Friendly Fire Notebook

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

(BUFDRVR) wrote in
:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

[snip]

T'other thing is the idiotic rules of engagement that prevented
attacks on Haiphong if there was "neutral" shipping in the port.
This policy worked very well for the North Vietnamese until the
day somebody screwed up and there were no neutrals. An acquaintance
of mine was on the ensuing raid and has some lovely pictures of the
port in flames.

IBM

__________________________________________________ _____________________________
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On 18 Apr 2004 22:07:46 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

While Linebacker was ongoing throughout the summer of '72 we were also
operating round-the-clock against the trail with Spectre and F-4s with
M-36 and with USAF/USN/Marine tacair in those beseiged hot spots.

In March of '73 we were about to muster a full scale roll-back on Khe
Sanh because in addition to the three SA-2 sites we had confirmed
there we also had intel on a pair of SA-3 sites being on the verge of
operational. That's after we "moved the rubble around" and there was
no infrastructure to move such stone age equipment three hundred miles
south.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.

----Ed: Hunter/Killer specialist and WW #2488.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB. It seems to this observer
that the first dedicated airfield strikes were by the F-111s on Dec.
18 PM. And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed. SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Ed Rasimus

Ed,

When I was assigned to one of the "summer help"Takhli F-4D units, namely the
48th out of Holloman, we hit Yen Bai in Aug 72 as our Pack 6 training flight,
and then Phuc Yen in Sept 72. Mixed loads of Mk 82 slicks and daisy cutters,
ffour flights of fours IIRC.

The F-4E Hunter-Killers were far more interesting. Didn't care much for that
1500' line abreast dumb bomber stuff.



Steve

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.

They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!

And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.

Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.

SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 19 Apr 2004 22:00:08 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

That logistic analysis sounds real good at the micro-fiche machine,
but if you'll talk to some Marines who were at Khe Sanh and Hue in MR
I and some ARVN and US troops at An Loc in MR III, you'll find that
the bad guys seemed to be doing just fine regarding supplies.

Which would show you why first hand accounts aren't always the best pieces of
info. Post war interviews with NVA regulars engaged in the Easter offensive
attest to severe shortages, including the tale of a young NVA 2nd Lt., sent
into battle with an AK-47 and a sidearm with no ammo. For every NVA unit with
"just fine supplies" there were two others with *none*.

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

And you haven't explained to me when Phuc Yen, Kep, Cat Bi, Hoa Lo and
Yen Bai airfields were struck during LB.

They weren't. I never claimed *every* LBII target was a "repeat", but a great
majority were. And even those new targets (like Phuc Yen and Kep airfields)
were hit repeatedly, beyond what kind of "maintenance" bombing you would do to
keep an airfield shutdown. Come on Ed, B-52s alone dropped nearly 1,000 bombs
on the Kep airfield. Other non-airfield targets got hit with as much as 4 times
that amount. All in 11 days!

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down? Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.) Also note
that on 27 Dec. Maj. Carl Jeffcoat and 1/lt Jack Trimble were shot
down in daylight by a Mig-21 flying out of Kep. I engaged a pair of
MiG-21s on Dec 23rd, out of Phuc Yen. And, on Dec. 26th put four
CBU-52 on the N. end of the relatively unblemished runway of Yen Bai
during egress on a H/K mission near Hanoi.

And, you might note, that if the archives told you that SAM
sites were specifically targeted during LB II, they fibbed.

Well, if you have Marshall Michel's phone number, you better give him a ring
because he (and at least three other authors) claim that on night #9 B-52s went
after SA-2 sites including the "infameous" VN-563 site (I think that was the
number?). Karl Eschmann lists 8 SAM sites as B-52 targets and 7 SAM sites as
F-111 targets in his book.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable". Regular
locations for the highly mobile SA-2 units were listed as VN numbers,
but few of them were occupied during LB II. We often carried 8x10 BxW
glossies of known sites taken by recent RF-4 runs as a backup. The
priority was attack sites that fired on us or the strike package,
attack sites that we fired Shrikes at, and finally F-4s in the lead to
visual recce SAM possible sites.

Talking to Marshall in December last, he was in Hanoi researching his
next book. I asked him for a photo of the site on the downtown lake
(peninsula on the E. shore, still has a network of roads on it--now a
park). Marsh reported that there never was a site on that location. I
led the H/K element that killed the site on 12/21 in a scene that was
reminiscent of the SAM City finale of Flight of the Intruder. There
was most definitely a SAM site at that location.

SAM sites
were too mobile for specific targeting and were always response
targets for the Hunter/Killer flights.


Not according to nearly every reference source I've seen....

Then you need to meet some Weasels. From the earliest days of F-100F
Weasels to the end of the war with third generation F-105Gs, we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up. While
early ('64-65) sites were classic Star-of-David bladed and surveyed
bases, in very short order they disappeared from view and became
heavily camouflaged and a "shell game" of which one is going to have
someone home.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down?

Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?

Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)

What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable".

Absolutely.

we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.

Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 20 Apr 2004 22:23:11 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Seems to me that you can't have it both ways. If on scene US observers
aren't reliable sources of information, why should lowest level,
in-the-jungle, low-tech, guerillas on the enemy side be more reliable?

