best mil+aviation writers?

Robey Price wrote:

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
confessed the following:

I'll take "Going Downtown" over "Thud Ridge".

I've read Thud Ridge at least 6 times, but Going Downtown only once. I
was put off with a minor detail, his description of an RF-101
shootdown in Nov 1964. He sorta kinda has the name right, Bert Walls
(IIRC) is actually Burt Waltz (currently residing near Hickam AFB)
and some of the cavalier attitude (IMO) he attributed to BW is not how
Burt remembers it.

snip

Alas I donated "Going Downtown," to my local library. Guy, unlike you
I buy lots of books, parting with them is almost unthinkable, no
qualms with GD.

I'd be sleeping in the car with the books overflowing the house if I bought
everything I read. I confess to having problems with Broughton's idiosyncratic
spelling in "GD" ('Oerlicon,' indeed), and "Thud Ridge" is better writing, but I
know the story -- I'm after the technical stuff, and "GD" provides more of that
than "TR".

As would I. Gene Basel's "Pak Six" is okay, but less informative in the areas
of interest to me..

I also like Al Lenski's "Magic 100."

Haven't found that one yet.

You've left out "Alpha Strike Vietnam," a chronological collection by year of
firsthand accounts. Kind of like "Fast Movers," but unlike most such
collections, this one concentrates on the attack pilots flying
A-1/A-4/A-6/A-7, irather than the fighters.

I enjoyed ASV, couldn't finish FM (and yet I liked Sherwood's Korean
effort "Offiecers in flight Suits."). FM suffered the same fate as GD
and now resides in a local library.

I wasn't all that impressed by it either - ISTR that Sherwood lacked aviation
background, which tended to throw jarring notes into the book that would bring me
up[ short. But I got to read the short form of Ed's 105 tour before he wrote
"WTR," plus I though the chapter on Robin Olds was pretty good (for his
personality, if not the accuracy of the facts cited).

I really enjoyed was George Marrett's "Cheating Death," combined with
Byron Hukee's http://skyraider.org/hook/ and Tilford's "The USAF
Search and Rescue in SEA," they make a good trio.

Haven't read those, but I thought Tilford's "Setup: What the Air Force did in
Vietnam and Why" was excellent. Sort of "Clashes," several echelons up.

Guy

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
confessed the following:

Haven't read those, but I thought Tilford's "Setup: What the Air Force did in
Vietnam and Why" was excellent. Sort of "Clashes," several echelons up.

I enjoyed "Setup" which makes for an interesting study along with Adm
Sharp's "Strategy for Defeat," and Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of
Air Power."

I gotta admit that I think Clodfelter got it right. I had come to
similar conclusions (based upon my own research) before I read his
book. Heck I read it just a couple years ago and he published it in
1989.

Juvat

On Sat, 22 May 2004 07:46:55 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Robey Price wrote:

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
confessed the following:

I'll take "Going Downtown" over "Thud Ridge".

I've read Thud Ridge at least 6 times, but Going Downtown only once. I
was put off with a minor detail, his description of an RF-101
shootdown in Nov 1964. He sorta kinda has the name right, Bert Walls
(IIRC) is actually Burt Waltz (currently residing near Hickam AFB)
and some of the cavalier attitude (IMO) he attributed to BW is not how
Burt remembers it.

I enjoyed Thud Ridge, primarily because at the time it came out it was
the only available book telling the story of the F-105 air war. I
faulted it for being a bit too heavy on the braggadocio and too
heavily weighted into MiGs that were few and far between. It still
conveyed a sense of the intensity of the mission and the frustrations
that we all felt.

Alas I donated "Going Downtown," to my local library. Guy, unlike you
I buy lots of books, parting with them is almost unthinkable, no
qualms with GD.

I couldn't stand Going Downtown. The whole purpose of the book was an
excuse for Broughton's actions in the Turkestan scandal. Years after
the events he still couldn't acknowledge the impropriety of his
actions and he still wanted to blame someone else for the collapse of
his promising career.

Last year in Las Vegas I had the chance to talk at length with Robin
Olds regarding Turkestan. Robin was commanding the 8th TFW at Ubon at
the time and was airborne nearby during the strafing. He recounted the
specificity of the morning briefing on the location of the ship and
the prohibition against attacking it. When he saw the activity going
on from his location several miles north along the coast, he knew
someone had screwed up big-time.

Olds was tasked to conduct the initial investigation and remains quite
knowledgeable on the events.

