Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

I wrote:
I don't see anything he posted that refutes Galland.

Mr. Willshaw writes:
Translation:

I propose to ignore any and all evidence that disagrees with
my pre-conceived notions.


I am sure glad you posted that. Sometimes it feels like it's just me and
Sinclair.


My pre-conceived notions don't show me that the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy
bombers available for day to day operations prior to mid-May, 1943.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that these aircraft bombed using only
the "mark I eyeball."


So far we are back in the motherhood area, the exaggerations are
simply deleted for the moment.

It's not a motherhood statement to say that all the bombing in this period was
visual. It's what happened.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans began bringing the
day
fighters home in April, 1943.


Now the first attempt to slip in misleading information...

I've certainly said it before. I guess you mean that stating that the bombing
was all visual wasn't false, it was just a "motherhood statement." It's still
true.

please supply
the units and dates of their arrival,

"Thus, despite the mounting production, the number of serviceable dayfighters
available for the defence of Germany rose only slowly: from 120 in March and
April to 162 in early May, 255 in early June and 300 in July.

By the end of August, under pressure of the American daylight offensive, the
home defence force reached its all-time "high" in first-line aircraft: 405 Me
109s and Fw 190s, plus one twin-engined Geschwaderwith about eighty Me 1l0s and
Me 410s.
Though some were newly formed units, most of them had had to be withdrawn from
other fronts. From southern Italy Il/JG 27 under Captain Schroer moved to
Wiesbaden-Erbenheim, II/JG 51 under Captain Rammelt to Neubiberg near Munich,
while. a single Gruppe of the renowned "Greenheart" Geschwader, IIl/JG 54 under
Major Reinhard Seiler, was posted from northern Russia to Oldenburg and
Nordholtz on HeIigoland Bight. .
Two complete Geschwader were also brought home: JG 3 ("Udet") under
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilcke from the southern sector of the eastern front;
JG 26 ("Schlageter") under Major Priller from the English Channel, where its
experience of combat with the British and Americans was perhaps un.rivalled.
Both now were stationed on the lower Rhine and in Holland, right on the enemy
approach routes.

Even the Me 1 I Os, long obsolete in daylight and lately relegated to a host of
inconsequential tasks, were given a new lease of life. Provided they could
evade combat with enemy fighters, their firepower could still make dents in the
heavy bombers."

-- "Luftwaffe War Diaries, p. 319

So the day defense force rose from April to May by 1/3, at a time when the
USAAF had no more than 100 heavy bombers available day to day, and was only
bombing by visual means.

As a hint, ignore JG 11,
it was formed in April 1943, and be aware of the rotation of fighter
units to the Reich for refitting, and note JG1 on 17 May 1943 was
around half strength compared with 27 July 1943, since it was used
to form JG11.

Thanks for making my points for me.

But let's look at something else, the effect of the first year of Harris in
charge of BC, also from the LWD:

"The success of Bomber Command's offensive was however, questionable. Although
many German cities lay in ruins, had the objective been acheived? Had German
industry been destroyed, or the morale of the population undermined? Nothing
of the sort had taken place."

LWD, p. 309

So we see that the first year of bombing by Bomber Command under Harris had no
apreciable effect.

But the first year of USAAF operations -- 8/17/42 -- 8/17/43, we see the Reich
day fighter force brought to it's 'all time 'high'", to fight against the Day
Bombers. This is pretty much what Galland said -- the USAAF received higher
priority even though still numerically inferior.

Then the key point, tell us how this means the Luftwaffe
was "denuding" the other fronts of fighters which was the original claim.

LWD does indicate that at Hitler's insistence, and against the advice of Milch,
Jeschonek and Goring, that many aircraft were sent both to the Med and the
Eastern Front in this time frame:

"But the most striking evidence of Jeschonek's failure emerges from the last
months of his life. The Luftwaffe staff was fully informed about the American
aircraft construction programme, and at last Jeschonek recognized the mortal
danger that such swarms of four-engined bombers represented for Germany. "A
danger of such magnitude, that by comparision the disaster of Stalingrad was
trifling.

His volte-face in favor of defense put him on the side of Generals Galland and
Kammhuber who, while the Luftwaffe was bled to death on the eastern and
southern fronts, had for long tried to draw attention to the threat from the
west."

-- LWD p. 316

This at a time, when the USAAF had only @ 100 heavy bombers available, and was
bombing only by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing", as one poster suggested.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that the Germans felt the need to
disperse the aircraft production in May, 1943.

Now the a bigger attempt at fiction, a "request" is turned into action

That's pathetic.

A request that was brought on by operations of the the 8th AF with @ 100 heavy
bombers on any given raid, bombing exclusively by visual means.

My pre-conceived notions don't tell me that this reinforces what Galland
said
-- the day bombers received more attention than the night bombers as 1943
wore
on, even though the night bombers were more numerous.

The largest 8th Air Force raid on Germany in December 1943 was
722 bombers on 24 December, the largest Bomber Command raid
was 712 bombers on the 29th (there were larger night raids in November)

Hello? Anyone home?

We're talking about the operation of @ 100 B-17's and B-24's and their
operations through mid-May, 1943.

snip a lot of really strange and pedantic stuff

It is clear the day defence in the west became the priority over the
day defences in the south and east in the July/August 1943 period.


It's also clear per Freeman and LWD that this build-up started in April, and
per LWD increased the Day fighters by 1/3 between "April and early May". This
at a time when the USAAF had @ 100 bombers available on any given day and was
bombing entirely by visual means.

