Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.
WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
factory

From MOD Archives

Bomber Command launched its largest raid thus far of the war, in March 1942
against the large Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, which was
an important source of trucks for the German military. Some 235 bombers
attacked, in an hitherto unprecedented concentration over the target - 121
per hour - which demonstrated that the risk of collision at night was lower
than feared, no accidents being suffered. The raid was a great success -
300 bombs fell directly on the factory, causing an estimated loss of
production of 2,300 trucks and destroyed 40% of the factory.

Well, that is clearly not the -most- successful attack as the 4/4/43 raid
deprived the Germans of over 3,000 lorries and 498 out of 500 bombs fell
into the factory area.

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
very badly indeed.

So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel
for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by the
Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by
USAAF units.

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

Two instances:

"Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched
over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the
two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at
Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own
importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division
had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium,
they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz
was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet
strikes against oil plants, although at this point the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others could
reform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the 385th
managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group.
The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division achieved
similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at
Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."

--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that
day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted.

This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division
2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off
3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter
reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The
96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295
despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half
the total lost.

I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2,
the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that
as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the
best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the
385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the
fight but with some disorganisation?

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas
production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845
tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd
bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time
according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb
division also lost 100% of production for two weeks.

So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes,
not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid
overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of
production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids.

So now we go to 11 January 1944,

"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid
out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben
was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself
in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout the trip.
Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large
number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was lost,
several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain
Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless ploughed
through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack.
The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship
which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell true
and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that followed
did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory."

-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then there
would be no necessity to highlight it.

The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

So what?

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
very badly indeed.


So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.


You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in
"The Berlin Raids" backs me up. The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in
a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You
couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's
could find them.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

Me, and the official history:

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks


"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66

So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the
Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43
-- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred
by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book.

Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France?

He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle
barrel, huh?

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel
for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by
the
Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by
USAAF units.

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

Two instances:

"Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched
over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the
two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at
Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own
importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division
had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium,
they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz
was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet
strikes against oil plants, although at this point the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others
could eform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the
385th
managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group.
The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division
achieved
similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at
Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."

--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that
day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted.

This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division
2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off
3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter
reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The
96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295
despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half
the total lost.

I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2,
the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that
as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the
best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the
385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the
fight but with some disorganisation?

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the
Germans could do.

The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still
managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German
defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was.

By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas
production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845
tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd
bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time
according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb
division also lost 100% of production for two weeks.

So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes,
not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid
overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of
production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids.

So now we go to 11 January 1944,

"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid
out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben
was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself
in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout
the trip.
Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large
number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was
lost,
several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain
Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless
ploughed
through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack.
The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship
which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell
true
and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that
followed
did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory."

-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then
there
would be no necessity to highlight it.

That's just flat weird.

The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44.

"The first pass made at our group included 30 to 35 ME-109's and FW-190s. The
low group, to our left, had three Forts go down from this first pass. We also
saw three German fghters shot down by this group during this time. The No. 4
ship, lead ship of our element and on whose wing we were flying formation, had
it's No. 1 engine hit. It immediately burst into flames and dropped out of
formation. A few minutes later, this plane exploded.

It is impossible to say who was in the "No.4 ship" that Vern Moncur saw go
down. The fight was far too concentrated and violent for an accurate accounting
of all the casualties, and the Group's records are unclear.' It is easier to
account for the first three losses in the Hell's Angels low group that Moncur
recorded. "Bad Check", a Fortress Hullar's crew had flown early in their tour,
and one of the Group's original aircraft, was one of the first to go. Lt. G.S.
McClellan's crew was aboard her in the No.7 slot of the low group's low
squadron. Lt. Robert Sheets's crew aboard the "City of Wanette" in the squadron
lead saw "Bad Check" at 12,000 feet circling in a tight turn. Other crews
reported her going down with the wheels down, and Lt. James Fowler learned that
night that 10 chutes were seen to come from her. Lt. McClellan was on his 18th
trip and the rest of his crew was not far behind except for Lt. W.A. Fisher,
the copilot from B-26s who was on his first B-17 raid. "Bad Check" was on her
45th mission. She reportedly went down some time between 1055 and 1105 near the
town of Lienen, 20 miles Southwest of Osnabruck.

Next to die was probably "Flak Wolf", Woddrop's favorite and the Queen that
had taken Hullar's crew on their first mission. She was flown by Lt.
J.W. Carothers's crew, most of whom were on their fourth mission. They were in
the No.6 slot of the low group's low squadron, and from the nose of "The Flying
Bitch", at the head of the low squadron's second element, Lt.
E.L. Cronin, bombardier of Lt. K.A. Hoeg's crew, "saw Carothers pull off to the
left and explode. Had time "to get men out. Saw three chutes plus some,objects,
perhaps men." "Flak Wolfs" end was also observed by Lt. T. Lamarr Simmons
aboard S for Sugar in the No.5 ,low squadron slot: "I saw several bombers
explode before this, maybe three or four, but this one made a really vivid
impression on me. I saw a wing fall off the plane, and then the whole fuselage
just came apart with a whole bunch of pieces in the air and fire all over the
place. I didn't see anybody get out." "Flak Wolf" was on her 40th raid. She
crashed at Kloster Oesede, just South of Osnabruck.

Lt. Hallden's No. 896 in ttle No.6 position of the low group's lead squadron
was another early loss. From the No.4 squadron position, Lt.
F.F. Wilson's crew in B-17G 42-31471 saw Hallden's bomber at 1055, just as an
FW-190 was attacking from seven o'clock low. They reported his ship "in
distress at 19,500 feet on a heading of 120 degrees...The aircraft was on fire
and went out of formation into a spin. The tail section came off. Three men but
no parachutes were seen." Most of Hallden's crew were on their fourth raid. No.
896 crashed near Kirchlengren, due Eastof Osnabriick and North of the Group's
inbound track to the IP.
The 190 that got them did not get away. Lt. Wilson's tail gunner, Sgt.
W.G. Hubley, opened fire and "the fighter blew up and pilot bailed out." Hubley
got credit for a kill.


.. Schwaebe's crew, flying the "War Bride" in the No.2 slot of the low group's
high squadron, peeled out of formation. This Fortress, which had taken Lt. Jack
Hendry home from so many missions, was last seen at 17,000 feet by Lt. E.S.
Harrison's crew from B 17G 42-39885 in the No.6 position of the lead group's
low squadron. They reported her going down "under control" but no chutes were
noted. It was the War Bride's 35th mission, and the seventh for half of Lt.
Schwaebe's crew. The ship crashed near Detmold, about 30 miles Southeast of
Osnabriick.

