Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

WalterM140 wrote:

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
factor.

Gee, that is -my- point.

And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
it.

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.

Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self
defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high
altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews?

We're not interested in 'divining' anything, what was needed was empirical
evidence, and early British unescorted raids by far more lightly armed, slower
twin-engined Wellingtons flying in looser formations at much lower altitudes
weren't necessarily indicative of US efforts. As it turns out, they _were_
indicative, but we didn't know that at the time.

Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the
fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were
addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer
Mustang group arrived.

3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC in the
ETO.

It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was what
it was. I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace any
more than it was.

Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine on
t/o.

snip

The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively
could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available
in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long,

Thats all I am saying, my friend.

So far we agree.

the
need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
shallow penetrations we were making at the time.

It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the
obvious.

Arnold ordered Giles to
increase
the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the
reference,
"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months
to
achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months
before
they were all sent to the Med.

Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long
range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason.

It wouldn't have made the slightest bit of difference if he had. With our focus on
the ETO air war and D-Day et. seq., we forget that in 1942 and 1943, the ETO wasn't
the highest priority theater - the Med was. the P-38 was consuidered absolutely
vital there, so that's where they went. Eaker screamed repeatedly to Arnold about
diversions to the MTO reducing the rate of the 8th's buildup throughout 1943; a fat
lot of good it did him prior to October or so.

And as others have mentioned, the P-38 wasn't all that much more long-ranged than
the P-47 at the time. P-38 internal fuel prior to the J with leading edge tanks,
was 300 gallons. A P-47D-23 or earlier with somewhat less total power had 305
gallons internal (the D-25 through M had 370 gal.). The P-38 would outclimb it,
but the P-47 was faster, so range was fairly close. The P-38's big advantage was
that it had large external tanks early, but the 165 gallon tanks weren't
pressurized (and never were), so couldn't have been used above 20,000 feet or so in
any case, which is where the escorts needed to be.

Let's instead postulate that the P-47 got big pressurized external tanks, either a
150 (actual cap. 165 gal.) or 200 gallon for the C/L, or a pair of 108 gallons
underwing, in August or September 1943 rather than February/April 1944.
Historically, note that despite high priority and the best efforts of Cass Hough
and Co. at Bovingdon, the first P-47 mission using drop tanks, the 200 gallon,
unpressurized and very draggy ferry tank only half loaded, was only in July 1943,
with the 75 gallon (actual cap. 84 gal.) metal pressurized tank becoming available
in August 1943, and the 108 gallon paper tank in October IIRR.

According to Zemke the 150 gal.C/L tank allowed the 56th to get to the Hanover
region, while the twin 108 gallon tanks only increased the radius a bit further
(limited by internal fuel for combat and return), but did increase the endurance.
Sure, they still can't go all the way to Berlin, but they can sure as hell take the
heavies a lot further in and meet them further in as well, decreasing the time the
Luftwaffe has to attack them. And the P-47 is a better high altitude escort
fighter than the P-38 anddoesnt suffer from all its problems, it just needs bigger
fuel tanks (external and then internal, in that order).

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Guy

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
1942.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
But they did not.


It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.


Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
been increased.

I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
any
more than it was.

I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.


Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
on
t/o.


The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

ibid p. 14

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Guy


Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote:

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so low
relatively late. The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges, turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need, and since they didn't have ANY P-38s in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no opportunity
for them to work out the bugs. The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why? The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to attack the
heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and were
inflicting only light to moderate casualties. We were still flying shallow
penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven) until
January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the poor
weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo tanks
that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was possible.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every single
P-38 they could get. The MTO was the highest priority theater in late 1942 and
most of 1943 (at least until after Salerno), so if any one was going to get them it
was the MTO. Guadalcanal got a single squadron (339th) in December 1942 while that
outcome was still in dispute, and the PTO wanted more. The ETO was well down the
list, because there was no ground combat underway, and the base was safe.

I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
any
more than it was.