I'd be sleeping in the car with the books overflowing the house if I bought
everything I read. I confess to having problems with Broughton's idiosyncratic
spelling in "GD" ('Oerlicon,' indeed), and "Thud Ridge" is better writing, but I
know the story -- I'm after the technical stuff, and "GD" provides more of that
than "TR".

Seems the "technical stuff" of GD is mostly legalistic and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.

As would I. Gene Basel's "Pak Six" is okay, but less informative in the areas
of interest to me..

I also like Al Lenski's "Magic 100."

Here's the link to Amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg...books&n=507846

You've left out "Alpha Strike Vietnam," a chronological collection by year of
firsthand accounts. Kind of like "Fast Movers," but unlike most such
collections, this one concentrates on the attack pilots flying
A-1/A-4/A-6/A-7, irather than the fighters.

I enjoyed ASV, couldn't finish FM (and yet I liked Sherwood's Korean
effort "Offiecers in flight Suits."). FM suffered the same fate as GD
and now resides in a local library.

I wasn't all that impressed by it either - ISTR that Sherwood lacked aviation
background, which tended to throw jarring notes into the book that would bring me
up[ short. But I got to read the short form of Ed's 105 tour before he wrote
"WTR," plus I though the chapter on Robin Olds was pretty good (for his
personality, if not the accuracy of the facts cited).

John Sherwood is an historian (Official Historian USN is his job
title.) He is an excellent researcher, but not an aviator. Regardless,
Fast Movers is a pretty good compilation of oral history interviews.
He didn't do too badly in recounting the results of my interviews and
could only find one or two minor misstatements.

Robin Olds, however, claims he will rip John's beating heart from his
chest should they ever meet again. Robin seems upset at the
characterization as a hard-drinking, hard-fighting, womanizing,
hell-raiser that Sherwood drew. Actually, it seems spot on to me!

Sherwood's got a new one out, "Afterburner"--more oral history, this
time of USN operations over North Vietnam from Yankee Station. (Not
sure about the title--since most of the USN aircraft didn't have A/B,
e.g. A-4, A-7, A-6, A-1, A-3D.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sat, 22 May 2004 07:46:55 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

snip

I'd be sleeping in the car with the books overflowing the house if I bought
everything I read. I confess to having problems with Broughton's idiosyncratic
spelling in "GD" ('Oerlicon,' indeed), and "Thud Ridge" is better writing, but I
know the story -- I'm after the technical stuff, and "GD" provides more of that
than "TR".

Seems the "technical stuff" of GD is mostly legalistic and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.

snip

Then you must have skipped the chapter discussing "Project Swatrock" in Korea (where he used those 'Oerlicon' rockets on his F-84), as well as
Broughton's opinions on the various Century series fighters, feelings about the Genie (IIRR he spelled it 'Geenie'), etc. That was the stuff that
interested me.

Guy

On Sun, 23 May 2004 06:29:06 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sat, 22 May 2004 07:46:55 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

snip

-- I'm after the technical stuff, and "GD" provides more of that
than "TR".

Seems the "technical stuff" of GD is mostly legalistic and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.

snip

Then you must have skipped the chapter discussing "Project Swatrock" in Korea (where he used those 'Oerlicon' rockets on his F-84), as well as
Broughton's opinions on the various Century series fighters, feelings about the Genie (IIRR he spelled it 'Geenie'), etc. That was the stuff that
interested me.

One of the grad courses I suffered through in my formative years
required reading of a half-dozen works (maybe more,) some book-length,
some journal articles. In each, the task was to determine the author's
"thesis"--the core idea that provided the backbone of the book, and
then to ascertain if the author had provided the logically reasoned
argument to support that thesis.

In "Going Downtown" Broughton's thesis is that he was a victim of the
AF's desire to scapegoat him and destroy his career while he was
simply doing the proper thing as a commander and supporting his
troops. His recounting of his biographical experience is part of the
argument of "what a great guy am I."

The majority of the book deals with his legal travails as the AF holds
him accountable for wilful destruction of the evidence that his troops
violated the ROE. The investigation, the arrest, the detainment at
Clark, etc. are all Jack's bewailing his treatment. "Everyone knows I
was on the fast track to Chief of Staff...."

Bah humbug. It's a poor self-serving attempt to rewrite history. I'm
hoping I can encourage Olds to get his details of the story included
in his book.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 23 May 2004 06:29:06 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sat, 22 May 2004 07:46:55 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

snip

-- I'm after the technical stuff, and "GD" provides more of that
than "TR".

