Friendly Fire Notebook

On Sun, 18 Apr 2004 07:48:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
think? ;-)

Which, I think, makes my point. The victory comes from a complex
intermix of events. To discount the impact of the 8th AF on Germany's
capability to continue is to grossly over-simplify.

It may be a return to the cliches of AF vs Army dialog in which the
regular repitition of "boots on the ground" or "a tank on the front
lawn of their O'club" is refuted by anecdotes of the rapid termination
of hostilities after Aug 6 & 9, 1945, or Dec 29, 1972, or or Desert
Storm's 100 day air/100 hour ground war.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
production facilities? Zero.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
vehicles came in from outside the country.

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?


Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.

Ahh, what a cruel accusation after all these years. Do you really
consider that I ignore all the history or that my perspective is so
narrow?


Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective.

Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

And hope like hell that the other side's definition of losing is the opposite of
your definition of winning, and that they will accept and conform to your exit
strategy. Neither may be the case, especially in limited wars.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

Actually, LB II did have a clear strategy, but it wasn't the one you state. It was
more "By bombing NVN before Congress comes back into session and cuts off all funds,
I can convince Thieu that we will continue to back him should the DRVN violate the
accords, while also convincing the DRVN that it's not worth it for them to hold out
for the whole loaf but accept the same offer they'd previously agreed to before
Thieu queered the deal, so we can get our PoWs back and get the hell out of there
with as much dignity as we can muster."

Nixon was successful on the first three counts, and the fourth was arguable.
"Winning the war" was never his goal with LB II; he knew that the war could only be
won in South Vietnam, unless we were prepared to obliterate North Vietnam and risk a
direct confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR.

You've said a mouthful, but unfortunately even those of us with the
largest orifice sometimes can't get the whole thing in. You might also
put it into the context of presidential politics. The Nixon policy of
Vietnamization that started in '68 had already been nearly completely
implemented. It was acknowledged at all levels that all we wanted was
a "withdrawal with honor" and release of the POWs.

Let's also acknowledge that the Oct termination of LB was just prior
to election and that both the Nixon administration and the NV/VC were
using it to their advantage. Once elected, and prior to inauguration
for his second term, with four years ahead of him, Nixon felt free to
flex our muscle to wrap things up quickly. He did.

The final point you make is a good one. The clear differences in ROE
between Rolling Thunder when we were decidedly tentative without a
clear knowledge that it was possible to keep the nuclear genie in the
bottle and the wider latitude for action in LB and finally LB II is
evidence. After eight years we had developed a much better picture of
the relationship between Vietnam and China, as well as the split
between the Soviets and Chinese. And, we knew that the Viets were
Soviet clients rather than Sino-proxies. Neither of the big players
were going to get confrontational and both benefited from our
political unrest.


Politically (and morally), that
wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?

Ahh, now there's a picture to contemplate.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in
:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

[snip]

T'other thing is the idiotic rules of engagement that prevented
attacks on Haiphong if there was "neutral" shipping in the port.
This policy worked very well for the North Vietnamese until the
day somebody screwed up and there were no neutrals. An acquaintance
of mine was on the ensuing raid and has some lovely pictures of the
port in flames.

IBM

__________________________________________________ _____________________________
Posted Via Uncensored-News.Com - Accounts Starting At $6.95 - http://www.uncensored-news.com
The Worlds Uncensored News Source

On 18 Apr 2004 22:07:46 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

While Linebacker was ongoing throughout the summer of '72 we were also
operating round-the-clock against the trail with Spectre and F-4s with
M-36 and with USAF/USN/Marine tacair in those beseiged hot spots.

In March of '73 we were about to muster a full scale roll-back on Khe
Sanh because in addition to the three SA-2 sites we had confirmed
there we also had intel on a pair of SA-3 sites being on the verge of
operational. That's after we "moved the rubble around" and there was
no infrastructure to move such stone age equipment three hundred miles
south.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.

----Ed: Hunter/Killer specialist and WW #2488.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Ed Rasimus

Ed,

When I was assigned to one of the "summer help"Takhli F-4D units, namely the
48th out of Holloman, we hit Yen Bai in Aug 72 as our Pack 6 training flight,
and then Phuc Yen in Sept 72. Mixed loads of Mk 82 slicks and daisy cutters,
ffour flights of fours IIRC.

The F-4E Hunter-Killers were far more interesting. Didn't care much for that
1500' line abreast dumb bomber stuff.



Steve

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.

They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!

And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.

Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.

SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 19 Apr 2004 22:00:08 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.

They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down? Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.) Also note
that on 27 Dec. Maj. Carl Jeffcoat and 1/lt Jack Trimble were shot
down in daylight by a Mig-21 flying out of Kep. I engaged a pair of
MiG-21s on Dec 23rd, out of Phuc Yen. And, on Dec. 26th put four
CBU-52 on the N. end of the relatively unblemished runway of Yen Bai
during egress on a H/K mission near Hanoi.

And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.

Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable". Regular
locations for the highly mobile SA-2 units were listed as VN numbers,
but few of them were occupied during LB II. We often carried 8x10 BxW
glossies of known sites taken by recent RF-4 runs as a backup. The
priority was attack sites that fired on us or the strike package,
attack sites that we fired Shrikes at, and finally F-4s in the lead to
visual recce SAM possible sites.

Talking to Marshall in December last, he was in Hanoi researching his
next book. I asked him for a photo of the site on the downtown lake
(peninsula on the E. shore, still has a network of roads on it--now a
park). Marsh reported that there never was a site on that location. I
led the H/K element that killed the site on 12/21 in a scene that was
reminiscent of the SAM City finale of Flight of the Intruder. There
was most definitely a SAM site at that location.

SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....

Then you need to meet some Weasels. From the earliest days of F-100F
Weasels to the end of the war with third generation F-105Gs, we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up. While
early ('64-65) sites were classic Star-of-David bladed and surveyed
bases, in very short order they disappeared from view and became
heavily camouflaged and a "shell game" of which one is going to have
someone home.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down?

Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?

Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)

What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable".

Absolutely.

we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.

Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 20 Apr 2004 22:23:11 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.

You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture." Then you offered a "young NV Lt, armed with an AK-47
and a pistol" and no ammo.

Today you discount the intense fighting that was going on at Hue, An
Loc, and Khe Sanh during the period in question. Lots of ammo was
being expended by the bad guys---it must have come from somewhere and
I'll be willing to believe US troops on the scene that it was being
fired.

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down?

Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?

There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.
As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable. And,
no, we weren't that bad. In fact, if you see the pix of Radio Hanoi
after the LGB guys from Ubon showed up, you'll see the level of
accuracy. You also might consider the Doumer Bridge, the Dragon Jaw at
Thanh Hoa, the Bac Giang and Bac Ninh bridges as examples of artistry
with manually delivered dive bombs. And, consider the difference
between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away, high in the menopause
and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.

Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)

What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.

I don't think they shot at F-4s. An F-4 had no reason to get to the
altitudes of the B-52s (in fact in A/A configuration with three bags
it was almost impossible.) I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all. But, it was good for morale to award
some kills.

Maybe Guy Alcala knows if Toperczer reported any losses from the NVN
side related to the BUFF gunner claims.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable".

Absolutely.

we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.

Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.

A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8