Towplane-Baron accident

All:

KLGC has been an uncontrolled airport with intersecting runways for many, many decades.
My understanding is at least as far back as a WW2 training base.

Aircraft operation from Rwy 3 have good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31.

Due to the prevailing winds and runway length, power traffic typically uses Rwy 31.
So as not to congest the approach end of the "primary" runway, gliders typically operated from Rwy 21.
Aircraft departing from Rwy 21 do not have line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31; hence, justification for a local rule to require an "agent" to be stationed at the intersection to advise "that no apparent traffic conflict will be involved".
See: http://www.lagrangeairport.com/Home/Rules_Regulations

As I previously pointed, non-glider related aircraft utilizing Rwy 21 have the same inability to see the approach end of Rwy 31, but the airport rule does not require an "agent" to advise in such a case.

Furthermore, since an aircraft departing Rwy 3 has good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31, the need for an agent to advise Rwy 3 glider ops is moot.

Regarding determination of right-of-way:

It is unclear to me from the court documents what phase of flight the Baron was at the intersection.

If the Baron was still on the ground from a touch and go, then it was still in the landing phase and thus had the right of way.
However, if the Baron was still on the ground by the intersection, that left precious little runway remaining to intiate a takeoff from that point.
The intersection of Rwy 31 & 3 is ~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31.

If, as it seems from all accounts, the Baron was airborne at the intersection (~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31), either from a go around, low approach, or touch and go, then the pilot probably wasn't intending to land within the remaining ~1500 of runway. The Baron was arguably no longer in the landing phase and, if a conflict with another airborne aircraft developed, standard right of way rules should have applied.

If auch an airborne conflict did occur at the intersection, standards dictate the less manuverable aircraft, being the tow plane with glider in tow, had the right of way.

IMO, there is too many specifics not known to be adamant about the Baron having the right of way.

My take, from the reports, is that the situation was not one of two airborne aircraft converging. Consequently, in flight right of way standards don't apply.

My take, from the reports, is that the cause of the crash is that the pilot of the Baron failed to maintain aircraft control. Other factors may be deemed contributory, but not causal. The only way the towplane could have caused the Baron to crash is if the towplane had impacted it. That did not happen.

The fact that a court of law can make an adamant ruling about the "cause" an aircraft accident, and assign liability therefom, without its discovery including an accurate determination about phase of flight, should concern every aviator, regardless of what type of aircraft they operate.

The fact that a local, political-appointed airport authority whose board members, who may or may not have flight training/experience, can independently institute rules specific to "their" public airport that conflict with FAA regulations but, nevertheless, will be used against you in a court of law should concern every aviator, regardless of what type of aircraft they operate.

Ray Cornay

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 6:40:11 AM UTC+12, wrote:
All:

KLGC has been an uncontrolled airport with intersecting runways for many, many decades.
My understanding is at least as far back as a WW2 training base.

Aircraft operation from Rwy 3 have good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31.

Due to the prevailing winds and runway length, power traffic typically uses Rwy 31.
So as not to congest the approach end of the "primary" runway, gliders typically operated from Rwy 21.
Aircraft departing from Rwy 21 do not have line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31; hence, justification for a local rule to require an "agent" to be stationed at the intersection to advise "that no apparent traffic conflict will be involved".
See: http://www.lagrangeairport.com/Home/Rules_Regulations

As I previously pointed, non-glider related aircraft utilizing Rwy 21 have the same inability to see the approach end of Rwy 31, but the airport rule does not require an "agent" to advise in such a case.

Furthermore, since an aircraft departing Rwy 3 has good line of sight to the approach end of Rwy 31, the need for an agent to advise Rwy 3 glider ops is moot.

Regarding determination of right-of-way:

It is unclear to me from the court documents what phase of flight the Baron was at the intersection.

If the Baron was still on the ground from a touch and go, then it was still in the landing phase and thus had the right of way.
However, if the Baron was still on the ground by the intersection, that left precious little runway remaining to intiate a takeoff from that point.
The intersection of Rwy 31 & 3 is ~4000' from the approach end of Rwy 31.

I got the impression the Baron never made it as far as the intersection, and didn't overfly either the intersection or the runway the glider&towplane were on before impact.