These observations are consistent with what Lt. N.E. Shoup's crew, flying B-17F
41-24605 in the No.5 slot of the low group's high squadron, reported. At 1113
they saw a "B-17 out of control,-eight chutes," together with another B-17 that
exploded with no chutes. Two minutes later they saw a third Fortress with the
tail shot off and no chutes.

At 1117 another Fortress fell. This bomber was Lt. W.A. Purcell's "Baltimore
Bounce". Lt. Purcell's crew had gone on the raid as a spare, taking a.position
in the lead squadron for one of four 303rd ships that aborted from the two
group formations. Vern Moncur had the best view of her end:

"Soon after the loss of the No.4 ship, the No.3 ship ahead of us also caught on
fire in the No.1 engine and peeled out of formation. This ship exploded, also.
Lt. Purcell was the pilot, and he and his crew didn't have a chance. (Purcell
and I had been together through all of our training.) I then moved my ship up
into the No.3 position, flying on the left wing of the Wing Leader, General
Travis." The "Eight Ball's" crew saw "Baltimore Bounce" blow up, as did Lt.
H.S.
Dahleen's crew from B-17G 42-31183 in the No.5 slot of the lead squadron
formation....

According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail
gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target."
The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just
how good Fawcett's aim had been:

"The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a
heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and
among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in
which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of
hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable
Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another
Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller
unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered
over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road
°and railway.

Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the
freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the
target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low
Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target
and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the
plant as a result of the attack."

The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to
make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward
bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German
fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in."

--"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill

The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was
deterred by night fighter attacks. The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans.


The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way
that had no parallel with the USAAF.


The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.


There's no fiction involved. The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany
in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. The RAF raid on the Renault
plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy was
degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot.

Walt

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.


WalterM140 wrote in message ...
Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:

Walter needs to editorialise the facts away.

This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations.

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

So what?

As usual with Walter anything that disturbs his view is dismissed.

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF.

Yes folks, after being told an RAF raid was credited with destroying
40% of the factory Walter will simply ignore it.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
very badly indeed.

So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.

You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in
"The Berlin Raids" backs me up.

You know Walter is in trouble when he throws other people's names
in front of his opinions. The 4,000 pound bomb idea gives a measure
of his detachment from reality. Most of this post is cut and paste, it
saves so much work, and gives you an idea of how Walter will simply
repeat the same discredited claims over and over.

The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in
a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

Walter will go through the hundreds of raids launched in WWII, find
good USAAF ones, find bad RAF ones, and "prove" his case with
the careful selection of evidence. In this case the baseline is RAF
raids on Berlin in the winter of 1943/44.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You
couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's
could find them.

The USSBS went out and counted the bombs on 3 major German oil
plants, they found, in late 1944 and early 1945 the night bombers were,
on average more accurate than the day bombers. They also found the
bigger bombs and longer raid times mean the night raids were more
destructive. People know the night bombers started off with very bad
accuracy, on average, but the rise of electronic aids changed that.

Killing pickle barrels only matters if they are the great secret weapon,
and it is interesting to note these wonder weapons were invisible to
the B-26s etc as well, even when they had the same bomb sights as
the B-17/24s. Makes the agenda quite clear, claim everything for the
USAAF heavy bombers.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

By the way, Walter has never read the British Official history,
relying on selected quotes of the work in other books.

Me, and the official history:

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

Note the above quote says that bombers were shot down or forced to
turn back early by the defences, nothing unique there. Now note it goes
on to note how the defences disrupted the timing of the attack, again
nothing unusual there (remember the claimed slow down to reorganise
quote about a USAAF mission?). Timing was important, at night to
arrive while the markers were visible and maximise countermeasure
cover, by day to minimise smoke and dust problems and maximise
fighter cover.

It says nothing about healthy bombers failing to attack.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

Walter loves this quote, he continually uses it without noting it is a
manufactured one. Nor that it says nothing about individual bombers,
only the force as a whole, the parallel with the USAAF pull back in
October 1943.

The text in the official history is actually,

"The Battle of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

(13 pages)

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... "

From December 2000,

Well yes Bekker is quoting the official history. The final two sentences
are from page 193 volume 2. The first is from page 206 volume 2.
Bekker makes it clear the quote is from two separate pages, without
noting the final sentence appears pages before the first one.

Walter has been told this before and as stated he actually has
entered the text in the correct order, without noting the 13 page
gap between parts of the text.

So it is a non quote, since the last sentence of it appears on a
page before the rest of the quote.

Walter replied to the above sentence with:

Well of course that is incorrect.

Oh good, and there is a reason for the declaration? The way I
see it reversing the order of the sentences means it is not
quoting the author. Let alone the fact the final part of the "quote"
is from 13 pages before. I gather Walter would be happy if posters
came along and rearranged his posts to suit when replying then,
and claimed them as his meaning. The "quote" is made up of
two separate quotes, as Bekker makes clear in his book, without
specifying what came from which page.

So, Walter, why do you think it is a valid way to quote a work?

The quote makes it very clear Bomber Command had been
defeated in the Battle of Berlin, it had to withdraw. And it clearly
shows the quote says nothing at all like the "conclusions" about
deterrence on individual raids Walter has drawn, it exactly parallels
the need for the 8th to pull back in October 1943.

From November 2000,

The text in the Official History is from the section detailing the
effects of the battle of Berlin. It does not deal with any particular
raid as such, it deals with the fact the defences were then usually
able to inflict unsustainable losses on the attackers. In other
words Bomber Command had been defeated and would need
to change things to be able to continue to bomb the preferred
targets, exactly the same as what faced the 8th Air Force in
October 1943.

To state it again, the official history is misquoted, misinterpreted
and talks about the ability of Bomber Command to continue to
mount a series of raids, not about the effect of the defences on
a raid.

From November 2000,

Page 193 British Official History. Putting the text Walter
really likes to use in its proper context,

"The expectations of the Commander in Chief had not been fulfilled,
and by that standard the Battle of Berlin had been a failure. The
attacks on the capital itself had not "cost Germany the war" nor
had the broader Lancaster offensive brought the enemy to, or,
as events were to show, anywhere near, the point of capitulation
on 1 April 1944. **Moreover, in the operational sense, the Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure, it was a defeat.** The disastrous
Nuremberg operation, in which the missing rate was no less than
11.8% brought the Bomber Command tactics of massed and
concentrated attack against major targets to a dead stop and
they were not again resumed until the entire air situation over
Germany had been radically altered."

