Does How a (Sailplane) Pilot Thinks, Matter?

If you're going to cite regulations, let me ask you this: Do you fly up
to cloud base? I'll wager more pilots are guilty of one than the other.

It's easy to lose track of regulatory requirements when deeply involved
in saving the flight but, as others have also said, getting to the point
of executing a low save indicates lapses in judgment further back in the
flight. To take from Nancy Reagan, "Just don't get low."

Having said that, I recall catching a thermal off a pig farm as I was
turning final to land at that farm. The lift was smooth, gentle, and
smelly, but I got away! ...Only to land out later at an airport (still
not at home).

Numbers are for non-thinkers. How does it feel? Turbulence? Wind
drift? Terrain? Narrow or wide area of lift? Airspeed? Coordination?
Any one of these things can cause a really bad day and it's incumbent on
each of us to know what is "safe" for us in a given situation. As Dirty
Harry said, "A man's gotta know his limitations."

Fly safe!

Dan

On 4/2/2016 6:47 AM, N97MT wrote:
As to a clear metric, yes it depends. Rules of thumb need to be carefully evaluated if they match the situation.

One thing that I think we miss in the discussion is that, from a regulatory standpoint, a low save is (again depending on the situation) a potential emergency.

In the US, §91.119 has a very clear metric on this. Unless you are INTENDING to land (or takeoff), you must remain at least 1,000 feet above any obstacle with 2,000 feet horizontal of your position in a congested area. In uncongested areas you must remain 500 feet above the surface, except over "sparsely populated areas" and water surfaces, at least 500 feet away from, essentially, persons or man-made objects.

Sorry I am quoting regulation here, but certainly something as food for thought, and if anything a guide for serial low-savers.


--
Dan, 5J

At 15:08 02 April 2016, Dan Marotta wrote:
If you're going to cite regulations, let me ask you this: Do you fly up
to cloud base? I'll wager more pilots are guilty of one than the other.

It's easy to lose track of regulatory requirements when deeply involved
in saving the flight but, as others have also said, getting to the point
of executing a low save indicates lapses in judgment further back in the
flight. To take from Nancy Reagan, "Just don't get low."

Having said that, I recall catching a thermal off a pig farm as I was
turning final to land at that farm. The lift was smooth, gentle, and
smelly, but I got away! ...Only to land out later at an airport (still
not at home).

Numbers are for non-thinkers. How does it feel? Turbulence? Wind
drift? Terrain? Narrow or wide area of lift? Airspeed? Coordination?
Any one of these things can cause a really bad day and it's incumbent on
each of us to know what is "safe" for us in a given situation. As Dirty
Harry said, "A man's gotta know his limitations."

Fly safe!

Dan

On 4/2/2016 6:47 AM, N97MT wrote:
As to a clear metric, yes it depends. Rules of thumb need to be
carefully
evaluated if they match the situation.

One thing that I think we miss in the discussion is that, from a
regulatory standpoint, a low save is (again depending on the situation) a
potential emergency.

In the US, �91.119 has a very clear metric on this. Unless you are
INTENDING to land (or takeoff), you must remain at least 1,000 feet above
any obstacle with 2,000 feet horizontal of your position in a congested
area. In uncongested areas you must remain 500 feet above the surface,
except over "sparsely populated areas" and water surfaces, at least 500
feet away from, essentially, persons or man-made objects.

Sorry I am quoting regulation here, but certainly something as food for
thought, and if anything a guide for serial low-savers.


Dan, 5J


How does a Comp pilot think ?
You can loose points spending 1/2 an hour struggling and then landing time

points are important.
Find a safe field as far down track as you can and land ,stopping the
clock,better points ,less tired,and back for the next day..
I've lost points to pilots who didn't try so hard because time points
I've also lost a day fixing the ship because I put it in the wrong field .
If the days over unless that last climb is going to get you home,stick it
in a
good field ASAP it's the best points you will get.
Once you have that in your head it's easier to rationalise ignoring that
1/2knot at 700 ft .
This assumes the comp is based on time and distance

Jonathon, thats a valid point. Some of us however are engaged in a different type of competition flying involving distance and record flying. For this type of endevor, staying in the air is the paramont concern. In these instances we take the risks necessary to keep going, making distance, many times is super marginal end of the day or very early in the day conditions.

