BRAC - The Preheat Mode

Found it!

The 25% number tossed around with such certainty is in fact an estimate base
on ... the relationship between force structure in 1989 (pre cold war) and
its supporting infrastructure and current force structure and its existing
infrastructure.

Sounds good if there's genuinely a linear relationship between the force and
its infrastructure. May make sense for apples, maybe not so much for
oranges. I think a more interesting and perhaps reliable index might be
total op tempo versus infrastructure.

In an example. Naval Aviation, facing a big-time procurement crunch in the
years ahead, may well procure a mix of F-18E/F and F-35B/C airframes that
only replaces 60-65% of the existing force. The plan is to increase
utilization of those assets to equal the total op tempo of the larger force.
So, if op tempo is concentrated on fewer airframes, will logistics support
or pilot requirements differ from those of the larger force? From "in the
trenches" experience I can say unequivocally NO. So the supply tail, the
maintenance effort and the pilot manning (and ergo training) requirements
are undiminished. You might be able to knock down an old hangar or two, but
runway requirements (a real driver) are undiminished. Airspace requirements
(the second big driver) are undiminished.

The 800 pound gorilla that hovers over every air station is encroachment.
Miramar and Oceana have to tread lightly. A number of others would have
issues if their tactical/training jet traffic were stepped up or extended
into the evening hours. The Navy has relatively few air stations with
little or no encroachment and/or noise concerns.

Next question: Can anybody tell me why the Navy moved all its mine warfare
assets from the coasts (where it was located in proximity to the fleets they
serve) to South Texas?

R / John


"John Carrier" wrote in message
...

I doubt that the 25% is anything more than an estimate spun by those who
only want to see defense dollars cut... for two reasons: (1) It's a
round
number (suspicious). (2) Many of those sound-bite-type bullets are made
up.

Possible, even probable. But you never know. The Navy had a thing out in
the late 90's claiming there was a 21% excess capacity in the Naval Air
Training command and I think that was based on BRAC data calls.

When BRAC '95 was going on, I got to watch the gathering of numbers for
a
few of the data calls at NAWCWPNS up close and personal. The data that
comes OUT of BRAC is fairly accurate--at least from the Navy side.
Can't
speak for the blue-suiters, the grunts, or the forces of one. The
observers
of the data calls were fairly strict about gathering accurate,
reproducable,
and verifiable data.

True. I was intimately familiar with the content of the data for TRACOM
and
browsed all of the rest for any NAS or AFB. There were some instances of
transposed numbers (birdstrike data ... they were THOROUGH!) and a couple
of
gross misrepresentations (a CNATRA staffer intentionally changed a formula
multiplier because he KNEW the FAA algorithm was wrong). The USAF
perspective was slightly different, but generated very usable data.

But the old adage "Figures lie and liars figure" is very appropriate to
the
process. The Navy installed their data into a weighted matrix to generate
a
military value for each base. You'd think that was intended to determine
the lowest military value and then nominate the base. Not so. The Navy
rule was that the average military value of the bases remaining after
implementation of their proposed scenario must be equal or higher to the
average value for all the bases examined in a particular category. A base
could be a comparative "winner" in the value matrix and still become part
of
the proposed closure scenario. This happened in 1993.

The 1995 rules were essentially unchanged. The Navy group, which did not
get its entire plan approved by the commission in 1993, attacked the issue
somewhat differently. They kept fiddling the value matrix (documented in
the minutes) until the numbers fell out the way they wanted (that's my
assumption, but it seems pretty obvious the results were reverse
engineered
to produce the desired outcome). How bad was it? Well, one base got
credit
for an aerial target on which even practice ordnance could not be
expended.

The Navy has a long history (perhaps shared by the other services, but my
experience doesn't allow that comparison) of generating and manipulating
data to justify/support a decision. The decision has very little input
(except in the form of the data calls) from the operational side of the
Navy. CNO, his deputies, the CINCs, type commanders, etc don't weigh in.
The process was within DON, headed by a super grade civilian and staffed
by
a mixed bag of civilians and military temporarily assigned to the BRAC
group. I met several of the military types, good folks for the most part
(albeit there was a Helo captain who hadn't seen the light of day for a
decade or more) but utterly ignorant about the majority of issues they
were
analyzing. They existed to staff the master plan of the big boss. In
most
part, they succeeded.