(Bomber Command bombed German targets 5 times in April
mainly in the south and west of the country, including an attacks
to take advantage of moonlight nights, Friedrichshafen for
example).

To continue the quote, after removal of slightly over a paragraph
where Harris talks about losses and asks for nightfighters, bottom
of page 193 and on to page 194.

"The implication was equally clear. The German nightfighter force
had interposed itself between Bomber Command and its
strategic object, at any rate in so far as the latter involved sustained
operations of deep penetration. Thus, as for some time the Air Staff,
and in particular, its deputy chief, Air Marshal Bottomley, had
feared, the night offensive was brought to a situation dangerously
similar to that which had already checked the day offensive of the
US 8th Bomber Command.
The operations against Schweinfurt and Nuremberg became
famous as isolated disasters, but their real significance lay in
the fact that they marked the culminating points, the former in
the day and the latter in the night offensive, of two rising tides
of insupportable casualty rates. These made the relevance, if
not the means of application, of the Pointblank intermediate
objective (Luftwaffe destruction) abundantly clear not only to
those charges with the preparations for Overlord but also to
those responsible for the continuation of the Strategic Air
Offensive or, in the code of the time, the Pointblank ultimate
objective. This was because they had destroyed the American
theory that formations of heavy bombers would be able to
defend themselves in daylight and because, equally, they
had shown that the British night offensive could not be
indefinitely sustained by the tactics of evasion, deception
and radar counter action alone. It was well that they also
introduced, only partly in the relationship of cause and
effect, the era of the long range fighter which, fortunately,
was no longer an insoluble technical problem."

To complete it here comes the text before the rest of the
text Walter uses, page 206, the previous paragraph in the
history is about how it was discovered most of the night
fighters were in northern Germany.

"It was this which led Bomber Command to change not only
its tactics but also, and in the process, its strategy. The
attack on Berlin was almost broken off. In fact, there was
only one further major operation against the capital in this
phase of the campaign and that did not take place until the
night of 24 March. Meanwhile a much greater proportion of
the effort was brought to bear against towns in the Southern
part of Germany and these were generally approached by
southerly routes. The number of route markers which
served to guide the nightfighters as well as the night
bombers, was severely reduced, the attacks were often
divided into two waves which approached by different ways
and struck at different times and a much greater effort was
thrown into diversionary operations. **Thus Bomber
Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter
force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse
its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less
efficient means than hitherto.** The situation, in view of the fact
that Berlin was by no means destroyed, meant that the Germans
had already won the Battle of Berlin."

The history notes the southern raids had about 2/3 the casualties
of the northern raids.

Now consider the following text,

The 8th Air force was compelled, largely by the German day-fighter force,
to draw away from its primary target, German industry, to disperse its effort
and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto.
.... The Battles of October 1943 were more than a failure. They were a defeat.

You see Walter tries to announce any RAF defeat is absolute, no
chance of coming back, the USAAF may suffer defeats but has
a near instant answer and carries on.

Now to the next quote.

The text before the passage used by Walter is a quote from
Farquier's navigator

"It was a good, clear night below and we had an excellent view
of the city. I was in the bomb aimers position. My main
function was to assess the accuracy of the T.I.s. Johnny would
then broadcast the information to all crews: "those green TIs
are short - aim for the red ones further on" "disregard the TIs
on your left" etc. Then he would encourage the Main Force with
such comments as, "Come on in, fellows! The flak is nowhere
near as bad as it looks!". He had an excellent R/T voice which
came over loud and clear to all we later talked with. It no
doubt helped to calm jittery nerves and, I believe, it helped
produce a better concentration of bombs on the aiming point"

Note how the master bomber is trying to tell the bombers there
are badly placed markers.

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

A master bomber aircraft had been used on two of the recent
raids but little success had been achieved. Group captain
John Searby who had successfully used the (master bomber)
technique over Peenemunde says

"There was a big difference between a limited "moonlight
special" like Peenemunde and the area attacks which were
much more difficult, with the sheer confusion of the
bombing, the defences, smoke, fires and, of course, the
terrific mass of searchlights. It was not like the relatively
easy target conditions of Peenemunde. The master bomber
on a area attack was a refinement that did not make much
difference, because a chap could just could not see the
ground properly.

"And Wing Commander Ken Burns, who had been the Master Bomber
over Nuremberg, says:

"I think that the reason for the discontinuance of the tactic
may have been that on very large areas in poor visibility it was
extremely difficult to drop the primary markers accurately, and
that most crews of the Main Force and some of the backers-Up
had only one thought in their mind at the target and that was to
get in, release their bombs and get out, and not let their own
intercom be messed up by incoming instructions." "

A Master bomber was used only once more in a raid to
Montlucon in France mid September, before the practice
was discontinued for 6 months.

The impression I receive is the master bomber effectiveness is more
to do with the confusion of a large raid coupled with the newness of the
tactic, if the instructions do not make sense then by definition they will
be ignored.

"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

When Walter runs an editorial you know the quote does not say what
he claims for it, the Middlebrook words do not even appear.

Ignoring the problems with raid timing and fuel loads on a long distance
raid, things like the wind shift. The briefed point was beyond Berlin, in
an attempt to lay a bomb pattern in a different direction to normal, the
bombers would fly beyond and then turn back. Things like the timing
going astray changed that as well as the idea of spending minimum
time in the Berlin defence zone.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66

Like I mentioned, Walter will measure accuracy from an aiming point
that was not marked.

The raid caused scattered damage including villages outside Berlin and
every government building on the Wilhelmstrasse. Note the quotes Walter
uses make it clear there were markers away from the correct aiming point.

If you look up the Bomber Command War Diaries you discover
the following, the Pathfinders did not identify the correct aiming
point, in the centre of the city, but rather marked one on the
outskirts. The main force was late, another reason why the
crews were in a hurry to bomb and go on a long range mission.

So comparing the actual bomb pattern to the planned aiming
point ignores the fact the crews were bombing the wrong
aiming point.

The RAAF history notes the Germans dropped dummy markers,
parachute flares were dropped over the bombers, and the main
problem was apparently a major wind shift that upset the
pathfinders, which would be another cause of anxiety for the
crews on such a long distance mission, running out of fuel on
the way home thanks to being late and a wind shift would not
be wanted.

