Did we win in Viet Nam?

You can think whatever you want, but it's my opinion that we beat them down
by
outspending them and, once we adopted that as a policy, they couldn't win
because they couldn't match our resources and/or spendable assets. That
being
the case, we didn't need to fight them in any portion of the world in order
to
hasten their political collapse.....it was going to happen eventually
regardless
of whether or not armed conflict was resorted to. Having said that, why did
we
feel obliged to resort to armed conflict with one of their surrogates? Why
did
we spend 58,000+ lives to achieve what was going to happen anyway? Doesn't
that
make it a war that should not have been fought?

In all honesty, I am not sure. At that time we were committed to stopping
Soviet expansion wherever it was happening. This was during the era of the
Cuban Missile Crisis and other smaller standoffs around the world. I believe
that our government honestly felt that the USSR had to be stopped in SEA before
it could gain a toehold but unfortunately Soviet expansionism and the VN civil
war were tightly intertwined. Did we have to engage in SEA - I think yes.
Could it have been done with less loss of life - again I think yes because our
political strategies were flawed in the sixties.






.....Japan and Germany lost WWII because they ran out of
resources and their logistics streams were effectively blocked by the
allies.

I was aware of that, but I thought we were talking about the Viet Nam War.

If we "lost the war" in Vietnam it was not because the US was defeated.
My
contention is that our goal was to stop Soviet expansionism in SEA and
clearly
we did that by making the price for that expansionism too high. There were
wars on two levels, the VN civil war and the war against the Soviets. I am
not sure the former mattered to us nearly as much as the latter.

You can't measure victory or defeat unless you first define the yardstick
you
are measuring with. Our departure from Vietnam was in Jan 73 and was not a
lay down your arms, put your arms in the air, and surrender event. We
simply
stopped dropping bombs there and moved our operations to the supply routes
in
Cambodia and Laos. We turned the war over to the South Vietnamese who were
then defeated by the north because we failed to keep our commitments to
them
while the Soviets met theirs.

You can define victory or defeat however you wish. IMHO, a nation that
engages
in armed conflict and ultimately fails to gain the objectives it had adopted
in
going to war is a nation that has been defeated. It doesn't matter if your
troops raised their hands and surrendered or if your diplomats negotiate a
peaceful withdrawal, if you haven't achieved your objective, you've lost it.
Maybe I mis-remember, but I thought that our objective was to insure the
ongoing
vitality of an anti-communist government in the southern part of Viet Nam
which
would, by its existence, prevent the spread of the communist form of
government
elsewhere in SEA. The South Viet Namese government ultimately failed in 1975
and the nation was unified, and communism as a form of government did not
spread
in the area in spite of it. Taking credit for that failure because of the
punishment we inflicted before we withdrew is akin to the old Israeli gag
about
the child who kills his parents and then pleads for mercy on the grounds that
he's an orphan.

Our objective was to prevent the spread of communism in SEA. The Domino
theory is evidence of that. I believe we accomplished that. NVN was never
able to fully bring SVN into its mold of government. As was the strategy for
NVN, we made the cost of future incursions by the USSR too high. I am not sure
what the alternate history would have been had we not intervened and all any of
us can do is speculate. SVN lost their civil war in spite of our support or
maybe lack of it, but we accomplished the larger objective. The USSR never had
much of a presence after the war and later abandoned VN. Therefore I cannot
agree we "lost" the war. It was a conflict in which there were no clear
winners though no one will ever convnce me that our 58,000 KIAs died in vain
any more than our casualties in Irag.


IAC, I think we can agree on one thing. Cost and difficulty notwithstanding,
our armed forces in largest part performed magnificently and, in point of
fact,
won just about every battle in which they were engaged. Unfortunately,
because
of political constraints, they were not permitted to win the war.

George Z.


We can most certainbly agree on that

Steve

"SteveM8597" wrote in message
...

