![]() |
If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
|
#1
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Churchill, all the decoded messages placed in the public arena.
Stimson, the Japanese must fire first. Dulles a claimed quote, Hoover no quote at all presente Churchill:"..from the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanase ciphers and were decoding large numbers of their Military and diplomatic telegrams" FDR:"The war starts tomorrow" Dec.6,1941 As I said before being a custodian of conspiracies is a tough job nowadays. See any Pearl Harbor conspiracies there? Yeah right,nobody sees anything. Translation if a person in public life tells a lie about being given a speeding ticket, they must be clearly responsible for mass murder. Translation if a public person or official tells a capital lie about Pearl Harbor,there is no reason to believe that they are telling truth about other similar incidents,for example 9/11. Denyav is having trouble coping with the idea the work on the A code stopped after it went out of service while work picked up on the B code. Congrulations you have finally accepted that recovery work did not stop in March or April 1941 but actually accelerated. 1) It was not Safford. 2) It appears the quote is about a specific case in 1943. It was Safford it refers to whole JN25B decoding process.Yes folks, Denyav needs a fact so he creates one, the number of groups recovered was around 3,800 to 1 December 1941. Just add up your own monthly recovery numbers after April 41 without trying to hide the numbers behind some definition walls,you will find a totally different number,and this number will be very close to 10000. Yes folks Denyav now needs to invent a whole new history. Apparently the fact the contribution allied intercepts and code breaking made has been known for decades has to be rewritten. You are excellent in contradicting yourself. How the Allies that,according to your own statements,were so incapable of reading JN25B messages prior to Pearl Harbor,became so sophisticated and efficient code breakers right after Pearl Harbor. How did this miracle happen,with the help of Mr.Willshaws outer space aliens maybe? The ability of the USN to read the IJN codes gave them the best chance yet to ambush the IJN. Heck,wasn't it the SAME USN that was unable to read any JN25B messages only a few months ago? I guess USN recruited outer space aliens as code breakers right after Pearl Harbor Yes folks Denyav does not have a clue, and needs to debate himself to avoid the facts. Reality says the allies knew how JN-25B worked in December 1941 but lacked enough code group meanings to Nice use of detractors,Allies knew how JN25B worked already in December 1940,not in December 1941. There is one full year difference and Allies did go to hibernating in December 1940. to figure out Midway and Coral Sea? Or that the all knowing intelligence system missed the IJN battleships coming out at Midway and the way the IJN carriers came [into the Coral Sea behind the US carriers.] Wasn't Midway a victory of superior intelligence gathering? |
#2
|
|||
|
|||
![]() "Denyav" wrote in message ... Churchill, all the decoded messages placed in the public arena. Stimson, the Japanese must fire first. Dulles a claimed quote, Hoover no quote at all presente Churchill:"..from the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanase ciphers and were decoding large numbers of their Military and diplomatic telegrams" Indeed they had penetrated Purple , the diplomatic cipher and a number of other codes, but not JN-25 FDR:"The war starts tomorrow" Dec.6,1941 Quite so , an attack of the Phillipines and Malaya was expected and all Pacific commands had been issued a war warning. Keith |
#3
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
Indeed they had penetrated Purple , the diplomatic cipher
and a number of other codes, but not JN-25 But Mr.Churchill clearly stated "..military and diplomatic.." which includes JN25 too. Quite so , an attack of the Phillipines and Malaya was expected and all Pacific commands had been issued a war warning. So called War Warning was designed not to warn Pearl Harbor but to draw attention away from Pearl Harbor,even though US learned on Nov.25 that the Pearl Harbor was the target. That was the reason why Naval Court of Inqury exonarated Kimmel. |
#4
|
|||
|
|||
![]() "Denyav" wrote in message ... Indeed they had penetrated Purple , the diplomatic cipher and a number of other codes, but not JN-25 But Mr.Churchill clearly stated "..military and diplomatic.." which includes JN25 too. He didnt say 'ALL military' so it clearly does not Quite so , an attack of the Phillipines and Malaya was expected and all Pacific commands had been issued a war warning. So called War Warning was designed not to warn Pearl Harbor but to draw attention away from Pearl Harbor,even though US learned on Nov.25 that the Pearl Harbor was the target. The message sent to Kimmel started thus "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days" This cannot be construed as anything but an alert against possible attack. The fact that it named other locations as 'likely' targets hardly ruled out Hawaii. That was the reason why Naval Court of Inqury exonarated Kimmel. It didnt, rather it found that his failings were not sufficient basis for a court martial on the grounds of dereliction of duty. In practical terms the Naval court blamed the army. The naval command staff were less charitable. As Admiral King put it " The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors." In short he was fired, hardly an exoneration ! Note further that the court stated clearly that there was NO information suggesting an attack on Hawaii Quote Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable. /Quote Keith |
