Hard Deck

"my point exactly Karl! the hard deck does nothing to prevent pilots from attempting climb-outs. "

Once again, the point of the hard deck is not to "prevent" anything. If the pilot in command thinks a climb out is a good idea, he/she should do it. If the pilot in command prefers to land, he/she should do it. The only point of the hard deck is to REMOVE an incentive given by the rules to do one or the other. The point of the hard deck is to leave the pilot in command alone to make a good decision. Often a climb-out is the right decision. Go for it!

John cochrane

On Thursday, February 8, 2018 at 7:37:52 PM UTC, John Cochrane wrote

Once again, the point of the hard deck is not to "prevent" anything. If the pilot in command thinks a climb out is a good idea, he/she should do it. If the pilot in command prefers to land, he/she should do it. The only point of the hard deck is to REMOVE an incentive given by the rules to do one or the other. The point of the hard deck is to leave the pilot in command alone to make a good decision. Often a climb-out is the right decision. Go for it!

John cochrane

The point of the hard deck surely is to try to prevent something; to try to prevent pilots from going lower than the hard deck. Once below it they are out of the game and how they then try to get home would be up to them. The question is how might the presence of the hard deck below affect the decision making of pilots flying above it - particularly those who find themselves close to dropping under it and so incurring a technical land out?

John, it is not incentivizing taking risk by adding a penalty for doing so. Punitive measures will not prevent bad decisions made 30 minutes prior. Incentivize things by adding points to stay above a hard deck. Carrot v stick type thing. Insurance companies realize they pay less claims when you reduce rates for safe driving. Legislating against stupidity doesn't work too well. Making rules for an occasional stupid decision adds complexity for no real gain. Pilots have died in contests and flying and they will continue to do so regardless of rules. We can save more lives by good training and practicing safe flight management so when we screw up it results in a good story. Safety is a process and worrying about outcome takes us away from being in the process and making the right decision for the next step in the process which if followed results in the desired outcome. glidets can be replaced, people cannot. My view is the glider is absolutely expendable if destroying it removes energy and saves lives of people in the aircraft and on the ground. Do I want to wreck the ship? Not at all but allowing for this let's me focus on the process of being able to tell the story of how I lived and bought another ship. This is my choice just as it is for a racing pilot to take a risk on a low save for points. If this pilot has such an inflated ego or lack of respect for his friends and family to take excessive risk to win a contest only he really cares about then let them as long as their actions don't interfere with others. Safety rules should be put into place where the action of one can effect another. If a pilot wants to risk their own life we should let them.

On Thursday, February 8, 2018 at 2:37:52 PM UTC-5, John Cochrane wrote:
"my point exactly Karl! the hard deck does nothing to prevent pilots from attempting climb-outs. "

Once again, the point of the hard deck is not to "prevent" anything. If the pilot in command thinks a climb out is a good idea, he/she should do it. If the pilot in command prefers to land, he/she should do it. The only point of the hard deck is to REMOVE an incentive given by the rules to do one or the other. The point of the hard deck is to leave the pilot in command alone to make a good decision. Often a climb-out is the right decision. Go for it!

John cochrane

but so i don't understand john, that sounds a little flimsy or at the very least downright bureaucratic. pardon me for seeming obstinate, but if the hard deck doesn't prevent anything, and people will still have low level mishaps, then the hard deck won't improve contest safety records. if it doesn't do that, then why complicate things with this proposed rule? simply in the name of absolving the competition rules of blame? that's absurd.

anyway, we already have to sign a "WAIVER OF CLAIMS, ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY, AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT". that's me the pilot saying that i'm legally responsible for my actions and their consequences.

the person to blame for getting smoked by circling at low altitude is always the PIC, never the rules or the contest organizers. the rules never force my hand to do anything.

Amen ND

BB,

You’ve said several times now (and I agree) that the effect of the hard deck isn’t to reduce incidents of pilots attempting low saves - but you have also said it’s purpose is to eliminate the points incentive for doing so. Since we’ve reasonably established that there’s no competitive advantage to be gained from deliberately planning to go that low I find myself stuck on what the benefit is. Reducing an incentive that you admit won’t alter behavior o outcomes seems like an incentive with zero effect and therefore meaningless from a rule-making perspective.

Help me out - what’s the purpose of eliminating an incentive that’s so dominated by other factors that it doesn’t drive behavior or outcomes?

9B

On Thursday, February 8, 2018 at 4:14:49 PM UTC-5, Andy Blackburn wrote:
BB,

You’ve said several times now (and I agree) that the effect of the hard deck isn’t to reduce incidents of pilots attempting low saves - but you have also said it’s purpose is to eliminate the points incentive for doing so. Since we’ve reasonably established that there’s no competitive advantage to be gained from deliberately planning to go that low I find myself stuck on what the benefit is. Reducing an incentive that you admit won’t alter behavior o outcomes seems like an incentive with zero effect and therefore meaningless from a rule-making perspective.

