Towplane-Baron accident

On Monday, June 4, 2018 at 3:26:19 AM UTC+12, wrote:
Your reply was cut off, and I definitely want to hear the rest of the story.

I found the court's account quite educational from a safety standpoint, yet riveting from a personal standpoint. Reading through the court's account of how to decide the pre-impact pain and suffering--the thoughts and feelings that must have been in their minds those few seconds--sent a chill down my spine.

I'm sorry for all involved. What a tragedy.

I'm quite troubled that the court ruled it's too much to expect a licensed pilot to be able to successfully execute a go-around without stalling and crashing.

I am with Bruce.
Go arounds/balked landings are part of flying, trained reguarly. All very sad but the main cause of the accident was not the tow combination being in the way although it was a factor.
Tom

On Sunday, June 3, 2018 at 6:55:00 PM UTC-7, Bruce Hoult wrote:
On Monday, June 4, 2018 at 3:26:19 AM UTC+12, wrote:
Your reply was cut off, and I definitely want to hear the rest of the story.

I found the court's account quite educational from a safety standpoint, yet riveting from a personal standpoint. Reading through the court's account of how to decide the pre-impact pain and suffering--the thoughts and feelings that must have been in their minds those few seconds--sent a chill down my spine.

I'm sorry for all involved. What a tragedy.

I'm quite troubled that the court ruled it's too much to expect a licensed pilot to be able to successfully execute a go-around without stalling and crashing.

The decision was assignment of liability for the accident's cause, not a test of the deceased pilot's emergency responses. The judge considered this and rejected it. What it boiled down to is the Baron had the right-of-way. It is like someone ran a red light and you hit him. The other guy can argue that you might not have hit him if you had swerved, or applied your brakes sooner and more aggressively, but he will lose in court.

Tom

It's dangerous to speculate on a situation like this so I'll just pose a few questions, recognizing that some will conclude I'm looking for a way to assign blame. I'm not.

1. Does it make sense that the airport-authority-required spotter's primary reason was to watch for powered aircraft taking off on the cross runway? Wouldn't landing aircraft (like the Baron) be visible to the glider launch crew? Or are the sight lines that restricted there?
2. The Court mentioned the Baron was making a simulated instrument approach.. The Baron pilot was well acquainted with the airport and the glider operation located there. Does a simulated instrument approach mean he was probably "under the hood" and therefore unable to scan the cross runway on final for possible glider traffic as he might otherwise have done? Since he was apparently not operating under an IFR flight plan, should there have been a safety pilot watching for conflicts? The co-pilot was a CFI but apparently disqualified for medical reasons.

Very sad situation, for everyone involved.

Chip Bearden

All:

KLGC has been an uncontrolled airport with intersecting runways for many, many decades.
My understanding is at least as far back as a WW2 training base.

Aircraft operation from Rwy 3 have good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31.

Due to the prevailing winds and runway length, power traffic typically uses Rwy 31.
So as not to congest the approach end of the "primary" runway, gliders typically operated from Rwy 21.
Aircraft departing from Rwy 21 do not have line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31; hence, justification for a local rule to require an "agent" to be stationed at the intersection to advise "that no apparent traffic conflict will be involved".
See: http://www.lagrangeairport.com/Home/Rules_Regulations

As I previously pointed, non-glider related aircraft utilizing Rwy 21 have the same inability to see the approach end of Rwy 31, but the airport rule does not require an "agent" to advise in such a case.

Furthermore, since an aircraft departing Rwy 3 has good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31, the need for an agent to advise Rwy 3 glider ops is moot.

Regarding determination of right-of-way:

It is unclear to me from the court documents what phase of flight the Baron was at the intersection.

If the Baron was still on the ground from a touch and go, then it was still in the landing phase and thus had the right of way.
However, if the Baron was still on the ground by the intersection, that left precious little runway remaining to intiate a takeoff from that point.
The intersection of Rwy 31 & 3 is ~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31.

If, as it seems from all accounts, the Baron was airborne at the intersection (~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31), either from a go around, low approach, or touch and go, then the pilot probably wasn't intending to land within the remaining ~1500 of runway. The Baron was arguably no longer in the landing phase and, if a conflict with another airborne aircraft developed, standard right of way rules should have applied.

If auch an airborne conflict did occur at the intersection, standards dictate the less manuverable aircraft, being the tow plane with glider in tow, had the right of way.

IMO, there is too many specifics not known to be adamant about the Baron having the right of way.

My take, from the reports, is that the situation was not one of two airborne aircraft converging. Consequently, in flight right of way standards don't apply.

My take, from the reports, is that the cause of the crash is that the pilot of the Baron failed to maintain aircraft control. Other factors may be deemed contributory, but not causal. The only way the towplane could have caused the Baron to crash is if the towplane had impacted it. That did not happen.

The fact that a court of law can make an adamant ruling about the "cause" an aircraft accident, and assign liability therefom, without its discovery including an accurate determination about phase of flight, should concern every aviator, regardless of what type of aircraft they operate.

The fact that a local, political-appointed airport authority whose board members, who may or may not have flight training/experience, can independently institute rules specific to "their" public airport that conflict with FAA regulations but, nevertheless, will be used against you in a court of law should concern every aviator, regardless of what type of aircraft they operate.

