Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.
Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.
The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one per
19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25 one
per 43 sorties.
In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout the
war.


Chris Mark

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ost (Chris Mark)
Date: 7/17/2004 10:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.
Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.

The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one
per
19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25
one
per 43 sorties.
In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout
the
war.


Chris Mark



The B-26's were unsuited to low level operations and were not used down on the
deck. The B-25's were fine on the deck and were used there. All B-25's were
pulled from the ETO and moved to the MTO and Pacific which accounts for the
numbers you quote.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ost (Chris Mark)
Date: 7/17/2004 10:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.
Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.

The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one
per
19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25
one
per 43 sorties.
In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout
the
war.


Chris Mark


The B-26's were unsuited to low level operations and were not used down on the
deck.

As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO, and ETO
(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to medium
altitude in every theater other than the PTO, where Japanese flak was less.

The B-25's were fine on the deck and were used there. All B-25's were
pulled from the ETO and moved to the MTO and Pacific which accounts for the
numbers you quote.

No B-25s were "pulled" from the ETO. There were a couple of Groups temporarily
deployed there while waiting to fly on to North Africa. It had originally been
planned to have two Bomb Wings of B-25s and B-26s in the ETO, the 4th and 5th
(later Air Division then Bomb Division) , but it seems the B-25's better
suitability for operating in theaters with poorer runways and logistic support
than the B-26 was happy with, led to a decision to use the B-25 everywhere other
than the ETO, with the B-26 pulled from the PTO.

I need to get down to Maxwell one of these years and do a search to find when the
decision was made as to theater allocation, and by whom. The decision to use the
B-26 exclusively in the ETO was probably made in early or more likely mid 1943.
In April 1943 the 5th Wing/Air Division was eliminated owing to Group diversions
to the 12th AF in the MTO, and its bases were reallocated to the 1st and 4th
BW/AD. Then the 4th BW/AD was supposed to get the mediums and lights, but flow
charts showed that most of the groups scheduled to deploy in the spring of '43
were equipped with B-17s. At the same time, the 3rd Wing/AD was expecting to get
a number of B-25 and B-26 Groups shortly. Sometime around May/early June, with
the failure of the first B-26 low-altitude raids and the change to medium
altitude, it was also decided to swap the bases of the medium and heavy groups of
the 3rd and 4th Air Divisions, so that the mediums would be closer to targets in
France, while the heavies could take advantage of the generally higher state of
completion of the 3rd AD airfields. (Details from one of Freeman's "The Mighty
Eighth" series books, either the first one or the technical manual; I made xeroxes
but didn't label it).

The B-25 was used exclusively in the CBI and ultimately in the PTO, both were used
in the MTO (where as Chris' data shows the B-25 had a lower loss rate than the
B-26, flying the same missions), and the B-26 was used exclusively in the ETO. I
suspect that the location of the production plants may have also played a part in
theater allocations. While both North American (Kansas City) and Martin (Omaha)
had plants in the middle of the country, the main factories were on the west
(Inglewood) and east (Baltimore) coasts respectively. Martin had to turn the
Omaha plant over to B-29 production starting in mid-43 or so, leaving only the
Baltimore plant producing B-26s.

Guy

ubject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala

As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO,
and ETO
(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to
medium

The B-26's were used on the deck with terrible results and were almost
instantly pulled up to 10,000 feet. After that the B-26 were the only mediums
used in the ETO replacing the slower, shorter range, smaller bombload B-25's.
The B-26 rendered the B-25's obsolescent.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

ubject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala

As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO,
and ETO
(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to
medium

The B-26's were used on the deck with terrible results and were almost
instantly pulled up to 10,000 feet.

That "instantly" took several months in the MTO and the PTO. It took two
missions, both to Ijmuiden, in the ETO, with the second mission suffering 100%
losses (1 a/c aborted and was the only one to return).

After that the B-26 were the only mediums
used in the ETO replacing the slower, shorter range, smaller bombload B-25's.

As I stated, the B-25s were never used in the ETO; the B-26s didn't replace
them. The only time that one replaced the other in any theater was in the PTO,
where the B-25 replaced the B-26. As to speed and range, we've been through this
before. Speeds of the B-25 and B-26 models used in the MTO and ETO were
comparable, a couple of mph either way, with the difference so small as to be
lost in individual a/c variations. The B-26 and B-26As used in the PTO and the
early B-26Bs used in the MTO were faster than the contemporary B-25s, but that
changed once the long wing came in on the B-26B-10 and subsequent models.