Making educated low saves in these cases are historically frequent and necessary. Given the basics as stated previously of having a field already set up etc, making low saves is a necessary skill thats is seen in every record setter especially when trying to do it in low performance ships.

One side note is, most of the lower performance ships are dang good at landing slow and consequently, can use little pea size patches to set down safely which would make a js1 or other high performance glider pilot cringe
Dan.

How does a Comp pilot think ? You can lose points spending 1/2 an hour
struggling and then landing. Time points are important. Find a safe field
as far down track as you can and land, stopping the clock, better points,
less tired, and back for the next day. I've lost points to pilots who
didn't try so hard because time points I've also lost a day fixing the ship
because I put it in the wrong field. If the days over unless that last
climb is going to get you home, stick it in a good field ASAP it's the best
points you will get. Once you have that in your head it's easier to
rationalise ignoring that 1/2knot at 700 ft . This assumes the comp is
based on time and distance.

No question "tactical thinking" affects contest scores, such "potential
effects" existing probably regardless of the set of rules under which Joe
Pilot competes.

The "type of pilot thinking" I had in mind when starting this thread was less
"contest tactical" and more "thinking as it affects Joe Sailplane Pilot's
potential for continuing existence." It's something that's long intrigued
me...might Joe S. Pilot's thought processes have a fundamental effect on his
potential for damaging glider/self to where he can't fly the same plane
tomorrow? (Hey, if George Moffat could be intrigued by pilot psychology as it
affected contests, I figure "psychology as it affects future existence" isn't
that big a stretch. Besides, I always wanted to use "George Moffat" and "I" in
the same sentence!)

I have in mind "Joe Average" Sailplane (J.A.S.) Pilot, soaring for fun on a
"routine sailplane flight" in which s/he expects to routinely (as distinct
from "overtly aggressively") challenge only the sky and his or her skill set.
In the U.S. at any rate, considering only this century, several pilots each
year manage to kill themselves during such "for fun" flights, and that
statistical toll is *after* I arbitrarily ignore fatalities "too easily
rationalizable" due to age and "stupid stuff" you or I would, of course,
*never* do.

"Low saves" were selected as a point of departure for discussing mind sets
that are generally - and maybe less generally - associated with that flight
condition, and NOT because "I have a thing for (or against) low saves."

"Generally associated mindsets" would include (say) Joe Newbie Pilot's
heightened anxiety/tenseness/nervousness due to the landing-may-be-imminent
flight condition combining with pushing their personal flight envelope. I'd
sure hope that J.A.S. Pilot would have some basic understanding of what s/he
should mentally expect the first time such a new/stress-enhancing/thin-margin
situation faces them...as surely it will and ought to be expected to.

"Less generally associated mindsets" include (in my case) active recognition
that if I get it badly wrong, - e.g. lousy coordination; "too slow" (aka too
high an angle of attack); untreated gust stall; improperly responding to (say)
wind-influenced visual optical illusion; etc. - due to my thin/may-be-thinning
ground clearance margin, I could just kill myself...as distinct from die.
Memory says I've always felt/thought that way about "flight with thin margins"
but regardless of when such thinking began, it's been a part of how I think
while soaring (and driving, and working/messing around anything - say, 120VAC
- with potential to kill me...) In other words, I think about death not as
something that "might HAPPEN" to me IF I screw up, but as something that *I*
will have done to myself BY screwing up. That awareness also doesn't morph
into fear; if I'm genuinely, I might die, fearful of something I can avoid
simply by choice, I don't do it.

I've actually talked about this aspect of thought with soaring buddies, and
it's never been clear to me if it's something unique, uncommon or common, but
I'm pretty much convinced it's not universal. Some of the more memorable
conversations involved folks who O'beer-Thirty-described their own thin-margin
situations with high-ish/active potential to kill them, but from whom I was
unable to elicit any admission they seriously recognized potential death as
anything more than a theoretical possibility. ("I'd never hose up *that*
badly!") Others seem to put black-and-white faith in their own personal "hard
deck" as if it were a talisman. ("How much altitude do I need at XYZ to get
safely out of the mountains back to Boulder?")

