The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

Dave S wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:

Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?

While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.

The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
may have made the third page.

Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.

In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
that is where our safety net failed.

Allen

A Lieberma wrote:
Dave S wrote in news:T%_uh.16106$yx6.10555
@newsread2.news.pas.earthlink.net:


Very interesting reading... and while there may be plenty of blame to
pass around, when push comes to shove, the aircraft was cleared to
depart from the proper runway, but the Pilot In Command effectively
failed to ensure that they were in fact lined up on that runway. It was
his responsibility. Regardless of any and all other contributing
factors, the FAA and the air traffic controllers weren't flying the
plane, the Pilot (and his crew) was.

Is this really about making things safer, or is this about exploiting
tragedy to advance an agenda?


While we pilots shouldn't depend on "safety nets", in my opinion, ATC is
our safety net for when we make mistakes.

The ATC folks that do catch our mistakes get very little media attention.
You can bet if that ATC controller had caught the mistake, it wouldn't
have made the comic page. Had that LEX mistake been caught at Ohare, it
may have made the third page.

Unfortunately, it does take a tragedy to get things changed.

In the LEX case, in my opinion, IF the controller was truly overworked,
that is where our safety net failed.

Allen

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.

And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff."
If it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a
IFR tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as
local controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data
controller?

I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.

Pertinant references from 7110.65P

2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand.

3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS

Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This
may be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other
written information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide
aircraft identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway
information as follows:

a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft
has been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.

3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES

When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.

3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning
runways, especially when runways are in close proximity to other
movement areas.

And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so,
why is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?

2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in
a position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe
proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot
informs you action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may
discontinue the issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because
someone else has responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe
situation has been observed and the safety alert issued; inform the
appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation
of unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized.

2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.

3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot’s prerogative to
determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.

a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue
the alert as follows:

PHRASEOLOGY-
LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
AREA IS (altitude),
or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
(nonprecision approach),
or the outer marker,
or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
and, if known, issue
THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).

Sam Spade writes:

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.

Even if he was hopelessly overworked, the final responsibility rests
with the flight crew. And it doesn't appear that he did anything
wrong, anyway, however overworked he might have been.

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

-----Original Message-----
From: Mxsmanic ]
Posted At: Sunday, January 28, 2007 10:51 AM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
Subject: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

....

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Because they couldn't find the reset button?

(I just had to take the shot...)

"Jim Carter" wrote in message
news:001f01c74304$7e55a260$4b01a8c0@omnibook6100.. .


-----Original Message-----
From: Mxsmanic ]
Posted At: Sunday, January 28, 2007 10:51 AM
Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
Conversation: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff
Subject: The Lexington ATC was NOT doing traffic count after he
cleared Comair 5191 for takeoff

...

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Because they couldn't find the reset button?

(I just had to take the shot...)

Cheap shot! :~)

Mxsmanic wrote:
Sam Spade writes:


Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster
you should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.


Even if he was hopelessly overworked, the final responsibility rests
with the flight crew. And it doesn't appear that he did anything
wrong, anyway, however overworked he might have been.

Why are so many pilots so quick to cry that it's not their fault when
they are actually held accountable for their mistakes?


You're missing my point.

Sam Spade writes:

You're missing my point.

Perhaps; what is your point? Since the pilots ultimately screwed up,
what else is there to say? No matter what the problems of the
controller may have been, it wasn't his actions that caused the
problem, and it wasn't his responsibility.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

Mxsmanic wrote:
Sam Spade writes:


You're missing my point.


Perhaps; what is your point? Since the pilots ultimately screwed up,
what else is there to say? No matter what the problems of the
controller may have been, it wasn't his actions that caused the
problem, and it wasn't his responsibility.


There is a theory both in law and accident investigation called
comparative negligence. Have you read the 7110.65 excerpts I posted
earlier today?

"Sam Spade" wrote in message
...

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster you
should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.


I did that. I concluded his workload was quite light.



And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff." If
it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a IFR
tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as local
controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data controller?

I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.

Pertinant references from 7110.65P

2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts as
required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing all
other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the situation
at hand.

3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS

Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This may
be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other written
information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide aircraft
identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway information as
follows:

a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft has
been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.

3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES

When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.

3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning runways,
especially when runways are in close proximity to other movement areas.

And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so, why
is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?

2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a
position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity
to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you
action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the
issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has
responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been
observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of
unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized.

2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.

3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot's prerogative to
determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.

a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue the
alert as follows:

PHRASEOLOGY-
LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
AREA IS (altitude),
or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
(nonprecision approach),
or the outer marker,
or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
and, if known, issue
THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).


How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests the
controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.

Steven P. McNicoll wrote:


How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests the
controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.


a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.