#5
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
But Mr.Churchill clearly stated "..military and diplomatic.." which
includes JN25 too. He didnt say 'ALL military' so it clearly does not BOTH,military and diplomatic.period. This cannot be construed as anything but an alert against possible attack. The fact that it named other locations as 'likely' targets hardly ruled out Hawaii. What HM gov't would do if they received a specific terror warning for London? 1)Issue a terror alert for London 2)Issue terror alerts for Montevideo,Montreal,Athens and Cairo,but not for London. Which one would be the correct response? In short he was fired, hardly an exoneration ! You forgat to mention that Naval court of inquiry decision EXONORATED Kimmel but courts decision was OVERTURNED by Forrestal and King. In other word overturning courts decision was a political move to save their own asses.Note further that the court stated clearly that there was NO information suggesting an attack on Hawaii Court based its decision mainly on so called War Warning message and considered it as an attempt to divert attention away from PH than warn PH. to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would None of Crane documents were available to court or Kimmel at that time. Even members Congress conducting a mini probe on Pearl Harbor in 1995 were denied access to the files. In other words Congress members were allowed to investigate Pearl Harbor incident on behalf American Public but even they were not allowed to see Pearl Harbor documents. Under these circumstances Naval Courts decision to exonorate Kimmel based on correct interpretation of so called War Warning becomes even more important. |
#6
|
|||
|
|||
![]() "Denyav" wrote in message ... But Mr.Churchill clearly stated "..military and diplomatic.." which includes JN25 too. He didnt say 'ALL military' so it clearly does not BOTH,military and diplomatic.period. I both watched TV and listened to radio today. This does not mean I watched all 200 TV channels and listened to the 30 or so radio channels available to me. This cannot be construed as anything but an alert against possible attack. The fact that it named other locations as 'likely' targets hardly ruled out Hawaii. What HM gov't would do if they received a specific terror warning for London? 1)Issue a terror alert for London 2)Issue terror alerts for Montevideo,Montreal,Athens and Cairo,but not for London. Which one would be the correct response? None of the above, they would issue the orders necessary to counter the threat, as has been done many times In short he was fired, hardly an exoneration ! You forgat to mention that Naval court of inquiry decision EXONORATED Kimmel but courts decision was OVERTURNED by Forrestal and King. Nope, the court didnt exonerate him, they excused his errors and blamed the army. In other word overturning courts decision was a political move to save their own asses.Note further that the court stated clearly that there was NO information suggesting an attack on Hawaii Court based its decision mainly on so called War Warning message and considered it as an attempt to divert attention away from PH than warn PH. A view that was overturned by every subsequent inquiry and was self serving, their major interest was proving that it wasnt the fault of the USN. to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would None of Crane documents were available to court or Kimmel at that time. Irrelevant Even members Congress conducting a mini probe on Pearl Harbor in 1995 were denied access to the files. Not really, they reported that the BRITISH Government was unwilling to declassify material relevant to the Pearl Harbor intelligence issue because it was subject to the UK-USA Intelligence Agreement, they made no complaint about US files being withheld In other words Congress members were allowed to investigate Pearl Harbor incident on behalf American Public but even they were not allowed to see Pearl Harbor documents. See above Note the so called 1995 probe was in fact an attempt to reinstate the reputations of Kimmel and Short at the urging of their families and was far from being an full or impartial inquiry http://users.erols.com/nbeach/kimmel.html Under these circumstances Naval Courts decision to exonorate Kimmel based on correct interpretation of so called War Warning becomes even more important. Trouble is the 12 subsequent inquiries, including the extremely through 1946 congressional investigation ALL overthrew that result. Kimmel just made too many mistakes. Keith |
#7
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
What HM gov't would do if they received a specific terror warning for
