Why did Britain win the BoB?

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message ...
"robert arndt" wrote in message
om...
Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.

Grantland

Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!

Rob

This is in fact an urban legend

The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
they had to defend , London.

All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.

Keith

A beg to differ. The lone German bomber ditched its bombs over London
while the Fuhrer's own directive forbid it. The German pilots were
reprimanded for their error even while Goering and the Luftwaffe
senior commanders were planning a switch in tactics.
Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.
Hitler's September 4, 1940 speech to the German people is filled with
rage over the British raid of Aug 25/26 and promised the destruction
of London. Had the German bomber NOT ditched its bombs over London and
hence, NO reprisal raid thereafter, Hitler might not have agreed to
change tactics on Sept 3, 1940. RAF Fighter Command at that point was
weakened to the point that losses were outstripping replacements and
many of their forward stations and airfields lie in wreckage. It was
the Luftwaffe's opinion at the time that despite losses incurred that
the RAF was already close to defeat, so attacking London made no
difference. A big mistake. Attacking London relieved Fighter Command
at their gravest hour and won them the BoB.

Rob

"robert arndt" wrote in message
om...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
"robert arndt" wrote in message
om...
Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed
Adolf
into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.

Grantland

Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!

Rob

This is in fact an urban legend

The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
they had to defend , London.

All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.

Keith

A beg to differ. The lone German bomber ditched its bombs over London
while the Fuhrer's own directive forbid it. The German pilots were
reprimanded for their error even while Goering and the Luftwaffe
senior commanders were planning a switch in tactics.
Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.
Hitler's September 4, 1940 speech to the German people is filled with
rage over the British raid of Aug 25/26 and promised the destruction
of London. Had the German bomber NOT ditched its bombs over London and
hence, NO reprisal raid thereafter, Hitler might not have agreed to
change tactics on Sept 3, 1940.

The minutes of the 3rd September meeting are a matter of record, your
belief not withstanding. At that meeting the date of 7th september was set
for the first raid on London. It was of course presented as a Fuhrer
order but the words used by Goering at that meeting were clear

Quote
The tactics that we have now implimented in the last month, that is moving
our fighter squadrons to the Pas de Calais so that they will have more time
over enemy territory with our bombers. The culmination of larger formations
of heavy bombers, that we have drawn from different advanced airfields and
Gruppes. The added support of out Bf110 squadrons that are doing damage in
their bombing role as well as that of the fighter. All this, must be a
formidable sight to the British as they, with a deteriating Air Force try to
penetrate our attacks.
My fellow commanders, we are now on the brink of victory. An assault and an
invasion of England is now more promising than ever before. Our intelligence
has now informed us that the RAF is now down to less than a hundred fighter
aircraft, the airfields protecting London are out of action because of the
superb and accurate bombing of our bomber forces, their communications are
in disarray, and now we are told, their air commanders are arguing with each
other.
Gentlemen, another phase is now almost complete. The RAF is now no longer
the great threat that it used to be, and we can now draw every available
fighter plane that the RAF has into the air, because the next target must be
London itself
/Quote


RAF Fighter Command at that point was
weakened to the point that losses were outstripping replacements and
many of their forward stations and airfields lie in wreckage. It was
the Luftwaffe's opinion at the time that despite losses incurred that
the RAF was already close to defeat, so attacking London made no
difference. A big mistake. Attacking London relieved Fighter Command
at their gravest hour and won them the BoB.

Rob

In fact although it wasnt clear to either side at the time it was the
Luftwaffe
that was losing the battle of attrition.

On 1 July 1940 RAF reports showed they had 640 single seat fighters
and 1103 pilots available for action

On 1st Sept 1940 they had 648 fighters and 1142 pilots

Source Steven Bungay , the Most Dangerous Enemy Appendix III

So the RAF had maintained their operational strength

During the same period Milch made a survey of Luftwaffe operational
units (beginning 20 August and lasting 5 days) What he found
was deeply disturbing. On average bomber units with a nominal
strength of 40 aircraft could field no more than 30, many as few as 20

source Milch report of 26/8/40 , Milch papers Vol 51/54 page 9
IWM dept of documents

Fighter units were similarly affected, not only were aircraft in short
supply, at a time when Fighter command had several hundred
spares, but pilot shortages were even worse and new pilots were
arriving at the squadrons with less than 10 hours on single engine
fighters. One new unit I.JG77 trannsferred to France in late
August and lost 7 aircraft on Aug 31 alone.

source Milch 9/9/40 p3 report same collection

Whats interesting is the attitudes of the commanders to the situation
they found themselves in. Dowding was an extremely cautious
commander who regarded the minimum number of pilots
acceptable as being twice that of the number of aircraft
on squadron strength, this meant that when he only had 1142
pilots for 650 aircraft he considered his forces seriously
under strength.

Goering at the same time had fewer pilots than aircraft
and the Germans were training pilots more slowly but
was convinced he was winning !