Given the nature of the current DOD (my way or the highway), I think we'll
see a similar process in 2005. Rumsfeld's inner cadre has a vision (I've
finally found a document describing it) of a "transformation" in military
affairs. I think there's also a vision about the infrastructure that they
believe is needed to support it. I suspect there's already a pretty good
idea of which bases conform to this vision and which don't. And I believe
that the BRAC group within DOD will be directed (perhaps subtly) to
massage
the data to support that vision.

There's no list, but you're on it.

R / John

The Navy tried to close NAS Lemoore fourteen months after it opened, but
Congress wouldn't let them.

NAS Meridian was built so John Stennis could have medical and dental care
when Congress was out of session.

The Navy built a new Bureau of Personnel at New Orleans. Senator Ebert died
before it was occupied, so it was given to the Reserves, VA, Social
Security, etc.

Gore got reelected in 1996, so the BuPers move to Millington, Tennessee
survived.

Then, they built a new battle group port at Ingleside. No battle group to
put there, but they couldn't quietly give away an 1,100 foot pier, etc...

And so it goes

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita.../ingleside.htm

Rick

"John Carrier" wrote in message
...
Found it!

The 25% number tossed around with such certainty is in fact an estimate
base
on ... the relationship between force structure in 1989 (pre cold war) and
its supporting infrastructure and current force structure and its existing
infrastructure.

Sounds good if there's genuinely a linear relationship between the force
and
its infrastructure. May make sense for apples, maybe not so much for
oranges. I think a more interesting and perhaps reliable index might be
total op tempo versus infrastructure.

In an example. Naval Aviation, facing a big-time procurement crunch in
the
years ahead, may well procure a mix of F-18E/F and F-35B/C airframes that
only replaces 60-65% of the existing force. The plan is to increase
utilization of those assets to equal the total op tempo of the larger
force.
So, if op tempo is concentrated on fewer airframes, will logistics support
or pilot requirements differ from those of the larger force? From "in the
trenches" experience I can say unequivocally NO. So the supply tail, the
maintenance effort and the pilot manning (and ergo training) requirements
are undiminished. You might be able to knock down an old hangar or two,
but
runway requirements (a real driver) are undiminished. Airspace
requirements
(the second big driver) are undiminished.

The 800 pound gorilla that hovers over every air station is encroachment.
Miramar and Oceana have to tread lightly. A number of others would have
issues if their tactical/training jet traffic were stepped up or extended
into the evening hours. The Navy has relatively few air stations with
little or no encroachment and/or noise concerns.

Next question: Can anybody tell me why the Navy moved all its mine
warfare
assets from the coasts (where it was located in proximity to the fleets
they
serve) to South Texas?

R / John


"John Carrier" wrote in message
...

I doubt that the 25% is anything more than an estimate spun by those
who
only want to see defense dollars cut... for two reasons: (1) It's a
round
number (suspicious). (2) Many of those sound-bite-type bullets are
made
up.

Possible, even probable. But you never know. The Navy had a thing out
in
the late 90's claiming there was a 21% excess capacity in the Naval Air
Training command and I think that was based on BRAC data calls.

When BRAC '95 was going on, I got to watch the gathering of numbers
for
a
few of the data calls at NAWCWPNS up close and personal. The data
that
comes OUT of BRAC is fairly accurate--at least from the Navy side.
Can't
speak for the blue-suiters, the grunts, or the forces of one. The
observers
of the data calls were fairly strict about gathering accurate,
reproducable,
and verifiable data.

True. I was intimately familiar with the content of the data for TRACOM
and
browsed all of the rest for any NAS or AFB. There were some instances
of
transposed numbers (birdstrike data ... they were THOROUGH!) and a
couple
of
gross misrepresentations (a CNATRA staffer intentionally changed a
formula
multiplier because he KNEW the FAA algorithm was wrong). The USAF
perspective was slightly different, but generated very usable data.

But the old adage "Figures lie and liars figure" is very appropriate to
the
process. The Navy installed their data into a weighted matrix to
generate
a
military value for each base. You'd think that was intended to
determine
the lowest military value and then nominate the base. Not so. The Navy
rule was that the average military value of the bases remaining after
implementation of their proposed scenario must be equal or higher to the
average value for all the bases examined in a particular category. A
base
could be a comparative "winner" in the value matrix and still become
part
of
the proposed closure scenario. This happened in 1993.

