The F14 vs what we are doing now

In article .com,
"Typhoon502" wrote:

None of those really solves the problem of cost and difficulty of
maintenance, though. The only thing a Super Bug really gives up is a
long-range missile, but Phoenix was aging and an extended-range AIM-120
variant could probably be cobbled together in short order if it was
really called for. On the other hand, it should be easier to keep more
Super Bugs in the air over an extended period of time with less
manpower exerted per airframe to make that happen, and if the internal
fuel tankage isn't what the Tomcat could muster, the Super Bug can at
least carry more external fuel stores without sacrificing missile
capability (five tanks, two Sidewinders, and six AMRAAMs with two on
the fuselage and four on dual-rails under the outer wing pylons).

Tomcats couldn't even shoot AIM-120.

That's a misleading statement.

There is no inherent reason that F-14's could not carry and shoot AIM-120.
It's just that the Navy decided it wasn't worth it.
The F-14 has a long range missile. Why spend money integrating a new
missile on an airframe that's going to go out of service soon?

The changes that would be needed were largely software and flight test.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Tomcats couldn't even shoot AIM-120.

That's a misleading statement.

There is no inherent reason that F-14's could not carry and shoot AIM-120.
It's just that the Navy decided it wasn't worth it.
The F-14 has a long range missile. Why spend money integrating a new
missile on an airframe that's going to go out of service soon?

The changes that would be needed were largely software and flight test.

Yep. Chump change and the aircraft could have had a vastly superior weapon
than Sparrow for a decade. Also better than Phoenix out to AAMRAM's max
range as well. In hindsight it didn't matter ... largely because the
aircraft was underutilized in Desert Storm, its last opportunity to fight
the good fight.

R / John

John Carrier wrote:
Tomcats couldn't even shoot AIM-120.

That's a misleading statement.

There is no inherent reason that F-14's could not carry and shoot AIM-120.
It's just that the Navy decided it wasn't worth it.
The F-14 has a long range missile. Why spend money integrating a new
missile on an airframe that's going to go out of service soon?

The changes that would be needed were largely software and flight test.

Yep. Chump change and the aircraft could have had a vastly superior weapon
than Sparrow for a decade. Also better than Phoenix out to AAMRAM's max
range as well. In hindsight it didn't matter ... largely because the
aircraft was underutilized in Desert Storm, its last opportunity to fight
the good fight.

Maybe the changes were small in scale, but if the service is unwilling
to do the integration, then that still means the F-14 was wholly
incapable of using the DOD's best AAM; the fact that the Navy didn't
incorporate AMRAAM while they were doing the Bombcat work is what's
surprising. I read once a discussion or article about the F-14 and the
Super Hornet and how Grumman kept coming back to the Pentagon with
modernized Tomcats, and kept getting shown the door. At what point did
the Pentagon (or the Navy specifically...it's been a while since I
recalled the particulars) really decide that they didn't want the
Tomcats around? Was it cost & complexity that turned them against the
F-14 in favor of the Super Bug?

John Carrier wrote:
Yep. Chump change and the aircraft could have had a vastly superior
weapon
than Sparrow for a decade. Also better than Phoenix out to AAMRAM's max
range as well. In hindsight it didn't matter ... largely because the
aircraft was underutilized in Desert Storm, its last opportunity to fight
the good fight.


Typhoon502 wrote:
Maybe the changes were small in scale, but if the service is unwilling
to do the integration, then that still means the F-14 was wholly
incapable of using the DOD's best AAM;

But could easily have been modded to use it... what don't you understand
about that? In hindsight, probably a good choice anyway, as the capability
was not needed--or at least, not particularly missed.


the fact that the Navy didn't
incorporate AMRAAM while they were doing the Bombcat work is what's
surprising.

I can't help suspect political pressure to keep the Bug looking good.
I always thought the Bombcat thing was at least partly a sop to the fighter
guys who didn't have so much to do, as well as a way for the Navy to get
more iron on the target without buying more airframes.


I read once a discussion or article about the F-14 and the
Super Hornet and how Grumman kept coming back to the Pentagon with
modernized Tomcats, and kept getting shown the door. At what point did
the Pentagon (or the Navy specifically...it's been a while since I
recalled the particulars) really decide that they didn't want the
Tomcats around? Was it cost & complexity that turned them against the
F-14 in favor of the Super Bug?

Maintenance man-hours per flight hour.


Jeff

"Jeff Crowell" wrote in message
...
John Carrier wrote:
Yep. Chump change and the aircraft could have had a vastly superior
weapon
than Sparrow for a decade. Also better than Phoenix out to AAMRAM's max
range as well. In hindsight it didn't matter ... largely because the
aircraft was underutilized in Desert Storm, its last opportunity to
fight
the good fight.


Typhoon502 wrote:
Maybe the changes were small in scale, but if the service is unwilling
to do the integration, then that still means the F-14 was wholly
incapable of using the DOD's best AAM;

But could easily have been modded to use it... what don't you understand
about that? In hindsight, probably a good choice anyway, as the
capability
was not needed--or at least, not particularly missed.


the fact that the Navy didn't
incorporate AMRAAM while they were doing the Bombcat work is what's
surprising.

I can't help suspect political pressure to keep the Bug looking good.
I always thought the Bombcat thing was at least partly a sop to the
fighter
guys who didn't have so much to do, as well as a way for the Navy to get
more iron on the target without buying more airframes.


I read once a discussion or article about the F-14 and the
Super Hornet and how Grumman kept coming back to the Pentagon with
modernized Tomcats, and kept getting shown the door. At what point did
the Pentagon (or the Navy specifically...it's been a while since I
recalled the particulars) really decide that they didn't want the
Tomcats around? Was it cost & complexity that turned them against the
F-14 in favor of the Super Bug?

