President Bush is a Miserable Failure

"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
Somehow I don't think that securing a few dozen sites would require an
additional 350,000 troops.

A few dozen? No sir, you are asking them to seal off well over 100. You
can't
use your 20/20 hindsight to determine what suspected sites actually had
material in them and which ones didn't.

I could excuse failing to seal off a site that we knew nothing about.
Failing to secure sites that the we knew contained nuclear material from
IAEA reports in inexcusable. Check out
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp...nguage=printer,
for example:
"Before the war began last month, the vast Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center
held 3,896 pounds of partially enriched uranium, more than 94 tons of
natural uranium and smaller quantities of cesium, cobalt and strontium,
according to reports compiled through the 1990s by inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Agency."

"Defense officials acknowledge that the U.S. government has no idea whether
any of Tuwaitha's potentially deadly contents have been stolen, because it
has not dispatched investigators to appraise the site. What it does know,
according to officials at the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command, is that the
sprawling campus, 11 miles south of Baghdad, lay unguarded for days and that
looters made their way inside. "

Failure to do so was a matter of incompetent
leadership, not lack of resources.
Gen. Franks is not incompetent.

He isn't the subject of this thread.

I could excuse failing to seal off a site that we knew nothing about.
Failing to secure sites that the we knew contained nuclear material from
IAEA reports in inexcusable.

Inexcuseable to you because you won't see reality. When U.S. forces got within
11 miles of Baghdad, there was a lot of issues to be dealt with, not least of
which was destroying Iraqi units that we believed had CW weapons and were
preparing to use them. If you were the 3ID commander (which is who you are
attacking here, not the President) do you detach forces to secure a *suspected*
(despite the IAEA report, the Iraqis moved material around quite a bit and
there was just as good a chance this site had nothing in it. The IAEA reported
"through the 1990s", what about since then?) WMD facility and leave some of
your forces short handed for an attack on unit that is *suspected* of having CW
weapons and is preparing to use them?

What it does know,
according to officials at the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command, is that the
sprawling campus, 11 miles south of Baghdad, lay unguarded for days and that
looters made their way inside.

This is who your beef is with, the Pentagon (indirectly I suppose) and CENTCOM
(more directly the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division who was running the
show in that sector). Ultimately you can blame CDRUSCENTCOM Gen. Tommy Franks I
guess.

Gen. Franks is not incompetent.

He isn't the subject of this thread.


Bush has and had nothing to do with force taskings during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
Inexcuseable to you because you won't see reality. When U.S. forces got
within
11 miles of Baghdad, there was a lot of issues to be dealt with, not least
of
which was destroying Iraqi units that we believed had CW weapons and were
preparing to use them. If you were the 3ID commander (which is who you are
attacking here, not the President) do you detach forces to secure a
*suspected*
(despite the IAEA report, the Iraqis moved material around quite a bit and
there was just as good a chance this site had nothing in it. The IAEA
reported
"through the 1990s", what about since then?) WMD facility and leave some
of
your forces short handed for an attack on unit that is *suspected* of
having CW
weapons and is preparing to use them?

Try: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3068560/
"Some of the lapses are frightening. The well-known Al Tuwaitha Nuclear
Research Center, about 12 miles south of Baghdad, had nearly two tons of
partially enriched uranium, along with significant quantities of highly
radioactive medical and industrial isotopes, when International Atomic
Energy Agency officials made their last visit in January. By the time U.S.
troops arrived in early April, armed guards were holding off looters-but the
Americans only disarmed the guards, Al Tuwaitha department heads told
NEWSWEEK. "We told them, 'This site is out of control. You have to take care
of it'," says Munther Ibrahim, Al Tuwaitha's head of plasma physics. "The
soldiers said, 'We are a small group. We cannot take control of this site'."
As soon as the Americans left, looters broke in. The staff fled; when they
returned, the containment vaults' seals had been broken, and radioactive
material was everywhere."