Defences (passive and active) were part of the reason, tight
concentrations of markers were the way to achieve accurate raids.

Actually the Berlin raids makes a point that creep back was
also effected by the accuracy of the marking, if a number of
scattered markers went down then the bombing was dispersed
leading to a bomb trail at times.

So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the
Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43
-- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred
by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side.

Yes folks, the only thing that stops RAF night bomber accuracy is
German defences, nothing else. The WWII RAF has an all weather
ability the modern USAF would really like.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book.

Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France?

As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration

He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle
barrel, huh?

Yes folks, as can be seen Walter needs to simply mismeasure everything
to push the fiction. It was a major reason the Berlin raids failed to do the
sort of damage Harris wanted, the inability to normally accurately mark a
target that far from Britain in early 1944.

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

See above how Walter posts quotes he either does not read or simply
cannot comprehend, the last line on fighters.

"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

(snip)

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the
Germans could do.

Yes folks, when in trouble change the subject, ignore the number of
kill claims the fighters assigned to the mission recorded, just pretend
there was no escort. Above all no mention the candidate for receiving
"almost fanatical resistance" suffered 1 aircraft MIA.

The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still
managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German
defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was.

This is good, firstly the force lost 1 bomber, so you would hope they
were not heavily disorganised, but it appears they did suffer some
problems. Secondly Walter is in trouble again, this time throwing
the RAF history in, since the book does not say what Walter is
saying.

(snip)

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then
there would be no necessity to highlight it.

That's just flat weird.

The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44.

The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the
description of the losses, most of which occurred before the
target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss.

(snip)

According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail
gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target."
The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just
how good Fawcett's aim had been:

"The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a
heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and
among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in
which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of
hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable
Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another
Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller
unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered
over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road
°and railway.

In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on
facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official
target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules.

Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the
freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the
target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low
Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target
and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the
plant as a result of the attack."

The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to
make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward
bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German
fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in."

--"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill

The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was
deterred by night fighter attacks.

Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your
case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed.
Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in
particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs
missed the target, only that some did and implying most.

The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans.

As people have gathered by his choice of references Walter has decided
the USAAF is "Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines" and everyone
else are short sighted fools.

Note the holes in the bomb damage quote above, with Walter
it is a good bet to assume there are things in there that do not help
his fiction. Note the 379th is mentioned, it lost 1 aircraft.

The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way
that had no parallel with the USAAF.

Yes folks, when confronted with the facts Walter simply repeats the lies.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.

There's no fiction involved.

Walter is basically wall to wall fiction.

The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany
in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

It seems Walter is going to simply pretend the range of radio aids
had no bearing on night raid accuracy.

The RAF raid on the Renault
plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy
was degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot.

USAAF raid on France, 99.6% accuracy claimed, on Germany, Huls
around 5% accuracy.

It is simple really, to make the comparison erase the bad USAAF results
and pretend real hard, find the worst RAF raids and pretend real hard.

Strenuously ignore the many factors like weather, training and luck
that make a difference in bombing accuracy, just claim it is all
defences.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration

As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were many
others.

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Walt

On 03 May 2004 10:13:47 GMT, (WalterM140) wrote:

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered.

Don't stop at the "largely".

Gavin Bailey

--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.


And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walt

"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".


You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head -- had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other factor,
go for it.

Walt

Ah yes, the wipe the slate clean approach again.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration

As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

Note how Walter deletes my words so he can pretend I agree with him.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy. There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance. The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."

This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target. And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears. Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next "" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.
Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh. After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.

People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head -- had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other factor,
go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Keep your postings refuting Walter, and it is simple to cut and paste
the same, unanswered, replies when the same junk claims are made
using the same junk "proof".

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

I don't know if you are being obtuse or not.

The Americans carried their targeting systems with them. Shallow or deep, it
made no difference.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so
did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,


I'm saying you can't show that German opposition degraded the accuracy of the
USAAF attacks, the way the nightfighters drgraded the accuracy of Bomber
Command over Germany.

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance".

That wasn't the only example. As I indcate, you are getting so over the top
ridiculous, you can almost be ignored.

Just because that formation lost only one aircraft doesn't mean they were not
heavily attacked. As Freeman indicates, the formation at one point was in some
disorder. They still bombed accurately.

In part of your note of yesterday that I didn't feel warranted a response, you
indicated that the experience of the 303rd on the 1/11/44 raid was invalid
--because they were not under attack -- in the target area--. That is so
completely ridiculous. You seem to have your little coterie of supporters
hovering around who won't post themselves, but will make up little funny
stories about pickle barrels. Maybe you are impressing them.

Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."


Unescorted B-17's could get good effect on target despite the worst the Germans
could do. Not so the RAF, as the official history shows.

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.


Walt saw a lot of anecdotal evidence of that and was interested to learn that
the offical British history confirmed it.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy.

--Not-- affecting bombing accuracy--

There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

Yeah, found it on the remnants table. Cheap.


There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the
target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance.

Walt said no such thing. You're a lying son of a bitch, aren't you?

Walt wants to say there was good effect on target. You are making things up
from whole cloth. But doubtless your buddies are glad you are defending the
right.

The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.


And all this pedantry shows what exactly?

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor
bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.


Address the point, Sinclair. Can you show that flak or fighters degraded USAAF
accuracy?

The answer is no, you cannot. So you just carp and parade your pedant's
pedigree.


"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

We know the Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse than the RAF
did.


Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."


Which you don't quote.


This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against
undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target.

It was dark, right? There was good effect on target, right? It was
undefended, right?

It helps establish a baseline for accuracy. And as I indicated the other day,
we can see clearly that over German targets, that accuracy was seriously
degraded by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel in the USAAF
experience.

And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.


As I said earlier, the USAAF took their targeting systems with them. You're
confirming that the vaunted RAF had an accuracy problem due to its technology.

Okay, fine. Too bad they didn't have better aircraft. Then they could have
attacked by day.

Too bad they didn't develop a better heavy machine gun for defense, or a
bomber with a very strong stucture, or very forgiving flight characteristics,
or one that could fly in tight formations above the worst of the flak. Too bad
they didn't have an aircraft like the B-17.

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.