Fact is that far from being seriously atrrited on 1st September 1940
the RAF fighter squadrons were essentially at full strength
but the Luftwaffe was down to about 75 % of the force they
had available at the start of the BOB

Throughout the battle the RAF was able to send pilots
on leave and rotate entire squadrons out of the combat
area, something that was unthinkable for the Luftwaffe.

The failure to provide adequate replacements for pilots
and machines that would plague the Luftawaffe throughout
the war was already evident in Augsut 1940.

Keith

Keith Willshaw wrote:

"robert arndt" wrote in message
om...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
"robert arndt" wrote in message
om...
Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed
Adolf
into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.

Grantland

Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!

Rob

This is in fact an urban legend

The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
they had to defend , London.

All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.

Keith

A beg to differ. The lone German bomber ditched its bombs over London
while the Fuhrer's own directive forbid it. The German pilots were
reprimanded for their error even while Goering and the Luftwaffe
senior commanders were planning a switch in tactics.
Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.
Hitler's September 4, 1940 speech to the German people is filled with
rage over the British raid of Aug 25/26 and promised the destruction
of London. Had the German bomber NOT ditched its bombs over London and
hence, NO reprisal raid thereafter, Hitler might not have agreed to
change tactics on Sept 3, 1940.

The minutes of the 3rd September meeting are a matter of record, your
belief not withstanding. At that meeting the date of 7th september was set
for the first raid on London. It was of course presented as a Fuhrer
order but the words used by Goering at that meeting were clear

FWIW, Hough and Richards state the following, after describing Hitler's speech
on 4 September:

"This public intimation of fresh work for the Luftwaffe followed a meeting
between Huitler and Goering on 30 August. There the Fuehrer had withdrawn his
ban on bombing London [Guy note; after several nights of RAF raids on Berlin
on/subsequent to 25/26 August] and expressed an ardent desire for attacks on the
British capital in retaliation for Bomber Command's raids on Berlin. An
appropriate directive from Goering followed." They then discuss the meeting of
3 September.

I'm hesitant to say this is definitely the case, as this is a work for a general
audience and there are several basic errors in it that never should have
appeared. For instance, it claims that the Me-109E-1 (which they write "109E1")
had "four heavy calibre (roughly .5 inch) machine guns . . . To the more popular
twin heavy machine guns augmented by the much more lethal and longer-ranging
20mm cannon, one in each wing ["109E2" according to them]," although they do go
on to say that the most likely armament was two 20mm and 2 x 7.9mm. So at least
they got that right.


Guy

On Wed, 08 Oct 2003 06:11:40 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

FWIW, Hough and Richards state the following, after describing Hitler's speech
on 4 September:

"This public intimation of fresh work for the Luftwaffe followed a meeting
between Huitler and Goering on 30 August. There the Fuehrer had withdrawn his
ban on bombing London [Guy note; after several nights of RAF raids on Berlin
on/subsequent to 25/26 August] and expressed an ardent desire for attacks on the
British capital in retaliation for Bomber Command's raids on Berlin. An
appropriate directive from Goering followed." They then discuss the meeting of
3 September.

There are two issues at stake here, the second is the actual German
decision-making process that lead to the deliberate bombing of London
after the withdrawl of Hitler's ban on attacking it. As the Luftwaffe
had been bombing targets in British urban centres at night* since
June, I feel adding London to the target list was only a matter of
time, regardless of what impulses drove the decision at the time.

[*And the night was significant: the Luftwaffe dropped a lot more
tonnage on London by night than they did by day: Hitler's apparent
desire for a retributional policy against London did not begin and end
in the first deliberate daylight attacks on the city, whatever the
peripheral consequences were for Fighter Command)

More important is the issue of whether the first daylight raids on
London were a critical watershed in enabling the RAF to recover from
incipient defeat at the beginning of September. The hard facts are
that they weren't at the position of imminent crisis and defeat, and
the attritional exchanges continued much on the existing basis.

All the Luftwaffe targetting change did was reduce the pressure on
selected forward airfields and their infrastructure. However, the
success or failure of Fighter Command in totality did not rest on the
status of Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and Kenley and their hosted
squadrons in isolation.

What really interests me about this assertion are the emotional
well-springs that fuel it. These seem to be very deeply embedded, and
involve satisfying the basic desire to provide a simplistic
revisionist narrative that appropriates success or failure in the
Battle of Britain to German agency alone, and specifically Hitler in
particular. Surely it is long since time that this myth was laid to
rest, and for it to be understood in the light of the emotional
impetus that created it.

A similar myth is the one about Churchill protecting Enigma by letting
Coventry be bombed. These myths say more about popular prejudices in
regard of the leaders concerned than they do about anything else.
They are resiliant to factual refutal because their primary basis
stands outside factual debate.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

In article , robert
arndt writes
Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.

Wasn't it Dowding who said "The nearness of London to German airfields
will lose them the war"?

--
John