"U.S. officers say the center had already been ransacked before their troops
arrived. They didn't try to stop the looting, says Colonel Madere, because
"there was no directive that said do not allow anyone in and out of this
place." Last week American troops finally went back to secure the site."

Bush has and had nothing to do with force taskings during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.

But he had everything to do with setting overall objectives and allocating
adequate resources. Franks was told to defeat the Iraqi army and capture
Baghdad. If Franks was never told that securing the known NBC sites was
important then it is hard to hold him responsible. If Franks was told to
secure the sites, but wasn't given adequate resources, he has more
responsibility but the ultimate responsibility is with the President.

Note that there was enough in the administration over the possibility of a
dirty bomb was high enough to arrest and declare a US citizen to be an
"enemy combatant" in the middle of 2002 for being involved in a dirty bomb
plot. What happened to this concern when it came to securing the materials
that could be used to make a dirty bomb?

David Pugh wrote:

"The
soldiers said, 'We are a small group. We cannot take control of this site'."

This is the issue, not military incompentence.

"U.S. officers say the center had already been ransacked before their troops
arrived.

Despite this statement, you choose to believe the Iraqis. Why?

They didn't try to stop the looting, says Colonel Madere, because
"there was no directive that said do not allow anyone in and out of this
place."

Once again we get back to the issue at hand. You would not have a plan to
secure a suspected WMD site unless you had enough forces to do so.

Bush has and had nothing to do with force taskings during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.

But he had everything to do with setting overall objectives and allocating
adequate resources.

He set the *overall* objectives, not individual tactical objectives. As far as
allocating adequate resources, Bush played the hand he was dealt. I suppose
Bush could have delayed the operation until congress authorized an increase in
U.S. force manning, then waited for that increase in manning to become a
reality, but even if he's to win a second term, he wouldn't have see that
increase take effect.

Franks was told to defeat the Iraqi army and capture
Baghdad. If Franks was never told that securing the known NBC sites was
important then it is hard to hold him responsible.

By this last statement I take it you have no military experience. "Important"
is a relative term, during a war (and even in peace) somethings are more
important than others. Because seizing Baghdad quickly was of a *higher*
priority than securing *suspected* WMD sites, doesn't mean that was not
important. We had a choice to make in regards to priority, we choose to sieze
Baghdad. If we had chosen to secure all *suspected* WMD sites prior to seizing
Baghdad and the Iraqi army had begun lobbying Sarin filled artilliary shells
killing both coalition personnel and innocent Iraqi's, you would have been up
in arms over that choice.

What happened to this concern when it came to securing the materials
that could be used to make a dirty bomb?

It was put at a lower priority than destroying the regime and severing the
control to already weaponized CW.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
He set the *overall* objectives, not individual tactical objectives. As
far as
allocating adequate resources, Bush played the hand he was dealt. I
suppose
Bush could have delayed the operation until congress authorized an
increase in
U.S. force manning, then waited for that increase in manning to become a
reality, but even if he's to win a second term, he wouldn't have see that
increase take effect.

If you can't afford to do it right, maybe you should consider not doing it
at all. Especially in a case where doing it wrong can have disastrous
consequences. With (admittedly) 20/20 hindsight, can you honestly say we are
better off now than if we had never invaded?

Franks was told to defeat the Iraqi army and capture
Baghdad. If Franks was never told that securing the known NBC sites was
important then it is hard to hold him responsible.

By this last statement I take it you have no military experience.
"Important"
is a relative term, during a war (and even in peace) somethings are more
important than others. Because seizing Baghdad quickly was of a *higher*
priority than securing *suspected* WMD sites, doesn't mean that was not
important.

Fair enough: I should have said that the importance of securing this site
was set too low, given the potential consequences of not securing the site.
Setting the relative importance of various objectives, especially
non-military objectives, was not Franks' responsibility.

We had a choice to make in regards to priority, we choose to sieze
Baghdad. If we had chosen to secure all *suspected* WMD sites prior to
seizing
Baghdad and the Iraqi army had begun lobbying Sarin filled artilliary
shells
killing both coalition personnel and innocent Iraqi's, you would have been
up
in arms over that choice.

I absolutely agree that moving quickly was critically important. Nor am I
suggesting that we deployed a battalion to cover each possible WMD site
(including Granny's still). By all accounts, however, Al Tuwaitha was
exceptional (recent and reliable reports about hundreds of pounds of
radioactive material). If we couldn't divert the resources to secure that
immediately, perhaps we should have waited a little (at least, for example,
until the troops had redeployed from Turkey).

"David Pugh" wrote in message
...
"BUFDRVR" wrote in message
...
He set the *overall* objectives, not individual tactical objectives. As
far as
allocating adequate resources, Bush played the hand he was dealt. I
suppose
Bush could have delayed the operation until congress authorized an
increase in
U.S. force manning, then waited for that increase in manning to become a
reality, but even if he's to win a second term, he wouldn't have see
that
increase take effect.

If you can't afford to do it right, maybe you should consider not doing it
at all. Especially in a case where doing it wrong can have disastrous
consequences. With (admittedly) 20/20 hindsight, can you honestly say we
are
better off now than if we had never invaded?

Well, that depends upon how you look at it. We have an endgame at least in
sight, versus the neverending flyswatting that was going on before. We do,
however, have a bunch of misguided regional native jihadis rolling into Iraq
to take shots at our forces, true enough...but would you rather have those
same jihadis instead trying to get at civilian targets here in the US or
overseas? Then there is the question of how much our action contributed to
the rather quick Libyan turnabout, and maybe the renewed interest on the
part of the Iranians to find an amicable inspection/verification solution...
It appears that you could just as well have asked, "Can you honestly say we
are worse of now than we would have been if we had never invaded?"


Franks was told to defeat the Iraqi army and capture
Baghdad. If Franks was never told that securing the known NBC sites was
important then it is hard to hold him responsible.

By this last statement I take it you have no military experience.
"Important"
is a relative term, during a war (and even in peace) somethings are more
important than others. Because seizing Baghdad quickly was of a *higher*
priority than securing *suspected* WMD sites, doesn't mean that was not
important.

Fair enough: I should have said that the importance of securing this site
was set too low, given the potential consequences of not securing the
site.
Setting the relative importance of various objectives, especially
non-military objectives, was not Franks' responsibility.

You seem to continue to misunderstand the nature and specificity of
mission-based orders at the operational level, and how that drives the
mission-based orders process for the subordinate levels. BUFFDRVR is
right--the focus during the early phases of OIF were upon removing the
assumed immenent, deliverable weapons threat (note that the senior leaders
at the time had a "when we get hit with chems/bio", not an "if" mindset.
Your hindsight may allow you to critique that from the advantage of knowing
how things played out in the end, but looking at the situation from *their*
view at the time, with the information they then had available, it would be
danged hard to critisize their priorities. Smart CinC's don't interfere with
their warfighting command's planning by inserting a laundry list of "do
this, and this, and this..."--they provide very broad guidance and let the
subordinates do their thing as they best see fit, and provide the resources
that the subordinate requires to do it. AFAIK, it would be hard to fault
Bush in either area.


We had a choice to make in regards to priority, we choose to sieze
Baghdad. If we had chosen to secure all *suspected* WMD sites prior to
seizing
Baghdad and the Iraqi army had begun lobbying Sarin filled artilliary
shells
killing both coalition personnel and innocent Iraqi's, you would have
been
up
in arms over that choice.