Three reasons for the lack of funding for F-14 mods. The F-14 community (an
attitude problem), The F-18 mafia within NAVAIR and the Pentagon, and
Grumman's arrogance. By the time the Bug was validating its incredible
maintainability rep in the late eighties, the writing was on the wall for
the Tom. It's maintainability (lack thereof ... you should have seen what
it was like to keep Block 75's up 'n flying) doomed the jet.

R / John

In article , John Carrier
wrote:

[...]
By the time the Bug was validating its incredible
maintainability rep in the late eighties, the writing was on the wall for
the Tom. It's maintainability (lack thereof ... you should have seen what
it was like to keep Block 75's up 'n flying) doomed the jet.

John, what percentage of that maintenance load was specific to keeping
the Tom's mission-capable in the fleet air-defense role? I'm thinking
mainly of the avionics for the Sparrows and Phoenixes. Would there
have been a significant savings in maintenance man-hours if the Toms
had been explicitly transitioned into being "cold nose" bomb trucks
dedicated purely to the strike mission?

It's an idle hypothetical now that the Toms are gone from the flight
decks. But I've always wondered if there was an economical option,
around the time the call was made to retire the A-6's, for handing the
the D's over to the strike community for use solely as strike bombers.

W.A. Baker wrote:
In article , John Carrier
wrote:

[...]

By the time the Bug was validating its incredible
maintainability rep in the late eighties, the writing was on the wall for
the Tom. It's maintainability (lack thereof ... you should have seen what
it was like to keep Block 75's up 'n flying) doomed the jet.


John, what percentage of that maintenance load was specific to keeping
the Tom's mission-capable in the fleet air-defense role? I'm thinking
mainly of the avionics for the Sparrows and Phoenixes. Would there
have been a significant savings in maintenance man-hours if the Toms
had been explicitly transitioned into being "cold nose" bomb trucks
dedicated purely to the strike mission?

Strike and cold-nose (i.e., no radar) aren't compatible options anymore.
You need radar ground-mapping modes at a minimum, and realistically
also some air-to-air modes for self-defense. At that point, there's not
a huge amount of unique Sparrow or Phoenix support left in the system.
But you have to ADD distinctive strike capabilities, such as a laser
designator and FLIR (e.g. LANTIRN) to match the A-6's TRAM sensor turret.

OTOH, a ground-up redesign of the F-14 like the Super Hornet (ASF-14,
roughly) might have allowed significant savings.

--
Tom Schoene lid
To email me, replace "invalid" with "net"

In article , "W.A. Baker"
wrote:

In article , John Carrier
wrote:

[...]
By the time the Bug was validating its incredible
maintainability rep in the late eighties, the writing was on the wall for
the Tom. It's maintainability (lack thereof ... you should have seen what
it was like to keep Block 75's up 'n flying) doomed the jet.

John, what percentage of that maintenance load was specific to keeping
the Tom's mission-capable in the fleet air-defense role? I'm thinking
mainly of the avionics for the Sparrows and Phoenixes. Would there
have been a significant savings in maintenance man-hours if the Toms
had been explicitly transitioned into being "cold nose" bomb trucks
dedicated purely to the strike mission?

It's an idle hypothetical now that the Toms are gone from the flight
decks. But I've always wondered if there was an economical option,
around the time the call was made to retire the A-6's, for handing the
the D's over to the strike community for use solely as strike bombers.

After the D upgrade the radar was not a maintenance factor.

I don't have visibility into all the other systems on the a/c but the new
radar was on par with the systems in the F/A-18 and F-15 in terms of
reliability and maintenance hours.

Besides, by that point the writing was on the wall that strike was going to
be heavily focused on PGMs, so why "fix" an aircraft to use dumb iron
when the tide is running the other way? That's just spending scarce
money on a dead end.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

In article .com,
"Typhoon502" wrote:

John Carrier wrote:
Tomcats couldn't even shoot AIM-120.

That's a misleading statement.

There is no inherent reason that F-14's could not carry and shoot AIM-120.
It's just that the Navy decided it wasn't worth it.
The F-14 has a long range missile. Why spend money integrating a new
missile on an airframe that's going to go out of service soon?

The changes that would be needed were largely software and flight test.

Yep. Chump change and the aircraft could have had a vastly superior weapon
than Sparrow for a decade. Also better than Phoenix out to AAMRAM's max
range as well. In hindsight it didn't matter ... largely because the
aircraft was underutilized in Desert Storm, its last opportunity to fight
the good fight.

Maybe the changes were small in scale, but if the service is unwilling
to do the integration, then that still means the F-14 was wholly
incapable of using the DOD's best AAM; the fact that the Navy didn't
incorporate AMRAAM while they were doing the Bombcat work is what's
surprising. I read once a discussion or article about the F-14 and the
Super Hornet and how Grumman kept coming back to the Pentagon with
modernized Tomcats, and kept getting shown the door. At what point did
the Pentagon (or the Navy specifically...it's been a while since I
recalled the particulars) really decide that they didn't want the
Tomcats around? Was it cost & complexity that turned them against the
F-14 in favor of the Super Bug?

Once the F/A-18 demonstrated it's avionics reliability in a production
configuration, the F-14 was doomed.
I do have some insight into this as I worked both the F-18's APG-65 radar
and the F-14's APG-71 radar (on the D). I also participated in several
Tomcat upgrade proposals from the radar side, so I'm pretty familiar with
both sides of the arguement.
The F-14D was a great preforming aircraft, but even after the radar upgrade
it was still a maintenance hog on other systems, about 4X per flight hour
greater than the F/A-18.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur