Friendly Fire Notebook

Well, perhaps my definition of truck is too narrow. My "understatement" comes
from Robert Pape's "Bombing To Win" (I think, I'm moving and can't find my
copy), IIRC Pape states there was "a hundred or so 2 1/2 Ton trucks" (I'm
paraphrasing). Perhaps there were smaller trucks in use that account for your
personal experience?

I frankly don't care what he states, he and/or his sources are wrong. I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own 2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I. I am pretty sure tht in most cases
the trucks came south in convoys of less than 100 but not always. Dependedoin
where they were, under the junglecanopy or in the open where the trails were
exposed. Specter could "see" through the jungle foliage and that is why it
became a great truck killer. Evidence that the truck convoys moved a lot of
supplies is the passes through hills west of the DMZ, such as Ban Karai and Mu
Gia, and river fords were heavily attacked and defended throughout the war.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south. My flight got targeted
by a slow FAC (c/s Nail IIRC) against a SAM transporter with two missiles on
the trailer that apparently had gotten stuck in a river crossing near the DMZ.
Apparently was real as there were some impressive secondaries. There were
hulks of tanks in that area as well though I never caught any in the open. An
offensive of this scale needed lots and lots of trucks to haul fuel, ammo, and
parts, not to mention halling the tanks themselves..




If it made
little difference then why were the bombers targeted against them in the
first
place?

Because Nixon wanted B-52s over Hanoi. B-52 targeting in Hanoi was sometimes
ridiculous. BUFFs were targeted against Radio Hanoi which consisted of a
small
building and a couple of antenna. 12 B-52s dropped weapons near Radio Hanoi
without ever knocking it off the air. 4 were lost.

Yeah, the nearest bomb missed by 800'. We got it the next day with four LGBs.
I'grant you this one. I always wondered why the bombers even bothered with
that one.



You seem to be building a case that the the only thing that mattered
was having the bombers scatter bombs all over the country side whether they
hit
anything or not

As far as Nixon was concerned, that was true, as long as the civilian
casulties
were kept to a minimum.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level! There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit critical
targets. I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not. That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces. My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs. That may have been the situation in Cambodia near the bombing
halt, but not in LB.



My own opinion is that the bombers failed miserably until HQ
SAC got its collective head out of its ass, paid some attention to what the
TAC
guys had learned the hard way

True, although I think "failed miserably" is a little too harsh. Night #2 saw
no BUFFs lost and about average bombing accuracy.

Giving the North Vietnamese no rest was an integral part of the plan.

So was blowing away their infrastructure.

That had already been accomplished for the most part by LB I.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years. The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly. You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II. The bridges had been partially reopened and the intell was
that they had built up in the interim to greater than LB i levels. Damage from
LB had destroyed much of the LOC infrastructure in the Panhandle but not in the
Red River Delta area. It got hit again and you stated that was the reason why
fewer and fewer missiles were fired on later LB II nights. I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.



You are making my pointwhen you say the bombers got all the publicity.

And you are making half of mine.

Depends what effect you were looking for...


As in the very first Arc Light in VN, that splintered 400 acres of jungle
killed four monkeys and was hailed as a great psychological victory?

No; as in it doesn't really matter if the Kihn No Vehicle repair yard get
hits
tonight or not, as long as bombs land somewhere near it and the NVN
government
gets a personal, up close viewing.

but you are
making my point that history downplays the role of the fighters in LB II

Like I said, you're making half of mine. All you have to do is admit that the
accuracy of the weapons you dropped wasn't nearly as important as dropping
them
and you and I will be in agreement.


You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets. However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot. I find your statement very startling. I can see how you
can say that the bomber raids were purely political if you in fact feel that
way. It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets. You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
real work.





BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own
2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I.

Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.

Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!

Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.

There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
critical
targets.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.

I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not.

Then tell me, what critical targets were hit and what problems was it causing
for the NVN that forced them to return to Paris (to sign an agreement they were
ready to sign in OCT 72)?

That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces.

I'm sorry, but testimony from nearly all major players on both sides attest to
the fact that; the NVN were not experiencing any drastic effects (not already
experienced from LB I) of *any* bombing and that Nixon ordered LBII, not to
disrupt any specific NVN infrastructure, but to show resolve and convince the
NVN that the U.S. was capable of unrestricted bombing.

