Future military fighters and guns - yes or no ?

In message , Tony
Williams writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars
only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on
relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills

Fair points. However, the 30mm Aden is an old gun with poor ballistics
by modern standards and there are now much better guns available for
air combat. The critical factor is of course the quality of the gun
fire control system. I don't know how good it was in the SHARs, but
what I have read about modern fighters is that once they've got a
radar lock there is a strong probability of a gun kill, with only a
short burst normally being required. In some cases, the FCS actually
takes over control of some elements of the flight controls to ensure
that the gun is correctly aimed.

Provided, of course, that you can get and hold a solid radar lock on the
target; the lack of which ability is sometimes cited as a reason to keep
guns, which of course are wonderful because they're just 'point and
shoot' with no fancy sensors or expensive jammable radars needed

Tony, you get picked on because you're a reasonable man advancing good
arguments and so I can have a civil debate with you. It's not your fault
that others have advanced some rather poor arguments... you just get hit
with defending them sometimes as well as arguing your own position. I
appreciate your forbearance.

I'd personally like to keep the gun a little longer, especially in cases
like EF2000 where the fitting costs are paid already: but there _is_ the
problem that training costs are significant, and the UK defence budget
_is_ so straightened that "deleting maintenance and training for
Eurofighter guns" is operationally significant and funds more urgent
requirements, and seems to be less bad than the alternatives. It sucks
but there it is.

I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian
tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved.

There's loads of detail available in Cooper and Bishop's 'Iran-Iraq
War in the Air 1980-1988' (Schiffer Military History, 2000).

Thanks for the cue. Tom Cooper posts on occasion and comes across well:
another author found via Usenet, it seems.

The
Iranians used the F-14's superior radar as a kind of mini-AWACS,
orchestrating air combats and trying to fight at long range. However,
tactical situations can change unexpectedly, especially at fighter jet
closing speeds, hence their occasional need to use guns.

Out of interest, how many Iranian Tomcats were lost in air combat?

They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the
chances of a 'danger close'?

I presume because the SHARs were seen as primarily fighters, the GR.7s
were specialised for ground attack - so they were the obvious ones to
use.

True to a point, but the SHars are at least multi-role and could even be
swing-role with the right loadout (what does the A in FA.2 stand for,
after all?) and there wasn't a noticeable fixed-wing air threat in
Sierra Leone that would require a CAP or DLI presence.

Also, can't the RAF Harriers use the 30mm gun packs?



I've personally come to the conclusion that the "guns are a waste of
space" movement was clearly and provably premature[1], but as combat
experience improved tactics and equipment the backlash was almost
counterproductive. By the time the USAF were fielding the F-4E, the
desperate need for its M61 had gone; but it was a lot easier to say
"that useless Navy fighter we were forced to buy didn't have a gun!"
than to admit to significant doctrinal, tactical and maintenance
shortcomings.

I do note that the US Navy, flying in the same area (though with
significant differences) never felt the need to field either gun pods
for air-to-air or to insist on an internal gun on any Phantom. (Though
the F-14 acquired one: interesting, that, and I'd like to know why. For
that matter, was the F-111B meant to have an internal gun?)

Who knows, if I can find the time I may follow your example and write a
book with this as a chapter



[1] Based on sound analysis for the expected wars, is the worst thing.
Fighter-versus-fighter shootouts at low level in Southeast Asia were not
a high priority compared to keeping nuclear missile-armed bombers from
hitting USN carrier groups or US cities, back when design decisions were
being made...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk