Is there a place for Traditional CAS in the 21st century?

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote:



I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be
eliminated.

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator
and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace
using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode
could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along
a
transportation link.

OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
solution.

The ground operator would have the capability of designating targets and the
ability to change the level of agression of the autonomous vehicle. I want
to get pilots out of the mud, not send them into harm's way. There is a
similar autonomous vehicle envisioned for the F-35, but it can wait until
the F-22 is either produced, or cancelled.

The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing
engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the
current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to
small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is
often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in
directions, and other factors.

The loiter vehicle is moving forward first, as it is funded for paper
investigation of the idea. That way it stays out of the obvious reality
check issues for "silver bullet" type assets.

Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having
a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA
years
ago.

Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think
the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact
and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose
look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with
stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what
CAS really is more debatable.

A 2000 pound bomb dropped accurate does the same job from 15,000 feet as it
does from 200 feet; perhaps even better, as the man on the ground has better
control of the target's coordinates. That is not always true, as my brother
has a story of his company commander calling a strike on his own company's
position, but that is another issue. The CO got his bronze star and never
went out again. (ie heroin addict)

I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an
operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm
comfortable.

How about a wedding? (Afghanistan)

You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the
fighter
mafia.

I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.

Which is why we are discussing autonomous vehicles for filling the role of
"traditional CAS". I have the impression that the Infantry is as pleased to
stay out of that type of situation as a fighter pilot is to have BVR
weapons.

And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue
incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality
in
this forum.

Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good
with regard to CAS.

Not as good as the Army's own rotary wings.

And, there is nothing inherent about "the
machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
system.

That depends on how well the operator can see the battle and follow
instructions.

Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.

The Army's own assets are statistically less likely to blue on blue.

I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
probability of error.

My man is on the ground, saving his own life.

Do you think Cleland was fragged?