Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

The Lufwaffe Nachtjakgt

Well that looks interesting.

The
Luftwaffe for a time had to resort to wild boar tactics which involved
single engined fighters equipped with special navigation equipment but with
no radar.

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW 190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I have
interviewed.


Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.


The night fighter pilots maintained high morale and motivation to the end.
In five years this arm of the Luftwaffe underwent greater technical and
tactical change than any other branch of the Armed Forces.

Probably true, although it should be weighed against the groud attack arm of
the airforce, that started the war in some cases with Henschel biplanes and
open cockpits and ended with Jets.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

"Krztalizer" wrote in message
...
The Lufwaffe Nachtjakgt

Well that looks interesting.

The
Luftwaffe for a time had to resort to wild boar tactics which involved
single engined fighters equipped with special navigation equipment but
with
no radar.

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials. Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights. They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators: I believe mosquitoes were the main
target. The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again. I believe that great of squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.


Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it? I
have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.


Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal. I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.



The night fighter pilots maintained high morale and motivation to the
end.
In five years this arm of the Luftwaffe underwent greater technical and
tactical change than any other branch of the Armed Forces.

Probably true, although it should be weighed against the groud attack arm
of
the airforce, that started the war in some cases with Henschel biplanes
and
open cockpits and ended with Jets.





v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials.

The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
subject as part of our interview.

Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.

Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.

They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:

Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
Viermots over citiesl

I believe mosquitoes were the main
target.

There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc., but these
were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.

The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again.

Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all of them knew
by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
was not going to be an effective tracking tool.

I believe that great of squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.

I know their songs Its difficult for me to call professional nightfighter
airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional.

Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?

Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
forward some more info about it.


I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.

Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
didn't copy that file when I saw it.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal.

Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...

I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.

Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
was unbearable.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

nt (Krztalizer) wrote in message ...

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials.

The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
subject as part of our interview.

You no doubt have great personal experience in these matters: however
so many variants of the Me 109G series are described as 'dirty weather
fighters'. Also there was in squadrans sometimes only a few pilots
with an instrument rating and I have the impression not all 109s had
artificial horizons.


This is from "Heinz Knoke's" wartime diary "I flew for the Fuhrer"
recently reprinted and obviously a leary publishers title. He was an
Me 109 pilot of 63 victories. Here he describes a dirty weather
interception and shootdown of a Mosquito. Probably Fug 16 and Wurzburg
directed. I believe this is one of the Mosquitos that embarased
Goering in Berlin during an political rally.

*******
6th November, 1942.

12oo hours: from Division Headquarters comes a report of two
Mosquitoes approaching. At the same moment there is a ring at my
telephone. Lieutenant Kramer, our Fighter Control Officer at Division,
calls to ask if 1 can fly in the bad weather.

I reply in the negative. Cloud ceiling is down to 100 feet, and
visibility is impossible. I cannot even see across to the other side
of the field.

" Sorry, Kramer, it cannot be done. Anyway, in this sort of muck the
two Tommies will come down on their snouts without our help."

For several hours it has been raining-a steady, persistent drizzle.
The pilots sit around, playing cards or writing letters home, or lie
sleeping on camp-cots in the next room.

I plot the progress of the Mosquitoes from the position reports as
they come in. They actually fly inland over the heart of the Reich.
Inside of an hour they are reported to be over Berlin, and our flak
opens up on them. Those lads must have guts all right. Weather like
this makes flying anything but a picnic.

The telephone rings again.

" No. 5 Flight; Lieutenant Knoke here."

The call this time is from Colonel Henschel, commanding fighter
defences in the North Sea coastal area. How is the weather at your
end, Knoke ? just as bad as it can be, sir. I can see only for a few
yards." Knoke, you will have to fly, and that is all there is to it. I
have just had a telephone call from Reich-Marshal Goring He is in one
of his rages. Why are we not in the air? The weather is too bad for us
to fly; yet those confounded Tommies can get over Berlin. Do you
imagine 1 would tell that to the Reich-Marshal ? Those Mosquitoes are
to be shot down at all costs. Do you understand?

" Yes, sir."

" Which of the pilots are you going to send?

" Flight Sergeant Wenneckers and myself, sir."

" Very well-and the best of luck to you!

" Thank you, sir."

Wenneckers and I are the only pilots in the Wing with experience in
blind flying. This is not the first time that we have set off together
in dirty weather.

Take-off 133o hours.

I can see hardly anything ahead. This blasted rain! Keeping down low,
we hurtle over the roof-tops, trees and power-lines. Radio reception
from the ground is good. Lieutenant Kramer directs me.

The Tommies are heading north-west over the Bremen area. From past
experience they may be expected to cross the East Friesian Islands.

I head for the coast. The weather over the sea is not any better.

The most recent report gives

the Position Of the Mosquitoes

as map reference sector Berta-Quelle-eight, on course threeone-five.
At any moment now we may sight the *******s, if we keep our eyes
peeled. If only it would stop raining! We have to concentrate our
attention on not running into some obstruction.

Time: 1347 hours.

I am unable to see anything at all ahead. It is maddening. Base calls:
" You should see them now. Try a little to the left."

I do not answer. For a shadow suddenly looms out of the greyness
ahead. It is a Mosquito.

He has spotted me also, and whips round to the left in a vertical
bank, almost dipping his wing-tip in the sea. Now he twists round to
the right. Then he dodges to the left again.

" No, no, my friend, it is not such a simple matter to shake off
Knoke." Every time he turns I fire in front of his nose.

We are flying low, very low, heading out over the open sea now. My
Tommy leaves a faint trail of smoke. At full throttle he follows a
steady course of three-two-zero. He moves at such a blasted high
speed. But my good Gustav is just able to maintain the pace. I stay on
his tail. Wenneckers

gradually falls behind. The terrific speed is too high for his plane.

I want to fire at only the closest possible range, and hence

try to close the gap between us. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, I draw
nearer to my opponent. I shut the radiator flaps, and the range drops
to 150 feet. He is squarely in my sights.

" Fire, Knoke, fire-NOW!! "

I press both firing-buttons. The burst catches him in the left engine.
The plane is constructed of wood. The wing goes up in flames at once
and shears off at the root. A few seconds later one De Havilland
Mosquito vanishes into the green depths of the North Sea.

That was my third.

Nothing but a sludge of oil is left on the surface. I mop the sweat
from my face.


*******

Knokes diary is interesting becuase he often speeks of improvements to
the electonics or engine boost for his Me 109 but seldom mentions the
series he is in. One is left with an impression of the power of the
30mm armament on the 109 he seemed to have no trouble bringing down
the mighty P47 with it.




Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.

Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.

They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:

Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
Viermots over citiesl

I believe mosquitoes were the main
target.

There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc.,
but these
were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.

The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again.

Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all
of them knew
by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
was not going to be an effective tracking tool.

I believe that the death rate of wilde sau squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.

I know their songs Its difficult for me to call professional
nightfighter airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional.

Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....

The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?

Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
forward some more info about it.


I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.

Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
didn't copy that file when I saw it.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal.

Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...

I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.

Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
was unbearable.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.