I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.

Arnold was a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, who determined
allocations after their respective governments had decided which theaters had
priority. Throughout the period in question, the MTO had priority, and Arnold gave
them first choice, often re-directing units which had originally been planned to go
to the ETO. Eaker got what was left. Only after Salerno, when it became clear
that the necessary air superiority required for D-Day had not yet been established,
and the commanders started to relocate to the UK from the Med, did the ETO move to
first priority.



Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
on
t/o.


The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

And for units trained from the start for multi-engine, that may be correct. But
there's still the extra training time factor, and in 1943 you're talking about
transitioning single-engine pilots to twins, if you want to crew these P-38s that
are supposed to magically become available. The 55th's experience with hastly
transitioned pilots was apparently less than wonderful.



ibid p. 14

Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Sure. OTOH, it was entirely possible to write off Regensburg/Schweinfurt as
everything going wrong that could go wrong (it did). It was hardly a typical
mission, so Eaker probably felt that a sustained effort was necessary, with the
large size force he believed was necessary to succeed. And of course, although he
knew that the German fighters were inflicting damage on the bombers, he still
believed that the bombers were badly attriting the fighters. Hence October
10th-14th.

After that, there could be absolutely no doubt. Eaker was wrong, but he wanted to
win just as much as anyone did. As one of the prime apostles of the very doctrine
he was employing (Hansell being another), no one was in a better position to give
it a full test.

Guy

http://www.p-38online.com/p38j.html
In spite of all the advances and improvements, the P-38 J would suffer in
the European Theater of Operations. Lockheed did all the testing in the
United States, and were never tested in conditions similar to those in
Britain. Once the P-38 J arrived in Britain, problems were encountered
immediately. In addition to the new problems, many new, inexperienced pilots
were beginning to fly. The problems would take time to work out, but the 8th
Air Force was not able or willing to wait. At this time, P-51 D Mustangs and
new versions of the P-47 Thunderbolt were available to perform long-range
escort and strike missions. This was the beginning of the end of the P-38 in
the ETO.

-HJC

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.


"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was
split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up
independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization;
next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing
orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance
and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick
A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
low
relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
opportunity
for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.


It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat,
the
B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.


The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to
attack the
heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and
were
inflicting only light to moderate casualties.

That's right. It's all a big what if. All I am saying is, "what if Eaker and
Hunter had seen the need for a long range escort?"

But they didn't. And they didn't see the need either of them, until after it
was plain to everyone else that the bombers needed help. It's tragic, but
there it is.


We were still flying shallow
penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven)
until
January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the
poor
weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo
tanks
that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was
possible.

Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been
screaming
for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production
was
what
it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
single
P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have? The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt. Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

If someone had said, "yes we are handling the GAF now but they might produce
new tactics, new equipment and strongly reinforce," then it might have been a
different story beginning in the summer of '43.


You make some very good points and I appreciate them.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote:

snip

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
alone
1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
low
relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

But the P-38 wasn't "the only aircraft even remotely capable" of long range escort,
especially not in 1943. Remember that the longest-ranged US escort fighter of the
war wasn't a P-38 or P-51. As I pointed out in another post, the P-38 prior to the
J had 300 gallons of internal fuel, and the P-47 prior to the D-25 had 305. Go
he

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/More_P-38_Stuff.html

and here

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/P-47.html

And click on the links for the "Flight Operation Instruction Chart" for both a/c
(it helps if you save them and then tile them side by side). This is for a P-38L
w/410 gallons internal instead of 300, vs. an early model P-47 w/o water injection,
but just compare the cruise ranges and gal/hr. fuel flows in say Cruise Condition
IV at 25,000 or 30,000 feet, with each a/c assumed to have 250 gallons of fuel for
cruise. You'll note that the range is identical at 700 statute miles, with the
P-38L cruising slightly faster (an earlier version without the extra internal fuel
would probably cruise a bit slower for max. range) but burning about 3-4 gal./hr.
more than the P-47. The need was for a longer-range fighter, and the P-38, P-47
and P-51 could all be modified to increase theirinternal/ and/or external fuel
carriage. And they all were.