I absolutely agree that moving quickly was critically important. Nor am I
suggesting that we deployed a battalion to cover each possible WMD site
(including Granny's still). By all accounts, however, Al Tuwaitha was
exceptional (recent and reliable reports about hundreds of pounds of
radioactive material). If we couldn't divert the resources to secure that
immediately, perhaps we should have waited a little (at least, for
example,
until the troops had redeployed from Turkey).

That last statement reveals a further disconnect with reality on your part.
First, where were you going to move the 4th ID(M) *to*, given that Kuwait
was already reaching the saturation point with the 3rd ID, elements of the
101st AASLT DIV, USMC units, British units, etc.? Second, doing so would
have allowed the Iraqis, operating along interior lines, to even *more*
rapidly reorient the forces they had already deployed facing the presumed
northern threat back down south. Leaving you with a diminishing return kind
of situation, right?

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...
If you can't afford to do it right, maybe you should consider not doing
it
at all. Especially in a case where doing it wrong can have disastrous
consequences. With (admittedly) 20/20 hindsight, can you honestly say we
are better off now than if we had never invaded?

Well, that depends upon how you look at it. We have an endgame at least in
sight, versus the neverending flyswatting that was going on before. We do,
however, have a bunch of misguided regional native jihadis rolling into
Iraq
to take shots at our forces, true enough...but would you rather have those
same jihadis instead trying to get at civilian targets here in the US or
overseas?

Ah yes, the tactic of infuriating the masses so the radical elements attack
your military and die. sarcasm That has worked so well in the past. After
all, the Soviets spent a decade killing "misguided regional native jihadis"
in Afghanistan and it was such an effective tactic that not only did the
surviving Afghan's establish an enlightened secular government but none of
them ever considered supporting the Chechen resistance. The French in
Algeria and Isralies in the West Bank are also examples of how effective
this particular tactic is. /sarcasm

Can you name one place where this tactic has actually worked?

Add in that the majority of the MRNJs would probably not bother to take
direct action against the US if we were not simultaneously ****ing them off
and providing a nearby target. More worrisome is that only the stupid ones
are going to Iraq (where they become dead or experienced and stupid). The
smart ones are raising money and/or plotting major attacks outside of Iraq.
And, of course, for everyone we kill there is a distinct possibility of
creating more than one MRNJ.

Your hindsight may allow you to critique that from the advantage of
knowing
how things played out in the end, but looking at the situation from
*their*
view at the time, with the information they then had available, it would
be
danged hard to critisize their priorities. Smart CinC's don't interfere
with
their warfighting command's planning by inserting a laundry list of "do
this, and this, and this..."--they provide very broad guidance and let the
subordinates do their thing as they best see fit, and provide the
resources
that the subordinate requires to do it.

Hardly. If I was arguing from hindsight then -- given the lack of dirty
bombs exploding in NYC using material from Al Tuwaitha -- I'd have to say
the correct decision was made. Based on the available intelligence at the
time, however, it seemed a terribly stupid risk.

Add in that CinC's do give the military objectives that are for essentially
non-military reasons. The scud hunt of the previous Gulf war is a good
example of this. Arguably, the decision to send the Marines into Fallouja
was another.

Note also the requirement, however, to provide the appropriate resources.
There have been many comments that US forces were inadequate (not to defeat
Iraq but secure the peace afterwards). Dismissing General Shinseki soon
after he estimates that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in
postwar Iraq has the distinct flavor of shooting the messenger. I wonder why
none of the military commanders after that claimed they needed more forces.
Was that because they truly felt they didn't need them or they felt any such
request would be a ticket to an early retirement?

That last statement reveals a further disconnect with reality on your
part.
First, where were you going to move the 4th ID(M) *to*, given that Kuwait
was already reaching the saturation point with the 3rd ID, elements of the
101st AASLT DIV, USMC units, British units, etc.?

I hadn't quite realize that all of Kuwait was packed tread to tread to tanks
and could have sworn there was a much higher density of forces in the run up
to the previous Gulf war. But, I'll grant you, that it would have been a
concern.