The 1995 rules were essentially unchanged. The Navy group, which did
not
get its entire plan approved by the commission in 1993, attacked the
issue
somewhat differently. They kept fiddling the value matrix (documented
in
the minutes) until the numbers fell out the way they wanted (that's my
assumption, but it seems pretty obvious the results were reverse
engineered
to produce the desired outcome). How bad was it? Well, one base got
credit
for an aerial target on which even practice ordnance could not be
expended.

The Navy has a long history (perhaps shared by the other services, but
my
experience doesn't allow that comparison) of generating and manipulating
data to justify/support a decision. The decision has very little input
(except in the form of the data calls) from the operational side of the
Navy. CNO, his deputies, the CINCs, type commanders, etc don't weigh
in.
The process was within DON, headed by a super grade civilian and staffed
by
a mixed bag of civilians and military temporarily assigned to the BRAC
group. I met several of the military types, good folks for the most
part
(albeit there was a Helo captain who hadn't seen the light of day for a
decade or more) but utterly ignorant about the majority of issues they
were
analyzing. They existed to staff the master plan of the big boss. In
most
part, they succeeded.

Given the nature of the current DOD (my way or the highway), I think
we'll
see a similar process in 2005. Rumsfeld's inner cadre has a vision
(I've
finally found a document describing it) of a "transformation" in
military
affairs. I think there's also a vision about the infrastructure that
they
believe is needed to support it. I suspect there's already a pretty
good
idea of which bases conform to this vision and which don't. And I
believe
that the BRAC group within DOD will be directed (perhaps subtly) to
massage
the data to support that vision.

There's no list, but you're on it.

R / John

The Navy tried to close NAS Lemoore fourteen months after it opened, but
Congress wouldn't let them.

Source for that info? Lemoore is one of the few unencroached air stations
we have ... a real jewel in that regard. Interestingly, it ranked last in
the military value matrix used in 1993. Check out this link and see if you
can tell how many of the listed air stations can operate 24/7 with little
impact on the local population.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/nas.htm

NAS Meridian was built so John Stennis could have medical and dental care
when Congress was out of session.

Incorrect. It was a consolation prize when Stennis didn't get the Air Force
Academy for Mississippi (not much better, eh?). I doubt he would have
bothered with NAS's rather spartan capabilities (I experienced them first
hand in early 1970) when the region's medical/dental hub was only another 12
miles down the highway.

The Navy built a new Bureau of Personnel at New Orleans. Senator Ebert
died
before it was occupied, so it was given to the Reserves, VA, Social
Security, etc.

I thought that was in New Iberia (could be wrong there).

Gore got reelected in 1996, so the BuPers move to Millington, Tennessee
survived.

Part of the BRAC plan to vacate DC. I doubt Gore was a player. NAS Memphis
was closed and the schools command was relocated at Pensacola. The real
winner was Pensacola, which lost a superfluous NADEP, but gained a huge
training complex that's unlikely to be threatened. Several hundred million
for local contractors, not a bad deal.

Then, they built a new battle group port at Ingleside. No battle group to
put there, but they couldn't quietly give away an 1,100 foot pier, etc...

Part of Lehman's "dispersal" plan for the ludicrous 600 ship Navy (nice
thought, but it was economically unfeasible. We're still paying the price
for this folly). Of course, the real reason was putting a base IN YOUR
STATE to gain the necessary political support (He once commented he'd
homeport a battleship in Iowa if he could figure a way to get it there).

No doubt powerful legislators (particularly Senators) tilt the table often,
but not always.

R / John

I've heard many reasons "not" to BRAC China Lake,. Including
realigning Dam Neck, Barking Sands, Indian Head, etc, and putting ALL
weapons testing/building here. Many reasons for this, one of them
being the Land, it is huge! And the Navy actually owns it.

If that doesn't work, how about this one?

Making China Lake a divert field for the shuttle? If something
happened on the final to Edwards, they could just do a little swing
and pop in right here!

(I don't know how possible that would be, or how true, but I had heard
there was a study on it)

On Sat, 22 May 2004 07:00:49 -0500, "John Carrier"
wrote:


I doubt that the 25% is anything more than an estimate spun by those who
only want to see defense dollars cut... for two reasons: (1) It's a round
number (suspicious). (2) Many of those sound-bite-type bullets are made
up.

