Two MOH Winners say Bush Didn't Serve

On Fri, 11 Jun 2004 16:13:08 -0400, "George Z. Bush"
wrote:

You lost no wars? I was under the impression that after we left that sad,
unfortunate country, the only thing we had to show for our efforts was that big,
black wall in Washington and a grievously divided nation that apparently exists
to this day. What was it that we supposedly won? We must have won something
since you claim that you didn't lose any wars. What was it?
Territory? Reparations? An indigenous Vietnamese government to our political
liking? What did we get out of it as "victors"?

George Z.


I didn't lose. My country lost a lot, but it wasn't the war. It was
pride in being an American and a fundamental belief in democracy. It
was a belief that we were morally anchored and the communists (and now
the jihadist fundamentalist muslims) were wrong. It was the firm
conviction that we were not the reason for injustice and poverty in
this world, but rather the source of a better way.

Take a look, if you choose at Vietnam today. If you see a communist
victory there, you aren't looking very closely. They are a flourishing
capitalist society. They are trading globally, entertaining tourists
from around the world, and the new version of the Hanoi Hilton--the
real hotel chain--advertises an "American breakfast" as included with
the room rate.

What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Stop feeling guilty, George. We're Americans and have a right to be
proud.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

....
What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?




--Mike

Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

...
What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

nevermind the fact that the US didn't really have air superiority over
vietnam, nor
did they have the benefit of having waxed almost all the SAM batteries
already, nor
did they have AWACS aircraft to tell their fighters where the Migs were 200
or 300 miles
out. Yeah...learned some lessons... learned how not to do it next time. And
how not to do it
is against someone as capable as themselves again. Go after the small
enemies, then your president
can look good on tv. ignore the big fish that'd kick yer arse again.

"Kristan Roberge" wrote in message
...


Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

...
What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

nevermind the fact that the US didn't really have air superiority over
vietnam,

air superiority: That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force
over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/a/00291.html
It appears that by that definition (though maybe you are not using the
definition agreed to by the US military branches) we did indeed have air
superiority--can you identify any targets we wanted to strike that we were
prevented from striking, whenever we so chose?

nor
did they have the benefit of having waxed almost all the SAM batteries
already,

An unfortunate political decision, but regardless, having ADA and SAM's does
not by definition deny us 'air superiority". Though you are getting a bit
warmer here--the US did learn a lesson in regards to taking down the IADS,
instead of letting some politico back DC decide it was not a worthwhile
target...

nor
did they have AWACS aircraft to tell their fighters where the Migs were
200
or 300 miles
out.

Maybe not to the degree that we have now, but we did have these nifty things
called EC-121's...

Yeah...learned some lessons... learned how not to do it next time.

I don't know about that; yes, we did learn from the mistakes we made (which
is why we are the best, right?), but everything we did was not a mistake.
LBII seemed to be on the right track, and accomplished its goals. The first
truly effective use of heavy bombers in support of tactical ground units on
a widespread basis, the use of modern PGM's, effective use of helicopter
gunships (to include use of reliable ATGM's from helos, during the 72 Easter
Offensive IIRC), and the most effective use of heliborne airmobile assets up
to that time, etc.

And
how not to do it
is against someone as capable as themselves again.

Well, after we get finished with round one, the opposition tends to not be
very effective at all; witness ODS.

Go after the small
enemies, then your president
can look good on tv. ignore the big fish that'd kick yer arse again.

And which fish would that be?

Brooks

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Kristan Roberge" wrote in message
...


Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

...
What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

nevermind the fact that the US didn't really have air superiority over
vietnam,

air superiority: That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force
over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/a/00291.html
It appears that by that definition (though maybe you are not using the
definition agreed to by the US military branches) we did indeed have air
superiority--can you identify any targets we wanted to strike that we were
prevented from striking, whenever we so chose?

nor
did they have the benefit of having waxed almost all the SAM batteries
already,

An unfortunate political decision, but regardless, having ADA and SAM's does
not by definition deny us 'air superiority". Though you are getting a bit
warmer here--the US did learn a lesson in regards to taking down the IADS,
instead of letting some politico back DC decide it was not a worthwhile
target...

nor
did they have AWACS aircraft to tell their fighters where the Migs were
200
or 300 miles
out.