London? 1)Issue a terror alert for London 2)Issue terror alerts for Montevideo,Montreal,Athens and Cairo,but not for London. Which one would be the correct response? None of the above, they would issue the orders necessary to counter the threat, as has been done many times Nice way of dodging some questions. A view that was overturned by every subsequent inquiry and was self serving, their major interest was proving that it wasnt the fault of the USN. Only twice Kimmel and/or his kin were given opportunity to present their their case and evidences,in Naval court of Inquiry and in 90s during Congressional mini probe,and both panels,what a surprise,concluded that Kimmel should be exonarated. Irrelevant This word seems to be the most frequenly used word by the custodians of Pearl Harbor conspiracy when they face hard evidence. BRITISH Government was unwilling to declassify material relevant to the Pearl Harbor intelligence issue because it was subject to the UK-USA Intelligence Agreement, they made no complaint about US files being withheld I was referring to Crane files not British files.Sen.Thurman and Rep.Sprnce were denied access to these files in 90s. In other words Mr.Willshaw,representatives of American people investigating Pearl Harbor incident were denied access to almost 60 year old files. Trouble is the 12 subsequent inquiries, including the extremely through 1946 congressional investigation ALL overthrew that result. Kimmel just made too many mistakes. Actualy Army Board of investigation report was much more damaging for FDR-Stimson-Marshall trio than Navy version. Marshall offered his resignation after Army report. Arndt started this thread and made a capital mistake by implying that UK has become a banana republic of US. US was a banana republic for UK in 1941 also US was a UKs banana republic in 2001. Lord Rhodas' ideas sometimes realized by using Rhodas scholars. sometimes by using shock and awe methods. Heck,everbody is trying to find a Straussian (Neocon),Jewish,Israeli or Southern Baptist connection in 21st century version of PH,but nobody is looking for an Anglo connection. As I said before,I admire British great gaming skills. |
#8
|
|||
|
|||
![]()
As usual most of my words have been deleted.
For what it is worth Washington, the GY-1 code breaking section, was not working on JN-25B in real time in 1940/41, intercepts would be forwarded by mail from the Pacific. There were also not enough staff in late 1941 (22 men including 10 enlisted men) to do a proper 7 x 24 arrangement. The unit was doing the real time "Purple" Japanese diplomatic code breaking on odd numbered days, the army did even numbered days. The unit was also doing real time work on the Kriegsmarine given the USN participation in the battle of the Atlantic. The IJN task force sent to Pearl Harbor did not transmit any radio messages on its voyage to Hawaii. So say the surviving logs, the IJN 1942 after action report and the key people in the post war interviews. Attempts to claim otherwise so far have used messages sent to the task force, messages sent before they left Japan and the dummy traffic known to have been sent. The final pre war USN plans had between 2 and 3 battleships per aircraft carrier as the right fleet mix. The change in priority can be seen by the way the USS Kentucky (an Iowa class) was broken up on the slip in 1942 to allow an Essex class carrier (Lake Champlain) to be built instead, Kentucky was laid down for a second time in December 1944. The USS Enterprise was due back from Wake on the evening of 6 December but rough weather caused a delay, the new time was 7.30 am 7 December, they wanted their Sunday in port, but the weather was against them. In order for the conspiracy to keep Enterprise out of Pearl Harbor the conspirators needed to have a better long range weather forecast than can currently be done. USS Lexington was near Midway and was very exposed should the IJN make a direct course back to Japan. In order for the conspiracy to keep Enterprise out of Pearl Harbor the conspirators needed to have a better long range weather forecast than can currently be done. Washington ordered the two ferry missions, exact timings up to Hawaii. The famed order to sail message was never sent by radio, so says all the IJN evidence. Stinnett in his attempt to claim otherwise uses two US sources, one of which simply references the other, so one source, which is the USSBS post war interviews with IJN personnel. This is the fun thing with Stinnett, his footnotes rarely support the claims in the text they are supposed to support. In 1945 and 1946 the USN, as an exercise, using the intelligence system built up over the war went back to the 1941 messages to see what could have been learnt, the answer is there was no smoking gun message, the US would have needed to put together a large number of inferences to come up with the right answer. Oh yes, anybody who says the message said "Pearl Harbor" should note it had a geographic designator, AK, in JN-25, just like AF = Midway, and the US was still cracking those designators in 1942, see the famed fresh water message sent by Midway. Denyav wrote in message ... Churchill, all the decoded messages placed in the public arena. Stimson, the Japanese must fire first. Dulles a claimed quote, Hoover no quote at all presente Churchill:"..from the end of 1940 the Americans had pierced the vital Japanase ciphers and were decoding large numbers of their Military and diplomatic telegrams" So of all the names mentioned we receive 1 quote. yes folks, when trapped Denyav will simply retreat, failing to mention the rest of Churchill's words, The quote is above is on page 532 of the edition I have access to, on page 535 comes the quote, "A prodigious