General Zinni on Sixty Minutes

In article ,
Robey Price wrote:

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

If they found this one, that means there were a *lot* more that were
never even supposed to exist.

Therefore, there's a place with a bunch more of these things, *not*
destroyed or accounted for. This one shell, by itself, shows that Iraq
*did* have a whole segment of its chemical weapons program that was
never even touched by the UN.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Chad Irby" wrote in message
.. .
In article ,
Robey Price wrote:

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

What inspectors? I don't really think we know much about that round.


If they found this one, that means there were a *lot* more that were
never even supposed to exist.

Perhaps, perhaps not.

Therefore, there's a place with a bunch more of these things, *not*
destroyed or accounted for. This one shell, by itself, shows that Iraq
*did* have a whole segment of its chemical weapons program that was
never even touched by the UN.

Or perhaps it was not even Iraqi and it came across those famously porous
borders sometime in the last 12 months or so. I don't really believe that; but
my point is, we just don't know, so therefore only a fool would try to draw a
conclusion from the meager information at hand.


Vaughn

In article ,
"Vaughn" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote in message
.. .
In article ,
Robey Price wrote:

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

What inspectors?

The UN inspectors.

I don't really think we know much about that round.

....and that's the point. According to the agreements that Iraq was
supposed to adhere to, all of their CW munitions were supposed to be on
record. This type wasn't.

If they found this one, that means there were a *lot* more that were
never even supposed to exist.

Perhaps, perhaps not.

But the smart money says "yes." You don't build *one* binary artillery
round and bury it in the desert.

Or perhaps it was not even Iraqi and it came across those famously
porous borders sometime in the last 12 months or so.

Possibly, but certainly not probably. It's funny how people will give
Iraq every benefit of the doubt when it comes to this sort of thing, but
will expect the highest standard of proof from the US as to what day of
the week it is.

I don't really believe that;

Nobody does. It's a very silly "what if?"

but my point is, we just don't know, so therefore only a fool would
try to draw a conclusion from the meager information at hand.

No, a smart person would look at what's been presented, use a little
common sense, and realize that this round (like all of the other bits
and pieces we've been finding) shows, once again, they had stuff the UN
didn't know about.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

"Chad Irby" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Vaughn" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote in message
.. .
In article ,
Robey Price wrote:

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

What inspectors?

The UN inspectors.

Reference?

I don't really think we know much about that round.

...and that's the point. According to the agreements that Iraq was
supposed to adhere to, all of their CW munitions were supposed to be on
record. This type wasn't.

Reference?

If they found this one, that means there were a *lot* more that were
never even supposed to exist.

Perhaps, perhaps not.

But the smart money says "yes." You don't build *one* binary artillery
round and bury it in the desert.

Reference?


Or perhaps it was not even Iraqi and it came across those famously
porous borders sometime in the last 12 months or so.

Possibly, but certainly not probably. It's funny how people will give
Iraq every benefit of the doubt when it comes to this sort of thing, but
will expect the highest standard of proof from the US as to what day of
the week it is.

What sort of thing? Even the White House is not yet claiming WMD.


I don't really believe that;

Nobody does. It's a very silly "what if?"

Great repartee, chilling insight.


but my point is, we just don't know, so therefore only a fool would
try to draw a conclusion from the meager information at hand.

No, a smart person would look at what's been presented...

You have given me no reason to think I have been communicating with one.

, use a little
common sense, and realize that this round (like all of the other bits
and pieces we've been finding) shows, once again, they had stuff the UN
didn't know about.

Again; reference?

In article ,
"Vaughn" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Vaughn" wrote:

"Chad Irby" wrote in message
.. .
In article ,
Robey Price wrote:

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

What inspectors?

The UN inspectors.

Reference?

http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/dis_chem.htm


I don't really think we know much about that round.

See Item 36 in the above report.


...and that's the point. According to the agreements that Iraq was
supposed to adhere to, all of their CW munitions were supposed to be on
record. This type wasn't.

Reference?

Item 50 for the missing VX, if that helps.

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

It's still -one- round in over a year of searching.

Even -if- you could buy off on a connection between Al Quaida and Iraq (before
9/11) and even -if- you thought Iraq had WMD, which they did not, you could
still, and should still -- hold the Bush administration culpable for their
gross mishandling of the conduct of the war.

More General Zinni, 5/12/2004:

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/p...ID=2208&from_p
age=../program/document.cfm

Bullet points from above:

1. the first mistake that will be recorded in history, the belief that
containment as a policy doesn't work.

2. The second mistake I think history will record is that the strategy was
flawed.

3. The third mistake, I think was one we repeated from Vietnam, we had to
create a false rationale for going in to get public support.

4. We failed in number four, to internationalize the effort.

5. I think the fifth mistake was that we underestimated the task.

6. The sixth mistake, and maybe the biggest one, was propping up and trusting
the exiles

7. The seventh problem has been the lack of planning.

8. The eighth problem was the insufficiency of military forces on the ground.

9. The ninth problem has been the ad hoc organization we threw in there.

10. the tenth mistake, and that's a series of bad decisions on the ground.

[end]

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

It's still -one- round in over a year of searching.

Even -if- you could buy off on a connection between Al Quaida and Iraq (before
9/11) and even -if- you thought Iraq had WMD, which they did not, you could
still, and should still -- hold the Bush administration culpable for their
gross mishandling of the conduct of the war.

More General Zinni, 5/12/2004:

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/p...ID=2208&from_p
age=../program/document.cfm

Bullet points from above:

1. the first mistake that will be recorded in history, the belief that
containment as a policy doesn't work.

2. The second mistake I think history will record is that the strategy was
flawed.

3. The third mistake, I think was one we repeated from Vietnam, we had to
create a false rationale for going in to get public support.

4. We failed in number four, to internationalize the effort.

5. I think the fifth mistake was that we underestimated the task.

6. The sixth mistake, and maybe the biggest one, was propping up and trusting
the exiles

7. The seventh problem has been the lack of planning.

8. The eighth problem was the insufficiency of military forces on the ground.

9. The ninth problem has been the ad hoc organization we threw in there.

10. the tenth mistake, and that's a series of bad decisions on the ground.

[end]

Walt, if that were the end, we could probably find some way to live with them,
but they'd like another four years in which to compound and add to the mess
they've collectively created. That'd be the 11th problem, because the public
hasn't fully perceived the danger to our nation in letting them get another bite
out of the apple.

George Z.

Walt

In article , Chad Irby
wrote:

In article ,
Robey Price wrote:

One sarin round after 12 months, that's hardly impressive Ed.

One sarin round, of a type that Iraq never had, according to the
inspectors.

Just as a point of information, the UNSCOM report does refer to "R&D",
but not deployment, of binary chemical rounds.


If they found this one, that means there were a *lot* more that were
never even supposed to exist.

Not necessarily a lot, if they were indeed only in the R&D phase for
this particular mission. We do know that program personnel took home,
and hid, nuclear and biological components.


Therefore, there's a place with a bunch more of these things, *not*
destroyed or accounted for. This one shell, by itself, shows that Iraq
*did* have a whole segment of its chemical weapons program that was
never even touched by the UN.

Again, specifically in the case of the binary artillery shell, possibly
R&D quantities only, with a few samples hidden. That would be
consistent both with the UNSCOM report and the few components we have
found in residences.