Another glider crash?

On Sunday, September 20, 2015 at 2:13:54 PM UTC-7, Ron Gleason wrote:
Saratoga NY, news report here

http://wnyt.com/article/stories/s391... dium=twitter

The same thing could happen in a Blanik, except it was the flaps and the spoilers that could be confused. I witnessed two crashes in a blanik, one ended in a ground loop just before a barbed wire fence at El Tiro, and another landed off the end of the runway in the sage brush at AirSailing. Call it tunnel vision or in full panic mode, the pilot kept pulling harder on the flaps as the runway was passing underneath getting shorter all the time.

BG

Memory fades but I seem to recall the Blanik's (L-13) brake being a
lever on the floor. I don't remember how the L-23 brake worked.

On 9/23/2015 12:03 AM, BG wrote:
On Sunday, September 20, 2015 at 2:13:54 PM UTC-7, Ron Gleason wrote:
Saratoga NY, news report here

http://wnyt.com/article/stories/s391... dium=twitter
The same thing could happen in a Blanik, except it was the flaps and the spoilers that could be confused. I witnessed two crashes in a blanik, one ended in a ground loop just before a barbed wire fence at El Tiro, and another landed off the end of the runway in the sage brush at AirSailing. Call it tunnel vision or in full panic mode, the pilot kept pulling harder on the flaps as the runway was passing underneath getting shorter all the time.

BG

--
Dan, 5J

I would think someone would switch to a sideslip if they perceived the spoilers not to be working. Might end up scraping the belly anyway, but thats better than a fence at the end of the runway...

Matt H

On Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 9:49:50 AM UTC-4, Dan Marotta wrote:
Memory fades but I seem to recall the Blanik's (L-13) brake being a
lever on the floor.* I don't remember how the L-23 brake worked.




On 9/23/2015 12:03 AM, BG wrote:



On Sunday, September 20, 2015 at 2:13:54 PM UTC-7, Ron Gleason wrote:


Saratoga NY, news report here

http://wnyt.com/article/stories/s391... dium=twitter


The same thing could happen in a Blanik, except it was the flaps and the spoilers that could be confused. I witnessed two crashes in a blanik, one ended in a ground loop just before a barbed wire fence at El Tiro, and another landed off the end of the runway in the sage brush at AirSailing. Call it tunnel vision or in full panic mode, the pilot kept pulling harder on the flaps as the runway was passing underneath getting shorter all the time.

BG





--

Dan, 5J



On Wednesday, September 23, 2015 at 9:49:50 AM UTC-4, Dan Marotta wrote:
Memory fades but I seem to recall the Blanik's (L-13) brake being a
lever on the floor.* I don't remember how the L-23 brake worked.


Yes it was on the floor in the L13. About the same spot as the door handle on a 1974 Chevy Nova. On my first year of gliding i spent most of my days reliving the previous weekends flights. I was daydreaming about this while driving one day and needed to slow down for an upcoming turn. I pulled up on the door handle to break. Luckily it was a left hand turn!
Kerry

I am sorry to say I happened to confuse diverse levers in diverse types of gliders in the past.
* I once pulled back on the release lever (it's not a knob, it really looks like an airbrake lever) instead of opening the spoilers in a Rhönlerche;
* I did the same with the flaps instead of the airbrakes in a L-13 Blanik;
* I put the flaps from positive to negative instead of closing the airbrakes on a Janus during finals when the airspeed became too low (that one allmost crashed the glider, I corrected my mistake at the very last moment; the situation arose while my pupil in front was making an approach with braking parachute, full positive flaps and full airbrakes, and was slow in closing the airbrakes when I asked him to do so to maintain airspeed - of course, I should have had the left hand on one of the levers, but I wasn't ready, being too confident in the abilities of my pupil).

The levers I wrongly used had a common characteristic: they were the upper, what you could call the "most obvious", lever. When under stress, that's where your hand is going automatically.

I really think, from a safety point of view, that the "most critical" lever should also be the "most obvious" lever. In my book, that's the airbrake lever. I don't like the ergonomics of the levers you have to rotate to be able to use.

Flap levers need detents of some kind so you can set different positions
and take your hand off the lever. In my LAK-17a, the flap and gear
levers must be rotated to move the lock out of the slot to move the
lever. The dive brake lever does not need to be rotated, however you
might scrape your knuckles by simply pulling it back. Rotating the dive
brake lever gets my knuckles away from the canopy side wall. MY flap
lever is at the top because I use it most often and that's where I like
it. Others may prefer other configurations.

Cheers!

On 9/25/2015 7:24 AM, wrote:
I am sorry to say I happened to confuse diverse levers in diverse types of gliders in the past.
* I once pulled back on the release lever (it's not a knob, it really looks like an airbrake lever) instead of opening the spoilers in a Rhönlerche;
* I did the same with the flaps instead of the airbrakes in a L-13 Blanik;
* I put the flaps from positive to negative instead of closing the airbrakes on a Janus during finals when the airspeed became too low (that one allmost crashed the glider, I corrected my mistake at the very last moment; the situation arose while my pupil in front was making an approach with braking parachute, full positive flaps and full airbrakes, and was slow in closing the airbrakes when I asked him to do so to maintain airspeed - of course, I should have had the left hand on one of the levers, but I wasn't ready, being too confident in the abilities of my pupil).

