Bulldozing US Homeland Defence.

"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 15:33:05 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

For the plant it might be, and there might be casualties there,
but, because the gas is over its ignition temperature, it can't
BLEVE. You get a fire burning the material in the pipe. There
wouldn't be effect beyond the fence. If the plant systems
functioned properly, the outage might be less than two weeks.

BTW, how would you go about breaking this line? A buldozer isn't
going to get there. These lines are fairly robust and plant's
just in case defenses against leaks are considerable.


Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed
place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard
to contain.

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

(I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a
bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator
or maintenance error compounded by control room error.)

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows
units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by
DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane
oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC,
they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted
without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused
by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed.


Gee I just said that

There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern
process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not
centrally controlled.


Quite so , not that it would have helped much


The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


No part of the plant met modern standards.

There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants
still out there and the best control system in the
world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of
Cyclohexane into the environment.

The causes of the
event were internal to the plant. The process affected was
obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such.


A bulldozer tearing open a line would have
had the same effect.

The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case
vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not
possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the
amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would
be one hell of a whoosh.


You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this
is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened
by that flame and what happens when they fail.

It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often
provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs

One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a
french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve.
Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere

BANG

Keith




----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups
---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =---

On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 15:33:05 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

For the plant it might be, and there might be casualties there,
but, because the gas is over its ignition temperature, it can't
BLEVE. You get a fire burning the material in the pipe. There
wouldn't be effect beyond the fence. If the plant systems
functioned properly, the outage might be less than two weeks.

BTW, how would you go about breaking this line? A buldozer isn't
going to get there. These lines are fairly robust and plant's
just in case defenses against leaks are considerable.


Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed
place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard
to contain.

The regulations must be drastically different over there.

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.

(I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a
bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator
or maintenance error compounded by control room error.)

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows
units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by
DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane
oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC,
they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted
without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused
by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed.


Gee I just said that

No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass.

There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern
process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not
centrally controlled.


Quite so , not that it would have helped much

It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes.


The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


No part of the plant met modern standards.

There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants
still out there and the best control system in the
world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of
Cyclohexane into the environment.

There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at
all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture.

The causes of the
event were internal to the plant. The process affected was
obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such.


A bulldozer tearing open a line would have
had the same effect.

How do you get the bulldozer to the line? Then how do you get the
line to dump much more than its contents? And who still oxidizes
cyane outside a collum?

The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case
vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not
possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the
amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would
be one hell of a whoosh.


You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this
is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened
by that flame and what happens when they fail.

No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about.

BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant.
It's not all that easy to do here.

It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often
provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs

One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a
french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve.
Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere

BANG


You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether
there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly
mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an
attack.

The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of
explosions or chemical plants. The plant you chose is ludicrously
different from existing types.

The CPI is not immune to accident. There have been many, there
will be more but this is a low-probablility scenario. In the case
at question, calling in an air strike because of the possibility
that the bulldozer might enter a chemical plant and do mischief,
I'll stick with what they decided to do.

Peter Skelton

"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

snip

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.

Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of
us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what
US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update
briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you
wonder why more and more folks don't believe you?

snip

The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.

Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true
extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response
below...amazing, huh?



Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


snip

Brooks

On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

snip

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.

Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of
us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what
US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update
briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you
wonder why more and more folks don't believe you?


I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than
generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas
plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude
you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you
can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly
dishonest three times, isn't that enough?

snip

The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.

Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true
extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response
below...amazing, huh?

I certainly had a senior moment there. Kieth handled it nicely.
Do you have anything to contribute?



Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless




Peter Skelton

"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

snip

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.

Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest
of
us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on
what
US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update
briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you
wonder why more and more folks don't believe you?


I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than
generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas
plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude
you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you
can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly
dishonest three times, isn't that enough?

No, Keith has demonstrated quite amply that you are clueless regarding the
incident at hand, not to mention of questionable veracity regarding the
subject in general, despite your, as he put it "sekret" information...
Sounds like just another example of your trying to pad your background a bit
too much, and as I noted, it ain't the first time you have been caught out
like this.


snip

The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.

Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true
extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response
below...amazing, huh?

I certainly had a senior moment there. Kieth handled it nicely.
Do you have anything to contribute?