Congressional Inquiry published its findings in 1946 in which every detail was exposed of the events leading up to the war between the United States and Japan and of the failure to send positive "alert" orders through the military departments to their fleets and garrisons in exposed situations. Every detail, including the decoding of secret Japanese telegrams and their actual texts, has been displayed to the world in forty volumes. The strength of the United States was sufficient to enable them to sustain this hard ordeal required by the spirit of the American Constitution." Simple really, fail to mention Churchill noted what the allies had read they put into the public arena in 1946. Otherwise the conspiracy requires Churchill to be alternatively the truth bringer and telling lies. And remember the IJN had more than 1 code in service, as did the IJA, but just pretend Churchill's first quote has an extra line with JN-25B in it. FDR:"The war starts tomorrow" Dec.6,1941 So please give us the verified source of this wonder quote and note "the war" does not equal "the war with the US". As I said before being a custodian of conspiracies is a tough job nowadays. Someone has to do it of course, Denyav is applying for the job and wondering why his tourist trip of various conspiracy web sites does not seem to work as a good recommendation. See any Pearl Harbor conspiracies there? Yeah right,nobody sees anything. Denyav basically has to wear a blindfold to avoid seeing the truth. Translation if a person in public life tells a lie about being given a speeding ticket, they must be clearly responsible for mass murder. Translation if a public person or official tells a capital lie about Pearl Harbor,there is no reason to believe that they are telling truth about other similar incidents,for example 9/11. Yes folks, apparently FDR, Stimson, Marshall, etc, were running the USA in 1941 and 2001. Simple really. Denyav is having trouble coping with the idea the work on the A code stopped after it went out of service while work picked up on the B code. Congrulations you have finally accepted that recovery work did not stop in March or April 1941 but actually accelerated. Yes folks, Denyav has to put words into other people's mouths in order to lie his way out of another mess. As usual no proof of what I said has been presented. 1) It was not Safford. 2) It appears the quote is about a specific case in 1943. It was Safford it refers to whole JN25B decoding process. Ah I like this, Denyav lifted the quote, which he keeps deleting, from a conspiracy web site. The trouble is the document was written in 1944 or later and Safford was put out of code breaking in 1942, and the quote itself appears to be the usual conspiracy quote idea, take an example about a specific case and pretend it applies generally, or claim that is what the document supports. The document itself does not give an author. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/...ea/Biblio.html History of OP-20-GYP-1 (Cryptanalysis-Pacific). This history was written after the war, probably by Stuart McClintock. It concerns the activities of the Pacific cryptanalysis unit in Washington. It contains information concerning the steps leading to success against the Jap Navy General-Purpose Code, JN 25. history Collection IV W I.5.12 and 5.13. This history is classified TS. Yes folks, Denyav needs a fact so he creates one, the number of groups recovered was around 3,800 to 1 December 1941. Just add up your own monthly recovery numbers after April 41 without trying to hide the numbers behind some definition walls, you will find a totally different number,and this number will be very close to 10000. Yes folks, Denyav will keep ignoring the facts, here are the totals I keep presenting. If you would like to know the exact code groups recovered it was "Unfinished or Continuous" [i.e., a running tally] April 1, 1941: "approximately 300 values recovered" May 1, 1941: "approximately 400 values recovered" June 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered" July 1, 1941: "approximately 1100 values recovered" August 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered" Sept 1, 1941: "approximately 2000 values recovered" Oct 1, 1941: "approximately 2400 values recovered" "Completed during October 1941" Nov 1, 1941: "600 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,000 values as of this date] "Completed during November 1941" Dec 1, 1941: "800 values recovered" [i.e., a total of 3,800 values as of this date] "Unfinished or continuous" Jan 1, 1942: "Approximately 6,180 values recovered" Remembering some previously assigned values could be changed by later discoveries. So by the end of December 1941 the allied thought they had around 7% of the code book recovered. Denyav is of course, simply adding the numbers together, rather than admitting they are the cumulative totals known at the end of the relevant month. Yes folks Denyav now needs to invent a whole new history. Apparently the fact the contribution allied intercepts and code breaking made has been known for decades has to be rewritten. You are excellent in contradicting yourself. Denyav is so funny. How the Allies that,according to your own statements,were so incapable of reading JN25B messages prior to Pearl Harbor,became so sophisticated and efficient code breakers right after Pearl Harbor. Yes folks, Denyav tries to announce that the