The levers I wrongly used had a common characteristic: they were the upper, what you could call the "most obvious", lever. When under stress, that's where your hand is going automatically.

I really think, from a safety point of view, that the "most critical" lever should also be the "most obvious" lever. In my book, that's the airbrake lever. I don't like the ergonomics of the levers you have to rotate to be able to use.

--
Dan, 5J

The only thing I like in Schempp-Hirth ergonomics is the flap position lever, (just make sure you have installed a metal backing) as the composite will only work for so long until the flap handle goes negative on you while on short final, a real thrill. The flap handle is low on the cockpit sidewall so you can rest your hand on the arm rest. I always thought the other manufacturers should use this set up. Different strokes for different folks.


On Friday, September 25, 2015 at 8:39:06 AM UTC-7, Dan Marotta wrote:
Flap levers need detents of some kind so you can set different
positions and take your hand off the lever.* In my LAK-17a, the flap
and gear levers must be rotated to move the lock out of the slot to
move the lever.* The dive brake lever does not need to be rotated,
however you might scrape your knuckles by simply pulling it back.*
Rotating the dive brake lever gets my knuckles away from the canopy
side wall.* MY flap lever is at the top because I use it most often
and that's where I like it.* Others may prefer other configurations..



Cheers!




On 9/25/2015 7:24 AM,
wrote:



I am sorry to say I happened to confuse diverse levers in diverse types of gliders in the past.
* I once pulled back on the release lever (it's not a knob, it really looks like an airbrake lever) instead of opening the spoilers in a Rhönlerche;
* I did the same with the flaps instead of the airbrakes in a L-13 Blanik;
* I put the flaps from positive to negative instead of closing the airbrakes on a Janus during finals when the airspeed became too low (that one allmost crashed the glider, I corrected my mistake at the very last moment; the situation arose while my pupil in front was making an approach with braking parachute, full positive flaps and full airbrakes, and was slow in closing the airbrakes when I asked him to do so to maintain airspeed - of course, I should have had the left hand on one of the levers, but I wasn't ready, being too confident in the abilities of my pupil).

The levers I wrongly used had a common characteristic: they were the upper, what you could call the "most obvious", lever. When under stress, that's where your hand is going automatically.

I really think, from a safety point of view, that the "most critical" lever should also be the "most obvious" lever. In my book, that's the airbrake lever. I don't like the ergonomics of the levers you have to rotate to be able to use.





--

Dan, 5J

I really think, from a safety point of view, that the "most critical"
lever should also be the "most obvious" lever. In my book, that's the
airbrake lever. I don't like the ergonomics of the levers you have to
rotate to be able to use.
Dan, 5J

Once while still on the ground and towing with a 182 I had a Janus A get
high and off to my left. He was high enough that I could not see his wings
in the mirror. There still being enough runway ahead for him to safely
land, I released the glider and the pilot safely landed in the dirt to the
left of the runway. When I got back on the ground and spoke with the
pilot. He admitted that he had taken off in negative flaps with his left
hand off of the flap handle then when he reached to go positive with the
flaps he mistakenly grabbed the spoiler handle. He said the glider didn't
feel normal but he was confused and didn't know what was wrong. As happens
far too often the pilot was tunnel visioned to the degree that he was
incapable of figuring out what was wrong and correcting it. An additional
disappointing aspect was the fact that his front seat passenger, who was
also a pilot saw what he was doing wrong but made no attempt to tell the
other pilot. In airline terms this is called a failure of cockpit resource
management.

This thread was initiated because a simple mistake that could easily have
been corrected, eventually led to a crash. The real cause of this accident
like so many others, was tunnel vision. Which may have started sometime
prior to the pilot mistakenly grabbing the gear handle. Rest assured this
pilot did not intend to grab the gear handle nor make multiple passes at
landing and of course he did not realize he was getting so slow that he was
going to stall/spin.

Until someone in higher authority like the NTSB or FAA decides that tunnel
vision is a root cause of far too many aviation accidents and initiates an
extensive study of it's causes, effects and all possible corrective
actions.
We will continue to hear accidents were the result of dehydration,
distraction, medical issue or the catch all, pilot error. I would like to
believe a meaningful study will be conducted in my life time, but after 50
years in aviation I seriously doubt it.

If I am ever killed in a glider accident, I honestly encourage all pilots
to use it as an opportunity to openly and seriously discuss accidents and
issues of safety. A year later when the NTSB report is published the
accident will have long faded from almost everyone's memory.