My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs.

Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years.

Yes, keep going with that thought and you'll realize that the damage inflicted
during LB II caused little additional hardships on the NVN government or
people. The B-52 bombings were quite a psychological shock (as POWs and NVN
attest to), but never to such a degree that anyone in Hanoi pressured the
government to go back to Paris.

The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly.

What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.

You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II.

It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.

I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.

The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt. According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.

You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets.

First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.

However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot.

I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.

It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets.

Sure it does, the military took purely political objectives (actually not
transmitted to the forces, but they took the vague Presidential guidance)
converted them to military objectives and executed the mission. You can argue
against this all you want, but all you have to do is pick up Nixon's memoirs
and read for yourself.

You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did the
real work.

The bombers were a bold political statement, used to make the strongest point
Nixon could, the fighters were also a political statement, allowing 24 hour ops
and debilitating the NVN efforts to defend themselves after the sun went down.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 21 Apr 2004 22:20:34 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our own
2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I.

Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria. A truck delivering war material in the
PRC buffer isn't a truck? Or it isn't war material? Or they had to
unload it and then put it on a different truck for the rest of the
trip? If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.

Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.

So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC, and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks? Or, they three
divisions carried their logistic goodies in their rice bags?

And, I just Googled Freedom Porch, since I'd never heard of it. No
hits. I then checked Hobson's "Vietnam Air Losses" where he has a list
of names of operations. No hit. Then I pulled Thompson's "To Hanoi and
Back". No hit. Got Freedom Train, but no Porch.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!

Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.

Throughout the war, targets in Route Pack VI weren't selected in
theater. They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could." Since SAC wasn't chopped to 7th AF,
where below the JCS did this selection of critical targets get done?

There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
critical
targets.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.

On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.

My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just to
scatter bombs.

Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.

Ahh, at last, grounds for agreement. All military operations have
political strategic objectives. They also have military tactical
objectives.

What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.

You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and hit
again in LB II.

It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.

It was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility. SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.

If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc. It
was because any time they emitted, we slapped them down again. It was
because the intensity of the air campaign was so great that the
deliveries couldn't be made safely through the no longer proscribed
port facilities.

I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.

The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt. According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.

Michel's account of the night 11 attack on Trai Ca is different than
you list here. He mentions the target and states that the A/C reported
eight SAMs fired, but doesn't indicate damage. As the mission was
going on, it had already been announced that operations would end at
dawn. If the crew provided Michel a detailed enough recounting that
there were 8 missiles fired at them, how could he have failed to
report the "hundreds" of missiles destroyed? Seems like a crucial and
significant fact.

And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?

You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets.

First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.

However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot.

I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.

Let's keep in mind that the tactical crews (and after the first three
nights with 9 BUFFs lost the SAC crews as well) had several hundred
associates on the ground in captivity. Locations of damage wasn't
random and precise targeting was essential if we weren't going to kill
the POWs as well.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria.

From my original post I had explained the "hundred or so trucks" were dealing
with vehicles stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. I have never
wavered on that criteria and have know reiterated it once more.

A truck delivering war material in the
PRC buffer isn't a truck?

No, it's a truck.

Or it isn't war material?

I'm sure it was hauling war material, most likely to Hanoi.

Or they had to
unload it and then put it on a different truck for the rest of the
trip?

BINGO. The trucks that operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail were stationed,
maintained and operated on the trail. Many had major modifications to increase
their clearence capability and nearly all had suffered some kind of battle
damage. Were some trucks brought down from Hanoi to work the trail? I'm sure on
occasion they were, but the Ho Chi Mihn trail didn't operate like the US
Highway system where a truck loads up at point A and delivers goods to point B.
In the case of supplies moving into SVN, typically the final destination was
point AA and delivered via bicycle. When you made the initial comment Ed about
the NVN supply system, I thought you were specifically talking about the Ho Chi
Mihn trail. Didn't you refer to supplies into SVN?

If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.