Possible, even probable. But you never know. The Navy had a thing out in
the late 90's claiming there was a 21% excess capacity in the Naval Air
Training command and I think that was based on BRAC data calls.

When BRAC '95 was going on, I got to watch the gathering of numbers for a
few of the data calls at NAWCWPNS up close and personal. The data that
comes OUT of BRAC is fairly accurate--at least from the Navy side. Can't
speak for the blue-suiters, the grunts, or the forces of one. The
observers
of the data calls were fairly strict about gathering accurate,
reproducable,
and verifiable data.

True. I was intimately familiar with the content of the data for TRACOM and
browsed all of the rest for any NAS or AFB. There were some instances of
transposed numbers (birdstrike data ... they were THOROUGH!) and a couple of
gross misrepresentations (a CNATRA staffer intentionally changed a formula
multiplier because he KNEW the FAA algorithm was wrong). The USAF
perspective was slightly different, but generated very usable data.

But the old adage "Figures lie and liars figure" is very appropriate to the
process. The Navy installed their data into a weighted matrix to generate a
military value for each base. You'd think that was intended to determine
the lowest military value and then nominate the base. Not so. The Navy
rule was that the average military value of the bases remaining after
implementation of their proposed scenario must be equal or higher to the
average value for all the bases examined in a particular category. A base
could be a comparative "winner" in the value matrix and still become part of
the proposed closure scenario. This happened in 1993.

The 1995 rules were essentially unchanged. The Navy group, which did not
get its entire plan approved by the commission in 1993, attacked the issue
somewhat differently. They kept fiddling the value matrix (documented in
the minutes) until the numbers fell out the way they wanted (that's my
assumption, but it seems pretty obvious the results were reverse engineered
to produce the desired outcome). How bad was it? Well, one base got credit
for an aerial target on which even practice ordnance could not be expended.

The Navy has a long history (perhaps shared by the other services, but my
experience doesn't allow that comparison) of generating and manipulating
data to justify/support a decision. The decision has very little input
(except in the form of the data calls) from the operational side of the
Navy. CNO, his deputies, the CINCs, type commanders, etc don't weigh in.
The process was within DON, headed by a super grade civilian and staffed by
a mixed bag of civilians and military temporarily assigned to the BRAC
group. I met several of the military types, good folks for the most part
(albeit there was a Helo captain who hadn't seen the light of day for a
decade or more) but utterly ignorant about the majority of issues they were
analyzing. They existed to staff the master plan of the big boss. In most
part, they succeeded.

Given the nature of the current DOD (my way or the highway), I think we'll
see a similar process in 2005. Rumsfeld's inner cadre has a vision (I've
finally found a document describing it) of a "transformation" in military
affairs. I think there's also a vision about the infrastructure that they
believe is needed to support it. I suspect there's already a pretty good
idea of which bases conform to this vision and which don't. And I believe
that the BRAC group within DOD will be directed (perhaps subtly) to massage
the data to support that vision.

There's no list, but you're on it.

R / John

John,

NAS Meridian was built so John Stennis could have medical and dental care
when Congress was out of session.

Incorrect. It was a consolation prize when Stennis didn't get the Air
Force
Academy for Mississippi (not much better, eh?). I doubt he would have
bothered with NAS's rather spartan capabilities (I experienced them first
hand in early 1970) when the region's medical/dental hub was only another
12
miles down the highway.


Actually it was built AT Meridian (versus elsewhere in MS) because SEN
Stennis' hometown of DeKalb was right up Highway 39 from the base. Made it
easier for him (and - occasionally - REP "Sonny" Montgomery) to get back to
their constituents on weekends.

I never heard the "consolation prize" story but it makes as much sense as
any other I heard while I was there (1970 - 1971).

One thing I will say for SEN Stennis - he did look out for "his boys" at the
base. Example: As the result of an intemperate exchange of Anglo-Saxon
honorifics, a certain Lauderdale County constable took an extreme dislike to
one of VT-7's folks. This upstanding officer of the law initiated several
nighttime encounters with our guy, tailgating him and otherwise attempting
to "bait" him into some action that would cause his arrest. Word got back
to SEN John, who called the appropriate Lauderdale County Poo-Bahs. Said
constable found himself on a beat w-a-a-a-y down by Whynot or some such
burg.

--
Mike Kanze

"A centerpiece for the table should never be anything prepared by a
taxidermist."