Seems the "technical stuff" of GD is mostly legalistic and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.

snip

Then you must have skipped the chapter discussing "Project Swatrock" in Korea (where he used those 'Oerlicon' rockets on his F-84), as well as
Broughton's opinions on the various Century series fighters, feelings about the Genie (IIRR he spelled it 'Geenie'), etc. That was the stuff that
interested me.

One of the grad courses I suffered through in my formative years
required reading of a half-dozen works (maybe more,) some book-length,
some journal articles. In each, the task was to determine the author's
"thesis"--the core idea that provided the backbone of the book, and
then to ascertain if the author had provided the logically reasoned
argument to support that thesis.

In "Going Downtown" Broughton's thesis is that he was a victim of the
AF's desire to scapegoat him and destroy his career while he was
simply doing the proper thing as a commander and supporting his
troops. His recounting of his biographical experience is part of the
argument of "what a great guy am I."

The majority of the book deals with his legal travails as the AF holds
him accountable for wilful destruction of the evidence that his troops
violated the ROE.

While agreeing with your description of _some_ of the book's thesis, I'll merely point out that the chapter describing the Turkestan incident begins on
page 207 of a 294 page book, and he continues on from there in the manner you describe. I'd also say that there was a third thesis to the book, that
political restrictions on the RoE handicapped our effectiveness. I know that you and virtually every U.S. aircrew member who participated in the war
agree.

The investigation, the arrest, the detainment at
Clark, etc. are all Jack's bewailing his treatment. "Everyone knows I
was on the fast track to Chief of Staff...."

Sure, and it's tedious. It also seems to accurately describe the atmosphere at the time, at least as far as General Ryan and the higher echelons of
command were concerned.

Bah humbug. It's a poor self-serving attempt to rewrite history. I'm
hoping I can encourage Olds to get his details of the story included
in his book.

Ed, the number of personal accounts that aren't self-serving attempts to re-write history can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Otherwise, there
would be no reason to write them. I agree that Broughton in "GD" is an extreme example of a man with a chip on his shoulder, and 'methinks he doth
protest too much'. However, since we once spent a long time discussing your attitude towards Broughton's actions as opposed to, say, Fred Tracy's
private jaunt into China with you in tow, and we know we disagree, there's no point in rehashing old arguments. Actually, in "WTR" you seem to have
come moved much closer to my point of view on Tracy.

Guy

On Tue, 25 May 2004 02:53:31 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:


Ed, the number of personal accounts that aren't self-serving attempts to re-write history can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Otherwise, there
would be no reason to write them.

Can I assume that one of those fingers is for WTR and you've got one
left over for Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights? If you can find some
self-service there or some revisionism, I'm ready to take my hits.

I agree that Broughton in "GD" is an extreme example of a man with a chip on his shoulder, and 'methinks he doth
protest too much'. However, since we once spent a long time discussing your attitude towards Broughton's actions as opposed to, say, Fred Tracy's
private jaunt into China with you in tow, and we know we disagree, there's no point in rehashing old arguments. Actually, in "WTR" you seem to have
come moved much closer to my point of view on Tracy.

The essential difference between Broughton and Tracy is that Broughton
engaged in a cover-up and lied point-blank to his superiors when
caught. Tracy may have reached too far in our China incursion, and I
certainly didn't like being endangered unnecessarily for that purpose,
but he didn't falsify or prevaricate.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Tue, 25 May 2004 02:53:31 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:


Ed, the number of personal accounts that aren't self-serving attempts to re-write history can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Otherwise, there
would be no reason to write them.

Can I assume that one of those fingers is for WTR and you've got one
left over for Phantom Flights, Bangkok Nights? If you can find some
self-service there or some revisionism, I'm ready to take my hits.

My point was that ANY personal account, no matter how big an attempt is made to be objective, will by its nature be somewhat self-serving. Virtually
everyone sees themselves through a favorable filter. As for revisionism, don't your accounts conflict with and therefore potentially revise other
accounts, official or otherwise? 'Revisionism' is the whole point of 'history' -- if you've got nothing new to add to the existing accounts (which may
cause those accounts to be revised), then why bother?

I agree that Broughton in "GD" is an extreme example of a man with a chip on his shoulder, and 'methinks he doth
protest too much'. However, since we once spent a long time discussing your attitude towards Broughton's actions as opposed to, say, Fred Tracy's
private jaunt into China with you in tow, and we know we disagree, there's no point in rehashing old arguments. Actually, in "WTR" you seem to have
come moved much closer to my point of view on Tracy.