Official landing distance for a Baron is 2490 ft (from 50') with 1440 ft ground roll. You'd think from a reasonably normal approach stopping within 4000 ft of the threshold shouldn't be an issue even if not planning a maximum performance stop. Takeoff performance (at gross weight of course) is actually a shorter distance: 1373 ft of ground roll and 2345 ft to clear a 50 ft obstacle.

So a well flown Baron could touch down, come to a dead stop, then accelerate takeoff and clear a 50 ft obstacle in a total of 3785 ft. That's less than the distance to the intersection. With any kind of speed kept in a touch-and-go or a missed approach it *should* be a doddle.

The airport altitude is 700 ft, which will have an effect on those numbers, but not a major one. It probably wasn't hot in Georgia in February.

Here's the NTSB report
https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/Re...Final&IType=FA

An unfortunate event with plenty of opportunities for improvement on all sides.

CAP could have done better in showing their intentions and understanding the traffic situation.
The Barron pilot could have brushed up on landing before instrument stuff.
The Airport could have been clearer on why the spotter was important.

It's a public use airport with random pilots of limited skill and limited visibility. With the benefit of hindsight, there may still be a few possible ways to prevent this.
1) Use a spotter so the glider operation can 'see' 31 traffic.
2) Don't use runway 31 after the intersection. (The defacto plan?)
3) Positive handshake on the radio.
4) Do the glider ops from 31.

2 and 3 don't work with random pilots.
4 would require CAP to be efficient in their use of the runway.
Which leaves 1.

1. Why should the extraordinary effort to ensure no crossing runway traffic exists be the sole responsibility of just the glider aviation activity at KLGC?
2. Wouldn't the Baron pilot have overreacted similarly if the aborting traffic on Rwy 3 had been, say, a Cessna 172?
3. Why didn't the NTSB report discuss how locally mandated, non-standard airport procedures can be detrimental to safety of flight by counterintuitively conflicting with established, FAA mandated procedures, especially at uncontrolled airports where such standard procedures must be universally assumed and relied upon?
4. Why wasn't KLGC/Airport Authority/City of LaGrange/Troup County named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not ensuring all operators were 1) aware of "their" local airport rules and 2) that such local rules were were being adhered to?
5. Why wasn't Beechcraft Aircraft Corporation/Textron Aviation named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not building a foolproof airplane?5. Did the airport authority involve the CAP & glider club in the local rules making process?
6. Did the airport authority ever formally notify the CAP & glider club about the local rules pertaining to glider flying at KLGC?
7. Considering personnel/membership changeover, does the airport authority periodically remind the CAP & Glider club of the local rules pertaining to glider flight at KLGC?
8. Why wasn't the estate of the Baron's pilot in command not a named defendant due to his negligence by not maintaining situational awareness and aircraft control?
9. Why wasn't the estate of the CFI onboard the Baron not a named defendant due to his negligence by not ensuring situational awareness and safety of flight, not to mention performing his flight duty while having methadone in his system?
10. Why was is never mentioned that common side affects of the antihistamines found in the Baron pilot's system are dizziness, drowsiness, blurred vision?
11. Why did the court summarily dismiss the possibility [probability] the CAP operation made a takeoff radio call when witness testimony stated that CAP CTAF use was "constant"?
12. Why did the court summarily dismiss expert witness testimony that the Baron's "lift detector" (stall warning system?) was inoperative based on the [il]logic *because it always worked just fine before*?
13. How could a judge (or jury?) have read the NTSB report and still conclude the "cause" of the Baron crashing was strictly the towplane/glider abort?

Seems the burden of guilt continues to be squarely laid upon the CAP glider op, and that just ain't right in so many ways...

Ray Cornay

"Way to go," Mr. Cornay for having the gumption and taking the time to raise
(on RAS, anyway) some serious and germane issues related to this
serious/tragic loss of 'aviation related' life.

It's so 'normally human' to wish for pat and neat resolutions to tragedies
like this...both within the piloting community and within the legal community
and within the far larger community who honestly hope in general to see
'perpetrators held accountable.' I'm no lawyer, but definitely inhabit the
other two categories.

Focusing responsibility on CAP/'the glider operation at the field' seems to me
- from my geographically-distant perspective - simplistic in the extreme.
Life/reality is more complicated...

Bob W.

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Never even played a lawyer on TV, but wasn't the court decision about
assigning liability and not about operations?Â* I read the court decision
end to end and, though deep inside I agree that the pilot of the Baron
screwed the pooch, the logic in the court's finding seemed sound to me.