Help me out - what’s the purpose of eliminating an incentive that’s so dominated by other factors that it doesn’t drive behavior or outcomes?

9B

Boom goes the dynamite^ well said.

One thing that strikes me about this conversation is the number of pilots who apparently have little or no regard for the recommendations of the Soaring Safety Foundation.

I believe the SSF recommendation is a personal hard deck of 800 - 1000 agl in flat land with good landing options below (which were evaluated and chosen at higher altitudes). If you are in the mountains or the ridges, a similar level of safety factor (however you define it) should apply.

As I understand it, the recommendation is below your personal hard deck, you stop soaring and you land - period. This is a decision you make before you launch. This applies in all cases - local XC or contest flying.

Any SSF Trustees out there wish to chime in?

Lou

I agree the hard deck concept has been well discussed (haha), with few new insights since the debate began on another thread. What HAS been revealed are a couple of philospohical differences.

1. I got in trouble very early on with this statement: "Let's be honest. If soaring were a zero-risk activity, like video games, it wouldn't have the same appeal." I'm not risk prone nor do I enjoy scaring myself. But mastering the risks of soaring is one of its appeals to me. That's a philosophy with which not everyone agrees, and it has significant impacts on rules and tasking. For the record, I hate low saves--which I consider as anything below about 1,000 AGL--and don't do them very often (I've only gotten up from under 500' once in 50+ years). I hate landouts even more, but they're part of soaring; I stopped counting at about 100 (blush). To date I've only damaged a glider once (hit a hidden rock in a pasture) but I know the risks are higher. It's obvious that pilots think about the concept of risk quite differently.

2. To Dale Bush's point, we've traditionally tested certain skills and rewarded pilots on that basis, including navigating before GPS, final glides before the finish cylinder, and finding good thermals before leeching became popular. We're chipping away at those skills to the point where some pilots don't want fly at a site like Mifflin or Nephi or Minden because local knowledge is a factor. The ultimate effect of this trend might be soaring competition that occurs on only the best days at "non-technical" sites with tasks that keep pilots within range of airports, and that penalize or disallow risky behavior to a greater extent even than the hard deck contemplates (e..g., being out of glide range of a listed safe landing field). That's not a trend I welcome but times are changing.

Like Erik, I'm a consultant. Before you start designing something, it's important to define the mission, the vision for it over some time period, the objectives, and the scope of what will be included. Some of the points made here are practical ones: i.e., the parties agree philosophically but disagree on the solution (e.g., we should try to stop pilots from making foolish errors, hurting themselves, and driving our insurance rates up and the hard deck is a good/poor step). Other differences are more philosophical (e.g.., whether the risks of competitive soaring make it more or less appealing) and those debates are no less valid. But some disagreements are really philosophical but the parties debate the merits/efficacy of a solution such as a hard deck because that's easier.

Chip Bearden

On Thursday, February 8, 2018 at 1:14:49 PM UTC-8, Andy Blackburn wrote:
BB,

You’ve said several times now (and I agree) that the effect of the hard deck isn’t to reduce incidents of pilots attempting low saves - but you have also said it’s purpose is to eliminate the points incentive for doing so. Since we’ve reasonably established that there’s no competitive advantage to be gained from deliberately planning to go that low I find myself stuck on what the benefit is. Reducing an incentive that you admit won’t alter behavior o outcomes seems like an incentive with zero effect and therefore meaningless from a rule-making perspective.

Help me out - what’s the purpose of eliminating an incentive that’s so dominated by other factors that it doesn’t drive behavior or outcomes?

9B

There are two separate aspects to the hard deck. One is to attempt to prevent some behavior. This is in my opinion a fools errand. The other is to keep from tempting others to that behavior who would not ordinarily engage, because it is rewarded with a win. You have invested a week or two weeks and 2000 miles of driving into a contest. You are doing well on the 13th day, but choose not to thermal at 500 ft and land out. Another pilot circles in the same spot at 400 ft and gets away, thrashing you on points that day.

There are numerous stories up thread about this happening.

The direction of encouragement is towards the most risky behavior that survives. We are bottom fishing the behavior continuum for trophies. If the pilot gets away from 400 ft, he doesn't need a retrieve, but the pilot that gave up at 500 ft shouldn't be punished by 5 places in the standings because he chose prudence. The problem in my view is not that saving from 400 ft is slow, there is no doubt about that. But it is very fast compared to a landout, as scored by our points system. On a day when everyone gets back, the couple of guys who dug out from 400 ft are likely way down the board. On a day when they are the only guys who made it back, they place 1 and 2.

There is a secondary aspect: I believe one really should be able to practice for competition. If the 400 ft save is part of competition, then 400 ft thermalling needs to be practiced. I'd like to see an attempt to round up 5 unacquainted instructors from across the country, with a financial interest in their 2 place trainer, who would gladly give instruction in 400 ft saves over say 10 randomly chosen, unfamiliar landing sites. I'll submit you cannot find those, because it will be deemed too dangerous. If it is too dangerous to practice, why is it allowed in competition?