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#21
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On Feb 16, 4:50*pm, "W. D. Allen" wrote:
"...Perhaps the time has come to put the Navy in charge of all joint electronic warfare activities...." Now it can be told... In 1966 the North Vietnamese with their Russian instructors began shooting down U.S. aircraft over NVN. Someone in the Navy had the wisdom and foresight to have on hand 1,000 ALQ-51 deception repeaters originally dedicated to aircraft protection during execution of the Navy portion of the SIOP. They weren't all for SIOP airplanes - and it's not a question of wisdom and foresight - The USAF had a very active ECM program as well. All their bombers carried huge batteries of jammers and about a half ton of chaff, with dedicated receivers for detection of threats, and dedicated system managers to run them. The USAF had also been procuring podded jammers through the QRC (Quick Reaction Contract) program. More on this later. The Air Force, with bigger airplanes with more electric power available, went in for large, powerful Noise Jammers, which would blank out any weaker signals (Like returning blips, which are very weak) coming into the radar's antenna. Since the reception pattern of a radar antenna isn't simply where it's pointed, but also includes sidelobes and backlobes, a strong signal can blot out a huge sector of the radar's coverage. (Unless they lower the gain (Turn down the volume) of the receiver to isolate the jamming transmitter,s azimuth - but if they do that, they lose any weaker blips from non-jamming airplanes. These systems work well against Early Warning and GCI systems, but not so well against weapons control radars - since they blatently broadcast their Azimuth and Elevation angles (but not range) to the receiver. If you're lucky, and can shoot enough watts into an antenna, you can either burn out the amplifiers in the receiver, or, if the receiver has self-protection circuits (Most do) force the radar to automatically shut down. (And a big radar takes from 5-15 minutes to bring back on line if this happens. That's a long time with airplanes moving at 8-10 miles/minute) The Navy, with smaller airplanes and less electricity available, went in for Deception Jammers. These are very sophisticated in concept, automatically listening to, and analyzing the characteristics of an incoming radar, and putting out pulses of its own that, hopefully, will fool the automatic tracking circuits in a fire control radar (Deception jammers work best against dedicated tracking radars.) and make it point somewhere else. Two things to remember here - the only work well against automatically tracking radars, and they are only really effective against fire control radars looking at that particular airplane. Those ALQ-51s were rounded up from all over the globe (some were found in Antarctica), refurbished, and sent to Southeast Asia for installation in carrier aircraft. Meanwhile the Air Force was compelled to use ALQ-76 pod noise jammers, which the Navy considered little more than tracking beacons.. In fact, USAF found it necessary to ask the Navy for fifty of the ALQ-51s for their RF-101 recce aircraft that were flying solo over NVN. And it was discovered that, against SA-2s (And, later, SA-3s) that, once the Pod formations were developed, which blanked out a volume of the sky that made very unlikey for an SA-2 launched into it to hit one of the 4 airplanes in that volume, the Air Force noise jammer solution worked much better. The problem is, the Navy through both necessity (small airplanes, not much electricity) and mirror-imaging, (Thinking that the Bad Guys were doing the same things that they were, in this case, building sophisticated automatic tracking systems) built jammers that worked fairly well at fooling the automatic systems. But the Soviets (And, hence, their clients) didn't do that. Early Soviet SAMs didn't use automatically tracking conical scan or monopulse trackers. They used a pair of overlapping pulse radars, one searching in azimuth, and one in elevation, on slightly different frequencies, so that they didn't interfere with each other, and both reporting their angle and range information. The tracking wsas actually done by 3 guys in the radar van, one using a handwheel to hold a marker over the Azimuth blip, one over the Elevation blip, and another over the combined range blips. This gave the fire control system a smoother track than an autmatic system, was easier to make and maintain, and, inadvertently, negated most of the Navy's clever deception techniques. A pair of eyes with a human brain behind them is unexcelled at recognizing patterns, and pulling out information from a seemingly worthless hash. It didn't take long for the tracking opertors to learn which of the returns coming from an airplane carrying a Deception Jammer was real, and which were the false signals. The noise jammers with their stronger signals and wider frequency ranges (Which would cover both the Az and El radars of an SA-2, usually), used singly, would pinpoint an individual airplane in Azimuth and Elevation, but block out range infomration. This allowed the shooters to guide their missile, which used a collision course (make the target's bearing to the missile constant) approach to make it likely that the missile would get close enough to the target for its fuze to activate. And an SA-2 had a big warhead - the fuze would activate about 100 yards out. This turned the USAF away from using noise jammers on fighters - until some clever folks at AFSD (The Air Force Systems Division) figured out that if you put noise jammers on avery airplane in a flight, and put the airplanes in the proper relation with each other, the combined jamming signals would blank out a large volume, and that a missile fired into that volume was unlikely to come close enough to an airplane to fuze. Electronic warfare is an occult and complex discipline that doesn't go bang, has no tailhook and won't go Mach 2+. It's damn hard to push for black boxes when knuckle draggers want more boom for the buck. They have to learn the hard way they can't haul their bomb load to the target before they recognize they need electronic protection as well as missile protection, bullet protection, etc. That's true, in a lot of ways, but we've also reached a point where we don't need as many dedicated assets - We've come a long way at making our passive systems (Elint receivers and such) smarter and more able to make it possible to avoid threats, and at making our transmitters (Which are largely a measure of last resort, since if you transmit, you tell everybody where you are) more powerful, more economical in their use of electricity, and smarter, (Used to be that deception "False Target" generators could only analyze a pulse after it had been received, so the first target in line was the real one. (You get a bunch of tranmitters weaving and dodging past each other, and it gets a bit more difficult to sort out who is who). Now, the jammer will map the radar's characteristics and make its pulses wherever it wants to - the false target generator on an EA-6B or B-52 can white out a scope with individual blips forced into sidelobes and backlobes. Stealth airplanes, with much reduced signatures, and hence, detection ranges, don't benefit from onboard transmitters. And, with modern satellite elint and photint, it's hard to spring a radar from a surprise location. That all being said - there's not a lot of public visibility for electronic warfare. It perks away, in its own small corner of the budget, and nobody ever hears about it until some slighted Congressman comissions a GAO report to criticize a particular program. (Which leads the Press to leap after something that they can't understand, being fed soundbites from others who can't, or won't understand, and who have some axe to grind.) EW test question: How did Halsey know to send Air Force P-38s to knock Admiral Yamamoto out of the sky in the South Pacific during WWII? SIGINT, of course. The Old Crows know! Even better - how did we map out the Soviet's Tall King air defence radar network without direct photo coverage, and the Sovs going silent whenever the ELINT airplanes were flying around? -- Pete Stickney |
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