The P-38's original perceived range advantage was due to its large external,
unpressurized 165 gallon ferry tanks, which was fine in the low/medium overwater
cruise conditions typical of the PTO and MTO, but unacceptable in the ETO owing to
the need to be above 20,000 feet relatively soon to avoid flak on crossing the
occupied Dutch/Belgian/French coasts. Otherwise the P-47's 200 gallon ferry tank
would have been reasonably acceptable in the ETO, and histories would be describing
the P-47 as a long-range fighter from the get go. Instead, the tank was carried
only half full so that all the fuel would be burned by the time the a/c reached
about 22,000 feet or so, above which no fuel could be drawn. Better than nothing,
but the a/c had to pay the drag for 200 gallons of fuel while only receiving the
benefit of 100 gallons. The same would have been the case with the P-38, and there
would have been no point in carrying more than a single 165 gallon tank for ETO
high altitude escort missions.


The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

snip


3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
was
still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
problems
in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
IOC
in the
ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
it.
But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

Summarizing from Freeman, the first RFI for availability of drop tanks for fighters
was sent from the 8th back to Air Materiel Command on 3 October 1942, which
certainly implies that improved range was on someone's mind quite early. After it
became clear that the 8th would only be dealing with the P-47 for some time,
arrangements were made in January 1943 to ship Republic 200 gallon paper composite
ferry tanks to the UK. A few arrived in February and were evaluated by VIIITH AFSC
at Langford Lodge and by Cass Hough's 8th Air Technical Section at Bovingdon,
numerous operational deficiencies being noted, including poor aerodynamics, lack of
pressurization so fuel couldn't be drawn above 22,000 feet, the tank tended to
impact the a/c upon release, and if fuel was left in the tanks for more than a few
hours it started to leak. The tank also lacked the strength to be pressurized.
Changes were designed and tested to improve the jettison behavior.

Simultaneously 8th AFSC was requested to design a 100 gallon steel tank that could
be attached under a P-47, and which wouldn't suffer from the faults of the Republic
tank. Prototype testing was successful in March, and an order was placed to
deliver 1,000/month starting in June, but shortages of sheet steel in England
delayed production.

Meanwhile, In May 8th ATS had managed to modify the P-47's instrument vacuum system
to pressurize a drop tank, which meant that fuel could be drawn as high as 35,000
feet. Further improvements were made to the design as well as to the tank pipe
connections to ensure a clean break on jettison.

Production delays with the steel 100 gallon tank caused ATS to look at the British
108 gallon paper composite tank as a substitute. It had been examined earlier but
was insufficiently strong to be pressurized. Investigation found that it was
possible to strengthen the tank to withstand 17psi, and it was cleared for
production on 7 July 1943. The first was delivered on 12 July.

Meanwhile, because the need was so obvious, 8th FC decided to use the 200 gallon
Republic tank despite its deficiencies, as being the only tank available in any
quantity (1,150 on hand on 24 July 1943) at the time. It was only filled halfway
owing to the lack of pressurization, and they were dropped at 23,000 feet.

As an additional stopgap, in July 4,000 nominally 75 gallon (actually 84 gallon)
P-39 tanks which had been ordered from the US had also arrived. These provided
about as much radius increase as the half-full 200 gallon tanks owing to their far
lower drag, and could be pressurized. However, modifications had to be made to the
tanks and the P-47s to fit them to belly shackles. First mission use followed in
late August 1943, after the 56th FG's a/c had been modified.

At the beginning of September the first cylindrical 108 gallon steel tanks (the
production version of the ATS 100 gallon design) started delivery, and the same
month the strengthened 108 gal. cylindrical paper tanks began delivery, seeing
first use on the 27 September mission to Emden. A problem with these tanks was
that there was only 4 inches of ground clearance when mounted on the P-47's
centerline, making them unusable on rough airfields. A request for a flat 150
gallon steel tank to avoid this problem was made in August, with the tanks being
delivered starting in the following February.