Ray Cornay

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 6:40:11 AM UTC+12, wrote:
All:

KLGC has been an uncontrolled airport with intersecting runways for many, many decades.
My understanding is at least as far back as a WW2 training base.

Aircraft operation from Rwy 3 have good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31.

Due to the prevailing winds and runway length, power traffic typically uses Rwy 31.
So as not to congest the approach end of the "primary" runway, gliders typically operated from Rwy 21.
Aircraft departing from Rwy 21 do not have line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31; hence, justification for a local rule to require an "agent" to be stationed at the intersection to advise "that no apparent traffic conflict will be involved".
See: http://www.lagrangeairport.com/Home/Rules_Regulations

As I previously pointed, non-glider related aircraft utilizing Rwy 21 have the same inability to see the approach end of Rwy 31, but the airport rule does not require an "agent" to advise in such a case.

Furthermore, since an aircraft departing Rwy 3 has good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31, the need for an agent to advise Rwy 3 glider ops is moot.

Regarding determination of right-of-way:

It is unclear to me from the court documents what phase of flight the Baron was at the intersection.

If the Baron was still on the ground from a touch and go, then it was still in the landing phase and thus had the right of way.
However, if the Baron was still on the ground by the intersection, that left precious little runway remaining to intiate a takeoff from that point.
The intersection of Rwy 31 & 3 is ~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31.

I got the impression the Baron never made it as far as the intersection, and didn't overfly either the intersection or the runway the glider&towplane were on before impact.

Official landing distance for a Baron is 2490 ft (from 50') with 1440 ft ground roll. You'd think from a reasonably normal approach stopping within 4000 ft of the threshold shouldn't be an issue even if not planning a maximum performance stop. Takeoff performance (at gross weight of course) is actually a shorter distance: 1373 ft of ground roll and 2345 ft to clear a 50 ft obstacle.

So a well flown Baron could touch down, come to a dead stop, then accelerate takeoff and clear a 50 ft obstacle in a total of 3785 ft. That's less than the distance to the intersection. With any kind of speed kept in a touch-and-go or a missed approach it *should* be a doddle.

The airport altitude is 700 ft, which will have an effect on those numbers, but not a major one. It probably wasn't hot in Georgia in February.

Here's the NTSB report
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Re...Final&IType=FA

An unfortunate event with plenty of opportunities for improvement on all sides.

CAP could have done better in showing their intentions and understanding the traffic situation.
The Barron pilot could have brushed up on landing before instrument stuff.
The Airport could have been clearer on why the spotter was important.

It's a public use airport with random pilots of limited skill and limited visibility. With the benefit of hindsight, there may still be a few possible ways to prevent this.
1) Use a spotter so the glider operation can 'see' 31 traffic.
2) Don't use runway 31 after the intersection. (The defacto plan?)
3) Positive handshake on the radio.
4) Do the glider ops from 31.

2 and 3 don't work with random pilots.
4 would require CAP to be efficient in their use of the runway.
Which leaves 1.

1. Why should the extraordinary effort to ensure no crossing runway traffic exists be the sole responsibility of just the glider aviation activity at KLGC?
2. Wouldn't the Baron pilot have overreacted similarly if the aborting traffic on Rwy 3 had been, say, a Cessna 172?
3. Why didn't the NTSB report discuss how locally mandated, non-standard airport procedures can be detrimental to safety of flight by counterintuitively conflicting with established, FAA mandated procedures, especially at uncontrolled airports where such standard procedures must be universally assumed and relied upon?
4. Why wasn't KLGC/Airport Authority/City of LaGrange/Troup County named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not ensuring all operators were 1) aware of "their" local airport rules and 2) that such local rules were were being adhered to?
5. Why wasn't Beechcraft Aircraft Corporation/Textron Aviation named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not building a foolproof airplane?5. Did the airport authority involve the CAP & glider club in the local rules making process?
6. Did the airport authority ever formally notify the CAP & glider club about the local rules pertaining to glider flying at KLGC?
7. Considering personnel/membership changeover, does the airport authority periodically remind the CAP & Glider club of the local rules pertaining to glider flight at KLGC?
8. Why wasn't the estate of the Baron's pilot in command not a named defendant due to his negligence by not maintaining situational awareness and aircraft control?
9. Why wasn't the estate of the CFI onboard the Baron not a named defendant due to his negligence by not ensuring situational awareness and safety of flight, not to mention performing his flight duty while having methadone in his system?
10. Why was is never mentioned that common side affects of the antihistamines found in the Baron pilot's system are dizziness, drowsiness, blurred vision?
11. Why did the court summarily dismiss the possibility [probability] the CAP operation made a takeoff radio call when witness testimony stated that CAP CTAF use was "constant"?
12. Why did the court summarily dismiss expert witness testimony that the Baron's "lift detector" (stall warning system?) was inoperative based on the [il]logic *because it always worked just fine before*?
13. How could a judge (or jury?) have read the NTSB report and still conclude the "cause" of the Baron crashing was strictly the towplane/glider abort?

Seems the burden of guilt continues to be squarely laid upon the CAP glider op, and that just ain't right in so many ways...

Ray Cornay