Friendly Fire Notebook

On 17 Apr 2004 02:20:13 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

I think that is painting with too broad a brush.

Yes, it was, but Michel's anti-SAC bias shines throughout the book and is the
only negative aspect to his writing. I felt he could drop the anti-SAC attitude
and still make his point.

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve. Marsh simply and
clearly states the relationship between SAC and the unified command.
He points out the parochialism driven by the bomber-generals and the
failure of leadership that cost a lot of airplanes during LB II.
Statement of the events and pointing out the relationships isn't
"anti-SAC bais."

But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area.

and struck them again and again and again....

Then your research probably disclosed the original prep order that
directed the wings to conduct a full scale, maximum effort for THREE
DAYS. The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent. I have written a formal review of his book and
the two faults that I found (which don't outweigh the excellent
detail, the probing analysis and the extremely valuable enemy
perspective), were the short-shrift given to the daytime ops and the
emphasis on the NVN view of the battle as "the Dien Bien Phu of the
air war." If that was a "victory" for them it was most assuredly
Phyrric.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve.

Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
reborn", which may be in progress. No, my beef with Michel is in his first
chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
value to the rest of the book. I agree completely with Michel about the
horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
any SAC unit. What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.

The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent.

So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
correct writting?


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 18 Apr 2004 21:18:55 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve.

Hardly, my biggest concern today is that STRATCOM re-invents itself as "SAC
reborn", which may be in progress.

No one will accuse you of paranoia for that apprehension. Be afraid,
be very afraid.

No, my beef with Michel is in his first
chapter where he bashes SAC about its "ORI mentality" and then makes a mistake
by throwing spears at SAC, LeMay and their contribution in Korea during that
conflict(Michel makes a *completely* false statement about SAC's contribution
to 7th AF during 1951-1952). In my opinion, that entire chapter is of little
value to the rest of the book.

You forced me to pull it off the shelf and do a quick skim. I think
you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.
Titled "Peace is Our Profession" it seems to be a fairly accurate
brief history of the period of the '50s. LeMay and other WW II bomber
generals were in control of a large chunk of the AF. The real
questions of doctrine in an emerging Cold War were driving decisions
and strategic nuclear forces were a major player. Even the tactical
inventory was being developed around bomber intercept for defense and
low-level nuke strike for offense.

I agree completely with Michel about the
horrible job SAC did in nearly every regard during LB II, but when read in the
context of the first chapter, it looks like he's got a gripe with SAC. In fact,
he admits he once had a "gripe" with SAC. In that first chapter Michel claims
(and since I lent my copy to someone I'm going to have to paraphrase) that all
fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE *hated* SAC and dreaded an assignment to
any SAC unit.

Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
is a fact. All fighter pilots in TAC, PACAF or USAFE most assuredly
hated the thought of possibly being assigned to SAC. (Can you recall
the vinyl square top baseball caps and polyester dickies of SAC
crews?)

When personnel requirements and the bad personnel policy decision of
"no involuntary second tours" drove the cross-training of loads of
SAC, MAC and ATC crews into fighters, the hatred was reinforced. While
a lot of guys did a great job (and some are described in When Thunder
Rolled), there were some who brought SAC attitudes and lack of
flexibility with them. It wasn't a "team-building" exercise.

What the book jacket tells us is that Michel was an F-4 pilot,
one that obviously had issues with SAC. Bottom line, I thought the book was
great, but the first chapter was not needed, contained historical innacuracies
and overall detracted from Michel's overall premis.

Marshall flew a combat tour in RF-4s, then another in F-4s during
Linebacker and finally wound up as an F-15 driver.

The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why? Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
December 18, 1972 was a fake?

If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
150 BUFF sorties on night one. (Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
in the same month let alone one night?)

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent.

So you can actually research facts from a library and produce a factually
correct writting?

I think Pliny the Elder did some of that. (And, after ten years
service on the seven-member Board of Trustees of the Pikes Peak
Library District I've got a soft spot in my heart/head for libraries.)


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

I think
you must be referring to the Prologue rather than the first chapter.

I'm sorry, I lent my book to someone, but yes the prologue is what I'm
referring to.

it seems to be a fairly accurate
brief history of the period of the '50s.