You don't deny it. As I suggest above, Mr. Wiltshaw, I believe it was, started
the ball rolling on this by showing that that RAF could get pretty could
concentration on an undefended factory. But over Germany where there were
flak, fighters and searchlights, they had to settle for attacking whole cities
and burning out the workers, not burning down the factories.

The Americans didn't have to do that.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears.

The Renault factory was undefended when the Americans hit it. After they left
the target area, they were attacked by JG 26. The point is that when the USAAF
-and- the RAF hit it, it was undefended. And the Americans could get good
effect on target despite the worst the Germans could do. Not so the RAF.

Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next "" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

A lot of your material is over the top ridiculous.

You delete a lot of my material; I don't mind.


"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.


I think you are lying. I think you took my meaning perfectly.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.


Huels was badly damaged. But I don't see the point. You don't address the
point.

Can you show that USAAF accuracy was degraded by flak and fighters, or even by
fighters, the way the official British history shows that the RAF's accuracy
was degraded when intercepted by the NJG?

No, you can't. You can only carp.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.


Huels was badly damaged.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences,

I have actually addressed the attack on the Renualt plant at Billancourt quite
a bit. but we can see on one hand accuarcy against an undefended target --
Billancourt-- and the accuracy over German targets and we can say,
"hmmmmmmm....big difference."


both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.


Both Air Forces attacked it. But the USAAF could get the same accuracy despite
the worst the Germans could do; RAF accuracy was degraded when the defenses
made a strong reaction.


It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,

Yeah, well. The German night fighters were not harrasssing British bombers
over Germany on a strategic level. It was pretty personal.

a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night.

It was noted on enough missions to be noted in the official history.

You're boring me, Sinclair.

Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy.

I haven't seen anything that indicated that fighters degraded the accuracy. On
many raids, the bombing was very accurate no matter how the Germans reacted.

You are welcome to lay aside your charts and abstracts and cite some actual
raids where the RAF had good concentration on target despite being heavily
engaged by the NJG. Seriously, I think there was at least one.

If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

But that wasn't the case.

If one RAF bomber crew flinched?

"The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Five aircraft out of 468? Who do you think you are fooling Sinclair? That's
a lot of flinching.

I cite one raid. As far as i know, you've -never- cited a good raid by the
RAF, one that had pretty good effect on target. Of course the targets were
whole cities. That should make it easier. Can you cite such a raid or raids?
Besides raids that resulted in the random firestorm, or the advent of window?
I've cited several raids. Thanks for mentioning Huels. That raid had good
effect on target, as did the others I named.

Now you name some significant Main Force raids of equal effect. And you have
this advantage -- the RAF targeted whole cities, typically.



Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers.

What I showed there was that after more than a year of Harris' command, the
effect of British bombing on the German economy was nil. On the other hand,
the Germans were very concerned over USAAF operations and after a period of
less than a year were giving them priority in the defense.

Now, if we extrapolate, we see after a year of USAAF operations the double
strike raid against Regensburg/Shweinfurt on 8/17/43 -- a year after the first
raid. What sort of effort was Bomber Command having on 9/1/40, a year after the
war started? Or maybe we can add 8 months, the time between the attack on
Pearl Harbor and the first USAAF raid. Let's see, that takes us to the Summer
of 1941. What effect was the RAF having on German industry in that time frame?

Almost none.

Isn't that about the time the Butts report came out? So given the same time
frames to develop, the USAAF is wrecking the Regansburg ME-109 factory, the
British were trying to improve on getting 3 aircraft out of 100 within five
miles of the target.

This just gets better and better. Or more embarrassing for you.

Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.


Do you remember that thread on the moderated WWII group called "Was the
daylight bombing campaign necessary?"

We've come a long way since then, haven't we? Now the question is, since you
seem to agree that RAF accuracy over distance was so poor, why was the RAF
wasting its time dropping so many bombs so inaccurately at night? I mean, the
accuracy over Germany, when compared to that raid on the Renault plant -- it's
sort of pitiful, isn't it?

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out

On the way out, the target had already been attacked.

, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.


The Americans sometimes missed, and missed wide. You're dodging the question
that we have wandered on to. Did the German fighter defenses degrade the US
bombing the way it did the British bombing?

I think the answer is no, and your dodging seems to confirm that you have no
information to the contrary.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.

People can judge for themselves.

Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.


I've no doubt you do. If you are hishonest enough to post it, there are those
hopeful enough to buy it.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that
the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day
fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above
the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

I'm right; you tried to fool people.

After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.


See above. You lied, and as is often the case, you got caught.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.


It doesn't mean that at all; you are blatantly lying. I even provided the
quote:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

What you know damn well was the case, was that the bulk of both day and night
fighter attackes happened well before the target. Ever hear of the Kammhuber
line?

You are so easy to show as a liar. You're pitiful.


People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

That wouldn't be the point, would it? Why didn't you post that before in this
thread? The German flak was supposed to moderate their fire when the wild
boars were around. Most of the fighter activity took place away from the
target cities, for both forces.


Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.


I don't have to. What you posted was complete bull****.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

It somehow made its way into the official history.


You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.


And blah blah blah. You can't show it, so you just carp.


US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head --
had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

Are you saying those raids didn't have good effect on target? Or that they
were not heaviy opposed, or what exactly?


If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and
fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other
factor,
go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Where do you show the defenses caused the errors?

The ball bearing plants at Shweinfurt on 10/14/43, to quote Freeman were
"heavily hit." The 351st group placed all bombs within 1,000 feet of the
aiming point. This, in spite of heavy fighter opposition.


Walt

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

Ah yes, stage 2 of the wipe the slate clean approach again, assume
everyone has forgotten the earlier problems with the "proof" and simply
resubmit it.

So we have an attempt to prove the degradation of bombing
accuracy was mainly due to the defences in the RAF case and
the weather in the USAAF case.

To prove this, select a group of USAAF raids, often using the
results of units that received citations, claim these are typical.
Ignore that in some cases the heavy fighter attacks claimed
resulted in zero or one bomber MIA and few kill claims logged
by the gunners, definitely ignore the fact some of the formations
lost their aircraft after bombing.

You see even in the worst raids there were units that were not
engaged by the fighter defences. Even when some groups were
heavily hit it was often the one squadron that took most of the losses.
Decline to mention the fighters usually held off near the target to
give the flak a chance.

Just ignore all this and announce this is the USAAF baseline.

Select one RAF raid where the marking was in the wrong place,
where the bombers came under fighter attack during the bomb
run (later strenuously deny the contents of the quote used to
show this). Measure accuracy from the official aiming point.

