Another Cirrus BRS deployment:

"Ron Lee" wrote in message
...
The problem with the report I read is that the cause of the "out of
control" situation was not apparent. Was it a gust of wind?
Turbulence? Pilot error? Did a wing fall off?

If someone uses a parachute to save a plane when the mixture was
pulled out or a tank ran dry, then the parachute is a crutch for pilot
error.

A crutch (or a safety net) that leads to complacency and inordinante
risk-taking.

Tom,

A crutch (or a safety net) that leads to complacency and inordinante
risk-taking.


And I'm sure this bold statement can be supported by the numbers, can
it?

Jeeze, what is it with pilots and change? Anything new in GA is
bad-mouthed here - while at the same time everybody and his brother
complains about the old technology we have to use. You can't have it
both ways.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Thomas, I love GPS. No way will VOR navigation be my primary method.
But let's get the facts about this parachute deployment and assess
whether it really saved four people from an otherwise certain
death...or was just a crutch for pilot error.

Ron Lee


Thomas Borchert wrote:

Jeeze, what is it with pilots and change? Anything new in GA is
bad-mouthed here - while at the same time everybody and his brother
complains about the old technology we have to use. You can't have it
both ways.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Ron,

But let's get the facts about this parachute deployment and assess
whether it really saved four people from an otherwise certain
death...or was just a crutch for pilot error.


I agree. And there's a high likelyhood for the latter. The question is:
Does that make the chute a bad thing? That's where I say: Not at all.
--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

NOTE: I'm working from memory of some things I read about three years ago.
If I have any errors or omissions please post a correction.

There are two major problems with the Cirrus BRS system at this point:
training and human nature.

In many areas of life, including flight training, we are taught two major
aspects of problem resolution. The first is to identify the problem by using
one or more checklists (written or mental) to determine the precise nature
of the problem. The second is to determine the corrective action, again by
using one or more mental or written checklists. Obviously, if you lose a
wing in flight problem identification is quick, and problem resolution is
limited to one option (prayer). But by and large we use the step-by-step
problem solving techniques we have been taught. That's the training issue.

On the human nature side, we are (by and large) thinking creatures, not just
robots. And our decision making process is often influenced by factors
outside of our training. If you are flying a GA aircraft that you personally
own, in the back of your mind will be the $100,000 or way up you have sunk
in the aircraft. And all too often, in the event of a serious problem, the
end result, if the problem is not corrected, is a broken airplane on the
ground with you in it. So, when your airplane has a problem, these kinds of
factors will be in at least the back of your mind. Any time we are presented
with a problem, human nature drives us to keep trying to find a solution.
And when flying an aircraft, you are even more driven by the unpleasantness
of the possible consequences of not solving the problem.

We have see up the background, now let's look at how this applies to the
Cirrus BRS.

The key factors are the short threshold time, and the narrrow window. In the
Cirrus, when you are presented with certain types of problems, you only have
a short period of time before the chute must be deployed, and a short window
after that when the chute will still be effective. If you delay deployment,
the BRS will not be able to save the aircraft. Let me give you an analogy,
which may or may not be fully accurate, but which will illustrate the point:

Consider a pilot in a jet fighter on an aircraft carrier. He gives his
"thumbs up", the catapult fires, and he begins his takeoff roll. But just
after he rotates, all engines flame out. The pilot then has two options: a
restart, or an eject. If he ejects, he saves himself, but he loses the
airplane. If he restarts, he and the plane both come out OK. But there's a
problem with the restart option: if it is not begun immediately or if it
takes too long, an eject will not work; the chute will not open.

So the pilot is taught that under this set of circumstances he shouldn't
even consider a restart, he should just eject.

And from what I understand, this is the situation with the Cirrus. If you
are presented with a certain type of problem, you must deploy the BRS right
then. You cannot attempt to solve the problem, because if you do, during the
time you spent trying to solve the problem, you have put the BRS outside of
it's operating window and it will no longer function. And you wouldn't be
able to solve the problem in the first place.

So, a Cirrus puts the pilot outside of the problem-solving methods he has
previously learned. The engine stops. In a typical GA plane you check the
fuel, check the mags, check a few other things and try to the resolve the
issue. In a Cirrus, you only need to determine that the engine has stopped
and deploy the BRS. You don't need to know why the engine stopped or what
must be done to restart it: it's stopped, you pull the handle. Obviously,
the "engine out" example is an exaggeration, but you get my point.

Then to human nature. You're in a gypical GA plane, ou're engine is out, you
are going to attempt everything possible to restart it. Because you are
thinking: "I spent $300,000 on this airplane, I'm not going to let it get
bent". And you also have no other alternative. So, you try this, and you try
than, and you try the other until you either get it fixed or you run out of
sky.

But in a Cirrus, you cannot follow human nature, you have to just say it's
broke, pull the handle. In many instances you will not be able to fix what's
wrong, and if you do spend time trying to fix it you will run outside of the
window where the BRS system will properly and effectively deploy.

So, the Cirrus and the BRS system are not inherently less safe than a
conventional aircraft, but you do have to break some old habits and develop
a good understaning of how the aircraft works. "That's broke, pull the
handle", "that's broke, pull the handle", that has to become your mantra.
Then you'll be OK...

"Bill Denton" wrote
So, the Cirrus and the BRS system are not inherently less safe than a
conventional aircraft, but you do have to break some old habits and develop
a good understaning of how the aircraft works. "That's broke, pull the
handle", "that's broke, pull the handle", that has to become your mantra.
Then you'll be OK...