Maybe not to the degree that we have now, but we did have these nifty things
called EC-121's...

Yeah...learned some lessons... learned how not to do it next time.

I don't know about that; yes, we did learn from the mistakes we made (which
is why we are the best, right?), but everything we did was not a mistake.
LBII seemed to be on the right track, and accomplished its goals. The first
truly effective use of heavy bombers in support of tactical ground units on
a widespread basis, the use of modern PGM's, effective use of helicopter
gunships (to include use of reliable ATGM's from helos, during the 72 Easter
Offensive IIRC), and the most effective use of heliborne airmobile assets up
to that time, etc.

And
how not to do it
is against someone as capable as themselves again.

Well, after we get finished with round one, the opposition tends to not be
very effective at all; witness ODS.

Go after the small
enemies, then your president
can look good on tv. ignore the big fish that'd kick yer arse again.

And which fish would that be?

china, ya know...that great country full of human rights abusers/oppressors that
the USA is so buddy-buddy with lately because they need their help in dealing
with north korea.

On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 05:11:46 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

...
What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm before repeating that
bit of revisionism. Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and
fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam
in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties
during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in
Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons.

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.


--Mike

On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 17:37:13 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"?

... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)

At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth
largest in the world. Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam
was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an
enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern
logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order
of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and
usually closer to 75 throughout the war.


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.

Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift
from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year
younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a
concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world)
and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather
than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more
than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F.
Kennan in 1947.



--Mike

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote:

Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time
super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training,
and "advisors" has anything to do with it?

You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and
doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm

What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you
not understand?

What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"?

"In place at the start" is static. It means at point A, this, this, and
that were there. Real-time means that not only were this, this, and that
there at point A, but they were sustained and augmented throughout the
conflict.

So to answer your question of "What part of "in place" doesn't equate
with 'real-time'"?: none of it equates to real-time.


... before repeating that bit of revisionism.


The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield
opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or
Korea, for that matter)

At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth
largest in the world.

Great, and I hear Spiderbreath, Kansas has the 3rd largest ball of yarn
in the world.

A gazillion trained bodies with a dirty AK's in one hand and white
flags in the other does not constitute a major force.




Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam
was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an
enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern
logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order
of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and
usually closer to 75 throughout the war.


So we have established that Iraq was better prepared at the onset of
battle than was Vietnam. I imagine a decade of high-intensity fighting
with Iran probably had something to do with that. In any case, I didn't
refer to what may or may not have existed at a single static moment; I'm
referring to outside help from a major super-power throughout the entire
conflict. Did Iraq have that for even a day of Operation Re-elect Bush
or the latest war?


Some analysts even contend that the failure of
Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the
collapse of the SU.


Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with
Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the
main reason the East Bloc collapsed.

Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift
from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year
younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a
concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world)
and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather
than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more
than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F.
Kennan in 1947.

They were also 99% of the reason why the East Bloc fell.


--Mike

From: Michael Wise
Date: 6/13/2004 1:24 PM Central


snip

A gazillion trained bodies with a dirty AK's in one hand and white
flags in the other does not constitute a major force.


Mike, trained forces don't have dirty weapons. If you had ever been in the
military and had weapons training you'd know that. The only time I came across
dirty weapons they were either abandoned or USAF aircrew weapons in my last
unit since they tended to not clean their weapons even after firing them,

Now how is a "gazillion trained bodies" with weapons NOT a major force? Would
you go up against them? The VC did pretty good work for a bunch of people with
low tech weapons as did the Soviet infantry in WW2.

--Mike

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired