Hard Deck

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 2:32:30 AM UTC-8, wrote:
Second, historically, races are not only won by those flying the perfect flight, with decisions made that minimized risk and maximized speed, but ALSO days are won by those same pilots who chose or had to take a major calculated risk to win the day. Those who are trying to eliminate that side of the contest also eliminate a whole grouping of pilots who have developed the skill set for that method of fast flying.


This summarizes the two poles of the argument. Those who believe taking 'major calculated' risks should continue to be part of the game, and those who would like to minimize those as a means to win.

I do not believe though, that "Those who are trying to eliminate that side of the contest also eliminate a whole grouping of pilots who have developed the skill set for that method of fast flying." It does not eliminate those pilots from competition, only to the extent that their success was born exclusively on taking those major calculated risks. The really good pilots are going to win anyway - even with airspace restricted to someone's idea of safe. There are a very few who would do less well, because major risk taking is a large part of their success. Is the success rate of taking major calculated risks what we are trying to measure in soaring competition? Should taking major calculated risks be weighted with, or above, picking thermals, centering them quickly, and managing energy in-between?

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:26:27 AM UTC-5, jfitch wrote:


This summarizes the two poles of the argument. Those who believe taking 'major calculated' risks should continue to be part of the game, and those who would like to minimize those as a means to win.


Not sure if that's what I'm coming away with. I actually think most/all of us agree that "major" risks (where major = a high likelihood of injury or death) should NOT be part of the game. I certainly feel that way, and that attitude (along with a lack of skill, time, and commitment) have limited me to a few near-podium finishes at Nationals.

My strong feeling is that the accidents BB is ascribing to bad-behavior driven by a quest for points is a complete red herring. Clay's analysis (if proven to be true) along with all I've seen in the accident report seems to support my point of view. While taking a break from sanding gelcoat in the shop last night, 3 of us (with a combined racing experience in excess of 120 years) had a hard time naming even one attempt to climb out below 600 feet, much less 500, 400, or 300.

So the question is - what exactly would a hard deck solve? More importantly, what other unintended behaviors will it drive, and at what cost in complexity of administration etc. My take is that it's a solution looking for the wrong problem to solve.

Erik Mann (P3)
ASG-29

On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 2:11:27 PM UTC-5, Papa3 wrote:
On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:26:27 AM UTC-5, jfitch wrote:


This summarizes the two poles of the argument. Those who believe taking 'major calculated' risks should continue to be part of the game, and those who would like to minimize those as a means to win.


Not sure if that's what I'm coming away with. I actually think most/all of us agree that "major" risks (where major = a high likelihood of injury or death) should NOT be part of the game. I certainly feel that way, and that attitude (along with a lack of skill, time, and commitment) have limited me to a few near-podium finishes at Nationals.

My strong feeling is that the accidents BB is ascribing to bad-behavior driven by a quest for points is a complete red herring. Clay's analysis (if proven to be true) along with all I've seen in the accident report seems to support my point of view. While taking a break from sanding gelcoat in the shop last night, 3 of us (with a combined racing experience in excess of 120 years) had a hard time naming even one attempt to climb out below 600 feet, much less 500, 400, or 300.

So the question is - what exactly would a hard deck solve? More importantly, what other unintended behaviors will it drive, and at what cost in complexity of administration etc. My take is that it's a solution looking for the wrong problem to solve.

Erik Mann (P3)
ASG-29

Perhaps the unintended consequence is that a guy who is at 800 ft over a good field in the valley makes a run at the ridge to get away from the hard deck...........

WH

On Fri, 02 Feb 2018 11:11:24 -0800, Papa3 wrote:

So the question is - what exactly would a hard deck solve? More
importantly, what other unintended behaviors will it drive, and at what
cost in complexity of administration etc. My take is that it's a
solution looking for the wrong problem to solve.

After reading those accounts of poorly executed field landings I got
curious about what is covered in all phases of the US Bronze badge
curriculum and found that its very similar to what we're taught in the UK
apart from one group of skills which are not included in your Bronze:

- navigation using a 1:500,000 chart (that is similar to a US sectional)
- field selection
- field landing

These are all discussed and then flown with an instructor. You need them
signed off to get the Bronze XC Endorsement but they aren't pass/fail
checks: you fly them until both student and instructor are satisfied with
the student's performance in a TMG: I, like many UK XC pilots, did them
in an SF-25 Scheibe, which has reasonably good airbrakes and, with a bit
of power added, can simulate a 32:1 glider. Here's a summary of what's
involved:

http://www.motorglide.co.uk/cross-country-endorsement/

... and a video of it being done:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAOCd18Bv8Y

Would something like this be helpful and/or possible in US clubs? It
should certainly help the confidence of a new XC pilot facing his first
one or two field landings.


--
Martin | martin at
Gregorie | gregorie dot org