Define "massive". There were trans-shipment points and troop rest areas every 9
miles. According to Lt. Gen. Harold Moore; "Each camp, which could shelter a
company of troops, consisted of a series of crude bamboo huts dispersed along a
half-mile of trail to make a smaller target for warplanes."

So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC

Yes. And their NVA cohorts operating south of the DMZ.

and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks?

Yes.

Or, they three
divisions carried their logistic goodies in their rice bags?

They did a lot of that as well, but not nearly as much as the guys/gals moving
down the Ho Chi Mihn trail.

And, I just Googled Freedom Porch, since I'd never heard of it. No
hits. I then checked Hobson's "Vietnam Air Losses" where he has a list
of names of operations. No hit. Then I pulled Thompson's "To Hanoi and
Back". No hit.Got Freedom Train, but no Porch.

There were actually two Freedom Porch Operations, with Freedom Porch Bravo
being the bigger one. Bravo was the first time B-52s struck targets in NVN.

Check out this web site: http://www.hdart.com/powmia.html

It gives a very good synopsis, here's just one part; "During the North
Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972, Allied air power was called on to turn the
tide. The U.S. Air Force response to the invasion was immediate as B-52 Arc
Light missions and tactical air attacks intensified during brief respites in
the weather. The invasion was checked, but the lessons learned lead to
Operation Freedom Train against targets south of the 20th Parallel, and later
to Freedom Porch Bravo against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
The first wave of Freedom Porch Bravo strikes began on April 16,1972, and
achieved respectable success over the highest threat areas within North
Vietnam. The first wave consisted of B-52 strikes supported by Navy and Air
Force tactical air."

What was that you were saying about us guys from the "back of the library"?

I believe Clodfelter also discusses, in pretty good detail, Freedom Porch Alpha
and Bravo in his book.


They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could."

Uhh, the Joint Chiefs of Staff *are* military or am I misunderstanding you
here?

Since SAC wasn't chopped to 7th AF,
where below the JCS did this selection of critical targets get done?

Both SAC and 7th AF nominated targets to the JCS targeting board, the JCS put
them through the "White House filter" during the Johnson years and pretty much
rubber stamped them during Nixon's years.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left
and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars

On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.

Both the standing order on SAM engagements and the undercast made that
possible. I'm confused are you trying to say that we had destroyed *all*
"critical" targets after night #5? If so, you would be helping make my point.

Ahh, at last, grounds for agreement. All military operations have
political strategic objectives. They also have military tactical
objectives.

They sure do, and sometimes the two don't depend on each other. That was true
for LBII and at least two raids I flew during OAF.

It was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility.

Not according to Chuck Horner who points out several times in "Every Man a
Tiger" that the construction of SAM sites was nearly always detected, but off
limits to bombing till it was complete. I've heard that dozens of times from
F-105 crews on nearly every documentary on the Vietnam War.

SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.

I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much
easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled
it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have
to lie?

If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc.

Not according to the guys commanding and operating the SAM sites.

Michel's account of the night 11 attack on Trai Ca is different than
you list here. He mentions the target and states that the A/C reported
eight SAMs fired, but doesn't indicate damage.

I got that from my thesis, unfortunately, it was not a direct quote and not
"foot noteable" (at least to my prof it wasn't, he didn't "ding" me for failing
to document sourcing for that paragraph) so I'm not sure which one of my
sources I used. Sorry, but I'll have to take your word on it about Michel, I
lent my copy out.

And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?

Guideline would be a Strategic SAM, so would a Goa or a Gammon. A Gainful or
Gecco would be tactical SAMs. Was this not common lexicon in the 70s and 80s?

Let's keep in mind that the tactical crews (and after the first three
nights with 9 BUFFs lost the SAC crews as well) had several hundred
associates on the ground in captivity. Locations of damage wasn't
random

I have never said it was, that's Steve putting words in my mouth.

and precise targeting was essential if we weren't going to kill
the POWs as well.

As well as civilians, Nixon was adamant that we not supply congress a reason to
cut short their holiday break. This concern for collateral damage was the
reason the B-52s (at least the Guam based B-52s) had the ridiculous, "no
maneuvering on the bomb run" order.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:


I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much
easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled
it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have
to lie?