Announce this as the RAF baseline.

Announce how this proves the case. Wonder why so many people
are busy laughing.

Throw around accusations of lies in reply.


WalterM140 wrote in message ...
As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

Deleted text,

"Note how Walter deletes my words so he can pretend I agree with him."

I don't know if you are being obtuse or not.

The Americans carried their targeting systems with them. Shallow or deep, it
made no difference.

Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
aids in 1944 and 1945.

So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so
did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,

I'm saying you can't show that German opposition degraded the accuracy of the
USAAF attacks, the way the nightfighters drgraded the accuracy of Bomber
Command over Germany.

The reality is Walter knows I can show it, hence the way he deletes
the evidence. His claims over state the effect on the RAF and under
state the effect on the USAAF. Standard stuff really.

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance".

That wasn't the only example. As I indcate, you are getting so over the top
ridiculous, you can almost be ignored.

Yes folks, when Walter is caught deciding losing 1 aircraft is to be
the definition of heavy fighter attack he will simply attack the person
showing the real evidence.

Just because that formation lost only one aircraft doesn't mean they were not
heavily attacked. As Freeman indicates, the formation at one point was in some
disorder. They still bombed accurately.

By the way Walter now assumes they were heavily attacked.

Remember the bomber gunner multiplication table? Similar thing for the
fighter encounter table.

This is from an RAF report, the 31 March 1945 raid when the formation
was hit by around 30 Me262s who made a single pass, knocking down
around 4 bombers, "78 encounters and 28 crews reported one or more
combats".

In part of your note of yesterday that I didn't feel warranted a response, you
indicated that the experience of the 303rd on the 1/11/44 raid was invalid
--because they were not under attack -- in the target area--. That is so
completely ridiculous.

Yes folks, when Walter is in trouble just invent other people's
words while forgetting his. It will be interesting to see what text
Walter uses to substantiate this claim, the text I wrote,

"The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the
description of the losses, most of which occurred before the
target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss.

In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on
facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official
target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules.

Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your
case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed.
Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in
particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs
missed the target, only that some did and implying most."

See anything of being attacked over the target,? As opposed to
pointing out the RAF bombers were attacked by fighters over
the target, in Walter provided evidence, which he goes on
below to try and deny.

You seem to have your little coterie of supporters
hovering around who won't post themselves, but will make up little funny
stories about pickle barrels. Maybe you are impressing them.

Translation Walter has noted his fiction is unsupported. Note how
Walter has been obsessed with pickle barrels recently.

Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."

Unescorted B-17's could get good effect on target despite the worst the Germans
could do. Not so the RAF, as the official history shows.

It is quite simple folks, note how the Official History quotes are not
repeated here, they had to be cut out immediately I put the full
context in.

Apparently unescorted RAF B-17s could not hit targets if we are to
take the above words literally.

Alternatively we are back at the usual boys own stuff, the B-17 heavy
fighter idea. Junk.

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.

Walt saw a lot of anecdotal evidence of that and was interested to learn that
the offical British history confirmed it.

It is quite simple folks, note how the Official History quotes are not
repeated here, they had to be cut out immediately I put the full
context in.

As for anecdotal evidence Walter trawls books looking for quotes
he can use, out of context and heavily edited if needed.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy.

--Not-- affecting bombing accuracy--

There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

Yeah, found it on the remnants table. Cheap.

Thanks for the confirmation, it helps when I quote the diary
because it shows how selectively Walter uses any work.

There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the
target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance.

Walt said no such thing. You're a lying son of a bitch, aren't you?

Walter's words,

"The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans."

Anybody see anything about some of the formations, as opposed to
the whole wing? Walter will presumably accuse Walter of telling lies.

Walt wants to say there was good effect on target. You are making things up
from whole cloth. But doubtless your buddies are glad you are defending the
right.

Translation Walter will simply wish away unpleasant facts.

The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.

And all this pedantry shows what exactly?

How about that. I accurately report what the USAAF did and Walter
simply ignores it, not for him to let people see the facts and decide
for themselves, the fact free editorial laced with the "right" conclusions
is the preferred option.

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor
bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.

Address the point, Sinclair. Can you show that flak or fighters degraded USAAF
accuracy?

The answer is no, you cannot. So you just carp and parade your pedant's
pedigree.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

Note this is an 8th Air Force document reporting the bombing results.
I could add the various USSBS accuracy reports and even Doolittle
noting the environment became better leading to better results. Walter
normally deletes the evidence.

Doolittle when commenting on improvements in accuracy during 1944,
"there were no real improvements in bombing equipment. The improvement
was in the environment in which the bombing took place." In other words
fewer fighter interceptions as the main decrease in resistance.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

We know the Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse
than the RAF did.

As you can see when confronted with the evidence Walter either
deletes it or changes the subject, back to a favourite junk claim,
from carefully selected quotes.

Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."

Which you don't quote.

Walter keeps deleting the evidence.

The calculation was each flak gun added 4.5 feet to error, rather precise.
Apart from misidentifying targets, crews improperly levelled gyroscopes
and cut bomb runs short.

This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against
undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target.

It was dark, right? There was good effect on target, right? It was
undefended, right?

Translation Walter is going to ignore his original claim and pretend
to answer other questions.

It helps establish a baseline for accuracy. And as I indicated the other day,
we can see clearly that over German targets, that accuracy was seriously
degraded by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel in the USAAF
experience.

It is simple really, find a report on an RAF raid on Berlin, misrepresent
the report, find a report on a USAAF where bombing accuracy was good,
even when parts of the formation lost heavily, ignore things like unit
citations presented, claim both raids are "typical" and smear from there.

And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.

As I said earlier, the USAAF took their targeting systems with them. You're
confirming that the vaunted RAF had an accuracy problem due to its technology.

Quite correct, radio aids made a big difference to long range
night raids. And as the electronics became better the result
was the night raids ended up more accurate, on average.

Okay, fine. Too bad they didn't have better aircraft. Then they could have
attacked by day.

People can see the "boys own" things here. Walter should be
railing against the diversion of resources from more B-17s into
P-51s is the B-17 was such a good heavy fighter.

Day bombing required strong fighter cover, not heavily armed
bombers.

Too bad they didn't develop a better heavy machine gun for defense, or a
bomber with a very strong stucture, or very forgiving flight characteristics,
or one that could fly in tight formations above the worst of the flak. Too bad
they didn't have an aircraft like the B-17.

