in the case of the F-22 even other ivory tower engineers are
ignored.

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A few months back, I was talking to a guy who was asking the "why not
one fighter plane" question (F-22 vs. F-35), until I pointed out that he
had a car *and* a pickup truck in his garage, with a motorcycle for
weekends...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Chad Irby wrote:

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A few months back, I was talking to a guy who was asking the "why not
one fighter plane" question (F-22 vs. F-35), until I pointed out that he
had a car *and* a pickup truck in his garage, with a motorcycle for
weekends...

Precisely. The Ferrari goes like hell, but makes a lousy
gravel-toter. Sometimes, you need LOTS of gravel.