- Martha Stewart's TIPS FOR REDNECKS


"John Carrier" wrote in message
...
[rest snipped]

Actually it was built AT Meridian (versus elsewhere in MS) because SEN
Stennis' hometown of DeKalb was right up Highway 39 from the base. Made
it
easier for him (and - occasionally - REP "Sonny" Montgomery) to get back
to
their constituents on weekends.

Well, if you're going to slice pork, you want to do it close to home. Sonny
wasn't in Congress when this deal was made. As it turns out, Meridian's
location makes it quite useful as a training station. No TRACOM base is as
thoroughly unencroached (even Kingsville has to observe quiet hours). MOA's
in three quadrants (I think it'll be 4 before the year is out). A handy OLF
and unlimited access to Key field (10,000 feet these days). Biggest problem
is it's a social wasteland for the bachelors who come here (albeit pretty
good for those with families).

As an aside, the "Congressman for Life" has given up his consulting business
inside the beltway and is fully retired. 85 IIRC and looking quite frail,
living in the local Cadillac quality retirement home. Good friend and a
great guy, one of the last gentleman politicians. Anyone who has cashed in
on their GI bill education over the last couple decades have a fella named
Montgomery to thank. There were many in congress who could have cared less
about those who grabbed the dirty end of the stick in service of their
country. A fitting legacy.

John X

John,

Sonny wasn't in Congress when this deal was made.

True. This was SEN John's deal, all the way. Sonny DID enjoy the benefit
as well, but IIRC he was quite circumspect in its exercise.

As it turns out, Meridian's location makes it quite useful as a training
station. No TRACOM base is as thoroughly unencroached (even Kingsville has
to observe quiet hours). MOA's in three quadrants (I think it'll be 4
before the year is out). A handy OLF and unlimited access to Key field
(10,000 feet these days).

Only training negative is its non-proximity to "blue" water, necessitating
carquals to be run as dets. (At least this was the case with the T-2s.
Don't know anything about the legs on the T-45.) This wouldn't have been
the case for the erstwhile NAS New Iberia, LA if it hadn't been strangled in
the cradle.

Biggest problem is it's a social wasteland for the bachelors who come here
(albeit pretty good for those with families).

Correct. VT-7 was my "stash" assignment right out of BJN School, and for a
bachelor who was also the only NFO on the base at the time there was little
redeeming about the place, either professionally or socially. At least the
backroads to Pensacola were picturesque and uncrowded - I wore deep ruts in
them over many weekends. After my 18 months there going to foggy, rainy
Whidbey was like getting into Heaven.

LOTSA families "got started" at Meridian during the VN era. g

Good friend and a great guy, one of the last gentleman politicians. Anyone
who has cashed in on their GI bill education over the last couple decades
have a fella named Montgomery to thank.

Amen. Well-regarded by all in his district and more than a few of us
transients.
--
Mike Kanze

"A centerpiece for the table should never be anything prepared by a
taxidermist."

- Martha Stewart's TIPS FOR REDNECKS


"John Carrier" wrote in message
...
[rest snipped]

Only training negative is its non-proximity to "blue" water, necessitating
carquals to be run as dets. (At least this was the case with the T-2s.
Don't know anything about the legs on the T-45.) This wouldn't have been
the case for the erstwhile NAS New Iberia, LA if it hadn't been strangled
in
the cradle.

No longer an issue. The closest a carrier will be to the Gulf is Key West
area. Both advanced TRACOM bases now are a leg away or more from CQ dets.

Biggest problem is it's a social wasteland for the bachelors who come
here
(albeit pretty good for those with families).

Correct. VT-7 was my "stash" assignment right out of BJN School, and for
a
bachelor who was also the only NFO on the base at the time there was
little
redeeming about the place, either professionally or socially. At least
the
backroads to Pensacola were picturesque and uncrowded - I wore deep ruts
in
them over many weekends. After my 18 months there going to foggy, rainy
Whidbey was like getting into Heaven.

Ouch! Well, Kingsville/Beeville weren't really any better, but the
proximity of Corpus (and San Antonio for Beeville) made them seem a bit more
tolerable.

LOTSA families "got started" at Meridian during the VN era. g

Still true today. Often a first shore tour after a fleet assignment. When
I was in base housing, you could look out the front windows and watch the
baby carriage grand prix.

R / John