Sort of summarises everything doesn't it? The penalties for heavy
armament, higher altitudes and so on are ignored, if the B-17 did it
then it must be good.

Agitate to replace those B-1s, 2s and 52s then.

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.

You don't deny it.

Walter the accuracy dropped dramatically between undefended
and defended targets, by day and night. Accuracy dropped
with distance more quickly by night than day.

As I suggest above, Mr. Wiltshaw, I believe it was, started
the ball rolling on this by showing that that RAF could get pretty could
concentration on an undefended factory. But over Germany where there were
flak, fighters and searchlights, they had to settle for attacking whole cities
and burning out the workers, not burning down the factories.

The Americans didn't have to do that.

People can note that for all the years 1943 to 1945 the 8th dropped
more bombs by non visual sighting, the USAAF did have to settle for
area attacks for a high percentage of its efforts, comparable to the
Bomber Command percentages in 1944/45.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears.

The Renault factory was undefended when the Americans hit it. After they left
the target area, they were attacked by JG 26. The point is that when the USAAF
-and- the RAF hit it, it was undefended. And the Americans could get good
effect on target despite the worst the Germans could do. Not so the RAF.

Yes folks, the fact the USAAF bombers were hit after they had bombed
is still proof of how they could do if they were hit before they had bombed.
This is really funny.

Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next "" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

A lot of your material is over the top ridiculous.

Translation, unanswerable.

You delete a lot of my material; I don't mind.

Walter will now present evidence of all this deletion, beyond me
deleting the 303rd's combat report for 11 January 1944. He will
be unable to.

"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

I think you are lying. I think you took my meaning perfectly.

Yes folks, Walter wants to set up a skewed comparison.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Huels was badly damaged. But I don't see the point. You don't address the
point.

The point is bombing accuracy and the difference obtained when
attacking a weakly defended target in France and a strongly
defended target in Germany.

So Walter changes the subject, to how much damage was done.

Can you show that USAAF accuracy was degraded by flak and fighters, or even by
fighters, the way the official British history shows that the RAF's accuracy
was degraded when intercepted by the NJG?

No, you can't. You can only carp.

Translation, the official history does not support Walter, and the
rest of the junk flows from there.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Huels was badly damaged.

Yes folks, when talking bombing accuracy run a mile from the
actual accuracy figures.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences,

I have actually addressed the attack on the Renualt plant at Billancourt quite
a bit. but we can see on one hand accuracy against an undefended target --
Billancourt-- and the accuracy over German targets and we can say,
"hmmmmmmm....big difference."

See above for the difference in USAAF accuracy.

both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.


Both Air Forces attacked it. But the USAAF could get the same accuracy despite
the worst the Germans could do; RAF accuracy was degraded when the defenses
made a strong reaction.

As people can see Walter prefers to hope no one has a short
term memory. Apparently 498 out of 500 bombs on the French
factory is equal to 20% in the factory fences and around 1/4 of
that on the German factory, but only for the USAAF.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,

Yeah, well. The German night fighters were not harrasssing British bombers
over Germany on a strategic level. It was pretty personal.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level.
As can be seen the pretence continues.

a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night.

It was noted on enough missions to be noted in the official history.

People can note the gaps between what works say and what
Walter wants them to say.

You're boring me, Sinclair.

Good. Given the amusement I derive.

Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy.

I haven't seen anything that indicated that fighters degraded the accuracy. On
many raids, the bombing was very accurate no matter how the Germans reacted.

Translation Walter will not go looking for the total body of evidence,
just the reports of above average achievement by the USAAF.

You are welcome to lay aside your charts and abstracts and cite some actual
raids where the RAF had good concentration on target despite being heavily
engaged by the NJG. Seriously, I think there was at least one.

This is good, it will be interesting to see what the rules are supposed
to be here, what raids qualify geographically and time wise.

If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

But that wasn't the case.

If one RAF bomber crew flinched?

"The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Five aircraft out of 468? Who do you think you are fooling Sinclair? That's
a lot of flinching.

Yes folks, the Walter rule of RAF reporting, do not mention that night
the pathfinders marked the wrong area, not the aiming point, nor
the markers dropped away from the concentration at what was
thought to be the aiming point.

In other words folks, take a USAAF formation that attacked an
alternative target, measure how far that target was from the
primary target, use that as a measure of the error and the USAAF
crews "bravery".

Remember the raids Walter cites, on 12 and 28 May 1944, the
USAAF ones against oil raids, the strike on Zeitz had 20.8%
of bombs on the plant with visual bombing according to the
USSBS, the 1.5 square mile Leuna plant had 37.9% hit, I
believe the current absurd criteria is "that is a lot of flinching".

Walter likes to smear the men in the bombers.

From my original post to this thread,

"Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away."

I cite one raid. As far as i know, you've -never- cited a good raid by the
RAF, one that had pretty good effect on target. Of course the targets were
whole cities. That should make it easier. Can you cite such a raid or raids?
Besides raids that resulted in the random firestorm, or the advent of window?
I've cited several raids. Thanks for mentioning Huels. That raid had good
effect on target, as did the others I named.

Now you name some significant Main Force raids of equal effect. And you have
this advantage -- the RAF targeted whole cities, typically.

This is really good, apparently I have to go find RAF raids that
really heavily damaged a city, the USAAF raids that they will
be compared to have to heavily damage a factory, using
wartime intelligence about USAAF damage levels.

Sort of summarises Walter's rules quite well.

Lets see now, the Alkett works in Berlin, November 1943, the loss
of Stug production was so bad it was the major reason a Panzer
IV line was changed to Stug IV.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers.

What I showed there was that after more than a year of Harris' command, the
effect of British bombing on the German economy was nil. On the other hand,
the Germans were very concerned over USAAF operations and after a period of
less than a year were giving them priority in the defense.

Yes folks, apart from the basic junk claims see the double
standard, the RAF is measured on the effects on the economy,
the USAAF on the effects on the military.

Now, if we extrapolate, we see after a year of USAAF operations the double
strike raid against Regensburg/Shweinfurt on 8/17/43 -- a year after the first
raid. What sort of effort was Bomber Command having on 9/1/40, a year after the
war started? Or maybe we can add 8 months, the time between the attack on
Pearl Harbor and the first USAAF raid. Let's see, that takes us to the Summer
of 1941. What effect was the RAF having on German industry in that time frame?