As to range, the B-25C and later models were longer-ranged than the B-26,
although the B-26 and B-26A were longer-ranged than the B-25 up through the 'B'
model. Hardly surprising, as the B-26 (all models) had normal max. internal fuel
of 962 gallons, while the early B-25s only had 670 gallons. But from the B-25C
and D models on, the B-25 carried 974 gallons internally, vice the B-26's 962.
Combined with its smaller, less thirsty engines, the B-25 (C and later) range was
better than the B-26. The B-26's normal max bombload was greater, by 1,000 lb.
(4,000 vs. 3,000).

The B-26 rendered the B-25's obsolescent.

Tey were both ordered out of the same design competition, and the B-26 was
removed from production before the B-25 was, which says a lot about about which
was considered more valuable to the war effort. If that's being rendered
obsolescent in your book, then most a/c would be happy to be obsolescent. Of
course, with the coming of jets they were both obsolescent, as were all
piston-engined a/c, but that's a different matter entirely.

Guy

Chris Mark wrote:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had difficulty in
tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.

Guy

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Chris Mark wrote:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as
the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss
rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The
B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had
difficulty in
tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.

Guy


Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO. A less hazardous theatre.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Chris Mark wrote:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as
the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss
rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The
B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had
difficulty in
tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.

Guy


Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO.

Art, read Chris's post. Both were in the MTO and PTO, which is why I asked where
he got the info. I'm going to repost Chris' data to refresh your memory:
-----------------------------------------------------------------

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

snip

During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25 one
per 43 sorties.
----------------------------------------------------------------

Please note that the above data provides info for those theaters where both the
B-25 and B-26 were flying the same missions at the same time, the only way to make
a valid comparision of the two a/c. To summarize the loss data:

Overall MTO loss rate:

B-25: 1/164 sorties, or .61%.
B-26: 1/148 sorties, or .68%.

Conclusion: B-25 loss rate is about 11.5% better than the B-26, flying the same
missions at the same time.

North Africa-only loss rate, Nov. '42 - June '43:

B-25: 1/43 sorties, or 2.33%.
B-26: 1/20 sorties, or 5.00%.

Conclusion: B-26 loss rate is over double B-25 loss rate.

And finally, you claimed that the MTO was :

A less hazardous theatre [than the ETO].

Does that claim hold up? Nope.

B-26 loss rate, North Africa only: 5.00%
B-26 loss rate, overall MTO: .68%
B-26 loss rate, Overall ETO: .48%

Conclusion, B-26 loss rate in the MTO was 42% higher than it was in the ETO, and
just taking the North African theater (where there was a high percentage of
low-level missions), loss rates were 7.4 TIMES what they were in the ETO. Still
insist that the MTO was a less hazardous theater?

Guy






B-25 loss rate

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

I think we need to be careful getting too detailed with loss rates as
indicating anything significant about aircraft types because there are so many
unknown variables, everything from accuracy of squadron records to how many dud
rounds an anti-aircraft battery fired on one day compared to another.
The safe conclusions are merely that low-level missions will cause losses to
soar, whatever the aircraft type, and that single-engine performance is
important in reducing losses. Both the B-25 and B-26 were good airplanes with
slightly different attributes.


Chris Mark

Chris Mark wrote:

I think we need to be careful getting too detailed with loss rates as
indicating anything significant about aircraft types because there are so many
unknown variables, everything from accuracy of squadron records to how many dud
rounds an anti-aircraft battery fired on one day compared to another.
The safe conclusions are merely that low-level missions will cause losses to
soar, whatever the aircraft type, and that single-engine performance is
important in reducing losses. Both the B-25 and B-26 were good airplanes with
slightly different attributes.

No disagreement from me - I'm not the one who's been arguing that the B-26 was used
in the ETO exclusively because the B-25 was inferior, was less able to take damage,
had a higher loss rate, etc., in the face of all the evidence and ignoring all the
factors you mention above. It's always bugged me that the B-26 is trumpeted as
having the lowest loss rate in the ETO, when it was the _only_ medium bomber in the
ETO (operated by the US). Since there's nothing to directly compare it to in that
theater, attempting to draw conclusions about its relative survivability are
meaningless.

That is not the case in the MTO, which is why I would still like to know if you can
break down the MTO numbers for the B-25 and B-26, excluding North Africa. I've got
the North African data somewhere, but only have overall "European War" data on
bomber sorties and losses, rather than the more specific post-North Africa MTO
numbers. If you can supply sorties and losses for the B-25 and B-26 for that
period, I'd be much obliged, because I haven't been able to find that anywhere
else.

Guy