The essential difference between Broughton and Tracy is that Broughton
engaged in a cover-up and lied point-blank to his superiors when
caught. Tracy may have reached too far in our China incursion, and I
certainly didn't like being endangered unnecessarily for that purpose,
but he didn't falsify or prevaricate.

Because he didn't get caught. None of you volunteered the information that Tracy knowingly threw the RoE out the window, even though every single one of
you knew that what you were doing was wrong. Not to mention he violated an international border for no better reason than he wanted to get another MiG -
he apparently didn't care whose MiG, nor the potential harm his actions might cause to the U.S. (would have been interesting if any of you guys had been
shot down and captured) - he was on a purely personal junket to add another Mig to his bag, which couldn't possibly be worth the potential harm, and which
had absolutely nothing to do with accomplishing the mission you guys were sent to do. I call that reprehensible behavior, and if anyone deserved being
court-martialled and cashiered, it was Tracy. Unless you have changed your mind, and now believe that it's okay for the military in a democracy to make
policy rather than carry out the policy of the civilian government?

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Robey Price wrote:

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
confessed the following:
SNIP:

I was half-way through "on Yankee Station" when I realized my jaw was
aching. I discovered I'd been grinding my teeth in subconscious rage
seeing the Navy had gone through the same BS we had experienced at Da
Nang, the same ignorance that had killed several dozens of my squadron
mates (in 9 fighter squadrons). I raised my head and startled my wife
by blurting out "If that SOB MacNamara was here I'd punch him right in
the nose!" BTW, I still feel that way . . .
Walt BJ

On 22 May 2004 13:05:19 -0700, (WaltBJ) wrote:

I was half-way through "on Yankee Station" when I realized my jaw was
aching. I discovered I'd been grinding my teeth in subconscious rage
seeing the Navy had gone through the same BS we had experienced at Da
Nang, the same ignorance that had killed several dozens of my squadron
mates (in 9 fighter squadrons). I raised my head and startled my wife
by blurting out "If that SOB MacNamara was here I'd punch him right in
the nose!" BTW, I still feel that way . . .
Walt BJ

Never forgive, never forget. The line for the McNamara shot starts
down the block there. There are a lot of folks already in the queue.


This from the last chapter of When Thunder Rolled:

"It's thirty-five years since that summer of '66 and the view of the
war today is only slightly clearer than it was then. We don't know yet
why we were there or what the objective was. We can't define a
national self-interest for involvement in Southeast Asia nor has
anyone told us what was worth squandering such a valuable treasure of
manpower and machines. We should know, but we don't. There have been
many attempts to explain it all, but they are either self-serving
excuses posing as the memoirs of the senior decision makers or
detailed rationale of their pacifism by professors who opposed the war
and taught their students how to think the same way. As with so much
of history, it depends upon the particular perspective of the observer
rather than the facts at hand.

Looking at the various levels of involvement in Rolling Thunder we can
see the lieutenants doing what was asked of them without question. We
trusted our leaders and our senior decision-makers to give us a
mission with a purpose. They had a moral obligation to not waste our
lives without meaning. They would decide when war was necessary and
what it took to win that war. In return for that, we would risk our
lives and do the job. We would fly and fight because, as the sign in
the Korat briefing room reminded us daily, that was the mission of the
United States Air Force. All we asked was that we be allowed to win.

The captains and majors had the benefit of experience. Some had been
in Korea and faced the challenge of overcoming their fears in that
earlier war, but all of them had the hours of flying time that helped
them to handle the tasks thrust upon them. They fought and died, doing
the job that they had been asked to do. They led the trusting
lieutenants, sometimes competently and sometimes reaching too far.
Occasionally they failed, but they did the best they could.

The colonels and the generals were the failures. They let us down by
failing to challenge the political leadership of the country. They had
an obligation to follow the orders of the duly elected administration,
but they needed to demand clear tasking and reasonable rules under
which to conduct the war. It's too easy to attribute the mismanagement
of the war to a timid foreign policy and a reluctance to risk
confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese. If one isn't willing to
win, then one shouldn't risk defeat. Fighting with no purpose is the
true immorality of war because it means you are asking your citizens
to die for no reason other than winning the next election or making
profits for a major international corporation. Dying for one's country
is no longer noble when your country doesn't care either way about the
outcome and it becomes a travesty when your war is being waged in
conjunction with the latest presidential campaign. Turn it on when
you're high in the polls and turn it off in response to the latest
protest gathering by your richest contributors. Several hundred
aircrew members languishing in North Vietnam prisons? No problem. They
won't be voting and the majority of people don't think they were doing
the right thing anyway."


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8