"David Pugh" wrote in message
...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...
If you can't afford to do it right, maybe you should consider not
doing
it
at all. Especially in a case where doing it wrong can have disastrous
consequences. With (admittedly) 20/20 hindsight, can you honestly say
we
are better off now than if we had never invaded?

Well, that depends upon how you look at it. We have an endgame at least
in
sight, versus the neverending flyswatting that was going on before. We
do,
however, have a bunch of misguided regional native jihadis rolling into
Iraq
to take shots at our forces, true enough...but would you rather have
those
same jihadis instead trying to get at civilian targets here in the US or
overseas?

Ah yes, the tactic of infuriating the masses so the radical elements
attack
your military and die. sarcasm That has worked so well in the past.
After
all, the Soviets spent a decade killing "misguided regional native
jihadis"
in Afghanistan and it was such an effective tactic that not only did the
surviving Afghan's establish an enlightened secular government but none of
them ever considered supporting the Chechen resistance. The French in
Algeria and Isralies in the West Bank are also examples of how effective
this particular tactic is. /sarcasm

Can you name one place where this tactic has actually worked?

How many attacks here in the US have you seen since we went into Iraq?


Add in that the majority of the MRNJs would probably not bother to take
direct action against the US if we were not simultaneously ****ing them
off
and providing a nearby target. More worrisome is that only the stupid ones
are going to Iraq (where they become dead or experienced and stupid). The
smart ones are raising money and/or plotting major attacks outside of
Iraq.
And, of course, for everyone we kill there is a distinct possibility of
creating more than one MRNJ.

Must not be many smart ones, then.


Your hindsight may allow you to critique that from the advantage of
knowing
how things played out in the end, but looking at the situation from
*their*
view at the time, with the information they then had available, it would
be
danged hard to critisize their priorities. Smart CinC's don't interfere
with
their warfighting command's planning by inserting a laundry list of "do
this, and this, and this..."--they provide very broad guidance and let
the
subordinates do their thing as they best see fit, and provide the
resources
that the subordinate requires to do it.

Hardly.

Well, you have already established beyond a doubt that you "hardly" have any
idea how military operations are planned, so your disbelief is
understandable.

If I was arguing from hindsight then -- given the lack of dirty
bombs exploding in NYC using material from Al Tuwaitha -- I'd have to say
the correct decision was made. Based on the available intelligence at the
time, however, it seemed a terribly stupid risk.

That "expert" analysis coming from...a guy without a clue. Yeah, right.


Add in that CinC's do give the military objectives that are for
essentially
non-military reasons. The scud hunt of the previous Gulf war is a good
example of this. Arguably, the decision to send the Marines into Fallouja
was another.

Excellent example! The Scud Hunt drained off resources that would have been
better used for other tasks, and was considered largely a waste of resources
by the folks tasked to make it happen. How many Scuds were found and
destroyed by those hunters? Versus how many resources were committed to that
endeavor? Yep, that is a good example of why the CinC should stay out of the
operational details when it comes to fighting a war.


Note also the requirement, however, to provide the appropriate resources.
There have been many comments that US forces were inadequate (not to
defeat
Iraq but secure the peace afterwards). Dismissing General Shinseki soon
after he estimates that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in
postwar Iraq has the distinct flavor of shooting the messenger.

LOL! Shinseki was the guy who was basically told, "Don't let the door hit
you in the ass on the way out." Now look at his estimate--it would take
"several hundreds of thousands soldiers"; interestingly, from the time that
comment was made by him in Feb 2003 until Sep 2003, he had apparently
revised his estimate down to 200K. Last I heard we have around 130K in
country, and no plans to increase that drastically (we have, however,
delayed the previously planned reduction down to the 115K figure). Being as
we are getting the job done with 130K, why do you say that Shinseki was
right when he claimed it would take "several hundreds of thousands"?