code was compromised in 2 months in December 1940 and January 1941, but now has to turn around and say the allies, with more resources, starting from a much higher level of knowledge, could not compromise the code in 6 months. You see for Denyav to be right the allies went backwards in 1942 when it came to reading JN-25. Simple really, just invent facts and delete the problems. Deleted text, "So tell us all please what A code values did the US recover in say the second half of 1941? How did this miracle happen,with the help of Mr.Willshaws outer space aliens maybe? Yes folks, Denyav tells us the allies could break the code in the first 2 months of its introduction but then tells us they could not break it a year after its introduction, even though the allies then started with 7% of the code book and knew about things like the double meanings and auxiliary tables. Then we are apparently supposed to ignore the major increases in manpower devoted to cracking the code. Hawaii was brought in, and the Australians. Furthermore after discovering the lack of trustable Japanese speakers in the US the USN had started language classes and in late 1941 and early 1942 were receiving the first graduates. Simply in the first half of 1942 the allies had 5 to 10 times the resources devoted to cracking JN-25 than a year previously. The Washington code unit, In the first quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 10 personnel, 7 officers and 3 enlisted men. In the second quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 16 personnel, 9 officers, 5 enlisted men and 2 civilian men. In the third quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 20 personnel, 8 officers, 10 enlisted men and 2 civilian men. In the final quarter of 1941 GY-1 is 22 personnel, 9 officers, 10 enlisted men and 3 civilian men. In the first quarter of 1942 GY-1 is 41 personnel, 9 officers, 30 enlisted men, 1 civilian man and 1 civilian woman. In the second quarter of 1942 GY-1 is 98 personnel, 12 officers, 70 Enlisted men, 1 civilian man and 15 civilian woman. In the third quarter of 1942 GY-1 is 207 personnel, 17 officers, 125 Enlisted men, 15 civilian man and 50 civilian woman. Note the difference in available personnel and note there was less Japanese diplomatic traffic to handle in 1942, which was a major drain in 1941. The ability of the USN to read the IJN codes gave them the best chance yet to ambush the IJN. Heck,wasn't it the SAME USN that was unable to read any JN25B messages only a few months ago? I guess USN recruited outer space aliens as code breakers right after Pearl Harbor Yes folks, Denyav is going to tell us all how the code was simple, even obsolete and cracked in the 2 months he wants it cracked in but then announces it could not be cracked in 1942 with far more knowledge and resources. Yes folks Denyav does not have a clue, and needs to debate himself to avoid the facts. Reality says the allies knew how JN-25B worked in December 1941 but lacked enough code group meanings to deleted text, "the messages. That changed in 1942 when the allies threw more resources at the problem, using the techniques developed in 1941 to crack the code. "Secondly ignoring the fact the "5" version of the code stopped being used in January 1941 and the USN stopped working on the A version in around March 1941, since the IJN decided to stop using the A code in December 1940. Just try and pretend I am running some sort of line the USN stopped work at that time. Above all do not even begin to understand that Washington was weeks behind current intercepts because they were mailed in from the Pacific. Thirdly changing the subject. Move away from the fact that if the failure to change additive books compromised the B code it must have compromised the A code, since the US had only 5% of the A code book when work ended on it around March 1941." Nice use of detractors,Allies knew how JN25B worked already in December 1940,not in December 1941. Yes folks, apparently the allies knew within a few days of the first messages the double meanings, the auxiliary tables and so on, but of course, according to Denyav, these could not be found in 1942 with many times the resources and 3 times the amount of available time. There is one full year difference and Allies did go to hibernating in December 1940. Yes folks, JN-25 is a code that can only be broken when Denyav wants it broken. Then it is put back to uncracked when Denyav wants it the other way. to figure out Midway and Coral Sea? Or that the all knowing intelligence system missed the IJN battleships coming out at Midway and the way the IJN carriers came [into the Coral Sea behind the US carriers.] Wasn't Midway a victory of superior intelligence gathering? Yes folks, just ignore the reality the allied intelligence was not perfect, but try and pretend it was 6 months earlier. I will leave off the majority of my previous post this time, Denyav's deleting of it is clear proof of inability to answer it. I must admit the claim the New York Times published on 8 December 1941 that the Pearl Harbor raid was no surprise but it seems no one noticed, at the time, during the war or after the war is very funny. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
![]() |
||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
Videos: Su-37 Superflanker vs F-22 Raptor | Alejandro Magno | Military Aviation | 20 | January 10th 04 05:19 PM |