Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
WalterM140 wrote in message
...



I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said:

"But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said
Portal, "it
is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have
been too
costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.' Here was a remarkable
admission from
the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of
American air
policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat.

Of course at no point did he say anything of the sort.

He never used the word defeat and was careful to refer
to possibilities.

Not
surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area
campaign.
He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and
none
whatever in the this present oil policy'.

--"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings

Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was
the
Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of
fuel
and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being
shot to
pieces.


Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.

Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and sloughed
that
off whenever he could.


Indeed but he did so when ordered and the RAF played a major part
in the oil campaign.

Keith

Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.

The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.

The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just three
days of raids.

Look what Galland said:

"As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very badly the
effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so low
that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when interrogated
by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get enough
aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up at
least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on the
plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties which
were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we needed
for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date was
reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."

-- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland

If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for the
RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command was
defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to "the
night blitzing of cities."

All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as part
of the "Oil Campaign".

Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly flawed.
I haven't seen it and don't plan to.



Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.

The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.


By which point Ploesti was far less important than the
German synthetic plants

The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just
three
days of raids.


Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%. In fact far from facing destruction in
the spring of 1944 the RAF was flying almost twice as
many sorties as it had in spring 43 and seeing lower loss
rates.

The so called 'Battle of Berlin' was indeed a costly failure for
the RAF and clearly it should have been curtailed earlier
but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

During 1944 of around 525,000 sorties flown by the RAF
180,000 were against industrial towns, 93,000 against troop
concentrations, 100,000 against transportation targets and
around 48,000 against oil targets


Look what Galland said:

"As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very
badly the
effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so
low
that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when
interrogated
by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get
enough
aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up
at
least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on
the
plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties
which
were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we
needed
for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date
was
reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."

-- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland

If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for
the
RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command
was
defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to
"the
night blitzing of cities."

All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as
part
of the "Oil Campaign".


The RAF conducted its first raids on German oil targets
as early as 1941. This however is not the point. The
German night fighters were NOT grounded by lack of
fuel, indeed they continued to fly well into 1945.

Their real problem was that by late 1944 there were
more Mosquito NF's hunting Luftwaffe planes than
the Germans out in the skies over the Reich

Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly
flawed.
I haven't seen it and don't plan to.

So you are criticisng something you
havent seen, hmmm.

Keith

but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

Last I heard, France wasn't Germany.

It sort of, at this point, comes down to your word or the word of Charles
Portal.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

Last I heard, France wasn't Germany.


I guess nobody ever told you the Germans
were in control of France at the time. Perhaps
you should read a little history.

It sort of, at this point, comes down to your word or the word of Charles
Portal.


No sir it does not.

Keith

Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%.

After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.

It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber Command
from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the favorable
situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the rubble
jump in German cities later in the war.

Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to interject
a technological antidote -- the Mustang.

Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could only
get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air force
of fuel. And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and I
further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as he
dared.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%.

After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.


Indeed and in the month of march the loss rate was 3.6%
which was approx the same as the 8th AF was taking.

It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber
Command
from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the
favorable
situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the
rubble
jump in German cities later in the war.


Were the 8th AF also humiliated ?

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and France but continued to operate
over Germany, your fantasies notwithstanding

Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to
interject
a technological antidote -- the Mustang.



As the British would do with windows, serrate , the Mosquito NF etc

Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could
only
get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air
force
of fuel.

This has been shown to be untrue. The RAF operated over Germany every day
of the war. During most of spring and summer 1944 the Mosquito's of
the LNSF were delivering their 4000lb bomb loads to Berlin
almost on a nightly basis


And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and
I
further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as
he
dared.


All of which is of course irrelevant to your claim

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: "Keith Willshaw"

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and

The heavy lifitng on the transportation targets wwas handled by the 9th Air
Force using B-26's and P-47's to attack bridges, marshalling yards, rail lines,
crossroads, ordnance depots etc. It was called tactical bombing and the 9th
was a tactical air force. See strike photos of these missions on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: "Keith Willshaw"

They were switched to invasion targets too. The reality is that
the heavies were required to attack the transportation network
and defences in germany and

The heavy lifitng on the transportation targets wwas handled by the 9th
Air
Force using B-26's and P-47's to attack bridges, marshalling yards, rail
lines,
crossroads, ordnance depots etc. It was called tactical bombing and the
9th
was a tactical air force. See strike photos of these missions on my
website.


For much of the war that was true and I certainly have no intention
of denigrating the valiant efforts of the 9th AF

However in the run up to the invasion in 1944 RAF bomber command dropped
98,000 tons of bombs on transportation targets and a further 93,000 tons
on defences and troop concentrations. Between April and August 1944
such operations were the mainstay for the heavies.

Keith

This will probably appear in the wrong spot thanks to a buggy news server.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
Night fighters need fuel. Night fighter pilots need training. It was the
USAAF that largely deprived the GAF of fuel.