Almost none.

Walter will of course ignore the effects of the USAAF on the
German economy in the same time frame. The fact that before
1944 the main effects of the bomber offensive were military and
that in any case the economic effects from 1943 onwards were
the result of the joint offensive.

Therefore judge the RAF on economic effects and USAAF on
the military effects.

Isn't that about the time the Butts report came out? So given the same time
frames to develop, the USAAF is wrecking the Regansburg ME-109 factory, the
British were trying to improve on getting 3 aircraft out of 100 within five
miles of the target.

This just gets better and better. Or more embarrassing for you.

Yes folks, just use different rules for the different "competitors"
and you can rig the results quite well.

Wrecking the Regensburg factory is apparently defined as the
Luftwaffe accepting over 600 fighters from it in the last quarter
of 1943, versus around half that in the first quarter of 1943.

It is apparent Walter will continue to ignore figures like the USSBS
reporting that on average in good to fair weather in the final 4 months
of 1944 35.7% of the 8th's bombs landed over 1/2 a mile away from
the aiming point, including 17.6% over a mile away. The RAF aircraft
that missed are automatically accused of being deterred by fighters
and flak, the USAAF are automatically excused

Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Do you remember that thread on the moderated WWII group called "Was the
daylight bombing campaign necessary?"

We've come a long way since then, haven't we?

I did not post any article under that topic so I do not recall it,
I simply note Walter has been pushing the same skewed
claims for years.

Now the question is, since you
seem to agree that RAF accuracy over distance was so poor, why was the RAF
wasting its time dropping so many bombs so inaccurately at night? I mean, the
accuracy over Germany, when compared to that raid on the Renault plant -- it's
sort of pitiful, isn't it?

Sort of summarises Walter quite well, why did the 8th bother
using H2X at all under the same rules, given the accuracy,
originally worse than the 1941 night bombers.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out

On the way out, the target had already been attacked.

Outbound from base Walter.

, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The Americans sometimes missed, and missed wide. You're dodging the question
that we have wandered on to. Did the German fighter defenses degrade the US
bombing the way it did the British bombing?

I think the answer is no, and your dodging seems to confirm that you have no
information to the contrary.

Translation Walter deletes the replies and then announces other
people are dodging the question. Walter goes looking for a couple
of good USAAF examples, a bad RAF one and then claims these
are typical.

Use USAAF raids where the formation suffered 0 or 1 loss, or losses
after they had bombed as "good" examples of fighter interception
effects on bombing accuracy. The result is what matters, the evidence
is irrelevant.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.

People can judge for themselves.

Oh they are, believe me, they are.

Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.

I've no doubt you do. If you are hishonest enough to post it, there are those
hopeful enough to buy it.

Translation Walter is finding his junk is unsupported in forums
where people know their air war history.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that
the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day
fighters
were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above
the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

I'm right; you tried to fool people.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.

See above. You lied, and as is often the case, you got caught.

Translation, the quote does not say what Walter wants it to say,
so declare everyone else a liar. The fun thing is Walter simply
invents these liar claims like he invents the rest of his fiction.
The more Walter accuses people of lies the closer you are to the
truth.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.

It doesn't mean that at all; you are blatantly lying. I even provided the
quote:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

Yes folks, apparently when listening to the master bomber's VHF
instructions, as they approached the target, "harassed by fighter
attack" does not mean they were under fighter attack while
approaching the target. The only time the master bomber
instructions are useful is basically on the bomb run.

The really good laugh for the post. I mean there is no point listening
to the master bomber if you are leaving the target. Also note the
problems with listening to the master bomber and the intercom at
the same time.

Walter will ignore the reported problems with master bombers and
area attacks, the additional confusion that made his instructions
unclear at times and so on.

As a point in logic when do bombers listen for the bombing instructions?
On the bomb run or way before or after?

What you know damn well was the case, was that the bulk of both day and night
fighter attackes happened well before the target. Ever hear of the Kammhuber
line?

You are so easy to show as a liar. You're pitiful.

Walter's definition of liar is people who contradicts him.

Where do we start with this one. When the Germans largely abandoned
the Kammhuber line after the use of window, and to an extent the tighter
bomber streams, was discussed Walter spent a lot of time saying all the
British had done was make the Germans do better. The running commentary
approach, feeding the fighters into the bomber stream, was adopted in the
second half of 1943, after things like better navigation systems were fitted.
This was backed up by the single engined nightfighters attacking over the
target.

It is quite simple, Walter uses the Luftwaffe interception system from
early 1943 and tries to pretend it was around in late 1943. He needs
to erase the fighters or flak from the defences against the RAF raid he
has chosen. Ignoring the quote he posts that reports both are present.

People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

That wouldn't be the point, would it? Why didn't you post that before in this
thread? The German flak was supposed to moderate their fire when the wild
boars were around. Most of the fighter activity took place away from the
target cities, for both forces.

Walter will simply ignore the fact that for the period of RAF raids he
has chosen the Luftwaffe had fighter forces dedicated to intercepting
over the target. He will go with the wartime averages, not the actual
defences faced by the bombers on the selected raids. That would
wreck the fiction.

Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.

I don't have to. What you posted was complete bull****.

Translation Walter cannot handle the truth. So he invents parts of
his assumed RAF raid, trying to erase the fighters over the target,
but when he cannot do that try and erase the flak over the target.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

It somehow made its way into the official history.

I see. The above quote made it into the official history, or is it
another case of myths being appended to the text?

You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.

And blah blah blah. You can't show it, so you just carp.

The reports are repeated above, people can check to see how often
Walter ignores or deletes them if they want to.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head --
had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

Are you saying those raids didn't have good effect on target? Or that they
were not heaviy opposed, or what exactly?

Change the subject time, ignore the reality Walter has a carefully
selected group of "typical" raids".

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and
fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other
factor,
go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Where do you show the defenses caused the errors?

From the reports of the air force and crews.

The ball bearing plants at Shweinfurt on 10/14/43, to quote Freeman were
"heavily hit." The 351st group placed all bombs within 1,000 feet of the
aiming point. This, in spite of heavy fighter opposition.

On 14 October 1943 the 351st group sent 10, had 6 attack, claimed
4 kills while losing 1 MIA.

You can see the Walter definitions working quite well, find a raid where
some of the US bombers were heavily opposed, then report the bombing
results of the formations that were fortunate enough to have escaped
heavy fighter attack.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email