Not where it claims LeMay sent 7th AF its "least combat capable B-29 units"
(paraphrased). SAC sent 2 *radar* equipped B-29 units to Japan. These B-29
units were hardly the least capable in SACs inventory, in fact quite the
opposite.

Well, duh! I don't want to be a shatterer of your illusions, but that
is a fact.

Which is fine, but don't expect readers not to question your main premis when
its reflected in the light of; "I always hated SAC anyway..."

So, you're telling me that the prep order that specified three-day max
effort that I read in the Korat Command Post on the morning of
December 18, 1972 was a fake?

No, the three day maximum effort was also followed in the JCS order with the
caveat that operations could be extended. Nixon's memoirs shed even further
light, indicating he was going to bomb them until they returned to Paris....or
congress removed funding. Are you trying to say Nixon wouldn't have been the
ultimate authority on the legth of LB II?

If damage inflicted was a secondary concern, then why didn't we just
resume tactical operations and pick up where Linebacker had ended.
Inflicting maximum damage was the whole raison d'etre for scheduling
150 BUFF sorties on night one.

Because Nixon himself ordered the use of BUFFs over Hanoi! He was making a
statement!

Have you ever seen 150 BUFFs airborne
in the same month let alone one night?

No, but that would be awsome!


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.
You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22 out ot Takhli with F-4s out the othe 48th
TFW. Or did I misunderstand?.

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern. The F-4s went up in
the daytime to hit targets that the bombers missed. Two of which I flew escort
on were Radio Hanoi and the Hanoi thermal power production plant. Given that
we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon, I'd say that damage was
a concern. My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Viernamized. The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

Steve
Korat RTAFB 72-74
F-4E







The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

The bombing was always going to be extended until the NVN delegation returned
to Paris, Nixon's memoirs as well as Kissenger's bear this out. Many of the
first B-52 targets struck weren't even recce'd until the 3rd day. Why?
Because
damage inflicted was a secondary concern.

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.

Well, not just me but several prominant authors....

You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22

These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon

Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing in
a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor) were
having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.

My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.

Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.

The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that than
LB I.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You have a few of your facts and explantions wrong.

Well, not just me but several prominant authors..

I have read several prominent authors, too, and some of their "facts" were
point blank wrong. The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts. The coal fired
electrical plant we took out with LGBs in the daylight on Day #3 after the
bombers two nights in a row is one that stands out in my mind. The post strike
photos in the textbook clearly shows the damage we left behind. Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.

Hereis an interesting read for you from aother author

http://www.sftt.org/303VINq.pdf



You made prior reference to a hundred or so WWII French truck as being the
exxtent of the NVN tranportation system. Doesn't explain the 800+ Russian
and
Chinese trucks we struck in Sept 22

These were truck being used as supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Mihn trail?

Yes they were. We also used to escort Specter on the trails at night, in
F-4Ds. We usually carried CBU-58 and MK 82 with daisy cutters. Specter would
"mark" the lead and tail trucks and stop the convoys with 20 mm API then we
would drop in the line between the two truck fires. According to the Specter
guys the convoys were often in the miltiple hundreds of trucks. I seem to
recall that the record number of Specter truck kills in one night was 500+. I
got credit for a total of 400+ over a period of four months according to
Specter BDA for whatever that was worth. I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.



Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed? Must have made sense to somebady
and we all worked for the politicians. Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.



we continued to restrike targets that were missed by the bombers at night,
recce'd in the AM and hit by fighters in the afternoon

Of the 7 night #1 B-52 targets, only a "few" were recce'd prior to night #3.
Had they recee'd immediately they would have noticed that the BUFFs bombing
in
a strong crosswind (the same crosswind that was moving the chaff corridor)
were
having accuracy problems due to those strong crosswinds. Interstingly enough,
18 years later, that same problem would resurface on targets in Iraq and
Kuwait.

SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a crosswind
or wind shear in other words? We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s. An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target, similar to that incident where the
B-52 cell hit Neak Long in Cambodia.



My strong recollection was that we were trying to damage the NVN
supply chain and command structure as much as we could while we had the
opportunity as the war was Vietnamized.

