Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Not having enough aviation fuel was a big problem late in 1944.
Earlier,
the
Germans had a pretty good handle on it, as the 3/30/44 raid to
Nuremburg
showed.

They nightfighters whacked at least 80 Brit bombers, total lost that
night
94-96.

The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not
well
known
because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates. For example on the 19th Jan 1944 the USAAF
dispatched 675 B-17's and 188 B-24's to Frankfurt with an escort
of 89 P-38's, 503 P-47's and 40 P-51's

34 B-17's and B-24's were lost , a loss rate of 3.94 %




And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."



On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
and it worked.

--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had
made
precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and also
some
P-38's.

It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp
even in
1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to
England
in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG,
Hunter,
wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown
that
even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans.
But
they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think
that
some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost
him
his job.

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
had no
such solution.


Horsefeathers.

The RAF returned to bombing German targets after D-Day as
did the US 8th AF. Ask any surviving German night fighter pilot
about the RAF response, the Mosquito intruders caused them
terrible losses.

Keith

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates.

So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?

And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting the
Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help out
over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was.


And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not saying
that.

If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say that
the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one.



This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."



On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
and it worked.

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks


"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66


The RAF was not only getting shot to pieces, they were ineffective.


snip

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
had no
such solution.


Horsefeathers.

What allowed Bomber Command to continue sending German cities to Harris'
bonfires was the favorable situation brought on by the Americans. That's what
Portal said.


Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates.

So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?


It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting
the
Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help
out
over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was.





And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life
to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy
bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not
be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical
innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not
saying
that.

If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say
that
the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one.


The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Keith

So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?


It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

Not material to what is being discussed. The USAAF was not running night
bombing raids over Germany.

You're making excuses.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?


It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

Not material to what is being discussed. The USAAF was not running night
bombing raids over Germany.

You're making excuses.

Walt

No I'm explaining that the overall loss rates were similar, if
the RAF was defeated by a loss rate of 3.6% so was the
USAAF

In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

Keith

In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added little to
the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added
little to
the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better.

Walt

The RAF layed a major part in the oil war in that period.

Which targets do you think were more important ?

Keith

The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?

If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
that help wasn't coming.. Right?

If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
then he was wrong.

You don't become a great captain by being wrong.

Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
not criminally incompetent.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote:

The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?

If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
that help wasn't coming.. Right?

If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
then he was wrong.

You don't become a great captain by being wrong.

Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
not criminally incompetent.

I'd say the evidence shows he was wrong, but you can be wrong without being
incompetent. Harris believed what he was doing was more effective than it was, but
unfortunately for him the Germans weren't providing BDA for him, and he couldn't
consult the USSBS. That others disagreed with him as to area bombing's
effectiveness is also true, but just because we know they were correct on that
issue NOW doesn't mean that it was obvious at the time. We can say that Harris
stuck with it long after he should of in the face of the evidence, but how many
commanders have been condemned for changing horses in midstream just when they were
on the verge of success? No one can accuse Harris of not adhering to maintenance
of aim. Of course, the same can be said of Haig; there's no one right answer.

Besides, Harris has an out; if you wish to throw around accusations of
incompetence, or rather negligence, you have to look no further than Portal. If he
disagreed with Harris' strategy and tactics and he didn't think that Harris would
properly support new ones if ordered to, it was his responsibility to replace him
with someone else; Harris said as much, in so many words. Portal punted, not
requiring him to change, and not replacing him.

Guy

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?

I think the opening line makes that clear, the Battle of Berlin was
a defeat. I think the way Walter ducks the rest of the paragraph
makes it clear he is not interested in history.

If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
that help wasn't coming.. Right?

Walter likes to run this line, Harris wrote a letter to his superiors
indicating the Battle of Berlin would go better if the USAAF could
help, Walter like to turn this into Harris killing his men.

If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
then he was wrong.

And until it was tried no one knew it was wrong. Just like all the other
tactics tried.

You don't become a great captain by being wrong.

So there are no great captains then, given all commanders are
wrong at times.

Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
not criminally incompetent.

Walter starts from his preferred conclusion and works backward,
fitting the preferred evidence in with the deletion of inconvenient
facts.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.