Galland may claim there was some sort of priority day versus night
but the numbers say it was day over the west versus day over the
other fronts.

After 1 year of BC operations under Harris, the RAF failed to achieve its
objectives.

After 1 year of USAAF operations, the day fighters were quadrupled. And all the
US raids were done solely by visual means.

It wasn't all "area bombing."

As of 1 April:

100 US heavies

120 German day fighters.

As of 17 August:

300 US heavies

500 German day fighters.

Did the night fighters quadruple in strength?

After the raid on Hamburg which produced the firestorm, things changed. But
that was over three years after the war began.

After 1 year of RAF operations against Germany, the effect was negligible. Not
even you can say -- honestly-- that the effect of the first year of USAAF
operations was negligible. In fact, the first year of USAAF operations scared
the Germans very badly, and defnitely impacted the number of aircraft they
planned to produce.

My pre-conceived notions don't show me, but the data above does -- that it
was
not all "area bombing" as one RAF apologist -- maybe it was you --
suggested.


Somebody with "uk" in their e-mail address indicated it was all "area bombing."
But that is not true. That's how this particular iteration started.

When stuck answer another question, not the one being asked, and
throw an accusation without any supporting evidence.

You have no answer. But then, you never do.

Walt

Concerning LW fighter strength losses etc:

Total German Aircraft losses Fighters only by front 1943:

Westren Front: 3,728

Eastren Front : 1,099

From Jan - June 1943 the average monthly attition rate* fighters only was
19.9%, bombers 16% etc.

*See:*See: Wiliamson Murray. Strategy For Defeat p.182

In July 1943 the LW lost *335 SE fighters in the West, 18.1% of total
available SE fighter force, & 16% of SE fighter pilots.

*See: ibid. p. 181

By the end of August 1943 the LW lost 248 SE fighters in the West*, 16.2% of
the total available fighter force, & 15.6% of SE fighter pilots. & 86 twin
engine fighters, 11.6% of the twin engine day/night fighter force).

*See: ibid. p.182

In 1943 the German aircraft industry produced* 64% more AC then ever before
with 125.2% increase in Fighter production, & 31.4% increase in bomber
production. For the first time in the war the industry produced 1000
fighters, by July production had reached 1,263 fighters.

*See: ibid. p.188

Yet despite this production increase the number of AC in front line units
all fronts decreased Ie, *German Authorized Fighter only Strength 1943:
actual frontline strength in ()'s:

May 31 1943 - 2,016 (1,786) 88.6%
June 30 1943 - 2,172 (1,849) 85.1%
July 31 1943 - 2,172 (1,528) 70.3%
Aug 31 1943 - 2,228 (1,581) 71%


*See: ibid. p.188

September 1943* cost the LW in the West 275 fighters (17.4% of total
available fighter force) & 284 in October (17.2% of total available fighter
force). October cost the Germans no less then 41.9% of their fighter force.

See: ibid. p.225

The below excerpt from an memo from General der flieger Galland , under
pressure from Georing concerning Octobers performance is interesting:

The fighter and heavy formations have not been able to secure decisive
success in air defense against American four engined formations. The
introduction of new weapons... has not appreciably changed the situation.
The main reason for the failure is that the Kommandeure and Kapitane (sic)
do not succeed in secureing attacks in close formation up to the shortest
ranges...

In November 1943 fighter production from factories, and returns from depots;
was only 78% of July. fighter Production dropped to 54.4% in December.

In November the Germans wrote off 21% of their available fighter force from
battle damage & non combat losses, in December it rose to 22.8%. In
Novermber 1943 10% of the fighter pilots in the West were lost, in December
10.4% etc.

From Jan - Dec 1943 the LW averaged 2,105 full & partialy trained pilots
each month. vs losses of 2,967 pilots KIA/MIA/WIA in the West alone.

*German Authorized Fighter only Strength Sept - Dec 1943 All fronts: actual
frontline strength in ()'s:

Sept 30 1943 - 2,228 (1,646) 73.9%
Oct 31 1943 - 2,228 (1,721) 75.2%
Nov 30 1943 - 2,244 (1,789) 79.7%
Dec 31 1943 - 2,244 (1,561) 69.6%

*See: ibid. p.233

In November 1943* 8th AF raids began in increased intensity throughout
November despite the losses from the October Schweinfurt' raid, Ie, Bremen
was hit by 491 B-17s , December 11 523 bombers hit Emden, Dec 13 649 bombers
hit targets in Germany, December 16, 535 hit Bremen, Dec 20 472 hit Bremen
again, Dec 22 Osnabruck & Munster, Dec 30th 650 bombers hit Ludwigshafen
etc.

See: ibid p.232

In January 1944* the LW fighter force in the West wrote off 30.3% of the SE
fighter force & 16.9% of its pilots. In Febuary 1944 33% of its SE fighter
force, 17.9% of its pilots, in March 1944 56.4% of its SE fighter force, and
22% of its pilots etc.

*See: ibid. p.243

Another quote a Galland report to LWHQ in early 1944 is interesting as
well*:


The ratio in which we fight today is 1 to 7. The standard of the Americans
is extraordinarily high. The day fighters have lost more then 1000 aircraft
during the last four months, among them our best officers. These gaps cannot
be filled. Things have gone so far that the danger of a collapse of our arm
exists.

*See: Overy Richard. Why the Allies Won p.124


Regards, John Waters