Too bad that it happened at all...

On 6/5/2018 11:53 AM, Bob Whelan wrote:
"Way to go," Mr. Cornay for having the gumption and taking the time to
raise (on RAS, anyway) some serious and germane issues related to this
serious/tragic loss of 'aviation related' life.

It's so 'normally human' to wish for pat and neat resolutions to
tragedies like this...both within the piloting community and within
the legal community and within the far larger community who honestly
hope in general to see 'perpetrators held accountable.' I'm no lawyer,
but definitely inhabit the other two categories.

Focusing responsibility on CAP/'the glider operation at the field'
seems to me - from my geographically-distant perspective - simplistic
in the extreme. Life/reality is more complicated...

Bob W.

---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com


--
Dan, 5J

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 11:27:56 AM UTC-6, wrote:
1. Why should the extraordinary effort to ensure no crossing runway traffic exists be the sole responsibility of just the glider aviation activity at KLGC?
2. Wouldn't the Baron pilot have overreacted similarly if the aborting traffic on Rwy 3 had been, say, a Cessna 172?
3. Why didn't the NTSB report discuss how locally mandated, non-standard airport procedures can be detrimental to safety of flight by counterintuitively conflicting with established, FAA mandated procedures, especially at uncontrolled airports where such standard procedures must be universally assumed and relied upon?
4. Why wasn't KLGC/Airport Authority/City of LaGrange/Troup County named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not ensuring all operators were 1) aware of "their" local airport rules and 2) that such local rules were were being adhered to?
5. Why wasn't Beechcraft Aircraft Corporation/Textron Aviation named as defendants due to its/their negligence for not building a foolproof airplane?5. Did the airport authority involve the CAP & glider club in the local rules making process?
6. Did the airport authority ever formally notify the CAP & glider club about the local rules pertaining to glider flying at KLGC?
7. Considering personnel/membership changeover, does the airport authority periodically remind the CAP & Glider club of the local rules pertaining to glider flight at KLGC?
8. Why wasn't the estate of the Baron's pilot in command not a named defendant due to his negligence by not maintaining situational awareness and aircraft control?
9. Why wasn't the estate of the CFI onboard the Baron not a named defendant due to his negligence by not ensuring situational awareness and safety of flight, not to mention performing his flight duty while having methadone in his system?
10. Why was is never mentioned that common side affects of the antihistamines found in the Baron pilot's system are dizziness, drowsiness, blurred vision?
11. Why did the court summarily dismiss the possibility [probability] the CAP operation made a takeoff radio call when witness testimony stated that CAP CTAF use was "constant"?
12. Why did the court summarily dismiss expert witness testimony that the Baron's "lift detector" (stall warning system?) was inoperative based on the [il]logic *because it always worked just fine before*?
13. How could a judge (or jury?) have read the NTSB report and still conclude the "cause" of the Baron crashing was strictly the towplane/glider abort?

Seems the burden of guilt continues to be squarely laid upon the CAP glider op, and that just ain't right in so many ways...

Ray Cornay

Ray,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but didn't Southern Eagles Soaring move from La Grange to Roosevelt Memorial Field precisely because of the airport's treatment of gliding operations and operational demands that prudent people could finally no longer tolerate?

Frank Whiteley

Dear Frank,

I was no longer a club member at the time it moved from the LaGrange airport to elsewhere.
One can presume the Baron accident/court finding against the CAP was a factor in that decision.

SES relocating away from all the hostility at KLGC is probably for the best.

Ray

Hi Frank,

I was no longer a club member at the time of its relocation.
I believe the relocation occurred after the Baron accident, and, if so, one can presume that was a catalyst.

SES getting away from all the hostility at KLGC is probably for the best.

I wonder if the CAP still operates from there?

Ray

On Tuesday, June 5, 2018 at 2:00:20 PM UTC-6, wrote:
Hi Frank,

I was no longer a club member at the time of its relocation.
I believe the relocation occurred after the Baron accident, and, if so, one can presume that was a catalyst.

SES getting away from all the hostility at KLGC is probably for the best.

I wonder if the CAP still operates from there?

Ray

I thought the move was before this accident. FWIW, CAP has also operated at Roosevelt in recent years.

Frank