You must be referring to SAM sites within SVN - because
the trail through Laos was a friggin' moonscape (complete
with overlapping craters-upon-craters) years before either
LineBacker.

On 23 Apr 2004 01:51:09 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

We're beginning to get really convoluted here. Now, your statement
regarding 100 trucks is caveated with some as yet undisclosed location
within the country criteria.

From my original post I had explained the "hundred or so trucks" were dealing
with vehicles stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail. I have never
wavered on that criteria and have know reiterated it once more.

As early as Rolling Thunder ops in 1966, I encountered large truck
convoys in areas of the panhandle (Pack II and III) consisting of at
least 100 trucks. During one mission when we were allowed into Navy
territory in RP III, we discovered a two mile stretch of road just
along the foothills about forty miles inland--apparently further than
the Navy armed recce missions routinely probed. Our flight of four
dropped 19 mk-83 (1000 lb LDGP) bombs and strafed to Winchester. I
remember it particularly well because I had a bomb hang up on the left
outboard station and had to ask the flight lead to work in a tight
hand wheel for the strafing so I didn't have to keep turning into the
heavy wing. (That's why 19 and not 20 bombs dropped.)

In May of '66 when Dick Hackford was shot down in the Steel Tiger area
of Laos (very much Ho Chi Minh trail country), he reported that during
his 90 minutes on the ground he was forced to cross a wide,
well-graded dirt road--almost three lanes wide and with a white center
stripe of small reflectors, totally shielded from aerial view by an
interlaced canopy of tree branches built overhead. The road was,
according to his on-the-ground description, "wide enough for a pair of
deuce-and-a-halfs, side-by-side."


If so, and there were only a 100 or so going down the trail,
there there should have been massive storage areas and trans-shipment
points.

Define "massive". There were trans-shipment points and troop rest areas every 9
miles. According to Lt. Gen. Harold Moore; "Each camp, which could shelter a
company of troops, consisted of a series of crude bamboo huts dispersed along a
half-mile of trail to make a smaller target for warplanes."

You must always remember that the war was on-going for more than eight
years. During that time the impressions can be correct for the period,
but change drastically one, two or five years later. Hal Moore, of Ia
Drang fame, was on the ground in '65. The NVA presence he encountered
was an intel surprise and much larger than estimated. It increased
drastically in the next year and by '67 was massive. That amount of
manpower consumes a lot more in the field than 100 trucks could
deliver.

So, the "hundred or so trucks" hauled supplies to VC

Yes. And their NVA cohorts operating south of the DMZ.

and the three
division offensive had thousands of other trucks?

Yes.

Here's the breakdown--is it a hundred or so, or is it thousands?


Check out this web site: http://www.hdart.com/powmia.html

It gives a very good synopsis, here's just one part; "During the North
Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972, Allied air power was called on to turn the
tide. The U.S. Air Force response to the invasion was immediate as B-52 Arc
Light missions and tactical air attacks intensified during brief respites in
the weather. The invasion was checked, but the lessons learned lead to
Operation Freedom Train against targets south of the 20th Parallel, and later
to Freedom Porch Bravo against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area.
The first wave of Freedom Porch Bravo strikes began on April 16,1972, and
achieved respectable success over the highest threat areas within North
Vietnam. The first wave consisted of B-52 strikes supported by Navy and Air
Force tactical air."

OK, I was surprised when I found out about the B-52 raids into NVN in
April of '72. They did, indeed strike near Hiaphong, but that was
about it. It was a short incursion, limited number of sorties and
didn't continue for very long at all. In November, December, they were
striking below 20 North, near Vinh, Quanh Khe and Dong Hoi, but these
areas are hardly "the highest threat areas within NVN."


They were JCS directed. Don't know where you got the idea
that "the military took the order and turned it into as sound a
military operation as they could."

Uhh, the Joint Chiefs of Staff *are* military or am I misunderstanding you
here?

No, I'm misunderstanding you. The implication of your earlier
statement was that LB II was lemons out of Washington that the
military (theater commanders and operators) turned into lemonade.


The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left
and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars

On day #6, I orbited Bullseye for 25 minutes at six thousand feet over
a solid undercast. Not a single defensive reaction was observed.