On Friday, September 25, 2015 at 7:45:05 PM UTC+1, Martin Eiler wrote:
I really think, from a safety point of view, that the "most critical"
lever should also be the "most obvious" lever. In my book, that's the
airbrake lever. I don't like the ergonomics of the levers you have to
rotate to be able to use.
Dan, 5J

Once while still on the ground and towing with a 182 I had a Janus A get
high and off to my left. He was high enough that I could not see his wings
in the mirror. There still being enough runway ahead for him to safely
land, I released the glider and the pilot safely landed in the dirt to the
left of the runway. When I got back on the ground and spoke with the
pilot. He admitted that he had taken off in negative flaps with his left
hand off of the flap handle then when he reached to go positive with the
flaps he mistakenly grabbed the spoiler handle. He said the glider didn't
feel normal but he was confused and didn't know what was wrong. As happens
far too often the pilot was tunnel visioned to the degree that he was
incapable of figuring out what was wrong and correcting it. An additional
disappointing aspect was the fact that his front seat passenger, who was
also a pilot saw what he was doing wrong but made no attempt to tell the
other pilot. In airline terms this is called a failure of cockpit resource
management.

This thread was initiated because a simple mistake that could easily have
been corrected, eventually led to a crash. The real cause of this accident
like so many others, was tunnel vision. Which may have started sometime
prior to the pilot mistakenly grabbing the gear handle. Rest assured this
pilot did not intend to grab the gear handle nor make multiple passes at
landing and of course he did not realize he was getting so slow that he was
going to stall/spin.

Until someone in higher authority like the NTSB or FAA decides that tunnel
vision is a root cause of far too many aviation accidents and initiates an
extensive study of it's causes, effects and all possible corrective
actions.
We will continue to hear accidents were the result of dehydration,
distraction, medical issue or the catch all, pilot error. I would like to
believe a meaningful study will be conducted in my life time, but after 50
years in aviation I seriously doubt it.

If I am ever killed in a glider accident, I honestly encourage all pilots
to use it as an opportunity to openly and seriously discuss accidents and
issues of safety. A year later when the NTSB report is published the
accident will have long faded from almost everyone's memory.

As an alternative description to "tunnel vision" I like the concept of the decision tree. We continually have choices (eg which lever to grab and then whether or not to do it without visually checking) and make a decision which may be wrong through carelessness or poor judgement. At that point we have taken one of two or more branches of the decision tree. If things don't work out as expected we may make another choice (e.g. start using the pitch control) and then find that control isn't responding as usual - so we make another decision that may help or may not help (e.g. choose to release or not release from tow) etc. etc.

The one thing we are demonstrably poor at in times of stress is mentally backing our way down the decision tree and considering at which step we may have made a wrong decision upon which all the other wrong decisions followed..

Tunnel vision on its own is a description that doesn't (for me) naturally lead to a mental process to correct things whereas if we hold the concept of the decision tree in the front of our mind then it gives us an easily understood mental technique that we can apply to very quickly reverse check our recent actions (and so escape the tunnel vision).

Unfortunately not all decisions are reversible once taken.

John Galloway

On 9/25/2015 12:44 PM, Martin Eiler wrote:
Snip...
This thread was initiated because a simple mistake that could easily have
been corrected, eventually led to a crash. The real cause of this accident
like so many others, was tunnel vision. Which may have started sometime
prior to the pilot mistakenly grabbing the gear handle. Rest assured this
pilot did not intend to grab the gear handle nor make multiple passes at
landing and of course he did not realize he was getting so slow that he was
going to stall/spin.

Until someone in higher authority like the NTSB or FAA decides that tunnel
vision is a root cause of far too many aviation accidents and initiates an
extensive study of it's causes, effects and all possible corrective
actions, we will continue to hear accidents were the result of dehydration,
distraction, medical issue or the catch all, pilot error. I would like to
believe a meaningful study will be conducted in my life time, but after 50
years in aviation I seriously doubt it.

If I am ever killed in a glider accident, I honestly encourage all pilots
to use it as an opportunity to openly and seriously discuss accidents and
issues of safety. A year later when the NTSB report is published the
accident will have long faded from almost everyone's memory.

Considerable food for thought above...

I suspect the 1st paragraph is 100% correct. In any event the logic works for me.

Considering the middle paragraph, I likewise suspect "pilot error" will
continue to be a favored root cause catch-all in accidents involving
less-than-perfect situational-awareness/decision-making from Joe Pilot. I
don't think it's fundamentally inaccurate, but it's often not terribly
illuminating of how people (are likely to) think, and consequently WHY J.P.
had/continued-with less-than-perfect situational-awareness/decision-making all
the way to the crunch. Consequently, it's up to us individual pilots to make
these "WHY-connections" as they apply to *us*. Routinely blaming (say) medical
incapacitation or bad luck may be personally comforting, while being
simultaneously a form of ostrichian thinking. You pays your money and you
takes your chances...

+1 to the sentiments of last paragraph. I'll add - for the benefit of readers
unfamiliar with the NTSB's typical glider crunch depth of analysis - that the
NTSB glider-crunch-analytical-norm is *generally* (not always) superficial and
typically unenlightening.

Bob W.