(Snip)

Our objective was to prevent the spread of communism in SEA. The Domino
theory is evidence of that. I believe we accomplished that.

I agree, but we did it by spending them into national bankruptcy. That in
itself ought to tell us that the Domino Theory was invalid from its inception.
We didn't have to enter armed conflict to contain communism, we had merely to
force them to expend their limited resources in a futile effort to keep up with
how we spent ours.

.....NVN was never able to fully bring SVN into its mold of government. As
was the strategy for NVN, we made the cost of future incursions by the USSR
too high. I am not sure
what the alternate history would have been had we not intervened and all any
of
us can do is speculate. SVN lost their civil war in spite of our support or
maybe lack of it, but we accomplished the larger objective. The USSR never
had
much of a presence after the war and later abandoned VN. Therefore I cannot
agree we "lost" the war. It was a conflict in which there were no clear
winners though no one will ever convnce me that our 58,000 KIAs died in vain
any more than our casualties in Irag.


IAC, I think we can agree on one thing. Cost and difficulty notwithstanding,
our armed forces in largest part performed magnificently and, in point of
fact,
won just about every battle in which they were engaged. Unfortunately,
because
of political constraints, they were not permitted to win the war.

George Z.


We can most certainbly agree on that

Steve

"George Z. Bush" wrote
"SteveM8597" wrote in message

(Snip)

Our objective was to prevent the spread of communism in SEA. The
Domino
theory is evidence of that. I believe we accomplished that.

I agree, but we did it by spending them into national bankruptcy. That in
itself ought to tell us that the Domino Theory was invalid from its
inception.
We didn't have to enter armed conflict to contain communism, we had merely
to
force them to expend their limited resources in a futile effort to keep up
with
how we spent ours.

Unchecked expansion and access to more natural resources might have had a
beneficial effect on their economy. Dragging out the (probably) inevitable
collapse for a few more years/decades.

I say *might*. We can't know what the outcome would have been had different
choices been made.

Pete

Our objective was to prevent the spread of communism in SEA. The Domino
theory is evidence of that. I believe we accomplished that.

I agree, but we did it by spending them into national bankruptcy. That in
itself ought to tell us that the Domino Theory was invalid from its
inception.
We didn't have to enter armed conflict to contain communism, we had merely to
force them to expend their limited resources in a futile effort to keep up
with
how we spent ours.


Not sure I see the connecton quite as you do. Soviet expansionism was going
full speed in the 60s with all the stops pulled out. I don't believe the
spending wars in the rush to build more and more weapons really got on-speed
until the late 70s. So the Domino Theory had validity in the 60s.

"SteveM8597" wrote in message
...
Our objective was to prevent the spread of communism in SEA. The Domino
theory is evidence of that. I believe we accomplished that.

I agree, but we did it by spending them into national bankruptcy. That in
itself ought to tell us that the Domino Theory was invalid from its
inception.
We didn't have to enter armed conflict to contain communism, we had merely to
force them to expend their limited resources in a futile effort to keep up
with
how we spent ours.


Not sure I see the connecton quite as you do. Soviet expansionism was going
full speed in the 60s with all the stops pulled out. I don't believe the
spending wars in the rush to build more and more weapons really got on-speed
until the late 70s. So the Domino Theory had validity in the 60s.

I was on active duty during WWII and the Korean War and into the end of the 60s,
and am trying to rely on my failing memory. Although I don't recall that we
were anything but fearful and defensive about Soviet expansionism during the
60s.....in that context, you might very well be right about the Domino Theory's
validity in those days. However, we also did not consider that the Soviet
Union, an artificial conglomeration of ethnic groups and areas, was largely
eviscerated during WWII and probably possessed far less resources in the decade
following the end of the war than we gave them credit for. After applying what
they did have to rebuilding their war ravaged nation and its armed forces, I
doubt that they had very much left that might have been available for fomenting
expansionist adventures around the world. In that sense, it's just possible
that the Domino Theory had a fatal leak in it. I don't guess we'll ever know.

George Z.

From: "George Z. Bush"

I was on active duty during WWII and the Korean War and into the end of the
60s,
and am trying to rely on my failing memory. Although I don't recall that we
were anything but fearful and defensive about Soviet expansionism during the
60s.....in that context, you might very well be right about the Domino
Theory's
validity in those days. However, we also did not consider that the Soviet
Union, an artificial conglomeration of ethnic groups and areas, was largely
eviscerated during WWII and probably possessed far less resources in the
decade
following the end of the war than we gave them credit for. After applying
what
they did have to rebuilding their war ravaged nation and its armed forces, I
doubt that they had very much left that might have been available for
fomenting
expansionist adventures around the world. In that sense, it's just possible
that the Domino Theory had a fatal leak in it. I don't guess we'll ever
know.

As General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said in 1957, "Our government has kept
us in a perpetual state of fear--kept us in a continuous stampede of patriotic
fervor--with the cry of grave national emergency.... Always there has been some
terrible evil to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by
furnishing the exorbitant sums demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters
seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."
In those days it was the Democrats who were among the fiercest anti-communist
warriors and MacArthur was only echoing the broad views of Eisenhower, who
shortly would be warning the nation of the dangers of the "military-industrial
complex," while the 1960 Democratic presidential candidate would attack the
Republicans as being soft on defense, claiming their laxness in the face of the
Communist threat had lead to a "missle gap."
Once in power again and having suffered repeated blows by reality, the
Democrats began to sound like Republicans of yore, with, for example, Ivan
Selin, Head of Strategic Forces Division in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense in the Johnson Administration telling a visitor in 1966,
"Welcome to the world of strategic analysis, where we program weapons that
don't work to meet threats that don't exist."


Chris Mark

It's worth recalling how very little we knew about Soviet intentions and
capabilities, even in the 1980s, after a decade or so of Nixon-Kissinger
detente and make-nice Carterism.
An example illustrating this is the following exchange from March, 1982, during
a Congressional hearing before the House Armed Services Committee between
Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY) and Army Maj. Gen. James P. Maloney, regarding the
Soviet T-80 tank:

Stratton: Is this tank a real tank or is this a notional tank?
Maloney: The T-80, sir?
Stratton: I thought that was what you were telling us about.
Maloney: The T-80 at this time is more than notional. We believe it is
beginning to come off their production lines.
Stratton: But you haven't seen it and you don't have a picture of it?
Maloney: That is correct, sir.
Stratton: You don't know how it is configured?
Maloney: We have indications generally of how it is configured, but we don't
have any detail on it.
Stratton: It is kind of hard to figure on that basis.
Maloney: May I explain how we estimate what the tank is capable of doing? We
get the best tank experts in four of the NATO countries, including our own, to
independently come up with their estimate of what the T-80 is going to be like
based on extrapolations of what we have seen the Soviets do in the past. We
then merge these four studies to come up with our composite estimate of what
the T-80 will be. So, you know, it is not just based on whimsey."
Stratton: In other words, a scientific wild-ass guess. That's what you are
telling this committee?
Maloney: You could put it that way, yes, sir.

And so it was, along with just about everything else we knew about the USSR
when it came not only to capabilities but intentions.
Stratton who was quite skeptical and harsh with Maloney and other witnesses,
was not, as some might want to believe, a pacifist leftie. During WW2 he was a
Naval Combat Intelligence officer on Gen. MacArthur's staff in the SWPA and was
awarded two Bronze Stars with Combat V. He was chief interrogator of Japanese
Gen. Tomoyuki Yama****a and gathered the information that led to his hanging as
a war criminal. During the Korean War he was recalled to duty and served as an
instructor at the Naval Intelligence School in Washington, D.C. He was
certainly a patriot, but he had a very effective BS detector.
The discussion of the T-80 tank was part of a debate on whether the M-1 Abrams
tank should be deployed by the US, and if so, in what numbers. Many believed
the Soviet tank threat was overstated, if not largely bogus, and therefore
there was no need for the Abrams.
The Soviet tank threat may have been overstated. But if it was, and we
acknowleded it and did not deploy the Abrams, sticking with upgraded versions
of the M-60, would we be better off today, would we have been as successful as
we were in various stand-offs and fights over the last two decades?