Well it depends on who is commenting on what. A U.S. Marine commenting on how
well supplied the enemy was is conjecture, a NV officer discussing personal
experiences about ammo shortages and testimony from high ranking government
officials supporting that experience,makes that a documented fact.

You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture." Then you offered a "young NV Lt, armed with an AK-47
and a pistol" and no ammo.

Today you discount the intense fighting that was going on at Hue, An
Loc, and Khe Sanh during the period in question. Lots of ammo was
being expended by the bad guys---it must have come from somewhere and
I'll be willing to believe US troops on the scene that it was being
fired.

Dare I say that the Kep strikes by the BUFFs didn't close the airfield
down?

Probably not since IIRC, Kep was one of the "crosswind" missions. However that
airfield received attention during the day on more than one occasion and the
BUFFs returned there on three more occasions. I realize we're not talking
about JDAMs here Ed, but surely you guys couldn't have been that bad?

There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.
As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable. And,
no, we weren't that bad. In fact, if you see the pix of Radio Hanoi
after the LGB guys from Ubon showed up, you'll see the level of
accuracy. You also might consider the Doumer Bridge, the Dragon Jaw at
Thanh Hoa, the Bac Giang and Bac Ninh bridges as examples of artistry
with manually delivered dive bombs. And, consider the difference
between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away, high in the menopause
and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.

Recall that two MiG-21 kills were awarded to B-52 gunners? (I'm
not saying they happened, merely that they were credited.)

What? You mean everyone in the USAF from the Air Force Academy through Air War
College is wrong? I'm shocked Before I exchanged posts here with you Ed, I
had never even heard those shoot downs were questionable. After discussing it
with you, Dr. Thompson and reading Michel's book I'm convinced both those guys
shot at F-4s...however I can go to Maxwell and read about those shoot downs. By
the way, those accounts were written by guys "who were there" and not in the
back of a library.

I don't think they shot at F-4s. An F-4 had no reason to get to the
altitudes of the B-52s (in fact in A/A configuration with three bags
it was almost impossible.) I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all. But, it was good for morale to award
some kills.

Maybe Guy Alcala knows if Toperczer reported any losses from the NVN
side related to the BUFF gunner claims.

The operative word on those targettings is "probable".

Absolutely.

we could
never be sure of exactly where a SAM site was going to pop up.

Same is true today...for the most part, but you claimed SAM sites were always
response targets, what you should have said was *confirmed* SAM sites were
always response targets, although that might not have been true had an SA-2
been parked under any of those F-111 or B-52 target areas.

A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

You're hedging. You indicated that personal observation was a poor
source of historical fact; that on-scene observers were unreliable and
only imperfectly viewed the metaphorical "lower right-hand corner of
the big picture."

Taken by itself, yes, personal observations are not adequate historical
sources. When backed up by other personal sources they get more credibility,
but when backed up by documents, they become factual. The munition, food and
POL shortages experienced by the NVA in the summer of '72 are well documented
by NV government records and by dozens of NV officers and enlisted who were
obsessive diary keepers. Ed, you're arguing against a very solid historic fact.

There were night strikes by the F-111s on the airfields during LB II.

And BUFFs.

As you know, an airfield is a very difficult target to disable.

Not with 108 bombs its not! Come on Ed, I split the runways at Batajanica with
a B-52 two-ship with a grand total of 90 weapons. 2 more two-ships followed
until we quartered the runway making it useless for anything except a
Cessna-172. This was all done with unguided Mk-82s. Its not really that
difficult to cut runways, even with unguided weapons.

And, consider the difference
between unleashing a JDAM from 30 miles away

30 miles ? I wish it were possible....

and the idea of hurling your chubby pink body at the ground amidst a
hail of 23/37/57/85/100 mm flak, SA-2s and other flying metal.

I have seen, up close and personal, SA-2s, SA-3's and SA-6s. Operating in the
"menopause" is not as safe as you seem to think.

I suspect that they were shooting at
shadows--no airplanes at all.

However, this whole issue gets at the heart of your argument. Here you have
reports from guys who were actually there and compared to studies done by guys
who weren't actually there (sitting in the back of a library as you put it) we
find the "library guys" more historically accurate. Why? Because the infameous
"fog and friction" tends to distort reality. There's no fog and little friction
from the back of a library. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the study
Checkmate did in the 80s of a supposed F-4 to F-4 blue on blue kill in Vietnam,
but several guys who were not old enough to drive when the incident occured,
accurately figured out that a supposed blue-on-blue kill in 1971 (I think?)
over NVN was, in fact, an enemy MiG-21 that shot down the F-4. As far as I'm
concerned personal eyewitness accounts are good historical sources, but like
all other sources, must be supported by other documentation.

A SAM site without SAMs or radar in residence isn't really a SAM site
is it?

LOL...nope, not at all. I was trying to point out that had there been an SA-2
site located in those areas (which there wasn't), they would have certainly
been destroyed, so the fact that no SAMs were attacked by B-52s is a matter of
good NVN luck.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"