Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?

Both played their part in final victory and young men
of both air forces flew their missions knowing their
chances of survival were poor.

But now the "pickle barrel" accuracy they set for a goal is belittled and made
fun of by the people they helped to save.

The "pickle barrel" claim originated with propagandists of the Norden
Company and the War Department, not the brave men who flew the
missions.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

vince norris

The "pickle barrel" claim originated with propagandists of the Norden
Company and the War Department, not the brave men who flew the
missions.

It was the standard the crews trained toward. Pickle barrels were common
sights in the grocery stores of the day. In fact, I have the impression they
were larger than regular barrels.

It proved pretty rare to achieve that sort of accuracy in Europe. But if you
don't set a goal, you surely can't do very well.

We know that the USAAF had to abandon the idea of bombing only in visual
conditions. There were too few days when this was possible to justify the very
expensive bomber force nor was it possible to hurt the Germans badly enough.

It proved very difficult to make accurate attacks with blind bombing methods.
In "Half a WIng, Three Engines, and a Prayer" the author relates a mission
that had a German target as primary. That target was obscured. A Belgian air
field was selected as a target of opportunity. The group made a couple of runs
on that target that weren't within the norm. Ultimately, the group broup their
bombs back to Molesworth. At the debrief the group commander said: "Next
time, leave those bombs in Germany!"

And I think that over time it became acceptable to think that any bomb that hit
Germany was a good bomb. That proved not to be the case.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect. But obviously, as the
Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

There was a lot of disagreememt on what to bomb and a general inability to get
enough bombs on decisive targets. The Germans also expended great effort to
repair what damage was done.

The targets that the Americans chose early on, specifically aircraft factories
and ball bearing plants, proved pretty resilient to damage. The USAAF also
early on flew a lot of raids to help suppress the U-Boats. Saint Nazaire was
"flak city" well before the first US bomber went to Germany. The US effort
also suffered from poor leadership in the form of Eaker and Hunter (the fighter
commander). Once they were replaced, things immediately improved dramatically.
Of course having a big infusion of new bomb groups and Mustang equipped groups
didn't hurt either. The Americans also determined to hit oil targets, which was
the one big success of the bombing. The RAF helped on this, but Harris was
reluctant to act, and adamant that this was a waste, when it was the one target
system that could collapse the German economy.

Walt

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect.

Well, Art has an ax to grind, too. What was the Survey's alleged ax?

Is there any *evidence* to support that charge?

Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

I'm not so sure about that. This thread was about the accuracy of the
Norden sight. But as I've mentioned before and others have agreed,
the bombing may have been primarily to destroy the LW, not to destroy
targets on the ground. Thus the question whether the bombs landed in
a pickle barrel is irrelevant. Even if industrial production
continued, and even grew, we achieved aerial supremacy and were able
to invade Europe. So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."

vince norris

What was the Survey's alleged ax?

Us Bus set out to prove that strategic bombing won the war, in order
to bolster the case for an independent USAF. Or so it is often said.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
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Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

Cub Driver wrote:

What was the Survey's alleged ax?

Us Bus set out to prove that strategic bombing won the war, in order
to bolster the case for an independent USAF. Or so it is often said.

But it's also been said that it was an attempt by Army ground
officers to prove that bombing didn't do much to win the war.

I didn't realize the Survey was begun even before the war was
over in Europe, and four of the survey members were actually
killed in action. The members of the survey consisted of 300
civilians along with 350 officers and 500 enlisted men, so it
was a large effort.

Besides looking over targets themselves for the effects of the
bombings, they also looked for German war records as well, which
were found in offices, private homes, safe-deposit boxes, in
barns, caves, in one occasion a hen-house and in two occasions
coffins!

Given the generally favorable conclusions toward air power of
the survey, it seems a tough sell to call it an attempt to
degrade effectiveness of this form of war making.

But I've been unable to find, in my very cursory look, exactly
*who* did the survey; largely USAAF or Army ground personnel?
The list of "officers of the survey" in the report foreward
lists no rank along with the names, so they seem simply to be
civilians from the War Dept [along with the Sect'y as well].

Since so many people were involved in making the survey [in Europe;
there was a Pacific one too], it would seem any attempt to "spin"
the results would have to come from higher ups, in the overall
Army or War Dept command.


SMH



SMH

So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."

The Bomber Barons promised to win the war without having to invade at all.
When you consider that the RAF had 55,000 KIA, the same number of officers
killed in World War One, it has to be a disappointment. The same thing is true
of the Americans. A lot of effort and relatively little return.

Walt

In article , WalterM140
writes
So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."

The Bomber Barons promised to win the war without having to invade at all.
When you consider that the RAF had 55,000 KIA, the same number of officers
killed in World War One, it has to be a disappointment. The same thing is true
of the Americans. A lot of effort and relatively little return.

Walt

So what would have the level of German armament production have been
WITHOUT the strategic bombing offensive?


Why are you so determined to denigrate the RAF? Are you related to that
Brennan creep?

Both RAF and 8th AF Bomber Commands did a tough job to the best of their
ability. To try to prove one was "better" or "worse" than the other is
ridiculous. Comparisons are odious, and, on the available evidence, so
are you. Just like a child calling names. Get a life.
--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!