Both the standing order on SAM engagements and the undercast made that
possible. I'm confused are you trying to say that we had destroyed *all*
"critical" targets after night #5? If so, you would be helping make my point.

The point I was challenging was not the quality of targets, but your
statement that the "only critical targets remaining were SAMs, radars,
etc." You then cited the day 11 raid on a SAM storage area. I was
saying that defensive reaction throughout RP VI had become minimal by
day 6.


(added for clarity:--moving/replacing SAMs) it was accomplished from 1965 through the end of the war with
remarkably little visibility.

Not according to Chuck Horner who points out several times in "Every Man a
Tiger" that the construction of SAM sites was nearly always detected, but off
limits to bombing till it was complete. I've heard that dozens of times from
F-105 crews on nearly every documentary on the Vietnam War.

Again you must consider the time of the statement. Horner is talking
about the introduction of the SA-2 into NVN in 1965. At that time, the
first sites were classic Star-of-David installations constructed using
the fixed air defense Soviet doctrine of the time. The dozen or so
sites were clearly visible and the ROE clearly prohibited striking
them so as to avoid killing Soviet technicians which were assume to be
there. By '66, the sites were mobile, random and proliferating at an
incredible rate. Some sites were known and numbered, but whether they
would be occupied or visible on any given day was unknown. SAMs were
much more likely to pop up from new locations than old.

SAM battalions relocated regularly and
were resupplied consistently. They seemed to be well supplied with
missiles throughout.

I'd imagine resupplying Guideline Missiles in the middle of the jungle is much
easier than in more suburban areas. In Michel's book the SA-2 commander spelled
it out pretty clearly. I guess you don't believe him. What reason would he have
to lie?

Resupply might be easier in the jungle because of concealment by the
canopy, but it is considerably more difficult because of lack of
navigable roads. The SA-2 is a large missile and the TEL is a big
piece of equipment for a jungle trail.

The difficulty in moving the missile battalion into remote areas is a
reason why Thud Ridge remained a sanctuary and why the mountainous
region along the Laos border and into RP V was not SAM country.

If, as Steve and I contend, the NVN ran out of missiles or was
constrained in their reaction by day 6 of LB II, it was because of the
destruction of roads, bridges, railroads, marshalling areas, etc.

Not according to the guys commanding and operating the SAM sites.

Keep in mind that even today the folks that Marsh was talking to in
Hanoi are living in a strictly regimented Communist society. While
they can provide insight, they must also consider the "company line"
in their responses.

As I previously mentioned, Michel replied to my request for a picture
of the SAM site on the lake in downtown Hanoi with the denial by the
NVN that a SAM site was ever in that location.

And, what is the distinction between a "Guideline and tactical
varients (sic)"?

Guideline would be a Strategic SAM, so would a Goa or a Gammon. A Gainful or
Gecco would be tactical SAMs. Was this not common lexicon in the 70s and 80s?

A Guideline is a Guideline. The Goa never showed up, although we
thought it arrived in '73 at Khe Sanh. We saw an unusual "black SAM"
in the summer of '72, but 7th AF intel denied that it could be an
SA-4, claiming rather that is was either a Chinese produced Guideline
or a defective missile.

Your phrase "Guideline and tactical variants" led me to understand you
were referring to some type of variation of the SA-2.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

The road was,
according to his on-the-ground description, "wide enough for a pair of
deuce-and-a-halfs, side-by-side."

I fail to see how this refutes the position that only 100 (or so) trucks were
stationed and operated on the Ho Chi Mihn Trail?

It increased
drastically in the next year and by '67 was massive. That amount of
manpower consumes a lot more in the field than 100 trucks could
deliver.

Nope. I realize you're not a Clodfelter fan, but throughout Rolling Thunder the
supply requirement in SVN remained consistant and Clodefelter's data comes from
Vietnamese sources including captured documents as well as NSC estimates. On
page 134-135 in his book Clodefelter states; "Hanoi had only 55,000 North
Vietnamese Army troops in the South by August 1967; the remaining 245,000
Communist soliders were Viet Cong. None of these forces engaged in frequent
combat, and the Viet Cong intermingled with the southern populace. As a
result, Communist supply needs were minimal. Enemy battalions fought an
average of one day in thirty and had a total daily supply requirement of
roughly 380 tons. Of this amount, the Communists needed only 34 tons a day
from sources outside the South. Seven 2 1/2 ton trucks could transport the
requirement, which was less than 1 percent of the daily tonnage imported into
North Vietnam."