Yeah. Keith did indeed "handle it nicely"; he made you out to be full of
bovine fecal materiel in spite of all that "sekret" stuff you have lying
about and you apparently haven't caught on to it as of yet.

Brooks




Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless




Peter Skelton

On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 00:44:39 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
.. .
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:

snip

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.

Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest
of
us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on
what
US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update
briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you
wonder why more and more folks don't believe you?


I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than
generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas
plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude
you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you
can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly
dishonest three times, isn't that enough?

No, Keith has demonstrated quite amply that you are clueless regarding the
incident at hand, not to mention of questionable veracity regarding the
subject in general, despite your, as he put it "sekret" information...
Sounds like just another example of your trying to pad your background a bit
too much, and as I noted, it ain't the first time you have been caught out
like this.

I'm not going to argue about Kieth with you. You've been caught
yourself more than once recently, as I said. As usual, you have
nothing to contribute. I have two choices, switch things back to
one of your idiot statements, like the bit about artillery
hitting without knowing where the target is, or ignoring you.
I'll take the second.



Peter Skelton

"Peter Skelton" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote:



Oh come on Peter. There are LPG lines all over the dammed
place on any refinery and a major leak is bloody hard
to contain.

The regulations must be drastically different over there.


LPG cant read

Go and look at the report on what happened at
Flixborough

I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't
generally available.


Yeah right, I only read the official report and work
on reliability and failure studies for a living, what would
I know ?

More than you it seems since I knew the full extent of the
damage.

(I can think of much worse scenarios, but not ones started by a
bulldozer that begins outside the fence. They start with operator
or maintenance error compounded by control room error.)

In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure
vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows
units.
Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored
and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose.

Flixborough happened in 1974. At that time, I was employed by
DuPont at Maitland ON, a plant that has a very large Cyane
oxidation unit so we had passing interest in the event. IIRC,
they were using a temporary bypass that had been constucted
without engineering assistance. A slug of process fluid, caused
by a process upset, tore a bellows that was improperly installed.


Gee I just said that

No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass.

Which is functionally identical to what you posted.

Did you even read it ?




There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern
process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not
centrally controlled.


Quite so , not that it would have helped much

It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes.


Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the
scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton
FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major
damage was done by the initial explosion


The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the
fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to
be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the
fence.


Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site
53 members of the public received major injuries and
hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was
destroyed as were several others on the same site and
close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories
were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless


No part of the plant met modern standards.

There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants
still out there and the best control system in the
world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of
Cyclohexane into the environment.

There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at
all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture.


There are lots of plants built in 60's and 70's


The causes of the
event were internal to the plant. The process affected was
obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such.


A bulldozer tearing open a line would have
had the same effect.

How do you get the bulldozer to the line?

How you ever actually seen a pipe trench ?

Then how do you get the
line to dump much more than its contents?

Have you ever calculated how much Cyclohexane
a 14" line 1000 m long contains ?

Try it , just for kicks.

And who still oxidizes
cyane outside a collum?


It was cyclohexane and its widely used in the production
of Nylon, and any leak is highly likely to oxidise externally.

The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case
vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not
possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the
amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would
be one hell of a whoosh.


You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this
is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened
by that flame and what happens when they fail.

No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about.


Controls dont stop steel losing its structural strength
in a fire

BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant.
It's not all that easy to do here.


Bull**** Peter, all that protects most plant are earth bunds and
chain link wire fences

It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often
provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs

One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a
french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve.
Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere

BANG


You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether
there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly
mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an
attack.


I responded to a claim that it couldnt happen - IT CAN

The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of
explosions or chemical plants.

Really , care to dispute the facts ?

The plant you chose is ludicrously
different from existing types.


Peter I have worked in this industry since I was 16, I have
seen 2 major Petrochemical incidents and investigated many
others. One of those included a major fire and explosion
caused by a mobile crane striking a pipe bridge.

Go find your Granny and teach her to suck eggs.

The CPI is not immune to accident. There have been many, there
will be more but this is a low-probablility scenario. In the case
at question, calling in an air strike because of the possibility
that the bulldozer might enter a chemical plant and do mischief,
I'll stick with what they decided to do.


So will I but that doesnt eliminate the potential risk from a
bulldozer or any other piece of heavy plant.

Keith