Which was done with great success during LB I and Freedom Porch.

The NVN didn't recover until 1975.

True, but the damage inflicted during LB II had much less to do with that
than
LB I.

Maybe for the bombers but I would have to disagree for the fighters.

On Day 8 for example, Korat was fragged against a rail LOC, first daytime
strike for the AF A-7Ds. Unfortunately that one was a fiasco as the #2 -105
Weasel punched off his load on the runway on TO roll after an engine problem
and shut the runway down for 45 min. We finally did get off and over the
target but it was 100% unercast, the Pathfinder couldn't get a Loran lock and
so we all went home. It is described in the ACSC thesis that Karl Eschmann
wrote that became the book you refer to. I'd have to get it out to see exactly
what the target was but I am almost certain it was a rail yard. Karl and I are
friends and as I was a contributor and proofreader, he gave me a couple copies
of the manuscript. I loaned my book out and never got it back. The book
leaves out some information in places that is in the manuscript.

The accounts of LBII are a sore subject with me as there seems to have been an
element in the AF that was determined to show SAC in the best light possible.
That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental. Particularly when I
see BDA attributed to the bombers when I know for a fact that the fighters were
responsible. I am in no way tryng to downplay the bravery of the SAC crews - I
wouldn't have wanted their jobs for twice the pay - but I don't believe the
bombing was all that effective.. What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more effective.
They were running out of missiles and fuel as their supply lines had been
pretty well cut off as early as Day 3. I guess you could call that political
but I see it as more of a tactical solution. Had the supplie lines stayed open,
the bombong might have gone on a lot longer. I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles. I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing - in fact I still have some
pictures I took with a little camera I carried with me.

Regards.

Steve Mellenthin






BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

The two targets I mentioned were included in the lists of
targets destroyed in the ACSC and Air War College texts.

Which include "documented facts" on how 8th Air Force won WW in Europe. See my
earlier posts for my opinion of AF PME.

Don't believe
all you read unless the author was there himself.

That's ridiculous. Using that logic there is only one "believeable" book on the
Peloponnesian War. Conversely, according to you I could right a definitive work
on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which wouldn't be worth the cost of the paper
because I was so deeply buried in B-52 stuff (flying and mission planning),
that the "big picture" blew right by me.

I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.

Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.

Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed?

Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.

Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

SAC couldn't hit a point target with strings of up to 300 bombs in a
crosswind
or wind shear in other words?

Nope. The BUFF OAS calculates a release using the winds at altitude, should
those winds change drastically on the way down, it could have a significant
impact on accuracy. It happened in LB II, then again in DS. It was fixed after
DS.

We managed reasonably well with the LORAN
equipped
A-6s, F-111As, and F-4s.

Not sure about the F-4s, but neither the F-111 or A-6 was dropping from inside
or above the jet stream. If the F-4 has that capability great, its too bad they
didn't give it to the BUFF following Vietnam, we could have used over
Iraq/Kuwait.

An A-6 with two flights of three waqs accurate enough
to nearly destroy the DaNang POL facility when the BN forgot to switch
steering
from his offset aimpoint to his target

A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.

That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.

I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.

but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..

Depends what effect you were looking for...

What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
effective.

What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.

They were running out of missiles

Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.

and fuel

They had been low on fuel since May due to LB I. LBII had little to no impact
on NV POL stores.

I don't think it wold have
happened as it did if NVN had more missiles.

See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.

I sat in an orbit over downtown
for 15 minutes on Day 3 until a single cloud drifted away from the target the
the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing

The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I never cared much about BDA numbers
but I understood them to be fairly accurate from recce photos and from
Specter's night vision and IR gear.

Except that the over inflated truck count is now a documented fact and one of
the accurate things taught at SOS and ASCS (I'm not sure about Air War
College). Recently there was a program on the Discovery Channel that
highlighted the Ho Chi Mihn Trail vehicle repair facilities and pointed out
that many of the trucks on the trail were "destroyed" several times over.