Here's the breakdown--is it a hundred or so, or is it thousands?

Are you intentionally doing this? OK...lets call it 1,100 trucks. 1,000 trucks
operating north of the 20th parallel and 100 trucks working the Ho Chi Mihn
Trail. By the way, I have no friggin' idea how many truck were working north of
20-degrees, I only offer it to make my point as clear as I can!

The implication of your earlier
statement was that LB II was lemons out of Washington that the
military (theater commanders and operators) turned into lemonade.

Well, I wouldn't call Nixon's order a Lemon, just vague on details. The JCS
took the vague order and put it into a militarily executeable plan.

You then cited the day 11 raid on a SAM storage area. I was
saying that defensive reaction throughout RP VI had become minimal by
day 6.

Minimal for whom? When BUFFs returned to Hanoi on night 8, two were hit by
SA-2's and 4 more would be shot down or damage by the time the whole thing
ended three nights later. I hardly call that minimal.

Resupply might be easier in the jungle because of concealment by the
canopy, but it is considerably more difficult because of lack of
navigable roads.

I agree, but we're not taking about speedy transportation of Guidelines from
Haiphong, we're talking about resupply operations at the site. Much more
visable near Hanoi then points south.

The SA-2 is a large missile and the TEL is a big
piece of equipment for a jungle trail.

I'm sure it was a bitch to get it out there, but I bet those guys had far less
attacks on them then the guys working Hanoi in DEC '72.

Keep in mind that even today the folks that Marsh was talking to in
Hanoi are living in a strictly regimented Communist society.

He was allowed access to records as well. Doesn't sound to me like they were
hiding anything.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

I have always respected your inputs to this group but it seems you are You are
putting a lot of energy into trying to convince me of something and I am not
sure of exactly what. You made earlier statements that I challenged that NVN
only had 100 old French trucks left over from WW II. You also stated that the
BUFFS were sent north for political reasons. You have contradicted yourself
several times on that 100 truck statement including below. Most of the rest of
what you wrote is telling me about how the BUFFS went after military targets,
not politcal targets, once they figured out how to operate in a tactical
environment. Your logic seems very circular to me and has totally lost me.

Dikes and dams are legit military targets but with political implications.
Hospitals are not, just to differentiate between what is legit and what is not.
We certainly did enough dam busting in WWII and Korea. They were not struck in
NVN because of those political implications..

I am trying not to be emotional here but it seems to me that under your logic,
every flight in VN was ultimately for political reasons starting long before
Rolling Thunder. Jphnson and Kennedy sent planes out with ordnance to impress
on the NVN and VC that they were serious. I just can't separate out the BUFFS
in my own mind as going north for different reasons other than the same ones
we are all going north for as you are implying.

Relative to the "experts" I guess people like Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter
Jennings are experts with the true facts because they have interviewed people
like Saddam Hussain. You;ve quoted many people who have synthesized first and
second hand information into "facts" that many participants don't agree with.
I am not sure that leaves much of a basis for discussion.


..

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: (BUFDRVR)
Date: 4/21/2004 6:20 PM Eastern Daylight Time
Message-id:

I
personally saw hundreds of trucks that our intel said were similar to our
own
2
1/2 T to 5 T trucks, parked in a marshalling yard just inside the PRC buffer
zone that we were fragged against in LB I.

Trucks parked near the PRC buffer zone were not the trucks in use along the
Ho
Chi Mihn trail in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

There were tanks and SAMs in the south during the April 72 offensive. 100
"duece and a halfs" certainly couldn't haul them south.

Now you're mixing apples and oranges. The easter offensive in '72 was a true
conventional offensive and as such, was supplied like one. The "hundred or so
trucks" I referred to were the ones used to haul supplies to VC forces in
SVN.
The logistics pipeline for the Easter offensive was what you would expect for
any nation supporting a 3 division offensive, that's what made it such an
easy
target and why the Freedom Porch missions were so successful.