I suggest people actually look up the Speer oil reports, they
show the credit for the reduction in avgas production was
much more evenly shared between RAF and USAAF raids
than Walter prefers.

I suggest that the people check what the leader of the RAF said:

Before going on to note the holes in one of Walter's pet quotes, you
can see his preferences. Speers day by day reports of the effects
on avgas production of the allied raids are to be ignored, they are
facts, they show the combined offensive working, and giving credit
to the RAF for some effective raids from June 1944 on. Instead we
switch to the RAF's chief of air staff, during wartime stating an
opinion, a possibility.

Walter prefers the opinions and possibilities, if they fit his fiction,

"But for the favorable air situation created by the Americans, said
Portal, "it
is possible that the night blitzing of cities, would have by now have
been too
costly to sustain upon a heavy scale.'

This quote is run through the Walter translator, so "it is possible"
becomes "it is certain", and "heavy scale" becomes "any scale"

Here was a remarkable admission from
the British Air Chief of Staff--that it was only the success of
American air
policy which had spared Britain from visible and humiliating defeat.
Not
surprisingly, Harris totally rejected Portal's criticism of the area
campaign.
He now asserted flatly that he had no faith in selective bombing, 'and
none
whatever in the this present oil policy'.

--"Bomber Command" P. 380-384 by Max Hastings

Hastings, like Walter, simply over states what Portal was saying and
ignores the multiple factors tat drove down the loss rates from July
1944 onwards.

Bomber Command was defeated over Germany in the spring of 1944. It was the
Oil Campaign, largely pursued by the Americans that deprived the GAF of fuel
and that allowed the RAF back over Germay with any chance of not being shot to
pieces.

When flying to Germany the percentage of effort devoted to oil
strikes looks like this,

Table is date, 8th Air Force bombs on Germany, tons / % of those bombs
on oil targets // Bomber Command bombs on Germany, tons / % of those
bombs on oil targets.

May-44 19880 / 12.89 // 9479.8 / none
Jun-44 13120.5 / 34.01 // 5443.5 / 83.82
Jul-44 29838.3 / 22.33 // 14670.1 / 26.14
Aug-44 23597.4 / 26.07 // 16119.3 / 11.49
Sep-44 34818.4 / 21.12 // 22955.3 / 19.56
Oct-44 43552.2 / 11.74 // 57679.1 / 7.09
Nov-44 37798.8 / 42.39 // 58870.2 / 24.20
Dec-44 41092.1 / 7.23 // 51132.1 / 14.54
Jan-45 38551.3 / 7.40 // 33218.9 / 27.55
Feb-45 51187.2 / 11.93 // 50891.2 / 28.69
Mar-45 72951.1 / 13.06 // 74969.8 / 28.28
Apr-45 35646.1 / 4.61 // 38103.1 / 14.80

Bomber Command matched the 8th Air Forces percentage of efforts
in three of the first 4 months of the offensive when flying to Germany,
despite having to reserve a greater amount of the better weather for
strikes to support the invasion. The difference in August 1944 appears
to be from outside requests, a series of raids against German ports
including Konigsberg by Bomber Command, and SHAEF requests
to the 8th and Bomber Command for strikes on German vehicle
production.

Remember Spaatz declared oil the number one priority. If you add
up the tonnages from June 1944 to September 1944 then the result
is the percentage of effort on oil targets when flying to Germany, 8th
Air Force 24.3%, Bomber Command 24.9%. Note these figures are
for Germany only. In effect the air forces matched each other's
percentage efforts, which means any claims Harris diverted effort
need to be made about Spaatz as well. In terms of absolute effort
the 8th dropped 24,629.2 tons, Bomber Command 14,740.9 tons
on oil targets in Germany in this period.

You see folks, Walter does not actually look at the German reports
about what raids did what damage. This would mean having to
understand how wrong he is about how the Germans were deprived
of avgas.

Arthur Harris' despatch on war operations has a graph for heavy
bomber losses over Germany, the missing rate. Walter needs to
explain the dramatic drops in the missing rate in July 1944, after
the capture of a Luftwaffe night fighter with all the latest radar and
radar homing devices, and in September 1944, when the allied
armies in the west over ran much of the coastal radar network and
the night fighter airfields outside Germany.

Bomber Command's Harris had to be ordered to bomb oil targets and
sloughed that off whenever he could.

Walter simply ignores the reality of the amount of effort involved,
and the fact Harris' personal preferences were an effect at the
margins. Harris was not so stupid as to not put in the effort and
then be set up to take the blame when the plan failed as he
expected it to. See Harris and bombing Atlantic ports earlier
in the war and the help to the invasion forces, lots of protest,
orders were followed. See above for the effort against German
targets.

Walter likes to think the oil campaign was an end in itself, ignoring
the war would go on until Germany was occupied. Strikes to help
the invasion and oil were a means to that end, it was not a
competition.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.