Nothing about this is new. Skydivers have been carrying backup
parachutes for decades. There are some skydivers I know who have
thousands of jumps and have yet to see their backup parachute. On the
other hand, I have a bit under 700 jumps and 8 reserve parachute
deployments that I can think of just now. That's significantly higher
than average (I believe the average is something like 1 in 300-600)
and I can honestly say that EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THOSE DEPLOYMENTS WAS
AVOIDABLE. In fact, very few deployments are unavoidable. BASE
jumpers generally do not carry backup parachutes - and don't need
them. They do things differently, and avoid the situations that would
require a reserve deployment.

There is absolutely no question that the ubiquitous backup parachute
in skydiving affects the way people practice that particular
aeronautical activity. Pack your parachute in 5 minutes in a dimly
lit area while chugging a beer? Let some total uncertified stranger
pack it for $5 (quick - how many does he have to do to make a decent
income?) and jump it without inspecting it? Fly your parachute with
lots of other people in formation so tight that you are literally
holding on to other parachutes and other jumpers are holding on to
yours? These are not aberrations - these are normal events at most
drop zones on most weekends. They would be unthinkable without a
backup parachute.

Yet the practice of deploying the reserve parachute is not without
cost or risk. Main parachutes that are jettisoned are sometimes lost,
and they are expensive. Repacks cost money. Freebags/pilot chutes
are often lost, and that means money and downtime. What's more, none
of these costs are covered by insurance. The jumper has to pay these
out of pocket, and jumpers are often college kids who have a hard time
coming up with the money.

What this will mean for the Cirrus is as yet unknown, but not every
safety innovation actually winds up making things safer. ABS is a
perfect example. The one point in favor of the Cirrus parachute -
since it will likely destroy the airframe, there should not be a
tendency to use it for no reason.

Michael

Bill

Have you seen the clip of the Navy bird that lost AB's coming off the
CAT shot? He banked 20-30 degrees and ejected and made it with his
Zero Zero system.. If he hadn't banked, the Carrier would have run
over him and after going through the props not much is left (my Navy
friends told me when I was with them in the tail hook Sq)..

Big John


On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 11:26:19 -0500, "Bill Denton"
wrote:

NOTE: I'm working from memory of some things I read about three years ago.
If I have any errors or omissions please post a correction.
training and human nature.

----clip----

Consider a pilot in a jet fighter on an aircraft carrier. He gives his
"thumbs up", the catapult fires, and he begins his takeoff roll. But just
after he rotates, all engines flame out. The pilot then has two options: a
restart, or an eject. If he ejects, he saves himself, but he loses the
airplane. If he restarts, he and the plane both come out OK. But there's a
problem with the restart option: if it is not begun immediately or if it
takes too long, an eject will not work; the chute will not open.

So the pilot is taught that under this set of circumstances he shouldn't
even consider a restart, he should just eject.

----clip----

But let's get the facts about this parachute deployment and assess
whether it really saved four people from an otherwise certain
death...or was just a crutch for pilot error.

In WWI the British forbid the use of parachutes in military aircraft because
they thought the pilot would be more likely to use the chute than make the
effort to bring a damaged aircraft back to the field. A lot of needless deaths
occured because of the stupidity of a few people.
I suspect the same reluctance to progress is at work here. One can speculate
that of the previous fatal VFR to IMC Cirrus accidents, lives MAY have been
saved if the chute had been deployed. Skip the arguement that Cirrus chute
didn't deploy - that now seems to be corrected as evidenced by the last 3
deployments.
There's a lot of NTSB reports of fatal accidents reports in which the
availability of a working chute probably would have been very appreciated by
the now deceased occupants.

John

"ISLIP" wrote in message
...

I suspect the same reluctance to progress is at work here. One can
speculate
that of the previous fatal VFR to IMC Cirrus accidents, lives MAY have
been
saved if the chute had been deployed. Skip the arguement that Cirrus chute

Everyone agrees that a chute is a great idea in case of strutural failure.
Most would agree it is a good idea for engine failure at night or over
mountains. There would likely be debate regarding whether it is a good idea
with an engine failure while VFR/VMC over the midwest. There would likely
be even more debate regarding whether using the BRS is a good idea in a
partial panel situation (noting also that the definition of partial panel
depends on whether this is a PFD airplane or a steam-gauge airplane).

But VFR into IMC is another story. First, given an appropriate weather
briefing this should not occur. Second, if this does occur then the pilot
should have enough emergency training to do a 180 in IMC and turn back to
VFR conditions. Does it make sense to total a perfectly functioning
airplane because the pilot did not know how to continue flying it in the
situation he got into? In fact, is it not possible that the BRS will result
in a landing into power lines or on an interstate highway or somewhere else
which will result in pilot injury, whereas a 180 back to VFR might result
in no injury and no damage?


--------------------
Richard Kaplan, CFII

www.flyimc.com

"Ron Lee" wrote in message But let's get the facts about this parachute
deployment and assess
whether it really saved four people from an otherwise certain
death...or was just a crutch for pilot error.

There are less than perfect pilots. Some pilots need crutches. Without the
crutch, 4 people likely would have been seriously injured. The plane came
down amongst pine trees. Even if the crutch was for ineptitude, it was still
a good thing.

D.