The order from the President to just scatter bombs at random away from
inhabited areas sure never made it down to the working level!

Obviously the EXORD wasn't for "random bomb scattering", it was for round the
clock maximum effort bombing against any legal target in NVN, including
previously restricted targets in Hanoi. The military did what they were
supposed to and went after what they determined to be critical targets. The
fact the military took the CJCS order and turned it into as sound a military
operation as they could, doesn't change the fact that Nixon didn't really
care
what damage was inflicted, his purpose was political, not military.

There were a
lot of energy, lives and materiel expended in actually trying to hit
critical
targets.

The problem is, by DEC 72, there were very little "critical targets" left and
by Day #6 there were nearly zero. The only critical targets remaining were
SAMs, radars and dikes and dams and the legality of striking them is
debateable.

I have a little trouble with the insinuation that it didn't matter if
targets wre hit or not.

Then tell me, what critical targets were hit and what problems was it causing
for the NVN that forced them to return to Paris (to sign an agreement they
were
ready to sign in OCT 72)?

That might have been true for the bombers; I can't
speak for that. Certainly not for the tactical forces.

I'm sorry, but testimony from nearly all major players on both sides attest
to
the fact that; the NVN were not experiencing any drastic effects (not already
experienced from LB I) of *any* bombing and that Nixon ordered LBII, not to
disrupt any specific NVN infrastructure, but to show resolve and convince the
NVN that the U.S. was capable of unrestricted bombing.

My three daytime
Linebackers against targets that the bombers missed certainly weren't just
to
scatter bombs.

Militarily, you're right, but the ultimate objective was political not
military.

You are overlooking the difficulty in blowing away infrastructure in a thrid
world country that has been bombed for years.

Yes, keep going with that thought and you'll realize that the damage
inflicted
during LB II caused little additional hardships on the NVN government or
people. The B-52 bombings were quite a psychological shock (as POWs and NVN
attest to), but never to such a degree that anyone in Hanoi pressured the
government to go back to Paris.

The NVN were able to
reconstitute pretty quickly.

What they were able to reconstitute from LB I made little difference in
regards
to the offensive in the south or in the lives of anyone up north.

You allude to references that say the materiel
was there in LBII but the NVN weren't able to get it where it was needed to
rearm and reload. That infrastructure was somewhat rebuilt after LBI and
hit
again in LB II.

It wasn't the infrastructure damage that kept them from resupplying their SAM
batterys, it was you in an F-4 and the fact that resupplying Guideline
missiles
is a fairly slow and highly visable process.

I Personally don't
buy the argument that the NVN really didn't run out of missiles but if in
fact
we did destroy their missile assembly and tranportation infrastructure, then
you are arguing against yourself.

The only damage to the NVN Air Defense system was on the SAM batterys and
associated radars themselves. Michel wonders out loud in his book, why a
concerted effort wasn't made from the beginning of LBII to find the SAM
storage
areas. Obviously someone *thought* they knew where they were, as several B-52
sorties targeted "SAM storage areas", but none of those targets up till night
#11 stored anything related to NVN Air Defense. On night # 11 when a 3-ship
of
B-52D models attacked the Trai Ca SAM storage area, we hit pay dirt.
According
to NVN reports "hundreds" of surface-to-air missiles, both Guideline and
tactical varients were destroyed. Most people would say; "see, when Trai Ca
got
hit that's when the NVN decided to return to Paris". This would be incorrect,
Le Duc Tho had already informed the State department on Day #9 that they were
willing to return to Paris to sign the original agreement. Nixon continued
the
bombing for another 2 days and nights to insure Le Duc Tho kept his word.

You have got to be kidding! Never having been in SAC I can't speak to the
bomber employment philosophy and that might explain why the bombers missed a
lot of targets.

First, I would question that B-52s "missed *a lot* of their targets. Prior to
night #3 they missed several due to the already mentioned wind problem, but
besides that their accuracy was within advertised unguided CEP, with the
exception being the guys who were fighting for their lives with Guideline
missiles.

However, for the tactical forces that certainly wasn't the
case by a long shot.

I'll have to disagree, the ultimate objective was political, not military and
as such, any damage you did was secondary to the fact you just did damage.