I wonder why
none of the military commanders after that claimed they needed more
forces.
Was that because they truly felt they didn't need them or they felt any
such
request would be a ticket to an early retirement?

You must have missed the FACT that Franks, who was commanding CENTCOM at the
time, did not request a drastic increase in manning for the stabilization
phase--and guess what? He retired. If you check into your history a bit, I
believe you will find that *most* CENTCOM commanders have retired from that
post--it is considered by most to be a career capstone assignment. The C/S
who *replaced* Shinseki came out of...*retirement*. So this theory of your's
theory falls about as flat as your earlier posits.


That last statement reveals a further disconnect with reality on your
part.
First, where were you going to move the 4th ID(M) *to*, given that
Kuwait
was already reaching the saturation point with the 3rd ID, elements of
the
101st AASLT DIV, USMC units, British units, etc.?

I hadn't quite realize that all of Kuwait was packed tread to tread to
tanks
and could have sworn there was a much higher density of forces in the run
up
to the previous Gulf war. But, I'll grant you, that it would have been a
concern.

Uhmmm...you do realize that during ODS we had that much larger force spread
over a large chunk of Saudi Arabia, which is a hell of a lot bigger than
Kuwait, and is served by multiple ports of entry, unlike Kuwait? Consider
Saudi Arabia as an olympic swimming pool you are filling with a 12" water
main direct to the pool, while Kuwait is more like a child's wading pool you
are trying to fill via an itty-bitty little ol' quarter-inch piece of
tubing.

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
...
How many attacks here in the US have you seen since we went into Iraq?

Zero. How many attacks were there in the US between 9/12/2001 and 3/18/2003?
Zero. Doesn't look like enough data to draw any conclusions. Other trends
are a little worrisome, however: according to the state department's own
report, though, the number of "significant terrorist acts" has increased
from 124 in 2001 to 169 in 2003 (this is world wide). Check out:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...2004May16.html

More worrisome is that only the stupid ones
are going to Iraq (where they become dead or experienced and stupid).
The
smart ones are raising money and/or plotting major attacks outside of
Iraq.
Must not be many smart ones, then.

Let's hope that is the case.

Being as
we are getting the job done with 130K, why do you say that Shinseki was
right when he claimed it would take "several hundreds of thousands"?

Given recent history, the notion that we are "getting the job done with
130K" troops is, at least, a matter of debate.

David Pugh wrote:

If you can't afford to do it right, maybe you should consider not doing it
at all.

Depends on what the threat is. In the military we call it risk assesment. Is
the risk that Hussain may be able to arm some terrorists worth the risk of
fighting a conflict without the resources to defeat a regime and secure all
suspected WMD sites? With 20/20 hind sight we *may* be able to say it wasn't
worth it, but knowing only what his intell sources were telling him, I have a
hard time making an issue out of the choice the civilian leadership made.

can you honestly say we are
better off now than if we had never invaded?

I'm not sure we have enough info to make that call. In the past week we've seen
the use of mustard and sarin gas. Not too effective in Iraq, against military
personnel trained to deal with such weapons, but whose to say, without
invasion, if those weapons would have been used in the NYC subway?

I should have said that the importance of securing this site
was set too low, given the potential consequences of not securing the site.

The potential consequences of a trained Iraqi military employing weaponized
chemical agents is a tough one to beat on the priority scale.

Setting the relative importance of various objectives, especially
non-military objectives, was not Franks' responsibility.

However, both these issues *were* military and as such, up to the discretion of
the combatant commander.

By all accounts, however, Al Tuwaitha was
exceptional (recent and reliable reports about hundreds of pounds of
radioactive material).

The way the Iraqis moved their "stuff" around, there was no reason to expect
the Al Tuwaitha site above any other. Additionally, according to U.S. forces,
when they arrived it was already looted. Seems it was a wise choice not to
divert too many men to secure it as they would have wound up guarding an empty
site and not helping seize Baghdad.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"