Chris Mark

But if it was, and we
acknowleded it and did not deploy the Abrams, sticking with upgraded versions
of the M-60, would we be better off today, would we have been as successful
as
we were in various stand-offs and fights over the last two decades?


Chris Mark


Not unlike the B-2. It was hailed as one of the biggest waste of taxpayer
dollars evr, at $44.4B for a 20 aircraft program. That is until its
capabilities were apparent. Now we want more. Granted it was intended
strictly as a nuclear platform but, like the BUFF is has proved very useful in
other roles.

From: "George Z. Bush"

I was on active duty during WWII and the Korean War and into the end of the
60s,
and am trying to rely on my failing memory. Although I don't recall that we
were anything but fearful and defensive about Soviet expansionism during the
60s.....in that context, you might very well be right about the Domino
Theory's
validity in those days. However, we also did not consider that the Soviet
Union, an artificial conglomeration of ethnic groups and areas, was largely
eviscerated during WWII and probably possessed far less resources in the
decade
following the end of the war than we gave them credit for. After applying
what
they did have to rebuilding their war ravaged nation and its armed forces, I
doubt that they had very much left that might have been available for
fomenting
expansionist adventures around the world. In that sense, it's just possible
that the Domino Theory had a fatal leak in it. I don't guess we'll ever
know.

As General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said in 1957, "Our government has
kept
us in a perpetual state of fear--kept us in a continuous stampede of
patriotic
fervor--with the cry of grave national emergency.... Always there has been
some
terrible evil to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by
furnishing the exorbitant sums demanded. Yet, in retrospect, these disasters
seem never to have happened, seem never to have been quite real."
In those days it was the Democrats who were among the fiercest anti-communist
warriors and MacArthur was only echoing the broad views of Eisenhower, who
shortly would be warning the nation of the dangers of the
"military-industrial
complex," while the 1960 Democratic presidential candidate would attack the
Republicans as being soft on defense, claiming their laxness in the face of
the
Communist threat had lead to a "missle gap."
Once in power again and having suffered repeated blows by reality, the
Democrats began to sound like Republicans of yore, with, for example, Ivan
Selin, Head of Strategic Forces Division in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense in the Johnson Administration telling a visitor in 1966,
"Welcome to the world of strategic analysis, where we program weapons that
don't work to meet threats that don't exist."


Chris Mark


There is truth in that logic but how do you account for threats that were
stopped? What if our internal security was robust enough to prevent 9/11 from
even being initiated? Would you say that that level of security measures were
unnecessary? You wouldn't know because in that scenario the attack never
happened. How do you determine the real threat to defend against with 100%
accuracy every time?

Unfortunately national security effectiveness is as easy to quantify as lives
saved or cost avoided because of threat warnings. Much easier to count lives
lost and dollars spent because of possibly flawed strategy or doctrine then
ctiticize in hindsight

Steve.

Chris Mark wrote:
From: "George Z. Bush"

(Snip)

Once in power again and having suffered repeated blows by reality, the
Democrats began to sound like Republicans of yore, with, for example, Ivan
Selin, Head of Strategic Forces Division in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense in the Johnson Administration telling a visitor in 1966,
"Welcome to the world of strategic analysis, where we program weapons that
don't work to meet threats that don't exist."

Damn if it doesn't sound like we're living in the 60s all over again! That's a
wonderful quote that could apply to the reasons we went to war with Iraq last
year with only a minor adjustment or two. (^-^)))

George Z.