Meanwhile more 75 gallon P-39 steel tanks had been arriving, but further deliveries
were cancelled in December, at which time 7,500 108 gallon tanks had been
delivered. The 75 gallon tanks were then restricted to P-51 units until used up.

In early 1944, P-47s had wing pylons added (a production change), which allowed a
pair of 108 gallon (or even 150 gallon) tanks to be carried underwing, although
some delay ensued owing to the need to improve sway braces. Only when this point
was reached was the P-47's combat radius limited by its internal fuel capacity.
The P-47D-25 with increased internal tankage and a bubble canopy was in production,
but deliveries would obviously take some time to make it to the operating
theaters. That was less of a problem than it might have been, as the P-51 and
P-38J which had been going through much the same range improvement process (but
without the big fuselage redesign also underway on the P-47D-25) were available in
increasing numbers to provide the TARCAP, while the P-47s provided ingress and
egress escort.

Ultimately the P-47N became the longest-ranged escort fighter of WW2, but it took a
near total wing redesign to do it, and the a/c just barely made it into the war in
the Pacific.

The point of all this is that the 8th was aware of the range issue and was doing
what it could to improve it with the a/c (P-47) and resources available to it, from
a very early stage. They were forced to utilize many stopgaps and work-arounds,
but with two possible exceptions, it seems to me that the 8th was doing everything
in their power to fix the problem (along with thousands of others). The first
exception was Eaker's placing improved fighter range 4th on his priority list (and
I've never seen what Nos. 1-3 were, so am not in a position to judge if the order
should have been changed). The second exception was the relatively long time
between the request for a 150 gallon flat tank and its availability. I assume this
was probably due to materiel shortages, but don't know. Alternatively the P-47
could have been given wet wing pylons earlier, but that's probably requires a
production mod (for wing strengthening at least), not a field retrofit.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
opportunity
for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

The 78th arrived in Nov. - Dec., and the a/c and pilots were sent down to North
Africa in February. In the meantime, few bombing missions were flown owing to the
poor weather, and I'm not even sure if the 78th flew any combat missions at the
time - they may well have been training, or rectifying equipment deficiencies.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

But not as far as the rest of the JCS, CCS and the respective governments were
concerned, and Arnold was going to go along with them.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.

And they were, but only from about Nov. - Dec. 1943, as early as it was possible to
do so, and six months after the requirement was identified. And the same holds
true for every other theater, except that they got their long-range escorts even
later. The P-38F/G/H was a useful interim "long-range fighter" in those theaters
where altitude and climate performance wasn't the issue it was in the ETO, but it
wasn't inherently any longer-ranged than the contemporary P-47. As far as
long-range and combat radius goes, the best 1943 medium and high altitude fighter
was the early Corsair, with 361 gallons internal and a 150 gallon tank. But the
124 gallons in the wings was a bit dangerous (not self-sealing, but inerted), and
was deleted from later versions. Now there's a 'what if' for you, but it suffers
from similar production number limitations as the P-38 in that timeframe.

snip

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
case
by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

They should have.

Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.

Not prior to mid-43 they hadn't, so why should they be expected to be clairvoyant
in late '42?

snip

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
have
been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
single
P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have?

In the MTO and PTO, you bet they did. Which were the only theaters they were being
used in at the time.

The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt.

And was doing everything possible to improve it, in the theaters it was being used
in.

Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

snip

Not that I've seen, once the performance of the Mk.X conversion was known. But it
took NA quite a while to a production design and then get it into production and
service, and the Mustang was the fastest US fighter development program in the
World War 2 period. I've seen no indication that there was unnecessary delay in
that period; the delay seems to have been in the Mustang I era, when the USAAF was
so dilatory in testing it.

Guy