It certainly doesn't explain away the use of the laser guided bombs
against critical targets.

Sure it does, the military took purely political objectives (actually not
transmitted to the forces, but they took the vague Presidential guidance)
converted them to military objectives and executed the mission. You can argue
against this all you want, but all you have to do is pick up Nixon's memoirs
and read for yourself.

You paint is as more of a case of the bombers being
sent to Hanoi just to keep the people awake while the tactical forces did
the
real work.

The bombers were a bold political statement, used to make the strongest point
Nixon could, the fighters were also a political statement, allowing 24 hour
ops
and debilitating the NVN efforts to defend themselves after the sun went
down.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

SteveM8597 wrote:


Relative to the "experts" I guess people like Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter
Jennings are experts with the true facts because they have interviewed people
like Saddam Hussain.


I'm not sure that I would give an interview with 'people like Saddam
Hussein' much more credibility than an interview with Michael Jackson.
If his offical spokesman is anything to judge by a large amount of
offical information from his government was outrageous fiction.

Remember the widely reported "Jenin massacre' which the media fell for
and reported around the world? Later turned out to be a hoax despite the
'facts' quoted by the media.

Dave

You are
putting a lot of energy into trying to convince me of something and I am not
sure of exactly what.

That Linebacker II didn't "win the war".

You made earlier statements that I challenged that NVN
only had 100 old French trucks left over from WW II.

No, I said they only had a hundred or so old French trucks being used to supply
forces in SVN, working the Ho Chi Mihn trail. I specifically stated I was not
refering to trucks operating in NVN.

You also stated that the
BUFFS were sent north for political reasons.

When the President directs it without knowing details about specific targets,
what would you call it?

You have contradicted yourself
several times on that 100 truck statement including below.

No, you have confused the issue. If you care (which I'm not sure I do anymore)
read through my original posts on the truck subject. I have reiterated several
times that I was *not* saying NVN had "a hundred or so old French trucks" *in
total*.

Most of the rest of
what you wrote is telling me about how the BUFFS went after military targets,
not politcal targets

The fact that BUFFs were going "down town" was political, the guys at 13th AF
and the JCS targeting board took a purely political objective and developed a
sound military campaign. The only thing lost in that conversion is the fact
that it really didn't matter for Nixon's ultimate objective if the Kihn No
vehicle repair yard was destoyed or not, just that bombs went off close enough
and didn't cause any large collateral damage issues. I've asked you twice and
now I'll try a third time. If the NVN returned to Paris because of the damage
inflicted from the bombing, what was hit and how was the damage effecting them?

Dikes and dams are legit military targets

Not always.

Hospitals are not

Not true, put a AAA piece on the roof or store arms there and its a legal
military target.

just to differentiate between what is legit and what is not.

You can't really do that with absolutes, the specific situation dictates
legality. If it were a case of absolutes, we wouldn't need lawyers in the Air
Operations Centers.

We certainly did enough dam busting in WWII and Korea.

We also bombed city centers for very small military gains, doesn't mean it
would pass the legality test. In the case of WWII the allies could claim
reciprocity since the Luftwaffe began striking city area targets first. The dam
busting in Korea was only legal because we claimed we were not targeting food
production but using the water to flood airfields and destroy bridges. In
Vietnam the dikes and dams would have been debateable legal military targets.

I am trying not to be emotional here but it seems to me that under your
logic,
every flight in VN was ultimately for political reasons starting long before
Rolling Thunder.

On several occasions Johnson attempted to let the military develop a bombing
campaign to achieve specific military objectives (with restrictions on bombing
targets in Hanoi or even NVN itself), during one period Johnson gave the JCS
the go to try to interdict supplies on the Ho Chi Mihn trail. Lots of luck,
like I stated earlier, until the Easter offensive the VC and NVA forces in SVN
required a mere 35 tons of supplies a day. This could be hauled in seven 2 1/2
trucks. How in the world are you going to shutdown over 80% of the trucking
along a route like the Ho Chi Mihn trail? During Johnson's years the military
attempted to go after NVN POL. The problem was it was so dispersed as to make
targeting it nearly impossible. Johnson grew frustrated with failure and went
back to his "target luncheons" and political bombing.



BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"