I don't disagree with you relative to overstating numbers . My body, truck,
and tonnage of enemy supplies destroyed counts were ridiculous at times. I am
trying point out that you are very much understating, at least with respect to
my own personal observations. I've enough pre/post strike recce photos of
truck parks and convoys to know that there were a lot of trucks, numbering int
he hundreds, certainly more than the hundred you mentioned unless you want to
tell me those photos wre faked.

I wasn't impressed one way or the other by the accounts of LB I and II when I
went through SOS and ACSC. The AWC readings were shown to me by an 0-4 and an
0-5 who were taking AWC by correspondence. I understand they upset a few folks
when they pointed out the errors in the photos to the staff.



Not sure you can say that damage was a secondary concern.

It was, at least for the politicians who ordered the operation.

If so then why were the LGB and Loran bombers sent up in the daylight to go
after targest that the bombers had missed?

Because it made military sense to do that, however it would have made little
difference in the end had the targets not been re-struck.

Possibly for some but not all the daytime targets that were struck. If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the first
place? You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they hit
anything or not, scaring the government back to the table and i don't quite
hold that view. My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the TAC
guys had learned the hard way, and then the collective actions of both forces
convinced the NVN there was no future in their current strategy once they
started losing assets..


Certainly would have been easier for
the fighter bases that were having to put sorties up around the clock. I
flew
a 18 hour crew duty day with two sorties over RP 6 on Day 2/3.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.




A BUFF could do that from 5,000' AGL too. Its a whole different story at
30,000+' AGL.

The pathfinders usually operated above 15,000' to stay out of small arms and
lighter AAA.like 23 and 37 mm.




That revisonist history tries to say that the bombers won the war and any
contribution from the fighters was purely coincidental.

I've never read anything that infers that, however, I will admit that the
bombers definitely have gotten more publicity.


Certainly did in the ACSC reading I referred to above.

You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity. Same
difference. Several who have challenged that viewpoint have become pariahs,
Dana Drenkowski for one.




but I don't believe the bombing was all that effective..

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?




What brought the North back to the bargaining
table was the threat that the bombing was going to become a lot more
effective.

What brought them back to the *signing* table was the fact that congress was
going to let the bombing continue; that and we told them (through the Swedish
ambassador I believe) that we were ready to sign the original agreement.

They were running out of missiles

Marshall L. Michel's book "The 11 Days of Christmas" attributes this to myth.
He supports this claim with interviews from NV SAM operators and commanders.
They were never short of missiles in Hanoi (they did have trouble getting
them
out to some of the sites, but were given a reprieve when night strikes in
Hanoi
decreased markedly night #5 through #7 when the BUFFs went to targets outside
Hanoi). The missile firings decreased because the bombers began to make the
operators job much more difficult with varied routing.

and fuel

I read that too but I don't agree. The missile firings dropped off after Day
3.


They were low on everything which also explains why the daytime AAA was so
light. I was over Hanoi and saw the sky go from absolutelyclear to totally
undercast from AAA. I never saw that in the daytime sorties I flew in LBII.
You are making my point about why their follow-on warfighiing capability was
set back by the fighter strikes. Whether the changed B-52 tactics or lack of
operation missiles reduced bomber losses is almost a moot point but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II


See above, or better yet, pick up Michel's book. Although, be forwarned, it
includes very little about you fighter guys.


I have the book and have read it a couple of times. I agree with nearly all he
has written. I guess we just see the accounts he describes differently. He
does quote a squadron mate, Rex Rivolo, in several places.but there isn't a
vast amount written about the daytime fighter sorties.




the Ubon LGB guys were after. We had a total of seven rounds of 57 mm fired
at
us at 15,000'. It was a good day for sightseeing

The NV SAM operators were under strict orders to fire SAMs at only F-111s or
B-52s. The one guy interviewed said he took a shot at an F-4 on night #1 and
was very concerned he would face disciplinary action.


There must have been quite a few SAM shooters getting disciplined that night
then. . One crew in our squadron had one fired at them, dodged it, then took
it down again for another. The backseater saw the altimeter unwind to zero as
they bottomed out in the pullup, but the SAM missed. It was the backseater's
first mission in country.

The F-111s operated far too low to be targeted once they were out onto the Red
River delta and in SAM country.