Without intending to pick on anyone or discount the sensibility of the hard
deck suggestion which I'll paraphrase as, "Talismanic hard deck = (height
fudge factor plus) 2x the demonstrated minimum height needed to recover from a
major wing/drop/incipient spin" put forth earlier in this thread, when I
combine the "talismanic protection aspect" which MAY accompany using such a
mental device with the potential reality of actually *experiencing* an
uncommanded departure from controlled flight "down low/close to the
above-defined hard deck," I can't help but wonder if the experience might
prove quite thoroughly more alarming than any/all practice in spin recoveries
"performed aloft." And, if that alarm may bring with it additional
flight-control-(mis-)handling problems by J.A.S. Pilot leading to the hard
deck maybe not being so talismanic as previously believed. Point being, that
thin margins are thin margins, and as such ALWAYS carry with them potential
for bad/deadly outcomes, which is one reason we generally practice spin
recoveries well above any proposed "hard XC deck" I've ever seen proposed.

Understand, I'm not "playing this mental game" out of (say) seasonal boredom,
or by way of trying to frighten people away from the sport, or a tendency to
contemplate my navel, but as a way of trying to get inside Joe Sailplane
Pilots' heads to (possibly) see if how they think matters as it affects how
they approach flying and consequently how they actually fly. While I see
"arbitrary hard decks" (and other such "shorthand guidelines") as a useful
training concept, particularly if approached by Joe CFIG with
cautionary/explanatory sharing of the hidden assumptions underlying them (the
"why" of the "shorthand what"), they - along with the rest of our training -
would seem inadequate, judging from NTSB glider fatality statistics. I suppose
it's possible we - the sailplane pilot community - have reached the
"irreducible minimum" number of annual deaths, but I'm far from convinced such
a conclusion is warranted. I know lifetime instructors (Tom Knauff comes to
mind) have their own specific training-based thoughts and suggestions as well.

Bob W.

Take the 1kt thermal before you get low? 9 or 14 day contests are rarely
won by the high risk pilot.

Jim

Well Jim that doesnt seem to apply to guys like karl streideck or ray gimmy or going back aways, jim inderbo. I've seen those guys pull off amaizingly "risky" moves. Risk in general is directly related to experience. What might have been super risky the first few times becomes incrementally less risky with the gained experience. The problems arise when less experienced guys try to rush the learning curve by trying to immulate what they see other more experienced guys get away with.
Dan

At 21:57 03 April 2016, wrote:
Well Jim that doesnt seem to apply to guys like karl streideck or ray
gimmy=
or going back aways, jim inderbo. I've seen those guys pull off
amaizingly=
"risky" moves. Risk in general is directly related to experience. What
mig=
ht have been super risky the first few times becomes incrementally less
ris=
ky with the gained experience. The problems arise when less experienced
guy=
s try to rush the learning curve by trying to immulate what they see
other
=
more experienced guys get away with.
Dan

Hi Dan

Following your post I thought I would take a look at Seb Kawa's flights at
the 2014 15M Worlds in Lezno which he won. I believe that Seb has 10 World
titles now so I thought we could learn something. Low points are above
ground.

Day Low Point Notes
1 2700ft Finished 4th
2 1200ft Only one low point, otherwise 2700ft 1st
3 2300ft 13th
4 3000ft 6th
5 2000ft 4th
6 1500ft Otherwise 2300ft everyone lands out 10th
7 2000ft 12th
8 3000ft 1st
9 2600ft 12th
10 2200ft 6th

I think that we can conclude that Seb didn't go low in order to win this
title. If you look at the barograph trace he takes frequent climbs in order
to stay high and conservative.

I have never looked at Karl's or the other guy's traces but I stand by my
point. Consistent result wins competitions. Getting low throws a lot of
time or, when you are the one that lands out, the day and the comp.

Jim